


Sweden SWE

Swedish Krona SEK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SEK	4.98tr	5.30tr	
	USD	541bn	622bn	
per capita	USD	52,129	58,639	
Growth	%	-2.8	4.0	
Inflation	%	0.7	2.0	
Def bdgt	SEK	64.8bn	71.2bn	76.5bn
	USD	7.04bn	8.36bn	
USD1=SEK		9.21	8.51	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 10,261,767

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.1%	2.8%	2.7%	3.4%	22.3%	9.6%
Female	8.6%	2.7%	2.6%	3.2%	21.9%	11.1%

Capabilities

Sweden's armed forces remain configured for territorial defence and there has been growing concern at Russian military activity in the Baltic area. There has also been a focus on increasing cooperation with neighbours and NATO in recent years. The 2021–25 defence bill, presented in October 2020, envisages increased spending and an expanded force structure with the re-establishment of five regiments and one air wing. Sweden has also announced measures to enhance societal resilience and the ability to deal with civil emergencies. There are plans to increase defence ties with the UK and the US. In July 2019, Sweden joined the UK-led *Tempest* future-combat-aircraft programme. Concerns over readiness levels have led to greater cooperation with NATO and NORDEFCO. In May 2018, Sweden, Finland and the US signed a statement of intent to develop closer cooperation on exercises and interoperability. Readiness, exercises and training, as well as cyber defence, are spending priorities. Amid recruitment challenges, Sweden announced in March 2017 that it would reinstate conscription from January 2018. Sweden has started to re-garrison the island of Gotland. Readiness challenges in the air force triggered a discussion about extending the service life of the JAS-39C *Gripens* beyond their intended 2026 retirement date, not least since the air force was slated to receive a lower number of JAS-39Es than requested. In August 2018, Sweden proceeded with the acquisition of the *Patriot* air-defence system. The country's export-oriented defence industry is privately owned and capable of meeting most of the armed forces' equipment needs, including for advanced combat aircraft and conventional submarines.

ACTIVE 14,600 (Army 6,850 Navy 2,100 Air 2,700 Other 2,950) Voluntary Auxiliary Organisations 21,200

Conscript liability 4–11 months, depending on branch (selective conscription; 4,000 in total, gender neutral)

RESERVE 10,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 6,850

The army has been transformed to provide brigade-sized task forces depending on the operational requirement

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 bde HQ

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bn

Armoured

5 armd bn

1 armd BG

Mechanised

1 mech bn

Light

1 mot inf bn

1 lt inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bn

Other

1 sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bn

2 engr bn

2 MP coy

1 CBRN coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 tpt coy

AIR DEFENCE

2 AD bn

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

40 Home Guard bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 120 *Leopard* 2A5 (Strv 122)

IFV 411: 369 CV9040 (Strf 9040; incl 54 CP); 42 Epbv 90 (OP)

APC 1,064

APC (T) 389: 239 Pbv 302 (incl variants); 150 BvS-10 MkII

APC (W) 315+: some *Bastion* APC; 34 XA-180 *Sisu* (Patgb 180); 20 XA-202 *Sisu* (Patgb 202); 148 XA-203 *Sisu* (Patgb 203); 113 Patria AMV (XA-360/Patgb 360)

PPV 360 RG-32M

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 6 Pionierpanzer-3 *Kodiak* (Ingbv 120)

ARV 40: 14 Bgbv 120; 26 Bgbv 90

VLB 3 Brobv 120

MW 33+: *Aardvark* Mk2; 33 Area Clearing System

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS NLAW; RBS-55

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 357SP 155mm 35 *Archer*MOR 322: 81mm 201 M/86; 120mm 81 M/41D SP 120mm 40 CV90 *Mjolnir* (Gkpbv 90)**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 11+

Long-range 3 M903 *Patriot* PAC-3 MSEMedium-range MIM-23B *Hawk* (RBS-97)

Short-range 8 IRIS-T SLS (RBS-98); RBS-23 BAMSE

Point-defence RBS-70

GUNS • SP 40mm 30 Lvkv 90

Navy 1,250; 850 Amphibious (total 2,100)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINE • SSK 5:**

- 1 *Gotland* (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT
- 2 *Gotland* mod (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT
- 2 *Södermanland* (fitted with AIP) with 3 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 6 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 150CORVETTES • FSG 5 *Visby* with 8 RBS15 Mk2 ASHM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 45 LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform**PCGT 4:**

- 2 *Göteborg* with 4 twin Inchr with RBS15 Mk2 ASHM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun
- 2 *Stockholm* with 4 twin Inchr with RBS15 Mk2 ASHM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun

PBF 133: 100+ Combat Boat 90H (capacity 18 troops); 27 Combat Boat HS (capacity 18 troops); 6 Combat Boat 90HSM (capacity 18 troops)

PB 8 *Tapper* (Type 80)**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7**MCC 5 *Koster* (SWE *Landsort* mod)MCD 2 *Spårö* (*Styrsö* mod)**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 11**LCVP 8 *Trossbat*LCAC 3 *Griffon* 8100TD**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15**AG 2: 1 *Carlskrona* with 1 hel landing platform (former ML); 1 *Trosso* (spt ship for corvettes and patrol vessels but can also be used as HQ ship)AGF 2 *Ledningsbåt* 2000AGI 1 *Orion*AKL 1 *Loke*ARS 2: 1 *Belos* III; 1 *Furusund* (former ML)AX 5 *Altair*AXS 2: 1 *Falken*; 1 *Gladan***Amphibious 850****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious

1 amph bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 M/86

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 8 RBS-17 *Hellfire***Coastal Defence****FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

1 ASHM bty with RBS-15

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM RBS-15

Air Force 2,700**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR**6 sqn with JAS 39C/D *Gripen***TRANSPORT/ISR/AEW&C**1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84); KC-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84); Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B); S-100B/D *Argus***TRAINING**

1 unit with Sk-60

AIR DEFENCE

1 (fighter control and air surv) bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 96 combat capable

FGA 96 JAS 39C/D *Gripen*

ELINT 2 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B)

AEW&C 3: 1 S-100B *Argus*; 2 S-100D *Argus*TKR/TPT 1 KC-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84)TPT 8: Medium 5 C-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84); Light 2 Saab 340 (OS-100A/Tp-100C); PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 (Tp-102D)

TRG 67 Sk-60W

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLESISR • Medium 8 RQ-7 *Shadow* (AUV 3 *Örnen*)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**ASM AGM-65 *Maverick* (RB-75)

ASHM RB-15F

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder* (RB-74); IIR IRIS-T (RB-98); ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM (RB-99); *Meteor***BOMBS**Laser-Guided GBU-12 *Paveway* II

INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb

Armed Forces Hel Wing**FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**3 sqn with AW109 (Hkp 15A); AW109M (Hkp-15B); NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (SAR/ASW); UH-60M *Black Hawk* (Hkp-16)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****HELICOPTERS**TPT 53: Medium 33: 15 UH-60M *Black Hawk* (Hkp-16); 18 NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (of which 9 configured for ASW); Light 20: 12 AW109 (Hkp-15A); 8 AW109M (Hkp-15B)**Special Forces****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt gp

Other 2,950

Includes staff, logistics and intelligence personnel

FORCES BY ROLE**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 EW bn

1 psyops unit

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bn

1 maint bn


4 med coy

1 tpt coy

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** EU • EUTM RCA 9**INDIA/PAKISTAN:** UN • UNMOGIP 4**IRAQ:** *Operation Inherent Resolve 2*; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1**KOREA, REPUBLIC OF:** NNSC • 5**MALI:** *Operation Barkhane* 150; 1 SF unit; 1 hel unit with 3 UH-60M; EU • EUTM Mali 8; UN • MINUSMA 187; 1 int coy**MIDDLE EAST:** UN • UNTSO 6**SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 2**SOMALIA:** EU • EUTM Somalia 9**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 2**Switzerland CHE**

Swiss Franc CHF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CHF	706bn	737bn	
	USD	752bn	811bn	
per capita	USD	87,367	93,515	
Growth	%	-2.5	3.7	
Inflation	%	-0.7	0.4	
Def bdgt [a]	CHF	5.37bn	5.20bn	5.33bn
	USD	5.72bn	5.72bn	
USD1=CHF		0.94	0.91	

[a] Includes military pensions



Population 8,453,550

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.9%	2.5%	2.8%	3.1%	24.7%	8.4%
Female	7.5%	2.4%	2.7%	3.1%	24.6%	10.4%

Capabilities

The conscript-based armed forces are postured for territorial defence and limited participation in international peace-support operations. The government has begun to reduce its armed forces, reflecting an assessment that in the militia-based system not all personnel would realistically be available for active service. With permanent neutrality a core feature of foreign and security policy, Switzerland is not a member of any alliances, although it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in 1996 and on occasion contributes to NATO- and EU-led operations alongside its engagement in UN or OSCE missions. Switzerland does not participate in combat operations for peace-enforcement purposes and its deployments are limited in size. The 2016 armed-forces development plan emphasises improvements in readiness, training and equipment, and is meant to be implemented by the end of 2022. The approach to readiness is changing to a flexible model in which different units are called up for active service gradually and on different timelines. Plans to replace F-5 *Tiger* II combat aircraft with the *Gripen* were scrapped after a national referendum rejected the proposal in May 2014. With Switzerland's air-policing capabilities diminished, in July 2018 the government relaunched its attempt to procure a new combat aircraft to now also replace the F/A-18 *Hornet*, which will have its life extended until 2030. The multi-stage selection process was completed in June 2021 and the F-35A was chosen. Parliamentary approval is planned for 2022. The fighter-acquisition programme was capped at CHF6 billion in May 2019 and has been separated from the ground-based air-defence procurement. Previously both programmes were linked. Other priorities include upgrades to Switzerland's air-surveillance systems and to transport helicopters. Switzerland's defence industry has limited design and manufacturing capabilities, with recognised capacity in the land-vehicles sector, which has links to North American firms.

ACTIVE 19,550 (Armed Forces 19,550)

Conscript liability 260–600 compulsory service days depending on rank. 18 or 23 weeks' training (depending on branch) generally at age 20, followed by 6 refresher trg courses (3 weeks each). Alternative service available

RESERVE 123,450**Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve)****ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Armed Forces 3,100 active; 16,450 conscript (19,550 total)****Operations Command 72,600 on mobilisation**

4 Territorial Regions. With the exception of military police all units are non-active

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

4 regional comd

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

2 (1st & 11th) bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn)

Mechanised

1 (4th) bde (2 recce bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 ptn br bn)

Light

10 inf bn
7 mtn inf bn
1 mtn inf unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 engr bn
4 MP bn
1 NBC bn
1 int unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 engr rescue bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 134 *Leopard 2* (Pz-87 *Leo*)
IFV 186: 154 CV9030CH; 32 CV9030 (CP)
APC 1,235
 APC (T) 311 M113A2 (incl variants)
 APC (W) 924 *Piranha I/II/IIIC*
AUV 441 *Eagle I/II/III* (incl 119 CP)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 12 *Kodiak*
ARV 25 *Büffel*
VLB 9 *Leopard 2* with *Leguan*
MW 46: 26 Area Clearing System; 20 M113A2

NBC VEHICLES 12 *Piranha IIIC CBRN***ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**

MSL • **SP** 106 *Piranha I TOW-2*

ARTILLERY 355

SP 155mm 133 M109 KAWEST
MOR • **81mm** 222 Mw-72

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14

PB 14 *Watercat* 1250

AIR DEFENCE • **SAM** • **Point-defence** FIM-92 *Stinger***Air Force** 18,900 on mobilisation**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

2 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D *Hornet*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air*; DHC-6 *Twin Otter*;
PC-6 *Turbo Porter*; PC-12
1 VIP Flt with Beech 1900D; Cessna 560XL *Citation*;
CL-604 *Challenger*; *Falcon* 900EX; PC-24

TRAINING

1 sqn with PC-7CH *Turbo Trainer*; PC-21
1 sqn with PC-9 (tgt towing)
1 OCU Sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with AS332M *Super Puma*; AS532UL *Cougar*;
H135M

ISR UAV

1 sqn with *Hermes* 900

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 55 combat capable

FTR 25: 20 F-5E *Tiger II*; 5 F-5F *Tiger II*
FGA 30: 25 F/A-18C *Hornet*; 5 F/A-18D *Hornet*
TPT 24: **Light** 20: 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 1 Beech
1900D; 1 Cessna 560XL *Citation*; 1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*;
14 PC-6 *Turbo Porter*; 1 PC-6 (owned by armasuisse,
civil registration); 1 PC-12 (owned by armasuisse,

civil registration); **PAX** 4: 2 CL-604 *Challenger*; 1 *Falcon*
900EX; 1 PC-24 (VIP)

TRG 40: 27 PC-7CH *Turbo Trainer*; 5 PC-9; 8 PC-21

HELICOPTERS

MRH 20 H135M

TPT • **Medium** 25: 15 AS332M *Super Puma*; 10
AS532UL *Cougar*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 1 *Hermes* 900

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • **AAM** • **IR** AIM-9P

Sidewinder; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **ARH** AIM-
120B/C-7 AMRAAM

Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)

GBAD assets can be used to form AD clusters to be
deployed independently as task forces within Swiss
territory

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM • **Point-defence** 56+: 56 *Rapier*; FIM-92 *Stinger*
GUNS 35mm 27 GDF-003/-005 with *Skyguard*

Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 9,650
on mobilisation**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1 log bde (6 log bn; 1 tpt bn; 6 med bn)

Command Support Organisation 11,150 on
mobilisation**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1 spt bde

Training Command 37,350 on mobilisation**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

5 trg unit

Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve)

(not part of armed forces)

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea*
20

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 1

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 6

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 13

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 165 (military volunteers); 1 inf
coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332M *Super Puma*

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Turkey TUR

Turkish Lira TRY		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TRY	5.05tr	6.63tr	
	USD	720bn	796bn	
per capita	USD	8,610	9,407	
Growth	%	1.8	9.0	
Inflation	%	12.3	17.0	
Def exp [a]	TRY	93.9bn	99.0bn	
	USD	13.4bn	11.9bn	
Def bdgt [b]	TRY	76.3bn	84.6bn	104bn
	USD	10.9bn	10.2bn	
USD1=TRY		7.01	8.33	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes funding for Undersecretariat of Defence Industries; Defence Industry Support Fund; TUBITAK Defense Industries R&D Institute (SAGE); and military pensions



Population 82,482,383

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	11.7%	4.1%	3.9%	3.8%	22.9%	3.9%
Female	11.2%	3.9%	3.7%	3.6%	22.5%	4.8%

Capabilities

Turkey has large, generally well-equipped armed forces that are primarily structured for national defence. Much recent activity has focused on internal security and cross-border operations in response to the continuing wars in Syria and Libya. The conflict with Kurdish armed groups continues. The armed forces' 2033 strategic plan aims to modernise military equipment and force structures. Turkey is a NATO member and has provided access to its airspace and facilities for operations in Iraq and Syria. However, relationships with NATO allies have come under pressure after Ankara's decision to procure the Russian-made S-400 air-defence system, its operations in northern Syria, rising tensions with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, its role in Libya and its position regarding the late-2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Following an attempted coup in July 2016, Ankara dismissed large numbers of officers from the armed forces. The armed forces train regularly, including with NATO allies. While key subcomponents are still often imported, a number of locally developed equipment designs are in production. Efforts are under way to increase military exports and Turkey has secured markets in Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Ukraine, successfully offering cost-effective assets in specific sectors. Deliveries on the S-400 contract began in 2019, and as a result the US government terminated Turkey's participation in the F-35 programme. Turkey is also developing a domestic fighter aircraft but is dependent on collaboration with external defence companies. The president has authority over defence procurement and control over Turkey's top defence companies. Turkey has signed defence-cooperation agreements with a focus on exports and technology transfer, in an effort to boost its national defence industry and achieve defence-industrial autonomy.

ACTIVE 355,200 (Army 260,200 Navy 45,000 Air 50,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800

Conscript liability 12 months (5.5 months for university graduates; 21 days for graduates with exemption) (reducing to 6 months)

RESERVE 378,700 (Army 258,700 Navy 55,000 Air 65,000)

Reserve service to age 41 for all services

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR 2 *Gokturk-1/2*

Army €260,200 (incl conscripts)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 army HQ

9 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

8 cdo bde

1 mtn cdo bde

1 cdo regt

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (52nd) armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde)

7 armd bde

Mechanised

2 (28th & 29th) mech div

14 mech inf bde

Light

1 (23rd) mot inf div (3 mot inf regt)

7 mot inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 trg arty bde

6 arty regt

2 engr regt

AVIATION

4 avn regt

4 avn bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 2,378: 316 *Leopard* 2A4; 170 *Leopard* 1A4; 227 *Leopard* 1A3; 100 M60A1; 650 M60A3 TTS; 165 M60TM *Firat*; 750 M48A5 T2 (2,000 M48A5 T1 in store)

RECCE €250 *Akrep*

IFV 645 ACV AIFV

APC 5,266

APC (T) 3,636: 823 ACV AAPC; 2,813 M113/M113A1/M113A2

PPV 1,630: 360 *Edjer Yalcin* 4x4; €650 *Kirpi*; 320 *Kirpi-II*; €300 *Vuran*

AUV 1,200: 800+ *Cobra*; €400 *Cobra II*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 12+: AZMIM; 12 M48 AEV; M113A2T2

ARV 150: 12 BPz-2; 105 M48T5; 33 M88A1

VLB 88: 36 *Leguan*; 52 Mobile Floating Assault Bridge

MW 4+: 4 *Husky* 2G; *Tamkar*; *Bozena*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 415: 365 ACV TOW; ε50 *Kaplan* STA; *Pars* STA 4×4
MANPATS 9K135 *Kornet-E* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); *Eryx*;
FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Milan*; OMTAS

RCL 106mm M40A1**ARTILLERY 7,836+**

SP 1,080: **155mm** 828: ε150 M44T1; 365 M52T (mod); ε310
T-155 *Firtina*; 3 T-155 *Firtina* II; **175mm** 36 M107; **203mm**
219 M110A2

TOWED 794+: **105mm** 75+ M101A1; **155mm** 557: 517
M114A1/M114A2; 40 *Panther*; **203mm** 162 M115

MRL 146+: **107mm** 48; **122mm** ε36 T-122; **227mm** 12
M270 MLRS; **302mm** 50+ TR-300 *Kasirga* (WS-1)

MOR 5,813+

SP 1,443+: **81mm**; **107mm** 1,264 M106; **120mm** 179
TOWED 4,370: **81mm** 3,792; **120mm** 578

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional *Bora*; MGM-140A ATACMS
(launched from M270 MLRS); J-600T *Yildirim* (B-611/CH-
SS-9 mod 1)

AIRCRAFT

ISR 5 Beech 350 *King Air*

TPT • **Light** 8: 5 Beech 200 *King Air*; 3 Cessna 421

TRG 49: 45 Cessna T182; 4 T-42A *Cochise*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 94: 18 AH-1P *Cobra*; 12 AH-1S *Cobra*; 5 AH-1W
Cobra; 4 TAH-1P *Cobra*; 9 T129A; 46 T129B

MRH 28 Hughes 300C

TPT 226+: **Heavy** 11 CH-47F *Chinook*; **Medium** 76+: 28
AS532UL *Cougar*; 48+ S-70A *Black Hawk*; **Light** 139: 12
Bell 204B (AB-204B); ε43 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 64
Bell 205A (AB-205A); 20 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Medium** 33 *Bayraktar* TB2

ISR • **Heavy** *Falcon* 600/*Firebee*; **Medium** CL-89; *Gnat*

LOITERING MUNITIONS Harpy**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**

ASM *Mizrak-U* (UMTAS)

BOMBS

Laser-guided MAM-L; MAM-C

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Short-range HISAR-A/A+; HISAR-O

Point-defence 148+: 70 *Altigan* PMADS octuple *Stinger*
Inchr, 78 *Zipkin* PMADS quad *Stinger* Inchr; FIM-92
Stinger

GUNS 1,402

SP **35mm** ε40 *Korkut*

TOWED 1,362: **20mm** 439 GAI-D01/Rh-202; **35mm** 120
GDF-001/-003; **40mm** 803 L/60/L/70

Navy ε45,000 (incl conscripts)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES • SSK 12**

4 *Atilay* (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT
with SST-4 HWT

4 *Gür* (GER Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHm/Mk 24 *Tigerfish* mod 2 HWT/
SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT

4 *Preveze* (GER Type-209/1400) (MLU ongoing) with 8
single 533mm TT with UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHm/Mk 24
Tigerfish mod 2 HWT/*SeaHake* mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 16 FFGHM 16:

4 *Barbaros* (GER MEKO 200 mod) with 2 quad Inchr
with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm, 2 8-cell Mk
41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm
SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 *Sea Zenith*
CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)
hel)

4 *Gabya* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS
with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm/SM-1MR
Block VI SAM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B
ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with
Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm
gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Seahawk*/AB-212 ASW hel)

4 *Gabya* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 1 Mk 13
GMLS with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm/SM-
1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32
ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Seahawk*/AB-
212 ASW hel)

4 *Yavuz* (GER MEKO 200TN) with 2 quad Inchr with
RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm, 1 octuple Mk
29 GMLS with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple
324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 *Sea*
Zenith CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-
212) hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45**CORVETTES 10:**

FSGHM 4 *Ada* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C
Harpoon Block 1B ASHm, 1 Mk 49 21-cell Inchr with
RIM-116 SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with
Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Seahawk* hel)
FSG 6 *Burak* (ex-FRA *d'Estienne d'Orves*) with 2 single
Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHm, 4 single 324mm ASTT
with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Creusot-Loire* Mk 54 A/S mor, 1
100mm gun (1 vessel with 1 76mm gun instead)

PCFG 19:

4 *Dogan* (GER *Lurssen*-57) with 2 quad Inchr with
RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm, 1 76mm gun
9 *Kilic* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block
1B ASHm, 1 76mm gun

4 *Rüzgar* (GER *Lurssen*-57) with 2 quad Inchr with
RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm, 1 76mm gun

2 *Yildiz* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon*
Block 1B ASHm, 1 76mm gun

PCC 16 Tuzla**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15**

MHO 11: 5 *Engin* (FRA *Circe*); 6 *Aydin*

MSC 4 *Seydi* (US *Adjutant*)

AMPHIBIOUS**LANDING SHIPS • LST 5:**

2 *Bayraktar* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 hel
landing platform (capacity 20 MBT; 250 troops)

1 *Osmangazi* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 4
LCVP; 17 tanks; 980 troops; 1 hel landing platform)

2 *Sarucabey* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 11
tanks; 600 troops; 1 hel landing platform)

LANDING CRAFT 30

LCT 21: 2 C-120/130; 11 C-140; 8 C-151

LCM 9: 1 C-310; 8 LCM 8

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 35

ABU 2: 1 AG5; 1 AG6 with 1 76mm gun

AGS 2: 1 *Cesme* (ex-US *Silas Bent*); 1 *Cubuklu*AOR 2 *Akar* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 hel landing platformAOT 2 *Burak*AOL 1 *Gurcan*AP 1 *Iskenderun*ASR 3: 1 *Alemdar* with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Isin II*ATF 9: 1 *Akbas*; 1 *Degirmendere*; 1 *Gazal*; 1 *Inebolu*; 5 *Onder*AWT 3 *Sogut*

AXL 8

AX 2 *Pasa* (ex-GER *Rhein*)**Marines 3,000****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

1 mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 arty bn)

Naval Aviation**FORCES BY ROLE****ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**2 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); S-70B *Seahawk*1 sqn with ATR-72-600; CN235M-100; TB-20 *Trinidad***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 4 combat capable

ASW 4 ATR-72-600

MP 6 CN235M-100

TPT • **Light** 7: 2 ATR-72-600; 5 TB-20 *Trinidad***HELICOPTERS**ASW 29: 11 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 18 S-70B *Seahawk***UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 7**CISR 8: **Heavy** 4: 1 *Aksungur*; 3 ANKA-S; **Medium** 4 *Bayraktar TB2***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**ASM AGM-114M *Hellfire II***Air Force €50,000**

2 tac air forces (divided between east and west)

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with F-4E *Phantom 2020*8 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon***ISR**1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*1 unit with *King Air 350***AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL**

1 sqn (forming) with B-737 AEW&C

EW

1 unit with CN235M EW

SEARCH & RESCUE1 sqn with AS532AL/UL *Cougar***TANKER**1 sqn with KC-135R *Stratotanker***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with A400M; C-160D *Transall*1 sqn with C-130B/E *Hercules*1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 550 *Citation II* (UC-35); Cessna 650 *Citation VII*; CN235M; Gulfstream 550

3 sqn with CN235M

10 (liaison) flt with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); CN235M**TRAINING**1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*1 sqn with F-5A/B *Freedom Fighter*; NF-5A/B *Freedom Fighter*

1 sqn with SF-260D

1 sqn with *Hurkus-B*; KT-IT1 sqn with T-38A/M *Talon*1 sqn with T-41D *Mescalero***AIR DEFENCE**4 bn with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)4 sqn with MIM-14 *Nike Hercules*2 sqn with *Rapier*8 (firing) unit with MIM-23 *Hawk***MANOEUVRE****Air Manoeuvre**

1 AB bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 306 combat capable**FTR** 27: 17 NF-5A *Freedom Fighter*; 10 NF-5B *Freedom Fighter* (48 F-5s being upgraded as LIFT)**FGA** 279: 19 F-4E *Phantom 2020*; 27 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* Block 30; 162 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* Block 50; 14 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* Block 50+; 8 F-16D Block 30 *Fighting Falcon*; 33 F-16D *Fighting Falcon* Block 50; 16 F-16D *Fighting Falcon* Block 50+**ISR** 9: 5 Beech 350 *King Air*; 3 C-160D *Transall*; 1 CN235M (Open Skies)**EW** 2 C-160D *Transall***SIGINT** 3 CN235M**AEW&C** 4 B-737 AEW&C**TKR** 7 KC-135R *Stratotanker***TPT** 83: **Heavy** 9 A400M; **Medium** 24: 6 C-130B *Hercules*; 13 C-130E *Hercules*; 5 C-160D *Transall*; **Light** 49: 2 Cessna 550 *Citation II* (UC-35 - VIP); 2 Cessna 650 *Citation VII*; 45 CN235M; **PAX** 1 Gulfstream 550**TRG** 171: 4 *Hurkus-B*; 33 SF-260D; 70 T-38A/M *Talon*; 25 T-41D *Mescalero*; 39 KT-IT**HELICOPTERS****TPT** 35: **Medium** 20: 6 AS532AL *Cougar* (CSAR); 14 AS532UL *Cougar* (SAR); **Light** 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)**UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES****CISR** • **Heavy** 19 ANKA-S**ISR** 27: **Heavy** 9: 9 *Heron*; **Medium** 18 *Gnat 750***AIR DEFENCE** • **SAM** 32+**Long-range** 32+: MIM-14 *Nike Hercules*; 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)**Medium-range** MIM-23 *Hawk***Point-defence** *Rapier***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES****AAM** • **IR** AIM-9S *Sidewinder*; *Shafir* 2(†); **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **SARH** AIM-7E *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120A/B AMRAAM**ARM** AGM-88A **HARM**

ASM AGM-65A/G *Maverick*; *Popeye* I
LACM Conventional AGM-84K SLAM-ER

BOMBS

Electro-optical guided GBU-8B HOBOS (GBU-15)
INS/GPS guided AGM-154A JSOW; AGM-154C JSOW
Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L; *Paveway* I; *Paveway* II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800

Gendarmerie 152,100

Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence in war

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 cdo bde

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (border) paramilitary div

2 paramilitary bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 57+: *Akrep*; 57 *Ates*

APC 760+

APC (W) 560: 535 BTR-60/BTR-80; 25 *Condor*

PPV 200+: *Edjer Yaclin* 4x4; *Kirpi*; 200 *Kirpi* II

AUV *Cobra*; *Cobra* II; *Otokar Ural*

AIRCRAFT

ISR Some O-1E *Bird Dog*

TPT • *Light* 2 Do-28D

HELICOPTERS

ATK 9 T129B

MRH 19 Mi-17 *Hip* H

TPT 35: **Medium** 12 S-70A *Black Hawk*; **Light** 23: 8 Bell 204B (AB-204B); 6 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 8 Bell 206A (AB-206A) *Jet Ranger*; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR 24: **Heavy** 6 ANKA-S; **Medium** 18 *Bayraktar* TB2

BOMBS

Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L

Coast Guard 4,700

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 108

PSOH 4 *Dost*

PBF 60

PB 44

AIRCRAFT • MP 3 CN235 MPA

HELICOPTERS • MRH 8 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP – SAR)

DEPLOYMENT

AZERBAIJAN: Army 170; 1 EOD unit

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 242; 1 inf coy

CYPRUS (NORTHERN): €33,800; 1 army corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd; 287 M48A5T2; 145 ACV AIFV; 70 ACV AAPC (incl variants); 418 M113 (incl variants); 36 M101A1; 36 M114A2; 12 M115; 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155; 18 T-122; 171 81mm mor; 70 M30; 135 HY-12; *Milan*; 66 ACV TOW; 219 M40A1; FIM-92 *Stinger*; 44 Rh 202; 78

GAI-D01; 16 GDF-003; 3 Cessna 185 (U-17); 2 AS532UL *Cougar*; 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 1 PB

IRAQ: Army: 1,000; 1 cdo unit; **NATO** • NATO Mission Iraq 86

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 112; 1 PCFG

LIBYA: €500; ACV-AAPC; *Kirpi*; 1 arty unit with T-155 *Firtina*; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B *Hawk*; *Korkut*; GDF-003; 1 CISR UAV unit with *Bayraktar* TB2

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 PCC • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO

QATAR: Army: 300 (trg team); 1 mech inf coy; 1 arty unit; 12+ ACV AIFV/AAPC; 2 T-155 *Firtina*

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 321; 1 inf coy; UN • UNMIK 1

SOMALIA: 200 (trg team)

SYRIA: €3,000; some cdo units; 3 armd BG; 1 SAM unit; 1 gendarmerie unit

FOREIGN FORCES

Spain *Active Fence*: 150; 1 SAM bty with M901 *Patriot* PAC-2

United States US European Command: 1,800; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 spt facility at Izmir; 1 spt facility at Ankara; 1 air base at Incirlik • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik

United Kingdom UK

Pound Sterling GBP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GBP	2.11tr	2.24tr	
	USD	2.71tr	3.11tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	40,394	46,200	
Growth	%	-9.8	6.8	
Inflation	%	0.9	2.2	
Def exp [a]	GBP	48.3bn	52.3bn	
	USD	61.9bn	72.8bn	
Def bdgt [b]	GBP	47.9bn	51.5bn	53.4bn
	USD	61.5bn	71.6bn	
USD1=GBP		0.78	0.72	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes total departmental expenditure limits; costs of military operations; Armed Forces Pension Service; and external income earned by the MoD



Population 66,052,076

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.0%	2.8%	3.0%	3.3%	23.2%	8.4%
Female	8.6%	2.7%	2.9%	3.2%	22.6%	10.2%

Capabilities

UK defence policy is based on the armed forces providing credible nuclear and conventional deterrence. The armed forces are relatively well trained with a strong combat ethos and a wide range of combat, combat-support and logistic capabilities. They also have a role in supporting the management of domestic civil emergencies. Defence activity includes maintaining the nuclear force, sustaining a broad range of conventional capabilities, counter-terrorism and contributing to the counter-ISIS coalition and to NATO tasks, including in Eastern Europe, as well as international missions in Africa. In March 2021, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy was followed by a Defence Command Paper that set out modernisation and restructuring plans. Russia is seen as the greatest direct threat to the UK and Europe. The documents underscored the intent to still play a leading role in NATO but with an increased focus also on the Indo-Pacific. The UK's Carrier Strike Group carried out a series of exercises in the Indo-Pacific in mid-year and in September the UK signed the AUKUS defence and security partnership with Australia and the US. The government has indicated it will raise the ceiling on the number of nuclear warheads for the *Trident* submarine-launched ballistic missile. Base and support facilities in Germany, Cyprus, Kenya and Oman are to be expanded, with more forces using them as hubs. The Defence Command Paper indicated that frigate numbers will increase, while platform numbers will reduce in the army and air force. All three services' personnel strength will be reduced, while reserves will remain at their current size. Strategic Command comprises key joint-force elements, such as special forces, defence intelligence and the military component of the civil/military National Cyber Force. A new Space Command was set up within the air force in early 2021 and spending on military space capabilities is increasing. Expeditionary logistic capability meets policy requirements, but peacetime logistic support within the UK is dependent on contractors. A new Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, issued in March 2021, set out naval-but not air- or land-procurement policy. Weaknesses in defence procurement persist. The UK's sophisticated defence industry is globally competitive in some areas of defence exports but cannot meet all of the UK's requirements.

ACTIVE 153,200 (Army 85,800 Navy 34,050 Air 33,350)

RESERVE 75,450 (Regular Reserve 36,050 (Army 23,950, Navy 5,600, Air 6,500); Volunteer Reserve 37,350 (Army 29,900, Navy 4,150, Air 3,300); Sponsored Reserve 2,050)

Includes both trained and those currently under training within the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet units

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces 1,000

Royal Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC

SSBN 4 *Vanguard* with 16 UGM-133A *Trident* II D-5/ D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 533mm TT with *Spearfish* HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each missile could

carry up to 12 MIRV; some *Trident* D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role)

MSL • SLBM • Nuclear 48 UGM-133A *Trident* II D-5 (fewer than 160 declared operational warheads)

Royal Air Force

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RADAR • STRATEGIC 1 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales Moor

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 8: 1 NATO-4B; 3 *Skynet*-4; 4 *Skynet*-5

Army 81,800; 4,000 Gurkhas (total 85,800)

Regt normally bn size. Many cbt spt and CSS regt and bn have reservist sub-units

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (ARRC) corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (3rd) armd div (3 armd inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn); 1 arty bde (2 SP arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 2 fd arty regt); 3 cbt engr regt; 1 sigs regt; 1 log bde (3 MP regt; 5 log regt; 3 maint regt; 3 med regt); 2 AD regt)

Light

1 (1st) Lt inf div (2 (4th & 51st) inf bde (1 recce regt, 1 lt mech inf bn; 1 Lt inf bn); 1 (7th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 Lt inf bn); 1 (11th) inf bde (2 Lt inf bn); 1 engr bde (1 cbt engr regt, 1 CBRN regt, 2 EOD regt, 1 (MWD) EOD search regt, 1 engr regt, 1 (air spt) engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 log bde (2 log regt; 2 maint bn; 1 med regt); 1 med bde (3 fd hospital))

1 (38th) inf bde (1 Lt inf bn)

1 (160th) inf bde (2 Lt inf bn)

2 inf bn (London)

1 inf bn (Brunei)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (16th) air aslt bde (1 recce pl, 2 para bn, 1 air aslt bn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt, 1 med regt)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (6th) cbt spt div (1 (Spec Inf Gp) inf bde(-) (4 inf bn(-)); 1 ISR bde (1 STA regt, 2 EW regt, 3 int bn, 1 ISR UAV regt); 1 (77th) info ops bde (3 info ops gp, 1 spt gp, 1 engr spt/log gp); 1 sigs bde (6 sigs regt))

1 (geographic) engr regt

1 engr bn(-) (joint GER-UK unit)

1 sigs bde (2 sigs regt; 1 (ARRC) sigs bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (3 log regt; 1 maint regt)

Reserves

Army Reserve 26,550 reservists

The Army Reserve (AR) generates individuals, sub-units and some full units. The majority of units are subordinate to regular-formation headquarters and paired with one or more regular units

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

3 recce regt

Armoured

1 armd regt

Light

15 lt inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 para bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty regt

1 STA regt

1 MRL regt

3 engr regt

1 EOD regt

4 int bn

4 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

11 log regt

3 maint regt

3 med regt

9 fd hospital

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 227 *Challenger 2*

RECCE 613: 197 *Jackal*; 110 *Jackal 2*; 130 *Jackal 2A*; 145 *FV107 Scimitar*; 31 *Scimitar Mk2*

IFV 388+: 388 *FV510 Warrior*; *FV511 Warrior* (CP); *FV514 Warrior* (OP); *FV515 Warrior* (CP)

APC 805

APC (T) 409 *FV430 Bulldog* (incl variants)

PPV 396 *Mastiff* (6×6)

AUV 1,238: 399 *Foxhound*; 252 *FV103 Spartan* (incl variants); 23 *Spartan Mk2* (incl variants); 396 *Panther CLV*; 168 *Ridgback*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 88: 56 *Terrier*; 32 *Trojan*

ARV 284: 80 *Challenger ARRV*; 30 *FV106 Samson*; 28 *Samson Mk2*; 105 *FV512 Warrior*; 41 *FV513 Warrior*

MW 64 *Aardvark*

VLB 68: 35 *M3*; 33 *Titan*

NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 *Fuchs* NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP *Exactor-2* (*Spike* NLOS)

MANPATS *FGM-148 Javelin*; *NLAW*

ARTILLERY 598

SP 155mm 89 *AS90*

TOWED 105mm 114 *L118 Light Gun*

MRL 227mm 35 *M270B1 MLRS*

MOR 81mm 360 *L16A1*

AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 3 Ramped Craft Logistic

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 74+

Short-range *Land Ceptor*

Point-defence 74: 60 *FV4333 Stormer* with *Starstreak*; 14 *Rapier* FSC; *Starstreak* (LML)

Joint Helicopter Command

Tri-service joint organisation including Royal Navy, Army and RAF units

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

HELICOPTER

1 bde (1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with *AH-64D Apache*; 1 trg sqn with *AH-64D Apache*); 1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with *AH-64D Apache*); 1 regt (2 sqn with *AW159 Wildcat* AH1; 1 trg sqn with *AW159 Wildcat* AH1); 1 regt (1 sqn with *SA341B Gazelle* AH1); 1 (spec ops) sqn with *AS365N3*; *SA341B Gazelle* AH1; 1 sqn with *Bell 212* (Brunei); 1 flt with *SA341B Gazelle* AH1 (Canada); 1 ISR UAV regt; 1 maint regt)

TRAINING

1 hel regt (1 sqn with *AH-64D Apache*; 1 sqn with *AS350B Ecureuil*; 1 sqn with *Bell 212*; *Lynx* AH9A; *SA341B Gazelle* AH1)

Army Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

HELICOPTER

1 hel regt (4 sqn personnel only)

Royal Navy

FORCES BY ROLE

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 lt sqn with *AW159 Wildcat* AH1

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with *AW101 Merlin* HC4/4A

Royal Air Force

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

3 sqn with *CH-47D/SD/F Chinook* HC3/4/4A/6

2 sqn with *SA330 Puma* HC2

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with *CH-47D/SD/F Chinook* HC3/4/4A/6; *SA330 Puma* HC2

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ATK 50: 40 *AH-64D Apache*; 10 *AH-64E Apache*;

MRH 66: 5 *AS365N3*; 34 *AW159 Wildcat* AH1; 27

SA341B Gazelle AH1

TPT 122: Heavy 60: 38 *CH-47D Chinook* HC6A; 8 *CH-47SD Chinook* HC5; 14 *CH-47F Chinook* HC6; Medium

48: 25 *AW101 Merlin* HC4/4A; 23 *SA330 Puma* HC2;

Light 14: 9 *AS350B Ecureuil*; 5 *Bell 212*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 7

Watchkeeper (37+ more in store)

Royal Navy 34,050

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 10

STRATEGIC • **SSBN** 4 *Vanguard*, opcon Strategic Forces with 16 UGM-133A *Trident* II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with *Spearfish* HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each each missile could carry up to 12 MIRV; some *Trident* D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role)

TACTICAL • **SSN** 6

2 *Trafalgar* with 5 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/*Spearfish* HWT
4 *Astute* with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/*Spearfish* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 20

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2:

CV 2 *Queen Elizabeth* with up to 3 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (future capacity 24 F-35B *Lightning* II, 14 *Merlin* HM2/*Wildcat* HMA2/CH-47 *Chinook* hel)

DESTROYERS 6:

DDGHM 3 *Daring* (Type-45) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C ASHM, 6 8-cell *Syber* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/30 (*Sea Viper*) SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 *Wildcat*/AW101 *Merlin* hel)

DDHM 3 *Daring* (Type-45) with 6 8-cell *Syber* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/30 (*Sea Viper*) SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 *Wildcat*/AW101 *Merlin* hel)

FRIGATES • FFGHM 12:

6 *Duke* (Type-23) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C ASHM, 1 32-cell VLS with *Sea Wolf* SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with *Sting Ray* LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 *Wildcat* or 1 AW101 *Merlin* hel)

6 *Duke* (Type-23) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C ASHM, 1 32-cell VLS with *Sea Ceptor* SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with *Sting Ray* LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 *Wildcat* or 1 AW101 *Merlin* hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26

PSO 8: 3 *River* Batch 1; 5 *River* Batch 2 with 1 hel landing platform

PBI 18: 16 *Archer* (14 in trg role, 2 deployed to Gibraltar sqn); 2 *Scimitar*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11

MCO 6 *Hunt* (incl 4 mod *Hunt*)

MHC 5 *Sandown*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2

LPD 2 *Albion* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 6 MBT; 300 troops) (of which 1 at extended readiness)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5

AGB 1 *Protector* with 1 hel landing platform

AGS 4: 1 *Scott*; 2 *Echo* (all with 1 hel landing platform); 1 *Magpie*

Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Support and miscellaneous vessels are mostly manned and maintained by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), a civilian fleet owned by the UK MoD, which has approximately 1,900 personnel with type comd under Fleet Commander

AMPHIBIOUS • PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3:

LSD 3 *Bay* (capacity 4 LCU; 2 LCVP; 24 CR2 *Challenger* 2 MBT; 350 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12

AOEH 4 *Tide* (capacity 1 AW159 *Wildcat*/AW101 *Merlin* hel)

AORH 3: 2 *Wave*; 1 *Fort Victoria* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS

AG 1 *Argus* (primary casualty-receiving ship with secondary aviation trg ship role)

AKR 4 *Point* (not RFA manned)

Naval Aviation (Fleet Air Arm) 4,900

FORCES BY ROLE

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

3 sqn with AW101 ASW *Merlin* HM2

2 sqn with AW159 *Wildcat* HMA2

TRAINING

1 sqn with Beech 350ER *King Air*

1 sqn with G-115

1 sqn with *Hawk* T1

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • **Light** 4 Beech 350ER *King Air* (*Avenger*)

TRG 16: 5 G-115; 11 *Hawk* T1

HELICOPTERS

ASW 58: 28 AW159 *Wildcat* HMA2; 30 AW101 ASW *Merlin* HM2

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM *Martlet*

Royal Marines 6,600

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 (3rd Cdo) mne bde (2 mne bn; 2 sy bn; 1 amph gp; 1 amph aslt sqn; 1 (army) arty regt; 1 (army) engr regt; 1 ISR gp (1 EW sqn; 1 cbt spt sqn; 1 sigs sqn; 1 log sqn), 1 log regt)

2 amph sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC (T) 99 BvS-10 Mk2 *Viking* (incl 19 cabs with 81mm mor)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

ARTILLERY 39

TOWED 105mm 12 L118 Light Gun

MOR 81mm 27 L16A1

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 *Island*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 26

LCU 10 LCU Mk10 (capacity 4 *Viking* APC or 120 troops)

LCVP 16 LCVP Mk5B (capacity 35 troops)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Starstreak*

Royal Air Force 33,350

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3 (including one joint QTR-UK sqn)

1 sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3 (aggressor)

1 sqn with F-35B *Lightning* II

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with P-8A *Poseidon* (MRA Mk1)

ISR

1 sqn with *Shadow* R1

ELINT

1 sqn with RC-135W *Rivet Joint*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with Bell 412EP *Griffin* HAR-2

TANKER/TRANSPORT

2 sqn with A330 MRTT *Voyager* KC2/3

TRANSPORT

1 (comms) sqn with AW109E/SP; BAe-146

2 sqn with A400M *Atlas*

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster*

1 sqn with C-130J/J-30 *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with A400M *Atlas*; C-17A *Globemaster*; C-130J/J-30 *Hercules*

1 OCU sqn with F-35B *Lightning* II (forming)

1 OCU sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3

1 OCU sqn with RC-135W *Rivet Joint*

1 sqn with EMB-500 *Phenom* 100

1 sqn with *Hawk* T1/1A/1W*

2 sqn with *Hawk* T2

1 sqn with T-6C *Texan* II

2 sqn with G-115E *Tutor*

COMBAT/ISR UAV

2 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 234 combat capable

FGA 167: 23 F-35B *Lightning* II; 138 *Typhoon* FGR4; 6 *Typhoon* T3

ASW 8 P-8A *Poseidon* (MRA Mk1)

ISR 6 *Shadow* R1

ELINT 3 RC-135W *Rivet Joint*

AEW&C 3 E-3D *Sentry*

TKR/TPT 10: 3 A330 MRTT *Voyager* KC2; 7 A330 MRTT *Voyager* KC3

TPT 46: **Heavy** 28: 20 A400M *Atlas*; 8 C-17A *Globemaster*;

Medium 14: 1 C-130J *Hercules*; 13 C-130J-30 *Hercules*;

PAX 4 BAe-146 CC2/C3

TRG 164: 5 EMB-500 *Phenom* 100; 86 G-115E *Tutor*; 28 *Hawk* T2*; 31 *Hawk* T1/1A/1W* (£34 more in store); 14 T-6C *Texan* II

HELICOPTERS

MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Bell 412EP *Griffin* HAR-2

TPT • **Light** 3: 2 AW109E; 1 AW109SP

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 10 MQ-9A *Reaper*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L/L(I) *Sidewinder*; IIR ASRAAM; ARH AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM; *Meteor*

ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*; *Brimstone*; *Dual-Mode Brimstone*; *Brimstone* II

LACM *Storm Shadow*

BOMBS

Laser/GPS-guided GBU-10 *Paveway* II; GBU-24 *Paveway* III; Enhanced *Paveway* II/III; *Paveway* IV

Royal Air Force Regiment

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

6 sy sqn

Tri-Service Defence Helicopter School

FORCES BY ROLE

TRAINING

1 hel sqn with Bell 412EP *Griffin* HT1

2 hel sqn with AS350B *Ecureuil*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

MRH 3 Bell 412EP *Griffin* HT1

TPT • **Light** 27: 25 AS350B *Ecureuil*; 2 AW109E

Volunteer Reserve Air Forces

(Royal Auxiliary Air Force/RAF Reserve)

MANOEUVRE

Other

5 sy sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 int sqn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med sqn

1 (air movements) sqn

1 (HQ augmentation) sqn

1 (C-130 Reserve Aircrew) flt

UK Special Forces

Includes Royal Navy, Army and RAF units

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (SAS) SF regt

1 (SBS) SF regt

1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt

1 SF BG (based on 1 para bn)

AVIATION

1 wg (includes assets drawn from 3 Army hel sqn, 1

RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 sigs regt

Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (SAS) SF regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**AUV 24 *Bushmaster* IMV**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL**MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; NLAW

DEPLOYMENT

ASCENSION ISLAND: 20**ATLANTIC (NORTH)/CARIBBEAN:** 1 PSO; 1 AORH**ATLANTIC (SOUTH):** 1 PSO**BAHRAIN:** *Operation Kipion* 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 MHC; 1 LSD 1 naval base**BELIZE:** BATSUB 12**BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY:** 40; 1 navy/marine det**BRUNEI:** 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212**CANADA:** BATUS 370; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341 *Gazelle* AH1**CYPRUS:** 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 *Griffin* HAR-2; 1 radar (on det); *Operation Shader* 450; 1 FGA sqn with 6 *Typhoon* FGR4; 1 A330 MRTT *Voyager*; 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; UN • UNFICYP (*Operation Tosca*) 327; 1 inf coy**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 3**EGYPT:** MFO 2**ESTONIA:** NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (*Operation Cabrit*) 828; 1 armd regt HQ; 1 tk sqn; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy**FALKLAND ISLANDS:** 1,200; 1 inf coy(+); 1 sigs unit; 1 AD det with *Land Ceptor*; 1 PSO; 1 ftr flt with 4 *Typhoon* FGR4; 1 tkr/tpt flt with 1 A330 MRTT *Voyager*; 1 A400M; 1 hel flt with 2 *Chinook***GERMANY:** 185**GIBRALTAR:** 570 (incl Royal Gibraltar regt); 2 PBI**GULF OF GUINEA:** 40; 1 PSO**IRAQ:** *Operation Shader*/NATO Mission Iraq 100**KENYA:** BATUK 350; 1 trg unit**KUWAIT:** *Operation Shader* 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-9A *Reaper***LIBYA:** UN • UNSMIL (*Operation Tramat*) 1**MALI:** *Operation Barkhane* 90; 1 hel flt with 3 *Chinook* HC5; UN • MINUSMA (*Operation Newcombe*) 256; 1 recce sqn**NEPAL:** 60 (Gurkha trg org)**NIGERIA:** 80 (trg team)**OMAN:** 90**PACIFIC OCEAN:** 2 PSO**POLAND:** NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 140; 1 recce sqn**SAUDI ARABIA:** 50 (radar det)**SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 35**SOMALIA:** 65 (trg team); UN • UNSOM (*Operation Praiser*) 2; UN • UNSOS (*Operation Catan*) 10**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS (*Operation Vogul*) 4**UKRAINE:** *Operation Orbital* 53 (trg team)**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:** 200; 1 tpt/tnr flt with C-17A *Globemaster*; A400M *Atlas*; A330 MRTT *Voyager* (on rotation)

FOREIGN FORCES


United StatesUS European Command: 9,500; 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath (1 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D *Eagle*, 2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E *Strike Eagle*, 1 FGA sqn with F-35 *Lightning* II (forming); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T *Stratotanker*; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B *Osprey*; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J *Commando* II) • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 *Spacetrack* radar at Fylingdales Moor

Chapter Five

Russia and Eurasia


- Russia's core defence budget saw a mild nominal increase in 2021 but fell by 1.8% in real terms as the inflation rate reached 5.9%. Similarly, while total military expenditure is estimated to have reached RUB4.59 trillion (USD62.2 billion) in 2021, up from RUB4.46trn (USD61.6bn) the year before, this also constitutes a reduction in real terms of 5.2% down to USD55.7bn (constant 2015 USD).
- In late 2021, attention was again focused on Russia's build-up of forces on the border with Ukraine and in Crimea. Russia's April 2021 deployments in the same areas, under the pretext of conducting surprise exercises, involved between 25% and 33% of Russia's total deployable ground forces. The November build-up again highlighted not just the resources Moscow could mobilise as part of its deployments, but also the supporting civilian – as well as military – infrastructure that enabled it to do so.
- Against the background of the continuing delay in developing and delivering armoured vehicles based on the new *Armata*, *Kurganets-25* and *Bumerang* platforms, the MoD continues to modernise the current armoured-vehicle fleet. The MoD signed an additional contract for an undeclared quantity of T-90M main battle tanks; some of these will be again upgraded from T-90As.
- There was particular attention on the Airborne Forces (VDV) in exercise *Zapad* 2021. For the first time, the VDV practised a full battalion landing with BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles. During the same exercise a full battalion also carried out a night airborne assault.
- The navy continued testing sea-launched 3M22 *Tsirkon* hypersonic missiles, including the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the *Yasen* (Project 885) vessel *Severodvinsk*, in October. The first serial-production *Tsirkon* weapons are scheduled to go into service in 2022.
- The Aerospace Forces has begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 *Fullback* bombers, which include a broader set of weapons and the ability to be fitted with expanded weapons and reconnaissance pods. The first aircraft are assigned to the 2nd Regiment at Chelyabinsk in the Central Military District, with the type likely replacing the Su-24MR *Fencer* E.

Russia real-terms total military expenditure, 2011–21 (USDbn, constant 2015)



Active military personnel – top 10

(25,000 per unit)




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
Russia's Military Districts



Russia: Self-propelled gun/howitzers, 2007–21



Russia: Su-34 and Su-35 numbers, 2014–21



Russia and Eurasia

Policy and strategy

In July 2021, President Vladimir Putin approved Russia's revised National Security Strategy (NSS), updating the previous document from December 2015. The principal changes in the new version do not relate only to military issues, with attention paid to what some Russian analysts have termed 'ideological issues' concerned with confronting Western influence. The argument offered is that some states were apparently looking to 'isolate Russia' and 'destroy its internal unity'. Indeed, there was a greater focus on Russia itself than before. Among the main non-military threats mentioned in the strategy was alleged activity in the information and psychological space directed at Russia from abroad, which aims to undermine traditional customs and beliefs and includes the 'westernisation' of Russian culture, indicating a concern about population security. Information security, meanwhile, was identified as a 'separate national strategic priority', according to Interfax (reporting after the NSS emerged) due to 'growing threats in the digital environment'. If anything, these factors reinforce the view that one of the strategy's key features was that it served to highlight Russia's persistently broad conception of security.

The United States is the only country named in the document within the context of military challenges to Russia (under the 'National Defence' section), notably the prospect of the US deploying medium- and short-range missiles to Europe and the Asia-Pacific – which were considered a 'threat to strategic stability and international security' – and also, as in previous strategies, US missile defence.

The NSS also criticised the 'build-up' of NATO military infrastructure near Russia's borders. Reflecting the general state of relations, in October 2021 Moscow said that it would suspend Russia's mission to NATO and withdraw the accreditation of the NATO Information Office in Moscow and the Alliance's liaison mission at the Belgian embassy. Earlier that month, NATO had withdrawn the accreditation of eight members of Russia's NATO mission, asserting that they were undeclared intelligence officers. The NATO–Russia Council remains, though this body has

not met since 2019. The NSS indicated, according to Interfax, Moscow's view that 'the desire of Western states to retain their hegemony' increases 'inter-state differences ... and makes the global security system less efficient'. The document reflected, according to some Western analysts, a 'more transactional view of international relations'.

Russia's new Defence Plan until 2025 also came into force in 2021 (it was signed by the president in November 2020). As before, this document – which sets out threat perceptions and outlines force dispositions and weapons programmes – is classified but, while there is little information available on its content, analysts understand that it addresses non-military as well as military threats.

Structural changes

On 1 January 2021, the Northern Fleet became Russia's fifth military district. However, the Fleet has for several years held an independent status only slightly lower than that of a district, meaning that its reclassification did not bring significant structural changes.

This upgrade nonetheless reflects the increased prominence given to the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route in Russia's strategic plans. There has for some time been an aspiration to improve Russia's military infrastructure and deployments in the Arctic. The region featured in the NSS, with the document indicating that Moscow considered that efforts focused on climate change and environmental factors could be used as an excuse to hinder Russian development of the Arctic. January 2021 saw MiG-31BM *Foxhound* C fighters begin patrols over the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya (flying from Rogachevo air base on Novaya Zemlya).

Aircraft also conducted a test landing on Alexandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago, even further north. The hard-surface airfield, opened in 2020 at Nagurskoye air base on Alexandra Land, is intended to enable the year-round deployment of aircraft. There are also plans to build heated hangars for storing and servicing aircraft. In March 2021 a pair of MiG-31BMs conducted a demonstration flight from Nagurskoye to the North Pole and back.

This was part of the 'integrated Arctic expedition' *Umka 2021*, which featured three ballistic missile submarines surfacing from under the ice in close proximity and also, according to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), an exercise involving elements of a motor-rifle brigade. Subsequently, some of the Northern Fleet's Su-33 *Flanker* D fighters were also sent on rotation to the Arctic islands. The group of forces in northeastern Russia is another reflection of Moscow's military focus on the region; these troops are mainly drawn from the Pacific Fleet and operate to the east of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago up to the Kamchatka Peninsula. To the east, a flight of navy MiG-31BM fighters from Kamchatka was despatched to Anadyr on the Chukotka Peninsula bordering Alaska; the plan was to ultimately deploy Su-35S *Flanker* M fighters to Kamchatka.

Aerospace and Ground Forces air-defence units have been moved to islands in the Russian Far East. The 1724th SAM Regiment of the Eastern Military District was redeployed to Sakhalin in 2021, and one of its two battalions was re-equipped with the S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*) as part of the move. At the end of 2020, an S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) battalion from the Eastern Military District's Ground Forces was noted on the Kuril Islands.

In European Russia, while changes continue to take place in the Southern Military District, there has been emphasis also on structural reforms in the west and northwest. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that threats to Russia from NATO in the west had intensified and that the plan was to create 20 new formations and military units in the Western Military District by the end of 2021.

Kaliningrad has been a focus of these moves. In late 2020, the 18th Motor-Rifle Division was stood up there as part of the Baltic Fleet's 11th Army Corps, formed out of the Corps' existing tank regiment and motor-rifle brigade. Although the 18th Division was therefore initially drawn from personnel already deployed in Kaliningrad, fully staffing the division will have the effect of increasing the number of military personnel permanently stationed in the Russian exclave. It has already begun receiving new equipment, such as T-72B3M main battle tanks (MBTs).

Two more divisions are also now being established in the Southern Military District. The 19th Motor-Rifle Division and the 20th Motor-Rifle Division were created in 2020 and 2021 respectively by converting the existing 19th and 20th Motor-Rifle Brigades.

Unlike previous Southern Military District divisions, which were formed near to Russia's borders with Georgia and Ukraine, the 20th is currently based deep inside the country in the Volga region, though it is understood to be assigned to the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) based at Novocherkassk. The long-held ambition to permanently base an additional Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment in Crimea seems to have been achieved and is in effect the re-scaling of the former 56th Air Assault Brigade to regimental size and its posting to Crimea under the 7th Air Assault Division. That such a move ultimately required the cannibalisation of an important existing formation suggests that tension remains between Russia's ambitions in terms of force structure and the personnel available to meet them.

Having in recent years established a permanent set of forces near the borders of Ukraine, with 28 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) under the command of the 8th and 20th CAAs and the 22nd Army Corps, in April 2021 Russia demonstrated that these could be further strengthened. To exert political pressure on Ukraine, under the pretext of conducting surprise exercises, around 20 additional BTGs from the Ground Forces and the VDV with 15,000–18,000 personnel deployed from across the country to its borders and to Crimea. These reinforcements were primarily drawn from formations of the 58th CAA from the North Caucasus (Southern Military District) and the 41st CAA from the Central Military District, as well as elements from the VDV's 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions and were further bolstered when elements of the 98th Air Assault Division participated in a parachute drop in the exercises. Forces began to pull back a month later, though an increased presence was maintained at the border in field camps in the summer, supporting the elements of the 41st CAA later deployed in the *Zapad 2021* exercise. In August, Shoigu announced that there was a total of 168 BTGs distributed between the Ground Forces, Naval Infantry and Airborne Forces, suggesting that the Ukraine build-up involved between 25% and 33% of Russia's total deployable ground forces. A subsequent build-up in November aroused concern over Russia's intentions, with some US sources positing that Russia was planning an invasion of Ukraine. However, this again highlighted not just the resources Russia could mobilise in its deployments but also the supporting civilian and military facilities and structures that enabled it to do so, not least the infrastructure it has in recent years built up in areas close to the border with Ukraine.

Personnel

According to the MoD, in the spring of 2021 the proportion of conscripts had fallen to about 30% of force strength. In the spring conscription campaign, 134,000 people were recruited and the plan was to call up 128,500 people in autumn. These figures have remained virtually unchanged for three years, though of course not all of these conscripts go to the armed forces, with some assigned to other organisations such as the National Guard or the Emergencies Ministry.

A year earlier, it was reported that, in total, 405,000 contract soldiers and 225,000 conscripts were serving in the armed forces and, with the MoD claiming in January 2021 that the ratio of contract to conscript personnel was 1.8 to 1, these figures were still, officially, broadly accurate. At that time, the MoD said that contractors had increased by 30,000 in 2020 and had more than doubled in number since 2012 (the year Shoigu was appointed).

A trial began in August, in the Southern Military District, to create a high-readiness mobilisation reserve force, called the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS). Civilians are being encouraged to sign a contract for three years as reserve soldiers, sergeants and officers, and they are then posted to a specific military unit and to a position within it. Once a year, the reservists will attend military-training camps for three weeks with two to three training days per month. In total, it is planned to recruit 38,000 of these reservists in the Southern Military District. The overall intent would seem to be not only to bolster overall reserve numbers but also to create a mobilisation reserve that addresses one of the concerns relating to skill fade that accompanied the old mobilisation model.

Ground and Airborne forces

Against the background of the continuing delay in developing and delivering armoured vehicles based on the new *Armata*, *Kurganets-25* and *Bumerang* platforms, the MoD continues to modernise the current armoured-vehicle fleet. It signed an additional contract for an undeclared quantity of T-90M MBTs; some of these will be again upgraded from T-90As.

Based on experience of the war in Syria, the army's most numerous tank – the T-72B3 – has started to receive additional protection for urban operations. For the first time, this includes removable cage or lattice armour covering the top part of the turret, likely intended to protect not only against fire directed from the upper floors of buildings, but

also against top attack from some types of anti-tank missile or uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). It was announced at the Army 2021 exhibition that BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles would also receive cage armour sets and explosive reactive armour during a modernisation programme.

In early 2021, the Ground Forces received the first batch of 20 *Uran-9* uninhabited ground vehicles (UGVs). The 13-tonne armoured vehicles are equipped with a 30mm autocannon, an anti-tank guided-missile system and a launcher capable of firing thermobaric grenades. The contract has been ongoing for several years, though Russian analysts report that tests in urban combat in Syria left mixed impressions and that a final decision has yet to be made on the programme's future. Meanwhile, a contract was signed for an experimental batch of *Shturm* UGVs. These have been developed from the T-72B3 main battle tank and are intended for urban-combat operations. It is understood that they will receive a shortened 125mm main gun and secondary weapons such as autocannons and unguided rockets. The Ground Forces are developing several small armed UAVs and have tested some on exercise. Russian analysts also report that a range of guided munitions has been developed (weights of 100kg, 50kg and 20kg were noted), and that loitering munitions were under development.

Small UAVs with laser designators were tested during the *Zapad* 2021 exercise as well as in Syria. Although they do not carry weapons themselves, they illuminate targets that are then engaged by artillery units firing guided 152mm artillery shells and 120mm mortar rounds. There was particular attention on the VDV in *Zapad* 2021. For the first time, they practised a full battalion-landing with BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles. During the same exercise a full battalion also carried out a night airborne assault with associated equipment; the troops were equipped with night vision devices. Meanwhile, the Railway Troops have begun building a 340 km-section of the second line of the Baikal–Amur railway in Eastern Siberia; this is scheduled for completion in 2024.

Aerospace Forces

Several multi-year contracts were completed in 2020, which meant that there were fewer deliveries of new combat aircraft and helicopters in 2021 than in recent years. That said, Russia's defence industry continues to experience problems in the serial production of new types of aircraft.

The first series-production Su-57 *Felon* joined the flight-test programme in December 2020. However, it was not delivered to a front-line unit, but was instead sent to the 929th State Flight Test Centre at Akhtubinsk. Perhaps up to three more of these aircraft are planned to be delivered by the end of 2021, with entry into service still some way off. According to the procurement plan, the first deliveries of the 'tranche two' Su-57, with a new, more powerful engine and improved avionics, will begin no earlier than 2024.

One new system has attracted publicity but no interest so far from customers, the *Checkmate* single-engine fighter, a full-scale model of which was exhibited in July 2021 and shown to the president. However, as a number of journalists observed, he was not accompanied by armed forces personnel, perhaps indicating not just that there may be little MoD interest in the project, but also that it may be aimed at export markets.

The Aerospace Forces has begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 *Fullback* bombers, which include a broader set of weapons and the ability to be fitted with expanded weapons- and reconnaissance-pods. The first aircraft are assigned to the 2nd Regiment at Chelyabinsk in the Central Military District, with the type likely replacing the Su-24MR *Fencer* E.

The fatal crash of the prototype of the Il-112V light military transport aircraft in August 2021 dealt a serious blow to plans to update the Aerospace Forces' transport aviation. The Il-112V is intended to replace the ageing An-26 *Curl*. The MoD admitted that the crash was a further setback in its effort to replace the An-26. Delivery of an upgraded version of the Il-76 *Candid*, the Il-76MD-90A, is also progressing more slowly than desired, which has prompted a new production line to be developed for the aircraft at Ulyanovsk. The aim is to be able to manufacture 10–12 aircraft a year.

There has been some progress in army aviation. Even though tests of the upgraded Ka-52M *Hokum* were not complete, a contract was signed in August 2021 for the supply of 30 production aircraft in 2022–23. The Ka-52M and the Mi-28NM *Havoc* (which was combat tested in Syria) will be able to carry the KBM Item 305 air-to-surface missile, providing both types with a longer-range air-to-surface weapon. The missile has a range of 15 km.

UAV progress

Up to 21 *Inokhodets* (also known as *Orion*) medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs are planned to be

delivered to the defence ministry by the end of 2023. Each system consists of three air vehicles and ground station and datalink equipment. The UAV is intended for air-to-surface attack as well as for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. Until *Inokhodets* enters service, Russia's most capable UAV remains the *Forpost*, a version of the Israel Aircraft Industries' *Searcher* II. An improved UAV, the *Forpost*-R, has been developed domestically and is reportedly capable of carrying small munitions.

The most ambitious project remains in development: Sukhoi's S-70 *Okhotnik* uninhabited combat aerial vehicle. In order to complete development work, the prototype will be joined by three more airframes that are under construction. The MoD has asked industry to accelerate development and start delivery of pre-production vehicles in 2024 rather than 2025.

After a long delay, the first radar-equipped *Pion*-NKS satellite for the *Liana* space-reconnaissance system was launched in June 2021. The system is designed to detect warships and provide targeting information for long-range anti-ship missiles. The system already has three satellites in orbit for passive electronic reconnaissance. To provide global coverage, it will be necessary to significantly expand the number of satellites in the constellation, particularly those with active radars. A key development in air defence remains the roll-out of the S-500 ballistic-missile-defence surface-to-air missile system. Meanwhile, deliveries of S-400 systems continue. Four regiments were delivered in 2020, and two more were due before the end of 2021.

Navy

In 2021, the Caspian Sea Flotilla finished relocating its ships and headquarters from Astrakhan on the Volga River to newly built ice-free bases on the Caspian Sea in the cities of Makhachkala and Kaspiysk. This transfer was agreed in 2018, and the Flotilla now has much quicker access to the Caspian Sea than before.

Despite industry presenting the MoD with several versions of the proposed *Lider* nuclear-powered destroyer, and an aircraft carrier, the navy remains sceptical about the capacity of Russia's defence industry to build such large and complex warship designs. As a result, Russian analysts consider that the MoD is in no hurry to order larger units and that no major announcements can be expected before the adoption of the State Armament Programme (SAP) for 2024–33.

▼ Figure 10 Russia *Yasen/Yasen-M* (Project 885/08851 (*Severodvinsk* I/II)) SSGN


The *Yasen/Yasen-M* Project 885/08851 (*Severodvinsk* I/II)) SSGN class heralds a long-awaited capability increase for Russia's nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet. Hailed as a 'multi-role platform', the class is able to engage land targets in addition to surface and sub-surface vessels. Key to this is the inclusion of a vertical launch system (VLS) – a first for a Russian submarine not designed to carry submarine-launched ballistic

missiles – likely permitting a greater number of embarked guided missiles than previous designs. Designed by the Malakhit Design Bureau, these boats are a further significant departure from Soviet-era design convention, featuring a spherical sonar array in the bow – common in US boats from the 1960s – instead of cylindrical array, and a 'one-and-a-half' hull design as opposed to the double hull seen in earlier Russian boats.


Construction of the lead *Yasen* (Project 885 (*Severodvinsk* I)) was hampered by financial constraints, but procurement of subsequent *Yasen-M* (Project 08851 (*Severodvinsk* II)) boats is now proceeding at a steady tempo. These slightly shortened 'serial production' submarines are believed to incorporate further design improvements and refinements, with US officials describing them as now 'on par' with their current *Virginia*-class SSGN in terms of acoustic detectability. Despite the *Yasen-M*'s greater displacement, when compared to the *Virginia*-class, it reportedly requires less than half the crew complement with only 64 personnel – suggesting reliance on a much higher degree of automation.

In 2019, Malakhit showed a model of what could be a successor design, designated *Laika* (Project 545). The model indicated that this may be a slightly smaller design, with an apparent reversion to a cylindrical bow sonar, though accompanied by what appeared to be a conformal array running along almost the entire flank of the hull.

Procurement timeline



Yasen-M (*Severodvinsk* II)



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Sources: IISS; *Izvestia*

[1] *Novosibirsk* reportedly to be commissioned by end 2021 [2] *Arkhangelsk* reportedly to be launched by end 2021 [3] Some sources indicate torpedo tubes reduced to 8 for *Yasen-M* [4] Initial surface and subsurface test launches of 3M22 *Tsirkon* conducted from *Kazan* in October 2021

Due to delays in the supply of propulsion components, the completion of repairs to the aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* has been postponed to 2023. For similar reasons, the long-running overhaul and modernisation of the *Admiral Nakhimov* nuclear-powered cruiser has also been further delayed.

Otherwise, much attention was focused on the navy's continued testing of sea-launched 3M22 *Tsirkon* hypersonic missiles, including in October the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the *Yasen* (Project 885) vessel *Severodvinsk*. The special-mission submarine *Belgorod*, designed among other reasons to deploy the *Poseidon* nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-tipped large uninhabited underwater vehicle, also began sea trials in June. In August 2021, contracts were signed for the delivery of the final version of *Tsirkon* and an additional batch of air-launched *Kinzhal* (RS-AS-24 *Killjoy*) missiles. The quantity was not disclosed. The first serial-production *Tsirkon* weapons are scheduled to go into service in 2022.

On 23 August, two Project 955A *Borey-A* nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) were laid down – the ninth and tenth so far of the type, including the original three Project 955 *Borey*-class (*Dolgorukiy*) SSBNs. They are scheduled to be commissioned in 2026 and 2027. The plan is that by that time all versions of the Soviet-era *Kalmar* (*Delta III*) and *Delfin* (*Delta IV*) SSBNs will be withdrawn from service. It is possible that a decision will be made to build additional *Boreys* or upgraded versions of them. There are continued reports that design work has started on a fifth-generation SSBN, but there is no information on the proposed design.

The third improved *Yasen-M* (Project 08851 (*Severodvinsk II*)) nuclear-powered submarine, *Krasnoyarsk*, was launched at the end of July. These boats have been developed from the prototype, the *Severodvinsk*. The first submarine of the improved design, the *Kazan*, was accepted in May 2021 after lengthy sea trials and weapons tests. In March 2021, the launch took place of the third of six non-nuclear submarines of the *Varshavyanka*-class (Project 06363 (*Improved Kilo*)) intended for the Pacific Fleet. Construction of all this batch is planned to end in 2024. There are reports of plans to equip the Baltic Fleet with a further improved version of the design.

Serious problems continue to trouble the alternative *Lada* (Project 677 (*Petersburg*)) non-nuclear submarine design. Completion is more than three years overdue, according to the latest schedule revi-

sion, and difficulty in developing an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system has meant plans to fit AIP to this class have so far been abortive. Nonetheless, it has been announced that two more of these submarines are expected to be laid down – the fourth and fifth so far, with a sixth reportedly also on order – although whether any of these will receive AIP remains uncertain. At the time of writing, only the prototype of the class was in service.

Procurement continues of the Project 22350 (*Gorshkov*) frigates that will be the mainstay of the navy's modern blue-water surface capability for the foreseeable future. The third vessel, the *Admiral Golovko*, is being fitted out and has received the first Russian-made gas turbines intended for the class in place of Ukrainian engines; these supply problems contributed to delays in the programme. According to Russian media reports, a further substantially more modified and enlarged design, the Project 22350M, is planned, with the first vessel to be laid down in 2023. Full-load displacement would increase from some 5,400 to 8,000 tonnes.

At the end of 2020, the Baltic Fleet accepted the third small missile corvette of the *Karakurt* (Project 22800 (*Uragan*)) class, the *Odintsovo*, which is capable of carrying the 3M14 *Kalibr* (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) land-attack cruise missile and the 3M55 *Onyx* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) anti-ship missile. Unlike its predecessors, which had only rudimentary defence against aerial threats, this ship has been fitted with the *Pantsir-M* air-defence missile system. Subsequent ships in the series will also be equipped with *Pantsir-M*.

Construction has started on two Project 23900 'universal landing ships' or large-deck amphibious assault ships (LHDs) at the Kerch shipyard in Crimea. The first of these LHDs is expected to be built and handed over to the navy by 2028. At the end of 2020, the Baltic Fleet received the second Project 11711 (*Gren*) tank landing ship (LST), the *Pyotr Morgunov*. Two more ships are under construction as part of this project, with a much-modified landing platform dock (LPD) design. These LPDs are expected to have increased displacement and improved amphibious landing capability.

Strategic Rocket Forces

According to the MoD, the share of new technology in the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) has grown from 40% to 83% over the past six years. Most progress has been made in recapitalising the mobile RS-12PM *Topol* and RS-12PM2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27

mod 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles with the new RS-24 *Yars* and RS-24 *Yars-S*. Four of the seven road-mobile intercontinental ballistic-missile divisions, the 14th, 29th, 39th and 42nd, have fully converted to *Yars/Yars-S*, while one more division (35th) should complete conversion to *Yars-S* by the end of 2021. Of the other two divisions, the 54th is operating a mix of *Yars* and *Topol-M* and only the 7th is still operating the original *Topol* systems. The plan is to retire both *Topol* and *Topol-M* in 2024.

It has proven more difficult for the RVSN to replace its silo-based heavy liquid-propellant missiles. The silo version of *Yars* is being delivered to the 28th Missile Division in the Kaluga region. The rearmament of regiments equipped with the ageing RS-18 and RS-20 designs in three other missile divisions is still on hold due to the delay in testing the RS-28 *Sarmat* (RS-SS-X-29) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). None of the three scheduled *Sarmat* test launches had taken place by the beginning of October 2021, which means the plan to put into service the first of these missiles in 2022 will likely not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, work to re-equip silos and auxiliary infrastructure for them is already underway at the 62nd Missile Division in Krasnoyarsk Territory. Meanwhile, the 13th Missile Division plans to finish rearming its first silo regiment with the *Avangard* hypersonic boost-glide vehicle system by the end of 2021. It has already converted four silos to house the interim modified RS-18 launch vehicle, and a final two are expected to be complete by the end of the year. A second regiment of the same type is planned to achieve initial capability by the end of 2023.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics and defence spending

The Russian economy faced severe headwinds in the wake of the 2014–16 oil-price crash, with economic growth averaging just 0.94% between 2014 and 2019. Military spending grew rapidly from 2012–15, with a surge in spending on the State Armament Programme (SAP), but it declined in both nominal and real terms during 2016–18, and then recovered modestly in 2019, as shown in Table 6. However, the coronavirus pandemic derailed this mild recovery, as the 2020 drop in oil prices, reduction in global economic activity and domestic lockdown restrictions resulted in a 3.1% contraction in real GDP. Despite this, Russia's core 'National Defence' budget increased in 2020 and rose sharply as a percentage of GDP,

from 2.7% to 3.0%. Total military expenditure, which includes elements such as military housing and pensions that are sourced from other budget areas, increased from 3.9% of GDP in 2019 to 4.2% in 2020.


The federal budget for 2021 was based on a forecast real GDP growth rate of 3.3% and proposed a mild nominal reduction in defence funding from RUB3.17 trillion (USD43.8 billion) in 2020 to RUB3.12tr (USD42.3bn). However, as the economic outlook improved – the IMF estimate is that 2021 real GDP growth will reach 4.7% in Russia – the budget was amended upwards to RUB3.38tr (USD55.8bn) which meant that it constituted a 1.5% nominal increase over 2020.


In real terms, however, the core budget fell from USD41.7bn to USD41.0bn (constant 2017 USD). Similarly, while total military expenditure was estimated to have reached RUB4.59tr (USD66.6bn) in 2021, up from RUB4.46tr (USD61.6bn) in 2020, this also constitutes a reduction in real terms of 5.2% because of Russia's 5.9% inflation rate in 2021. The 2021 budget also fell as a proportion of GDP from 3.8% to 3.7%.

In 2020 the MoD indicated that the main target of the SAP for 2011–20 – that the inventory of military equipment at the end of this period comprise 70% of 'modern' military equipment – had been achieved. The growth rate of military spending started to moderate, and this trend is expected to continue to 2024. The budget law for 2022–24 provides for nominal increases for defence, though as a percentage of GDP, total military spending would fall from 4.2% in 2021 to less than 3.4% by 2024.

The scale of the annual state defence budget for 2021 has not been revealed but analysts expect it to be around 3.7% of GDP.

▼ Figure 11 Russia: defence expenditure as % of GDP





▲ Map 3 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending¹

that it will be approximately RUB1.5tr (USD20.3bn), similar to that of 2020. This means that in real terms it is now declining.

Although the coronavirus pandemic has had a serious impact on Russia's economic performance, defence-industrial output has not been significantly

affected. The recovery in the first nine months of 2021 was aided by an increase in oil price. This boosted budget revenues because, while the 2021 budget was based on a forecast of USD45.3 per barrel, the actual price from January–August averaged USD65 per barrel.

Table 6 Russia: defence expenditure, 2011–21

Year	'National Defence'			Annual state defence order (SDO)		Total military expenditure ¹			
	RUB (trillion)	USD ² (billion)	% of GDP ³	RUB (trillion) ⁴	As % 'ND'	RUB (trillion)	USD ² (billion)	% of GDP ³	% change real terms
2021 ⁵	3.381	41.0	2.78	1.500	48.1	4.590 ⁶	55.7	3.77	-5.2
2020	3.169	41.7	2.96	1.500	47.3	4.460	58.8	4.17	5.0
2019	2.997	39.8	2.74	1.500	50.1	4.211	56.0	3.85	4.0
2018	2.827	38.8	2.72	1.450	51.3	3.928	53.8	3.78	-3.6
2017	2.666 ⁷	40.2	2.90	1.400	52.5	3.704 ⁷	55.8	4.03	-8.2
2016	2.982 ⁷	47.3	3.48	1.600	53.7	3.831 ⁷	60.8	4.47	-7.5
2015	3.181	51.9	3.83	1.800	56.6	4.026	65.7	4.85	16.4
2014	2.479	43.4	3.14	1.450	58.5	3.224	56.5	4.08	7.6
2013	2.104	39.6	2.89	0.894	42.5	2.787	52.5	3.82	5.6
2012	1.812	35.9	2.66	0.677	37.4	2.505	49.7	3.68	13.4
2011	1.516	32.7	2.52	0.575	37.9	2.029	43.8	3.38	3.6

1. According to the NATO definition. 2. Constant 2015 USD. 3. GDP data from IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2021. 4. Approximate; the annual SDO is classified but every few years an approximate total is released. 5. As budget listing, 1 September 2021. 6. Estimate based on higher 2021 'National Defence' budget listing on 1 September 2021. 7. Excluding a one-off payment to reduce accumulated debts of defence-industry enterprises under the scheme of state-guaranteed credits. If this debt payment is included, the total GDP share in 2016 rises to 5.4%, and 4.2% in 2017.

However, one issue for the defence industry is that the cost of some weapons has increased, including a 25% increase in the cost of naval ships arising from increased metals prices. Without compensation by the MoD from budget sources, rising costs could further undermine the profitability of many companies, exacerbating the problem of large accumulated debts experienced during recent years.

Weapons procurement

The key objective of SAP 2020 was to increase the share of modern weapons in the inventory to 70%. By the end of 2020 it is reported to have reached 70.1% and 71.9% is forecast for the end of 2021, with a goal to reach 72.9% at the end of 2023.

Within the framework of SAP 2020, the rate at which the annual SDO delivery targets have been met has proven to be uneven, with signs that it moderated over time – notably for combat aircraft, with deliveries dipping after 2016. Meanwhile, surface ships saw uneven delivery rates after 2015, though this reflected the problem of replacing power units previously obtained from Ukraine with domestically-sourced alternatives. Unfortunately (and perhaps to conceal the extent of the slowdown) there has been reduced transparency, with less reliable information published on both SDO plans and on its implementation.

The annual SDO is now based on the SAP to 2027, which was signed off by President Vladimir Putin in early 2018. Total funding of approximately RUB19tr (USD257bn) is to be allocated over the course of SAP 2027, plus an additional RUB1tr (USD13.5bn) for infrastructure relating to the deployment of new systems. Work has begun on the next SAP, for the years 2024–33, although this is hampered to some extent by the lack of a new long-term economic forecast on which firm funding decisions can be based. Provisionally it is expected to get at least RUB21–22tr (USD284–298bn) – in monetary terms much the same as earlier programmes – but in real terms much less. In preparation, the MoD will produce a document called ‘Basic Directions of Development of Armaments, Military and Special Equipment to 2038’ (‘special equipment’ being the term used for systems intended for the security services). There will also be a report to the president with an analysis and evaluation of security threats out to the year 2053.

Defence industry

The Ministry of Industry and Trade confirmed that defence-industrial output in 2020 was affected by the coronavirus pandemic, contracting by 7.7% compared with a growth of 1.7% in 2019. Output intended for exports, meanwhile, fell by almost 15% in 2020, following a 13.5% increase in 2019. Total employment across the sector remains relatively stable, with around two million working at almost 1,900 enterprises and research and development establishments.

There have been no significant new organisational changes across the sector since the United Aviation Corporation (UAC) was absorbed into the Rostec state corporation. UAC is still undergoing internal restructuring, and there is a plan to merge the administrative and management functions of UAC subsidiaries into two new organisations dealing with aircraft manufacturers and design bureaux. However, the Sukhoi and MiG design bureaux will remain independent. The head office of the United Shipbuilding Corporation has now been relocated to St Petersburg, leaving in Moscow some departments that require regular direct contact with central government agencies.

In 2017, when it became clear that the rate of growth of the annual SDO was going to moderate, authorities set an ambition for defence industries to diversify into the field of civil-sector high-technology. This process is progressing gradually, but is not without its problems. In 2020, the civil-sector share of total defence-industrial output reached 25.6% compared with 24% in 2019. Efforts are now focused on reaching the 2025 target of 30%. Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, who is responsible for the defence industry, said at a meeting with Putin in July 2021 that the peak of deliveries under the SDO had been passed, making attention to diversification more important, and that prospects for increasing weapons exports were not favourable. A large role is being played by the main bank serving the defence industry, Promsvyazbank, which has established a separate division to fund the development of new civilian projects and to give advice to companies. According to its head, Anton Drozdov, about one-third of enterprises have a civilian-focused output of less than 5%. In his view, at least RUB2tr (US27.1bn) will be required to finance the diversification programme, but there is a problem in that many of the proposed projects are of low quality, and the top managers of the defence companies are insufficiently motivated

to focus on issues other than the implementation of military contracts under the SDO and for export. There is now interest in developing closer relations between companies in the defence sector and civilian firms, encouraging the latter to take on some defence work. There has, for instance, been growing interest in China's experiences in the area of 'military-civil fusion'. Overall, according to Minister for Industry and Trade Denis Manturov, defence-industrial output has increased by 38% and labour productivity by almost 40% since 2014. He forecasts, notwithstanding the pandemic, that output will have increased by 5–6% in 2020.

Defence exports

The value of Russian arms exports has in recent years been relatively stable, notwithstanding the imposition of sanctions on some countries that have bought weapons from Russia and also the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Indeed, the volume of sales increased in 2020. Export volumes are measured as 'military-industrial cooperation', which includes the sale of weapons and other military equipment, components, licence sales, repairs, servicing and training. The annual volume reported by the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) is shown in Table 7. The increase may relate to revenues earned by the widening network of repair facilities organised in recipient countries by Rosoboronexport, the state-owned company responsible for managing over three-quarters of all sales.

In June 2021, the director of the FSVTS, Dmitri Shugaev, forecast that total exports in 2021 would reach about USD15bn, with a portfolio of orders at the beginning of the year of more than USD50bn. In July 2021, Aleksandr Mikheev, the general director of Rosoboronexport, claimed that most transactions are not in dollars but in roubles or the currencies of purchasing countries, with the increasing use of offset agreements. However, reaching agreements on terms can be problematic. It has been claimed,

for example, that Indonesia's purchase of 11 Su-35s, agreed in 2018, has still not been implemented as Jakarta wants to make payment in goods such as palm oil, but the terms offered have not been acceptable to Moscow. But the principle accords with a concerted effort by Russia to reduce the use of dollars in foreign trade in order to minimise the impact of US sanctions.

ARMENIA

After its defeat in the 44-day war with Azerbaijan in September–November 2020, Armenia was faced with the task of rebuilding and reforming its armed forces in light of the conflict and a changed strategic environment. There is, according to some Armenian analysts, a perception in the country that Armenia's lack of a sufficient quantity and quality of attack and reconnaissance uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the armed forces, and Azerbaijan's extensive use of these, played a decisive role in the defeat.

UAVs did play an important role, but this can be overstated. The war revealed other significant problems in Armenia's armed forces, including poor mobility as well as ageing communications and command-and-control and reconnaissance systems. Institutional challenges were also highlighted, including in the threat assessment process, the provision of supplies and logistics support during combat, political management during wartime and staffing decisions in the army, as well as in the mobilisation system. For example, according to several high-ranking officers, by the time hostilities began, many units had not been withdrawn from their permanent bases in a timely manner and deployed.

Martial law and mobilisation were declared on 27 September 2020 but the call-up of reservists during hostilities raised questions even at the time. For example, on 21 October, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan urged citizens to organise them-

Table 7 Russia: Volume of military-technical cooperation and arms exports (USD billion, current)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
FSVTS military-technical cooperation	14.5	15.0	15.3	16.0	15.2	15.0
Rosoboronexport	13.0	13.0	13.4	13.7	11.0	13.0
TsAMTO arms sales	11.2	11.4	12.5	15.1	14.1	
% of world arms sales	15.0	14.0	14.4	17.8	15.4	

FSVTS: Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation. TsAMTO: Centre for the Analysis of the World Trade in Arms, Moscow. The centre measures all arms exports in terms of current USD.

selves into volunteer platoons of 30 men each, select a commander and apply to the military enlistment office. There was a mobilisation plan, but Armenian sources report that reservist call-ups had faced problems in recent years, with many call-up notices ignored and administrative challenges in posting reservist officers to the right occupation (such as artillery officers being mobilised as motorised infantry officers). Combined with low numbers of major call-up drills, these factors meant that the mobilisation system suffered significant problems during the conflict. Indeed, some Armenian analysts judge that during the war, the country was unable to significantly increase its forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, neither through regular army units nor through mobilised reservists, while questions were raised about the organisation, preparedness and management of those forces that were mobilised. Pashinyan's administration was heavily criticised in a letter published by the General Staff in February. It demanded his resignation and was described by Pashinyan as a 'coup attempt'. (Pashinyan subsequently resigned, prompting a June election, perhaps intended to regain legitimacy in the army.)

Meanwhile, it was not clear whether in the aftermath of the war there was significant progress on a lessons-learned process, or a meaningful public or expert debate on this or on the future shape of the armed forces; indeed, it took until August 2021 for reform proposals to be laid before parliament. However, the authorities in Yerevan argue that military reform had already started, as was said by Deputy Minister of Defence Arman Sargsyan on 16 March 2021, when speaking at the session of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Issues. He said the priority was to create a more capable and professional army.

A month later Pashinyan confirmed, during his election campaign, a plan to transition to a professional army. He also said that 'the conscription system should be changed completely, the period of service should be shortened: there is an idea that every five years there should be a three-month service, so that young people learn basic combat skills'.

This was also reflected in his party's electoral programme for the June elections. It mentioned the ambition to professionalise Armenia's armed forces. It also said that the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army should become fully professional and that the Russian peacekeeping force located in Nagorno-

Karabakh and in the Lachin corridor constituted a security guarantee for Nagorno-Karabakh.

The party's programme also envisaged replacing army units on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border with border guards from Armenia's National Security Service. Later, on 22 August, Armenia's Chief of General Staff (CGS) Artak Davtyan confirmed that the army was being replaced by border guards in some areas. (At the same time, Davtyan stressed that the armed forces carry out the tasks set by the political leadership of the country, perhaps with an eye to the events of earlier in 2021.) There have also been references in the Armenian press to the possibility that Russian border guards could be involved in border duties, as well as statements by officials, such as those in June 2021 by the Governor of Gegharkunik region Gnel Sanosyan, the First Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan and CGS Davtyan.

Later, on 30 June, Andranik Kocharyan, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Issues and a member of the ruling party, said in an interview that the reforms underway involve 'new armaments; new, intelligent command and control; and a professional army'. According to Kocharyan, the professionalisation process will reduce personnel numbers while citizens of conscription age will undergo a training programme leading to recruitment into the army. While Kocharyan did not confirm the duration of this training, analysts consider that this was the same as that mentioned by Pashinyan when he spoke about a three-month period of service once every five years.

After months of uncertainty, on 18 August Pashinyan announced the government's programme for 2021-26. This was later submitted to parliament and approved. The 90-page document devotes three pages to defence. It confirmed the intention to cease conscription and gradually shift to a contract-based army, and also said that a new military doctrine and a national defence plan would be developed. Other plans included the intention to introduce an automated command-and-control system; to establish territorial defence, active reserve and militia training systems; to generate mobile formations and units with heavy weapons and the ability to conduct independent combat operations; and to improve military-technical cooperation with Russia to help the recapitalisation process.

Some practical steps emerged in August. The government amended the regulations of the General Staff, adding to its structure a Territorial Defence

and Reserve Forces Command and an Armed Forces Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Department. In addition, plans appeared to set up a new Special Army Corps, which, according to Armenian specialists, included the remnants of the 1st Army Corps (which suffered heavy losses in the conflict) and the 4th Army Corps. The new corps appears to be engaged on border protection tasks. Meanwhile, the creation of a territorial-defence system was envisaged in a pre-war draft law that was submitted for public discussion on 24 August 2020 but was not adopted. Nevertheless, the creation of the separate UAV directorate seems to reflect the view that UAVs played a decisive role in the defeat. However, it is not clear how a separate UAV directorate will cooperate with the air force and air defence forces, not least as these forces already faced challenges in cooperating during the conflict, exemplified by reported 'friendly-fire' incidents that led to the loss of some aircraft.


Nevertheless, the published programme indicates that while there may have been little discussion in public, there has been an internal debate within Armenian military circles, not least about the importance of mobility and the problems with mobilisation and command and control. But

other questions remain. One concerns the degree to which a downsized army, even if it is composed of contract personnel, can control a front line with Azerbaijan which has increased in length because of the war. Another relates to whether the envisaged three-month training system would be capable of producing an adequate combat-ready reserve and what reforms will be needed to produce an effective training regime for professional personnel.

There are also questions about planned procurements. Some contracts were signed with Russia at the Army 2021 show at Kubinka, near Moscow, but there was no information on these contracts at the time of writing. Prior to the 2018 revolution, Armenia adopted a seven-year procurement programme. This was later revised by Pashinyan's government and its fate is now unclear. It is likely that military defeat and equipment losses will change Yerevan's priorities and that a new procurement programme will be developed. Russia will be Armenia's principal partner in this process and on 11 August, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu – while hosting his Armenian counterpart Arshak Karapetyan in Moscow – said that Russia is ready to continue assisting the modernisation of Armenia's armed forces.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Russia and Eurasia


Significant events in 2021



MARCH

UKRAINE SEIZES CONTROL OF MOTOR SICH


A Ukrainian court ruled that 100% of Motor Sich shares would be transferred to the state in a move that the head of the Security Service said concerned protecting 'national security'. For several years previously, the privately owned company had been seeking Chinese investment. This caused concern in the US, because Motor Sich produces engines for cruise missiles, large transport aircraft and helicopters. In September 2021, President Zelensky spoke about the need for 'state control' rather than 'state ownership', suggesting that a 'golden share' arrangement might be the ultimate outcome. Media reports in Ukraine have suggested that the government may be looking for Turkish investment in Motor Sich.



MARCH

UAC REORGANISATION


Rostec announced that it planned to merge the administrative and management functions of United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) subsidiaries into two new organisations. The first will deal with aircraft manufacturers and the second, which will be based in Moscow, design bureaux. The company hopes that the move, which is expected to take several years, will achieve RUB130bn (USD1.87bn) in efficiency savings and transform the prospects of some of its companies, some of which are close to bankruptcy. Although it has often been suggested that Sukhoi and MiG would be merged, not least after Sukhoi won most of the recent large combat-aircraft deals in Russia, the plan so far seems to have had a limited impact on them, as these firms' design bureaux will remain independent and engineering jobs will not be relocated. Several companies in UAC have recently experienced financial difficulties to fulfil some Russian aerospace programmes as they look to balance the economic viability of deals with affordability for the armed forces. Whether this restructure will be sufficient to improve the situation remains to be seen.



JULY

UKRAINE TO CONSOLIDATE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Following plans announced in 2020, the Ukrainian parliament approved the reform of UkrOboronProm. This will see UkrOboronProm and its 137 subsidiaries split into six divisions (missiles, aviation, aircraft repair, armoured vehicles, radar and marine systems), while some enterprises will be privatised or wound up. A number of anti-corruption measures were also included in the second reading of the bill. Twenty-eight of the 137 firms generate 98% of UkrOboronProm's revenue and the government hopes that the reorganisation, due to be completed by the end of 2022, will improve efficiency and competitiveness. UkrOboronProm performed above expectations in 2020, with a 74% increase in profits over 2019, but suffered in 2021 due to the pandemic and problems in securing funding for contracted work.



JULY

SUKHOI UNVEILS CHECKMATE DESIGN

Sukhoi unveiled what appeared to be an engineering mock-up of a fighter called *The Checkmate* at the MAKS air show outside Moscow. A single-engine model that shares some design characteristics with the larger Su-57, the aircraft is intended 'primarily' for export, according to local media. The Su-30, Sukhoi's greatest export success of the past two decades, has seen over 260 Su-30MKI variants sold to India alone, while a domestic variant is also in service in significant numbers. It is unclear whether *Checkmate* will be able to emulate the Su-30's success. Its development timeline is ambitious, with a first flight slated for 2023 and production in 2026, at a time when generally the international marketplace for combat aircraft is becoming increasingly crowded. As of November 2021, no customers had been announced for the project.

Table 8  **Belarus: defence procurement since 2010**

The defence industry in Belarus is oriented more to providing subsystems to Russia's defence industry, and maintenance and overhaul services for a range of customers, than it is towards developing and building complete platforms. Because of this, and the close political and political-military relationship between the two countries, Belarus acquires the vast majority of its defence equipment from Russia; this enables members of its industry to benefit from their position as subcontractors. At the same time, Minsk mostly procures

equipment that is already being acquired for the Russian armed forces. This has the advantages of ensuring relatively rapid delivery (for instance the first batch of Yak-130 *Mitten* training aircraft was delivered within 12 months) and greater interoperability with its neighbour's forces. However, budget pressures mean that equipment is typically acquired in small batches. This has had the effect of limiting recapitalisation, with the majority of the inventory still consisting of platforms from the Cold War era.


Contract date	Equipment	Type	Quantity	Prime contractor	Deliveries	Notes
c. 2010	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	8	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2011–12	
Dec 2012	Yak-130 <i>Mitten</i>	Training aircraft	4	 Irkut Corporation	2015	
Jan 2013	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	4	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2014	
c. 2014	<i>Tigr</i>	Armoured utility vehicle	5+	 Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant (MZKT)	2015	
Jul 2014	S-300PS (RS-SA-10B <i>Grumble</i>)	Long-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	32	 Russian government surplus	2015–16	Donation
c. 2015	<i>Polonez</i>	300mm multiple-rocket launcher	6	 Precision Electromechanics Plant (ZDEM)	2016	
Jun 2015	Mi-8MTV-5 <i>Hip</i>	Medium transport helicopter	12	 Kazan Helicopter Plant (KVZ)	2016–17	
Aug 2015	Yak-130 <i>Mitten</i>	Training aircraft	4	 Irkut Corporation	2016	
Aug 2015	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	5	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2016	
c. 2016	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	5	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	2017	
c. 2016	CS/VN3B mod	Armoured utility vehicle	8	 Chongqing Dajiang Industrial Company	2017–ongoing	Donation
c. 2017	BTR-70MB1	Armoured personnel carrier (wheeled) upgrade	≈64	 140 Repair Plant	2018–19	
May 2017	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	10	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	2018	
Jun 2017	Su-30SM <i>Flanker H</i>	Fighter ground-attack aircraft	12	 Irkut Corporation	2019–ongoing	
Oct 2017	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	4	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2018	
c. 2018	<i>Cayman</i> BRDM	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle	≈18	 140 Repair Plant	2019	
c. 2018	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	10	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	2020–ongoing	
c. 2018	Yak-130 <i>Mitten</i>	Training aircraft	4	 Irkut Corporation	2019	
Jun 2019	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	11	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	n.k.	
c. 2018	BTR-82A	Infantry fighting vehicle	31+	 Arzamas Machine-Building Plant (AMZ)	2021–ongoing	

Figure 12  **Russia: Airborne Forces (VDV) armoured-vehicle modernisation**

Russia's Airborne Forces (VDV) has been spared organisational upheavals of the kind experienced by the Ground Forces since 2008. Divided into Airborne and Air Assault forces, the VDV has kept its largely division-based structure. It fulfils several traditional airborne roles and is also earmarked for rapid-reaction tasks. It is with this last role in mind that several Air Assault formations have now been equipped with at least a company, and in some cases a battalion, of T-72B3 main battle tanks. While this limits the overall formations' air deployability, the recent Russian practice of deploying Battalion Tactical Groups may mean this is less of an issue in reality. Meanwhile, at least 11 battalion sets of BMD-4M/

BTR-MDM airborne combat vehicles (ABCV) have now been delivered to replace BMD-1s and BMD-2s. These have been designed with significant commonality with the Ground Forces' and Naval Infantry's BMP-3 to reduce maintenance and production costs. BTR-82AM infantry fighting vehicles, widely utilised across the Russian armed forces, are being delivered to VDV reconnaissance units. BMD-2s are still being upgraded, however, perhaps as a budgetary compromise similar to the Ground Forces' choice to modernise T-72s instead of mass producing new-build T-90s. Meanwhile, a new light tank, the *Sprut-SDM1*, is based on the BMD-4M chassis and is expected to complete state trials in 2022.


T-72B3 main battle tank



Prime contractor:
Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)

Replacing:
New capability.
Since 2016, most of the air-assault divisions and brigades have been equipped with at least a company set.


BTR-82AM infantry fighting vehicle



Prime contractor:
Arzamas Machine-Building Plant (AMZ)
Key subcontractors:
KAMAZ
Tulamashzavod
Zavod Korpusov


Replacing:
BMD-2 and BTR-D.
Batches delivered to reconnaissance units of at least four brigades.

BMD-4M airborne combat vehicle



Prime contractor:
Kurganmashzavod (KMZ)
Key subcontractors:
Barnaultransmash
Motovilikha Plants (MZ)
Tulamashzavod
Volgograd Tractor Plant (VgTZ)

BTR-MDM tracked armoured personnel carrier




Replacing:
BMD-4M: BMD-2
BTR-MDM: BTR-D
At least 11 battalion sets delivered since production began in 2015 as well as batches to training centres.

Armenia ARM

Armenian Dram AMD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AMD	6.18tr	7.03tr	
	USD	12.6bn	13.6bn	
per capita	USD	4,267	4,595	
Growth	%	-7.4	6.5	
Inflation	%	1.2	6.9	
Def bdgt [a]	AMD	307bn	312bn	
	USD	628m	603m	
USD1=AMD		489.02	516.54	

[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military pensions



Population 3,011,609

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.7%	2.9%	3.1%	3.6%	24.1%	5.4%
Female	8.7%	2.6%	2.8%	3.6%	25.7%	7.8%

Capabilities

The armed forces' main focus is territorial defence, and a resumption of armed conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh after September 2020 saw forces mobilised and losses of both personnel and equipment. A government plan for 2021-26, approved in August, indicated an aspiration to move to a contract-based force, improve reserve structures and produce new defence plans and doctrines. A new UAV department was created in August. In the wake of the 2020 conflict, Armenia is looking to improve its UAV inventory, and likely its ground-based air defence. Coordination between the services reportedly remains a problem. Armenia is a member of the CSTO and maintains close defence ties with Russia, centred on equipment procurement, technical advice and personnel-training programmes. Military doctrine remains influenced by Russian thinking. Relations with Iran are also developing. Armenia is also engaged in a NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Conscription continues, but there is a growing cohort of professional officers. Personnel train regularly and take part in annual CSTO exercises and in bilateral drills with Russia. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin. Agreements have been reached in recent years to purchase modern Russian systems, though only in small quantities to date. Serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft have been a problem for the air force. There is some capacity to manufacture defence equipment for the domestic market, including electro-optics, light weapons and UAVs, but Armenia is reliant on Russia for other equipment platforms and military systems.

ACTIVE 42,900 (Army 40,000 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,800) Paramilitary 4,300

Conscript liability 24 months

RESERVE

Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €40,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (Special) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn(-), 5 MR regt, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)

1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn)

1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 5 MR regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)

1 (5th) corps (2 MR regt)

Other

1 indep MR trg bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT regt

1 AD bde

2 AD regt

2 (radiotech) AD regt

1 engr regt

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Available estimates should be treated with caution following losses suffered in the fighting in late 2020 in Nagorno-Karabakh

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; €100 T-72A/B; 1 T-90A

RECCE 12 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 140: 100 BMP-1; 25 BMP-1K (CP); 15 BMP-2

APC 150

APC (T) 20 MT-LB

APC (W) 130: 108 BTR-60 (incl variants); 18 BTR-70;

4 BTR-80

AUV *Tigr*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • SP 22+: 9 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 13

9P149 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K129 *Kornet-E* (RS-

AT-14 *Spriggan*)

ARTILLERY 225

SP 37: 122mm 9 2S1 *Gvozhdika*; 152mm 28 2S3 *Akatsiya*

TOWED 122: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36

Giatsint-B; 2 D-1; 34 D-20

MRL 54: 122mm up to 50 BM-21 *Grad*; 273mm 2 WM-80;

300mm 2 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 120mm 12 M120

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 14: 7+ 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C

Scud B); 3+ 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*); 4 9K720

Iskander-E

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Light** *Krunk*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Medium-range 2K11 *Krug* (RS-SA-4 *Ganef*); S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); 9K37M *Buk-M1* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); S-125 *Pechora* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); 9K331MKM *Tor-M2KM*

Point-defence 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K35M *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba* (RS-SA-29 *Gizmo*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100

1 Air & AD Joint Command

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable

FGA 4 Su-30SM *Flanker H*

ATK 13: up to 12 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 1 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*

TPT 4: **Heavy** 3 Il-76 *Candid*; **PAX** 1 A319CJ

TRG 14: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; 10 Yak-52

HELICOPTERS

ATK 7 Mi-24P *Hind*

ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K *Hind*; 2 Mi-24R *Hind* (cbt spt)

MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)

C2 2 Mi-9 *Hip G* (cbt spt)

TPT • **Light** 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AIR DEFENCE • **SAM** • **Long-range** S-300PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,300

Police

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

4 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 5 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 45: 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K (CP)

APC • **APC (W)** 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152

ABCV 5 BMD-1

Border Troops

Ministry of National Security

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 3 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 35 BMP-1

APC • **APC (W)** 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70

ABCV 5 BMD-1

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 32

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40


FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 3,500: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 4 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MT *Hip*; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladicator/Giant*); 1 SAM bty with *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Azerbaijan AZE

Azerbaijani Manat AZN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AZN	72.4bn	89.5bn	
	USD	42.6bn	52.6bn	
per capita	USD	4,232	5,167	
Growth	%	-4.3	3.0	
Inflation	%	2.8	4.4	
Def bdtg [a]	AZN	3.85bn	4.59bn	
	USD	2.27bn	2.70bn	
USD1=AZN		1.70	1.70	

[a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of procurement outlays.



Population 10,282,283

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.9%	3.5%	3.5%	4.4%	23.3%	3.0%
Female	10.6%	3.0%	3.1%	4.1%	24.9%	4.7%

Capabilities

The armed forces' principal focus is territorial defence, and there was a resumption of armed conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh after September 2020. This ended in Baku's favour after six weeks, though tensions between the two remain, with sporadic exchanges of fire continuing in late 2020 and in 2021. Defence cooperation persists with Russia and has developed more recently with Turkey. In June 2021 Baku and Ankara signed the 'Shusha Declaration', including what appears to be a mutual defence accord. Azerbaijan maintains a defence relationship with NATO, concluding in 2019 a fifth cycle of its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Readiness within Azerbaijan's conscript-based armed services varies between units. Azerbaijan has taken part in multilateral exercises and its forces have trained with Turkish troops in bilateral drills including 2021's 'Indestructible Brotherhood'. The armed forces have little expeditionary capability, though they contributed to NATO's Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. Defence modernisation and procurement has been a focus in the past decade, intended to replace the ageing inventory of mainly Soviet-era equipment. Recent orders include for air-

defence and artillery systems and wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles, predominantly of Russian origin. In recent years there has been significant procurement and industrial cooperation with Israel, focused on UAVs and guided weapons, and increasingly with Turkey as a key defence partner. Azerbaijan's limited but growing defence-industrial capabilities are centred on the Ministry of Defence Industry, which manages and oversees the production of small arms and light weapons. While the country is reliant on external suppliers for major defence-equipment platforms and systems, some defence companies have started to export to foreign markets.

ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000

Conscript liability 18 months (12 for graduates)

RESERVE 300,000

Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 56,850

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

5 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

4 MR bde

Light

19 MR bde

Other

1 sy bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 arty trg bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2020 resulted in some combat losses as well as the capture of some equipment from Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 437: 95 T-55; 244 T-72A/AV/B/SIM2; 98 T-90S

RECCE 15 BRM-1

IFV 215: 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 88 BMP-3; 7 BTR-80A; 44+ BTR-82A

APC 568

APC (T) 336 MT-LB

APC (W) 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70

PPV 90: 45 *Marauder*; 45 *Matador*

AUV 64+: 35 *Cobra*; 29+ *Sand Cat*

ABCV 20 BMD-1

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV IMR-2; MT-LB

ARV BREM-L *Brelianka*

MW *Bozena*; GW-3 (minelayer)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 10 9P157-2 *Khrizantema-S* (RS-AT-15 *Springer*); *Cobra* with *Skif*; *Sand Cat* with *Spike-ER*

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*) (reported); *Spike-LR*

GUNS • TOWED 85mm some D-44

ARTILLERY 630

SP 102: **122mm** 46 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 39: 6 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 18 2S19 *Msta-S*; 15 *Dana*-M1M; **155mm** 5 ATMOS 2000; **203mm** 12 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 233: **122mm** 129 D-30; **130mm** 36 M-46; **152mm** 68: 44 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 24 D-20

GUN/MOR **120mm** 36: 18 2S9 *NONA-S*; 18 2S31 *Vena*

MRL 147: **107mm** some T-107; **122mm** 60+: 43 BM-21 *Grad*; 9+ IMI *Lynx*; 8 RM-70 *Vampir*; **128mm** 12 RAK-12; **220mm** 18 TOS-1A; **300mm** 36: 30 9A52 *Smerch*; 6+ *Polonez*; **302mm** 21 T-300 *Kasirga*

MOR **120mm** 112: 5 *Cardom*; 107 M-1938 (PM-38) **SP** **120mm** *Sand Cat* with *Spear*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 6: 2 IAI *LORA*; ε4 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 9K33-1T *Osa*-1T (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*)

Point-defence 9K35 *Strela*-10 (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K32 *Strela* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K34 *Strela*-3 (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K338 *Igla*-S (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS

SP **23mm** ZSU-23-4

TOWED **23mm** ZU-23-2

Navy 2,200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11

CORVETTES • FS 1 *Kusar* (ex-FSU *Petya* II) with 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun

PSO 1 *Luga* (*Wodnik* 2) (FSU Project 888; additional trg role)

PCC 3: 2 *Petrushka* (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1 *Shelon* (ex-FSU Project 1388M)

PB 3: 1 *Araz* (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 *Bryza* (ex-FSU Project 722); 1 *Poluchat* (ex-FSU Project 368)

PBF 3 *Stenka*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MHC 4: 2 *Korund* (Project 1258 (*Yevgeniya*)); 2 *Yakhont* (FSU *Sonya*)

AMPHIBIOUS 6

LSM 3: 1 Project 770 (FSU *Polnochny* A) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); 2 Project 771 (*Polnochny* B) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LCM 3: 2 T-4 (FSU); 1 *Vydrat* (FSU) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3

AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470)

ATF 2 *Neftgaz* (Project B-92) (ex-Coast Guard)

Marines

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 mne bn

Air Force and Air Defence 7,900

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum A*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24 *Fencer*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-25UB *Frogfoot B*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; Yak-40 *Codling*

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Ka-32 *Helix C*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 36 combat capable

FTR 15: 13 MiG-29 *Fulcrum A*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

ATK 21: 2 Su-24 *Fencer*; 16 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 3 Su-25UB *Frogfoot B*

TPT 4: **Medium** 1 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 3 Yak-40 *Codling*

TRG 15: 12 L-39 *Albatros*; 3+ *Super Mushshak*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 26 Mi-24 *Hind*

MRH: 20+ Mi-17-IV *Hip*

TPT 24: **Medium** 17: 1 Bell 412; 3 Ka-32 *Helix C*; 13 Mi-8 *Hip* **Light** 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Medium** *Bayraktar TB2*

ISR 7+: **Heavy** 3+ *Heron*; **Medium** 4+ *Aerostar*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-200 *Vega* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); **Medium-range** S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); 9K37M *Buk-M1* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); *Buk-MB*; ε24 S-125-2TM *Pechora-2TM*; *Barak-LRAD*

Short-range *Abisr* (*Barak-MRAD*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*) IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)

ASM *Barrier-V*

BOMBS

Laser-guided MAM-L

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £15,000

State Border Service £5,000

Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 168 BMP-1/BMP-2

APC • APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80

ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 3 T-122

AIRCRAFT • TPT • **Light** 40 An-2 *Colt* (modified for use as decoys)

HELICOPTERS • ATK 24 Mi-35M *Hind*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 7+: 4+ *Hermes* 450; 3+ *Hermes* 900

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harop*; *Skystriker* (two variants)

Coast Guard

The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the State Border Service

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19

PCG 6 *Sa'ar* 62 with 1 8-cell *Typhoon* MLS-NLOS

Inchr with *Spike* NLOS SSM, 1 hel landing platform

PBF 9: 1 Project 205 (FSU *Osa II*); 6 *Shaldag V*; 2 Silver Ships 48ft

PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 *Point* (US); 1 *Grif* (FSU *Zhuk*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4

ARS 1 *Iva* (FSU *Vikhr*)

ATF 3 *Neftegaz* (Project B-92) (also used for patrol duties)

Internal Troops 10,000+

Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

DEPLOYMENT

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

FOREIGN FORCES

Turkey 170; 1 EOD unit

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan, but mostly populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when inter-ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted in Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention to secede and join Armenia. Baku rejected this and armed conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994; since then, Armenia controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh. While Armenia provides political, economic and military support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared itself independent – although this has not been recognised by any other state, including Armenia. Baku claims Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as part of Azerbaijan. Following a period of sustained fighting in September–November 2020, Azerbaijani forces regained most of the territory lost prior to the 1994 ceasefire. Data presented here represents an assessment of the de facto situation. Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh and must be treated with caution due to the heavy levels of attrition in the 2020 conflict. Some of the equipment listed may belong to Armenian forces.

Nagorno-Karabakh €5,000

Available estimates of military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh have to be treated with caution due to the heavy level of attrition in the 2020 conflict

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR div(-)

1 mtn div(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 22: €20 T-72AV/B; 1 T-72 SIM2; 1 T-90S

RECCE BRDM-2

IFV 150: €50 BMP-1; €100 BMP-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

ARTILLERY

TOWED 122mm some D-30

MRL 122mm some BM-21 *Grad*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 9K331 *Tor-M1* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-defence 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K310 *Igla-1*

(RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

of widespread civil protests during the latter part of 2020. The country's latest military doctrine was approved in July 2016 and identified as security challenges 'hybrid methods' and 'colour revolutions'. A new plan for the development of the armed forces until 2030 was approved in late 2019. Belarus is a member of the CSTO. Russia remains the country's principal defence partner, with the relations growing closer during 2021, including setting up joint training centres for air-force and air-defence personnel. The forces remain conscript-based and train regularly with other CSTO partners. There has been increased emphasis on the training of territorial-defence troops to allow them to better operate with the regular forces. There is a small heavy-lift fleet that could be supplemented by civil transport aircraft, and Minsk has a special-forces brigade trained for the air-assault role. There is no requirement to independently deploy and sustain the armed forces, but it could be possible for elements assigned to the CSTO. Russia continues to be Minsk's main defence-equipment supplier. There is a renewed emphasis on air defence, with Minsk expressing interest in 2021 in acquiring additional systems from Russia. The local defence industry manufactures vehicles, guided weapons and electronic-warfare systems, among other equipment. However, there is no capacity to design or manufacture modern combat aircraft. The sector also undertakes upgrade work for foreign customers.

ACTIVE 47,950 (Army 11,700 Air 11,300 Special Operations Forces 6,150 Joint 18,800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000

Conscript liability 18 months; 12 months for graduates (alternative service option)

RESERVE 289,500

(Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years)


FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping)

Belarus BLR

Belarusian Ruble BYN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BYN	147bn	168bn	
	USD	60.2bn	65.8bn	
per capita	USD	6,398	7,032	
Growth	%	-0.9	2.1	
Inflation	%	5.5	9.2	
Def bdgt	BYN	1.47bn	1.63bn	
	USD	601m	638m	
USD1=BYN		2.44	2.55	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 9,441,842

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.3%	2.4%	2.5%	3.1%	24.9%	5.4%
Female	7.8%	2.3%	2.4%	2.9%	27.2%	10.9%

Capabilities

Located between Russia and NATO European members, the main task of Belarus's armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, though army units were visible in the government's curbing

Army 11,700

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 comd HQ (West & North West)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

4 mech bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 engr bde

1 engr regt

2 sigs regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 497: 477 T-72B; 20 T-72B3 mod

RECCE 132 BRM-1

IFV 957: 926 BMP-2; 31+ BTR-82A

APC • APC (T) 58 MT-LB

AUV *Tigr*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV BAT-2; IMR-2; MT-LB

ARV 2 BREM-K

VLB 24: 20 MTU-20; 4 MT-55A

MW UR-77

NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; *Cayman* NRBC *Chimera*; RKhM-4; RKhM-K

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 160: 75 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 85 9P149 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*)

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

ARTILLERY 583

SP 333: 122mm 125 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 208: 125 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 71 2S5; 12 2S19 *Msta-S*
TOWED 152mm 72 2A65 *Msta-B*

MRL 164: 122mm 128 BM-21 *Grad*; 220mm 36 9P140 *Uragan*
MOR 120mm 14 2S12

AIR DEFENCE

SAM Point-defence 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*)

GUNS • SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch)

Air Force and Air Defence Forces 11,300

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with MiG-29/S/UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot A/B*

TRANSPORT

1 base with An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; Il-76 *Candid*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 71 combat capable

FTR 34: 28 MiG-29 *Fulcrum A*/MiG-29S *Fulcrum C*; 6 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

FGA 4 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; (21 Su-27/UB *Flanker B/C* non-operational/stored)

ATK 22 Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot A/B*

TPT 8: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid* (+9 civ Il-76 available for mil use); **Light** 6: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 4 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 11+: Some L-39 *Albatros*; 11 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT 26: **Heavy** 6 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 20: 8 Mi-8 *Hip*; 12 Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*)

SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10 *Alamo A*)

ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*)

ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*) (likely WFU)

Air Defence

AD data from Uzal Baranovich EW radar

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE

1 bde S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

3 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 bde with 9K37 *Buk* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); 9K331ME *Tor-M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

1 regt with 9K331ME *Tor-M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

2 regt with 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

Medium-range 9K37 *Buk* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range 21 9K331ME *Tor-M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-defence 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)

Special Operations Command 6,150

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 mech bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 13+ *Cayman* BRDM

APC • APC (W) 217: ε64 BTR-70M1; 153 BTR-80

AUV 12 CS/VN3B mod

ARTILLERY 114

TOWED 122mm 24 D-30

GUN/MOR • TOWED 120mm 18 2B23 NONA-M1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

Joint 18,800 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff)

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

2 engr bde

1 EW unit

1 NBC regt

1 ptn bridging regt

2 sigs bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB

NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhM-K

ARTILLERY 112

SP 152mm 36 2S5 *Giatsint-S*

TOWED 152mm 36 2A65 *Msta-B*

MRL 300mm 42: 36 9A52 *Smerch*; 6 *Polonez*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • **Conventional** 96: 36 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*); 60 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud B*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000

State Border Troops 12,000

Ministry of Interior

Militia 87,000

Ministry of Interior

Internal Troops 11,000

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9

Georgia GEO

Georgian Lari GEL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GEL	49.4bn	57.5bn	
	USD	15.9bn	17.8bn	
per capita	USD	4,275	4,808	
Growth	%	-6.2	7.7	
Inflation	%	5.2	9.3	
Def bdtgt	GEL	880m	900m	918m
	USD	283m	279m	
FMA (US)	USD	40m	20m	25m
USD1=GEL		3.11	3.22	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 4,933,674

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.6%	2.7%	3.0%	3.6%	22.2%	6.8%
Female	8.9%	2.4%	2.6%	3.4%	24.5%	10.4%

Capabilities

Georgia's main security preoccupations concern Russian military deployments and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A Strategic Defence Review 2017–20 was published in April 2017. This aimed at improving personnel structures, training facilities and equipment, and stressed a 'total defence' approach. It highlighted the importance of Georgia's reserves, and a ministerial document in 2020 indicated there may be more reliance on active and mobilised reserves. A National Security Strategy 2020–30 has been drafted. Security cooperation with the US includes the Georgia Defence Readiness Program (due to end in 2021). A combat training centre is being developed under the NATO–Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre. Conscription was reinstated with revised terms and increased pay in early 2017. Forces take part in several NATO multinational exercises. Georgia's armed forces have limited expeditionary logistic capability. The backbone of the armed forces' military equipment is legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsolescence. The Major Systems Acquisitions Strategy 2019–25 outlines efforts to procure new equipment in several areas, though funding availability will be key to meeting aspirations. There were plans to boost special-forces capacity in 2020 and there is a focus on boosting anti-armour and air-defence capability. The country has begun to develop a defence-industrial base, and this is intended mainly to support the armed forces. The State Military Scientific-Technical Center has demonstrated some maintenance, repair, overhaul and design capabilities for the production of light armoured vehicles.

ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 19,050 National Guard 1,600)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400

Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 15,000; 4,050 conscript (total 19,050)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (4th) mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)

Light

1 (1st) inf bde (1 mech inf bn, 3 inf bn)

1 (2nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 fd arty bn)

1 (3rd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)

Amphibious

2 mne bn (1 cadre)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (5th) arty bde (1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bn)

1 (6th) arty bde (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn)

1 engr bde

1 engr bn

1 sigs bn

1 SIGINT bn

1 MP bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 123: 23 T-55AM2; 100 T-72B/SIM1

RECCE 41: 1 BRM-1K; 40+ *Didgori*-2

IFV 71: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2

APC 221

APC (T) 69+: 3+ *Lazika*; 66 MT-LB

APC (W) 152+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 40+ *Didgori*-1; 3+

Didgori-3; 65 *Ejder*

AUV 10+: ATF *Dingo*; *Cobra*; 10 *Cougar*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV IMR-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*);

9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spondrel*); FGM-148 *Javelin*

GUNS • TOWED 40: 85mm D-44; 100mm T-12

ARTILLERY 240

SP 67: 122mm 20 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 46: 32 M-77

Dana; 13 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 1 2S19 *Msta-S*; 203mm 1 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36

Giatsint-B; 10 2A65 *Msta-B*

MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21 *Grad*; 6 *GradLAR*; 18 RM-70

MOR 120mm 65: 14 2S12 *Sani*; 33 M-75; 18 M120

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Short-range *Spyder*-SR

Point-defence *Grom*; *Mistral*-2; 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-7

Grail); 9K35 *Strela*-10 (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K36 *Strela*-3

(RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

Aviation and Air Defence Command 1,300
(incl 300 conscript)

1 avn base, 1 hel air base

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable

ATK 3 Su-25KM *Frogfoot* (6 Su-25 *Frogfoot* in store)

TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 *Colt*; 1 Tu-134A *Crusty* (VIP); 2 Yak-40 *Codling*
TRG 9 L-29 *Delfin*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6 Mi-24 *Hind*
TPT 29: **Medium** 17 Mi-8T *Hip*; **Light** 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium 1+ *Hermes* 450

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Medium-range 9K37 *Buk*-M1 (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*) (1-2 bn)
Point-defence 8 9K33 *Osa*-AK (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*) (two bty); 9K33 *Osa*-AKM (6-10 updated SAM systems)

National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon Army

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light
 2 inf bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400

Border Police 5,400

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8MTV-1 *Hip*

Coast Guard

HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24

PCC 2 *Ochamchira* (ex-US *Island*)

PBF 7: 4 *Ares* 43m; 1 *Kaan* 33; 1 *Kaan* 20; 1 Project 205P (*Stenka*)

PB 15: 1 *Akhmeta*; 2 *Dauntless*; 2 *Dilos* (ex-GRC); 1 *Kutaisi* (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 *Point*; 7 *Zhuk* (3 ex-UKR)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 35

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL


Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition as sovereign states.

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72B3; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; 16 S-300PS); 1 mil base at Djava/Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72BA; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

Kazakhstan KAZ

Kazakhstani Tenge KZT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KZT	70.7tr	82.5tr	
	USD	171bn	194bn	
per capita	USD	9,071	10,145	
Growth	%	-2.6	3.3	
Inflation	%	6.8	7.5	
Def bdtg	KZT	591bn	655bn	
	USD	1.43bn	1.54bn	
USD1=KZT		412.95	425.44	



Population 19,245,793

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.6%	3.4%	3.2%	3.9%	21.3%	3.1%
Female	13.3%	3.3%	3.0%	3.8%	23.4%	5.7%

Capabilities

Kazakhstan's October 2017 military doctrine indicates a change in focus from countering violent extremism towards a wider concern for border security and hybrid threats. A military agreement was signed with Uzbekistan in September 2017 for cooperation on training and education and countering violent extremism. In late 2021, the bilateral relationship has focused on jointly addressing security challenges from Afghanistan after the Taliban's return to power. There is a close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced by CSTO and SCO membership, and Moscow operates a radar station at Balkash. Kazakhstan takes part in regional and CSTO exercises, including anti-terror drills. In October 2019, in Saint Petersburg, Kazakhstan and four other Caspian littoral states signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, among other discussions including on maritime security. By regional standards, the armed forces are relatively sizeable and well equipped. In the army, air-mobile units are held at the highest level of readiness. Significant amounts of new and upgraded materiel have been acquired in recent years, primarily from Russia. Russia has supplied Kazakhstan with S-300PS self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems as part of a Joint Air-Defence Agreement, boosting its long-range air-defence capability. Kazakhstan is expanding its indigenous defence industry, and joint ventures and the production of rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft are envisaged with European companies. In 2021, following a two-day summit of the CSTO and in light of instability in Taliban-led Afghanistan, it was announced that Kazakhstan's defence-industrial base will be used to help expand the CSTO's defence capabilities.

ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000) **Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500**

Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 20,000

4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

2 tk bde
2 mech bde
1 aslt bde

Mechanised

1 naval inf bde
1 (peacekeeping) inf regt

Air Manoeuvre

4 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde
1 SSM unit
3 cbt engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 350 T-72BA
RECCE 100: 40 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1
IFV 413: 280 BMP-2; 70 BTR-80A; 63 BTR-82A
APC 303
APC (T) 50 MT-LB
APC (W) 152: 2 BTR-3E; 150 BTR-80
PPV 101 Arlan
AUV 11+: 11 *Cobra*; *SandCat*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 9+: 3 BMP-T; HMMWV with 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 6 9P149 *Shturm* (MT-LB with RS-AT-6 *Spiral*)
MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

GUNS 100mm 20 MT-12

ARTILLERY 490

SP 126: 122mm 66: 60 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 6 *Semser*; 152mm 60 2S3M *Akatsiya*
TOWED 194: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 94: 70 2A65 *Msta-B*; 24 D-20
MRL 107: 122mm 80 BM-21 *Grad*; 220mm 3 TOS-1A; 300mm 24: 6 BM-30 *Smerch*; 18 IMI *Lynx* (with 50 msl)
MOR 63+: 82mm some; SP 120mm 18 *Cardom*; 120mm 45 2B11 *Sani*/M120

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 12 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*)

Navy 3,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14**

PCGM 3 *Kazakhstan* with 1 4-cell Inchr with 4 *Barrier-VK* SSM, 1 *Arbalet-K* Inchr with 4 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)
PCC 1 *Kazakhstan* with 1 122mm MRL
PBF 3 *Sea Dolphin*
PB 7: 3 *Archangel*; 1 *Dauntless*; 1 *Lashyn*; 1 *Turk* (AB 25); 1 Other

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1

MCC 1 *Alatau* (Project 10750E)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik**Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence)****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* A/B
2 sqn with MiG-31B/MiG-31BM *Foxhound* A/C

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with MiG-27 *Flogger* D; MiG-23UB *Flogger* C
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker* B/C
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-30SM *Flanker* B/H

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

1 unit with Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154 *Careless*
1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*, An-26 *Curl*, An-30 *Clank*, An-72 *Coaler*, C295M

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

5 sqn with Mi-24V *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); H145; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; Mi-171Sh *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

AIR DEFENCE

1 bty with 9K317M2 *Buk*-M2E (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)
2 bty with S-75M *Volkhov* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)
1 bty with S-125-1T
1 bty with S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)
10 bty with S-300PS (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)
Some regt with 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 120 combat capable**

FTR 45: 12 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* A; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* B; 31 MiG-31/MiG-31BM *Foxhound*
FGA 61: 12 MiG-27 *Flogger* D; 2 MiG-23UB *Flogger* C; 20 Su-27 *Flanker*; 4 Su-27UB *Flanker*; 23 Su-30SM *Flanker* H
ATK 14: 12 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*
ISR 1 An-30 *Clank*
TPT 21: **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 18: 6 An-26 *Curl*, 2 An-72 *Coaler*; 8 C295; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 1 Tu-154 *Careless*
TRG 19: 17 L-39 *Albatros*; 2 Z-242L

HELICOPTERS

ATK 32: 20 Mi-24V *Hind* (some upgraded); 12 Mi-35M *Hind*
MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; 6 Mi-171Sh *Hip*
TPT 16: **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Light** 12: 4 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 8 H145

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 2 *Wing Loong* (GJ-1)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range 43+: 3 S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); 40+ S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)
Medium-range 15: 3 9K317M2 *Buk*-M2E (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); 12 S-75M *Volkhov* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)
Short-range 3+: some 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 3 S-125-1T
Point-defence 9K35 *Strela*-10 (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** R-33 (RS-AA-9A *Amos*); **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder* – on MiG-31BM)
ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*)
ARM Kh-27 (RS-AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500**National Guard** €20,000

Ministry of Interior

AIRCRAFT**TPT** • **Medium** 1 Y-8F-200WA**State Security Service 2,500****Border Service** €9,000

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 6: **Light** 5: 3 An-26 *Curl*; 1 An-74T; 1 An-74TK; **PAX** 1 SSJ-100**HELICOPTERS** • **TPT** • **Medium** 15: 1 Mi-171; 14 Mi-171Sh**Coast Guard****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 22**PBF** 11: 1 *Aibar* (Project 0210); 8 FC-19; 2 *Saygak***PB** 11: 4 *Almaty*; 5 *Sardar*; 2 *Zhuk* (of which 1 may be non-operational)**DEPLOYMENT****LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 37**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 7**Kyrgyzstan KGZ**

Kyrgyzstani Som KGS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KGS	598bn	690bn	
	USD	7.75bn	8.15bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,189	1,225	
Growth	%	-8.6	2.1	
Inflation	%	6.3	13.0	
Def bdgt	KGS	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=KGS		77.24	84.70	

Population 6,018,789

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.5%	4.1%	3.8%	4.3%	19.0%	2.3%
Female	14.7%	3.9%	3.7%	4.2%	20.8%	3.7%

Capabilities

Kyrgyzstan is increasing its ties with neighbouring countries on issues including defence-industrial cooperation, though it remains generally dependent on Russian assistance. Kyrgyzstan is a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Moscow maintains

a military presence, including a squadron of Su-25SM ground-attack aircraft at Kant air base, which it has leased since 2003. In 2020, plans were reported to add air-defence systems and UAVs to Russia's air base. In 2020, Kyrgyzstan increased its annual fees, reportedly because Russian forces are using more land than outlined in the 2003 agreement. Talks are ongoing over a possible second Russian base. Joint training is held with regional countries, including on anti-terror drills, but combat readiness remains an issue. In 2021, Indian and Kyrgyz special forces held the eighth iteration of bilateral *Khanjar* exercises, focusing on mountain warfare in the broader context of counter-terrorism missions. Kyrgyzstan has a limited capability to deploy externally, and personnel have been deployed to OSCE and UN missions. The armed forces possess generally ageing land equipment and limited air capabilities, relying instead on Russian support, training and deployments. There is little local defence industry. Defence ties with India have increased and a joint working group has been formed on defence cooperation. Reports in 2020 indicated discussions with Russia over the transfer of air-defence equipment and helicopters.

ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500*Conscript liability* 18 months**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 8,500****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

2 MR bde

1 (mtn) MR bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES****MBT** 150 T-72**RECCE** 39: 30 BRDM-2; 9 BRDM-2M**IFV** 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2**APC** • **APC (W)** 55: 25 BTR-70; 20 BTR-70M; 10 BTR-80**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL** • **MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111*Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)**RCL** 73mm SPG-9**GUNS** 100mm 36: 18 MT-12/T-12; 18 M-1944**ARTILLERY 228****SP** 122mm 18 2S1 *Gvozдика***TOWED** 123: 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 16 D-1**GUN/MOR** 120mm 12 2S9 NONA-S**MRL** 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 *Uragan***MOR** 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120**AIR DEFENCE****SAM** • **Point-defence** 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)**GUNS** 48**SP** 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4**TOWED** 57mm 24 S-60

Air Force 2,400

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with L-39 *Albatros**

TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-2 *Colt*; An-26 *Curl*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

2 bty with S-125 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

1 bty with S-75M3 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable

TPT • **Light** 6: 4 An-2 *Colt*; 2 An-26 *Curl*

TRG 4 L-39 *Albatros**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-24 *Hind*

MRH 4 Mi-8MT *Hip*

TPT • **Medium** 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Medium-range 6 S-75M3 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)

Short-range 8 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500

Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers)

Internal Troops 3,500

National Guard 1,000

DEPLOYMENT

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1


FOREIGN FORCES

Russia €500 Military Air Forces: 13 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip*

Moldova MDA

Moldovan Leu MDL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MDL	206bn	223bn	
	USD	11.9bn	12.4bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,523	4,792	
Growth	%	-7.0	4.5	
Inflation	%	4.4	3.0	
Def bdtg	MDL	770m	914m	
	USD	44.4m	50.8m	
USD1=MDL		17.32	18.00	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 3,323,875

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.4%	2.9%	2.9%	3.5%	24.5%	5.7%
Female	8.9%	2.7%	2.7%	3.2%	24.9%	8.7%

Capabilities

The primary role of Moldova's armed forces is to maintain territorial integrity, though their size means they would be unable to offer more than token resistance to a determined adversary. The forces are constitutionally neutral. A National Defence Strategy for 2017–21 included plans to strengthen border defence and air-space control and protection, and to improve the military-training system. Moldova continues to build relations with European states and with NATO. Relations with Russia deteriorated following the election of a pro-European Union president in November 2020. The armed forces are receiving modest amounts of equipment as part of NATO's Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. The country signed up to the NATO initiative in September 2014. With NATO support, a Moldovan cyber incident response capability was set up in January 2021. Moldova is aiming to end mandatory conscription and develop professional armed forces. The Professional Army 2018–2021 programme was approved in June 2018. A draft government action plan (2019–20), circulated in August 2019, reportedly included closer ties with NATO and a continuing emphasis on professionalisation. A Long-Term Military Capabilities Development Plan was approved in March 2020, covering the period to 2030. The services exercise regularly with NATO states. Moldova has no requirement or capability to independently deploy and support its forces overseas. However, service members continued to deploy as part of KFOR in 2021. The country has no defence-industrial capabilities beyond the basic maintenance of front-line equipment. A solution to the issue of the breakaway region of Transdniestria has yet to be agreed.

ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support 1,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900

Conscript liability 12 months (3 months for university graduates)

RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Light**

3 mot inf bde

1 lt inf bn

Other

1 gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

1 NBC coy

1 sigs bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC 153

APC (T) 61: 9 BTR-D; 52 MT-LB (variants)

APC (W) 92: 12 BTR-80; 80 TAB-71

ABCV 44 BMD-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTUREMSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*);9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS 100mm 31 MT-12

ARTILLERY 219

TOWED 67: 122mm 16 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 51: 20

2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 31 D-20

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S

MRL 220mm 11 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7

PM-38


AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11 S-60**Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts)****FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT**1 sqn with An-2 *Colt*; Mi-8MTV-1/PS *Hip*; Yak-18**AIR DEFENCE**1 regt with S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**TPT • **Light** 3: 2 An-2 *Colt*; 1 Yak-18 *Max***HELICOPTERS**TPT • **Medium** 6: 2 Mi-8PS *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range** 3 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900****OPON 900 (riot police)**

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4****MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1****SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41; UN • UNMIK 1****SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5****FOREIGN FORCES****Russia** €1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 7 Mi-24 *Hind*/Mi-8 *Hip***Ukraine** 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)**Russia RUS**

Russian Rouble RUB		2020	2021	2022
GDP	RUB	107tr	122tr	
	USD	1.48tr	1.65tr	
per capita	USD	10,115	11,273	
Growth	%	-3.0	4.7	
Inflation	%	3.4	5.9	
Def exp [a]	RUB	4.46tr	4.59tr	
	USD	61.6bn	62.2bn	
Def bdgt	RUB	3.17tr	3.38tr	3.51tr
	USD	43.8bn	45.8bn	
USD1=RUB		72.35	73.82	

[a] Calculated to be comparable with the NATO definition of defence expenditure

**Population** 142,320,790

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.8%	2.6%	2.3%	2.7%	24.6%	5.3%
Female	8.3%	2.5%	2.2%	2.6%	27.2%	10.9%

Capabilities

Russia supports capable conventional military forces and retains the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal. The armed forces underpin an assertive foreign policy. Military aims are guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity and maintaining and increasing Russia's influence in its near abroad and further afield. An updated National Security Policy was adopted in June 2021 extending beyond core military concerns to include countering the influence of the US and its allies. The 2021–2025 Defence Plan was also agreed, though this remains classified. Russia is a leading member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Volunteers now outweigh conscripts in the armed forces. Defence reforms launched in 2008 emphasised the shift from a conscript-based mass-mobilisation army to smaller, more professional ground forces. Morale has improved because of better pay, terms and conditions, and greater prestige associated with military service. The armed forces can independently deploy and sustain forces on a global scale, although likely only in modest size at extended distances. Its air-led intervention in Syria indicated that Russia was able to deploy, sustain and maintain a high operational tempo for a fixed- and rotary-wing air component, along with the required force-protection package for its main operating base. Russia continues to modernise its nuclear and conventional weapons. The 2020 State Armament Programme (SAP) has been broadly successful, although several of the more ambitious procurement goals were not met. The follow-on programme, SAP 2027, continues the emphasis on modernisation, though some aims are more modest. Russia can design, develop and manufacture advanced nuclear and conventional weaponry. Its defence-industrial base suffered

from a lack of investment in the 1990s, and more recently from the loss of access to Ukrainian components. The defence-aerospace sector has been notably successful in terms of exports, particularly of combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems.

ACTIVE 900,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 150,000 Air 165,000 Strategic Rocket Force 50,000 Airborne 45,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Railway Forces 29,000 Command and Support 180,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 554,000

Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for contract service immediately, which entails a 24-month contract)

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)

Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve obligation to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces €80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Aerospace Forces)

Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 11:

- 1 *Kalmar* (Project 667BDR (*Delta III*)) with 16 R-29RKU-02 *Stantsia-02* (RS-SS-N-18 *Stingray*) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT
- 6 *Delfin* (Project 667BDRM (*Delta IV*)) with 16 R-29RMU2 *Sineva*/R-29RMU2.1 *Layner* (RS-SS-N-23 *Skiff*) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT
- 3 *Borey* (Project 955 (*Dolgorukiy*)) with 16 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT
- 1 *Borey-A* (Project 955A) with 6 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT
- (1 *Akula* (Project 941UM (*Typhoon*)) in reserve for training and SLBM trials with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT)

Strategic Rocket Forces 50,000

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers organised in 12 divs. Regt normally with 6 to 10 silos or 9 mobile launchers, and one control centre

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 2 ICBM regt with RS-12M *Topol* (RS-SS-25 *Sickle*)
- 8 ICBM regt with RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27 mod 1)
- 2 ICBM regt with RS-18 (RS-SS-19 *Stiletto*)
- 1 ICBM regt with RS-18 with Avangard HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 *Stiletto*)
- 8 ICBM regt with RS-20 (RS-SS-18 *Satan*)
- 14 ICBM regt with RS-24 *Yars* (RS-SS-27 mod 2)
- 6 ICBM regt with *Yars-S*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

ICBM • Nuclear 339: 18 RS-12M *Topol* (RS-SS-25 *Sickle*) (mobile single warhead); 60 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27 mod 1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27 mod 1) road mobile (single warhead); up to 20 RS-18 (RS-SS-19 *Stiletto*) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl) (being withdrawn); €6 RS-18 with *Avangard* HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 *Stiletto*); 46 RS-20 (RS-SS-18 *Satan*) (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); €99 RS-24 *Yars* (RS-SS-27 mod 2; €3 MIRV per msl) road mobile; €18 RS-24 *Yars* (RS-SS-27 mod 2; €3 MIRV per msl) silo-based; €54 *Yars-S* (€3 MIRV per msl) road mobile

COUNTERSPACE • DE • Laser *Peresvet*

Long-Range Aviation Command

FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER

- 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod *Blackjack*
- 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod *Bear*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

BBR 76: 9 Tu-160 *Blackjack* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*) nuclear LACM; 7 Tu-160 mod *Blackjack* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*)/Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B *Kodiak*) nuclear LACM; 42 Tu-95MS *Bear H* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*) nuclear LACM; 18 Tu-95MS mod *Bear H* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*)/Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B *Kodiak*) nuclear LACM

Space Command

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 113

COMMUNICATIONS 64: 4 *Blagovest*; 2 *Garpun*; 21 *Gonets-M/M1* (dual-use); 3 Mod *Globus* (*Raduga-1M*); 5 *Meridian*; 21 *Rodnik* (*Strela-3M*); 8 *Strela-3*

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 26: 24

GLONASS; 2 *Parus*

ISR 11: 2 *Bars-M*; 2 GEO-*IK-2*; 1 *Kondor*; 1 *Kosmos-2519*; 2 *Persona*; 3 *Resurs-P*

ELINT/SIGINT 7: 5 *Lotos-S*; 1 *Pion-NKS*; 1 *Tselina-2*

EARLY WARNING 5 *Tundra*

MISSILE DEFENCE some S-500 (entering service)

RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi (St Petersburg); Armavir (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk (Murmansk); Mischelevka (Irkutsk); Kaliningrad; Pechora (Komi); Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul (Altayskiy); Orsk (Orenburg); and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH)

Aerospace Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE

- 2 AD div HQ
- 4 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)
- 5 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE • SAM 222**

Long-range 186: 90 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20

Gargoyle); 96 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 36 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (RS-AB-4A *Gazelle*)

RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow)

Army €280,000 (incl conscripts)

4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk)), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

12 army HQ

1 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

8 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

2 recce bde

Armoured

1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 (90th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

2 tk bde (1 armd recce bn, 3 tk bn, 1 MR bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)

2 (3rd & 144th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (19th) MR div (2 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (20th) MR div (1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (127th) MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 (150th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

11 (BMP) MR bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 armd inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)

Mechanised

1 (2nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 (42nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

8 (BTR/MT-LB) MR bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mech inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)

2 MR bde (4-5 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn)

3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn)

1 (18th) MGA div (1 tk bn, 2 MGA regt, 1 arty regt, 2 AD bn)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

12 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26 *Stone*/RS-SSC-7 *Southpaw*) (3+ brigades also with 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 *Screwdriver*))

COMBAT SUPPORT

9 arty bde

1 hy arty bde

4 MRL bde

4 engr bde

7 engr regt

1 ptn br bde

5 EW bde

5 NBC bde

10 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

11 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

15 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 2,927: 650 T-72B/BA; 850 T-72B3; 530 T-72B3M; 310 T-80BV/U; 170 T-80BVM; 350 T-90A; 67 T-90M; (10,200 in store: 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90)

RECCE 1,700: 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; 700 BRM-1K (CP); (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store)

IFV 5,180: 450 BMP-1; €20 BMP-1AM; 2,900 BMP-2; 70+ BMP-2M; 640 BMP-3/-3M; 100 BTR-80A; 1,000 BTR-82A/AM; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2)

APC 6,050+

APC (T) 3,550+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB; 50+ MT-LB VM1K; (2,000 MT-LB in store)

APC (W) 2,500: 800 BTR-60 (all variants); 200 BTR-70 (all variants); 1,500 BTR-80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store)

PPV *Typhoon-K* 4x4; *Typhoon-K* 6x6

AUV IVECO LMV; *Linza*; *Tigr*; *Tigr-M*; *Tigr-M* SpN; *Vystrel*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IMR-3; IRM; MT-LB

ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A

VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2

MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2; UR-77

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 9+: €9 BMP-T with 9K120 *Ataka* (RS-AT-9 *Spiral* 2); 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9P149M with 9K132 *Shturm-SM* (RS-AT-9 *Spiral*-2); 9P157-2 with 9K123 *Khrizantema* (RS-AT-15 *Springer*); 9P163-3 with 9M133 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); 9K128-1 *Kornet-T* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

MANPATS 9K111M *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (RS-AT-13); 9K115-2 *Metis-M1* (RS-AT-13); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS • TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12 (100mm 2,000 T-12/MT-12 in store)

ARTILLERY 4,894+

SP 1,968: 122mm 150 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 1,758: 800 2S3/2S3M *Akatsiya*; 100 2S5 *Giatsint-S*; 500 2S19/2S19M1 *Msta-S*; 350 2S19M2/2S33 *Msta-SM*; 8 2S35 *Koalitsiya-SV* (in test); 203mm 60 2S7M *Malka* (4,260 in store: 122mm 2,000 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 2,000: 1,000 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 850 2S5 *Giatsint-S*; 150 2S19 *Msta-S*; 203mm 260 2S7 *Pion*)

TOWED 150: 152mm 150 2A65 *Msta-B* (12,415 in store: 122mm 8,150: 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); 130mm 650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 600 2A65

Msta-B; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 (M-1943); 100 M-1937 (ML-20); **203mm** 40 B-4M)

GUN/MOR 180+

SP 120mm 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34

TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 1,056: **122mm** 730: 550 BM-21 *Grad*; 180 9K51M *Tornado-G*; **220mm** 206+: 200 9P140 *Uragan*; 6 9K512 *Uragan-1M*; some TOS-1A; **300mm** 120: 100 9A52 *Smerch*; 20 9K515 *Tornado-S*; (3,220 in store: **122mm** 2,420: 2,000 BM-21 *Grad*; 420 9P138; **132mm** 100 BM-13; **220mm** 700 9P140 *Uragan*)

MOR 1,540+: **82mm** 800+ 2B14; **120mm** 700 2S12 *Sani*; **240mm** 40 2S4 *Tulpan* (2,590 in store: **120mm** 1,900: 1,000 2S12 *Sani*; 900 M-1938 (PM-38); **160mm** 300 M-160; **SP** **240mm** 390 2S4 *Tulpan*)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM 150:

Dual-capable 150 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26 *Stone*)

GLCM • **Dual-capable** Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7

Southpaw); some 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 *Screwdriver*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Heavy** Tu-243 *Reys*/Tu-243 *Reys D* (service status unclear); **Light** BLA-07; *Pchela-1*; *Pchela-2*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 1,520+

Long-range S-300V (RS-SA-12A/B *Gladiator/Giant*); S-300V4 (RS-SA-23)

Medium-range 350: €200 9K37M1-2 *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); €90 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); €60 9K317M *Buk-M3* (RS-SA-27)

Short-range 120+ 9K331/9K331M/9K331MU *Tor-M1*/M2/M2U (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*) (9M338 msl entering service)

Point-defence 1,050+: 250+ 2K22M *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grisson*); 400 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*); 400 9K35M3 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K34 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba* (RS-SA-29 *Gizmo*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

Reserves

Cadre formations

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

13 MR bde

Navy €150,000 (incl conscripts)

4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 49

STRATEGIC • **SSBN** 11:

1 *Kalmar* (Project 667BDR (*Delta III*)) with 16 R-29RKU-02 *Stantsia-02* (RS-SS-N-18 *Stingray*) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT with SET-72 LWT,

4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT

6 *Delfin* (Project 667BDRM (*Delta IV*)) with 16 R-29RMU2 *Sineva*/R-29RMU2.1 *Layner* (RS-SS-N-23 *Skiff*) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT

3 *Borey* (Project 955 (*Dolgorukiy*)) with 16 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT

1 *Borey-A* (Project 955A) with 6 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT

(1 *Akula* (Project 941UM (*Typhoon*)) in reserve for training and SLBM trials with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT)

TACTICAL 38

SSGN 8:

6 *Antey* (Project 949A (*Oscar II*)) (2 more non-operational, in long-term refit) with 24 single SM-225A *Inchr* with 3M45 *Granit* (RS-SS-N-19 *Shiptwreck*) dual-capable AShM, 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT/TPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT

1 *Yasen* (Project 885 (*Severodvinsk I*)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); 10 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT

1 *Yasen-M* (Project 08851 (*Severodvinsk II*)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); up to 10 single 533mm TT with UGST *Fizik* HWT

SSN 10:

2 *Kondor* (Project 945A (*Sierra II*)) with 4 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT

3 *Schuka* (Project 671RTMK (*Victor III*)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 2 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT

3 *Schuka-B* (Project 971 (*Akula I*)) (5 more non-operational, return to service significantly delayed) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*))

nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) ASW msl

- 2 *Schuka-B* (Project 971/09711 (*Akula II*)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) ASW msl

- (1 *Barracuda* (Project 945 (*Sierra I*)) (in reserve) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed))

SSK 20:

- 10 *Paltus* (Project 877 (*Kilo*)) (1 more non-operational, in long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT
- 9 *Varshavyanka* (Project 06363 (*Improved Kilo*)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K *Kalibr*-PL (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear)
- 1 *Lada* (Project 677 (*Petersburg*)) (in test) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K *Kalibr*-PL (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 32

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 *Admiral Kuznetsov* (in extended refit) with 12 single SM-233A Inchr with 3M45 *Granit* (RS-SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) ASHM, 24 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 *Udav* 1 A/S mor, 8 3M87 *Kortik* CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 6 AK630M CIWS (capacity 18–24 Su-33 *Flanker D*/MiG-29KR/KUBR Ftr/FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R *Helix* AEW hel)

CRUISERS 4:

CGHMN 1 *Orlan* (Project 11442 (*Kirov I*)) (1 other non-operational; undergoing extensive refit and planned to return to service in 2023) with 20 single SM-233 Inchr with 3M45 *Granit* (RS-SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) ASHM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300F *Fort* (RS-SA-N-6 *Grumble*) SAM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300FM *Fort-M* (RS-SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 16 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm TT with RPK-6M *Vodopad*-NK (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 6 3M87 *Kortik* CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 3 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

CGHM 3 *Atlant* (Project 1164 (*Slava*)) with 8 twin SM-248 Inchr with 3M70 *Vulkan* (RS-SS-N-12 mod 2

Sandbox) ASHM, 8 octuple VLS with S-300F *Fort* (RS-SA-N-6 *Grumble*) SAM/S-300FM *Fort M* (RS-SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm PTA-53-1164 ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 6 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 11:

- 3 *Sarych* (Project 956 (*Sovremenny I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 twin 3S90 Inchr with 9M317 *Yezh* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-956 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

- 6 *Fregat* (Project 1155 (*Udaloy I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with URK-5 *Rastrub-B* (RS-SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

- 1 *Fregat* (Project 1155 (*Udaloy I*)) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

- 1 *Fregat* (Project 11551 (*Udaloy II*)) (in refit) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 3M87 *Kortik* CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

FRIGATES 16

FFGHM 14:

- 3 Project 11356 (*Grigorovich*) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM/91RT2 A/S msl (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 12-cell 3S90.1 VLS with 9M317 *Yezh* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM/9M317M *Yezh* (RS-SA-N-7C) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-11356 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

- 1 *Jastreb* (Project 11540 (*Neustrashimyy*)) (1 other non-operational, in long-term refit) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 4 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*), 6 single 533mm ASTT with RPK-6M *Vodopad*-NK (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 3M87 *Kortik*

CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

- 1 Project 20380 (*Steregushchiy* I) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 1 3M87 *Kortik*-M CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 6 Project 20380 (*Steregushchiy* II) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 3 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-3 *Redut* (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 1 Project 20385 (*Gremyashchiy*) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 *Poliment-Redut* (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 2 Project 22350 (*Gorshkov*) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 8-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 *Poliment-Redut* (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 3M89 *Palash* CIWS (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

FFGM 2:

- 1 *Burevestnik* (Project 1135 (*Krivak* I))† with 1 quad Inchr with URK-5 *Rastrub*-B (RS-SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns
- 1 *Burevestnik* M (Project 1135M (*Krivak* II)) with 1 quad Inchr with URK-5 *Rastrub*-B (RS-SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 2 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 100mm guns

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 129

CORVETTES 42

FSGM 14

- 9 *Buyan*-M (Project 21631 (*Sviyazhsk*)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 sextuple 3M47 *Gibka* Inchr with *Igla*-1M (RS-SA-N-10 *Grouse*) SAM, 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
- 1 *Karakurt* (Project 22800 (*Uragan*)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B

Sizzler) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 *Pantsir*-M with 57E6 SAM, 1 76mm gun

- 1 Project 11661K (*Gepard* I) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 1 Project 11661K (*Gepard* II) with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 1 3M89 *Palash* CIWS with 9M337 *Sosna*-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 76mm gun
- 2 *Sivuch* (Project 1239 (*Dergach*)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33AM *Osa*-MA2 (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

FSG 2 *Karakurt* (Project 22800 (*Uragan*)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

FSM 26:

- 2 *Albatros* (Project 1124 (*Grisha* III)) with 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun
- 18 *Albatros* (Project 1124M (*Grisha* V)) with 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 6 Project 1331M (*Parchim* II) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PSOH 3 Project 22160 (*Bykov*) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

PCGM 10:

- 9 *Ovod*-1 (Project 1234.1 (*Nanuchka* III)) with 2 triple Inchr with P-120 *Malakhit* (RS-SS-N-9 *Siren*) ASHM, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 1 *Ovod*-1 (Project 1234.1 (*Nanuchka* III)) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCFG 23:

- 5 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* II) with 2 twin Inchr with P-22 *Termit*-R (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 17 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* III) with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

1 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* III) with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 1 3K89 *Palash* (RS-CADS-N-2) CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCM 3 *Buyan* (Project 21630 (*Astrakhan*)) with 1 sextuple Inchr with 3M47 *Gibka* Inchr with *Igla*-1M (RS-SA-N-10 *Grouse*) SAM, 1 A-215 *Grad*-M 122mm MRL, 1 100mm gun

PCF 1 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* III) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PBF 19: 17 *Raptor* (capacity 20 troops); 2 *Mangust*

PBR 4 *Shmel* with 1 17-cell BM-14 MRL, 1 76mm gun

PB 24 *Grachonok*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 42

MCC 5 *Alexandrit* (Project 12700)

MHI 7 *Sapfir* (Project 10750 (*Lida*)) with 1 AK630 CIWS

MHO 2 *Rubin* (Project 12660 (*Gorya*)) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MSC 20: 19 *Yakhont* (Project 1265 (*Sonya*)) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM); 1 *Korund*-E (Project 1258E (*Yevgeniya*))

MSO 8: 7 *Akvamaren*-M (Project 266M (*Natya*)); 1 *Agat* (Project 02668 (*Natya* II)) (all with 2 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 21:

12 Project 775 (*Ropucha* I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

3 Project 775M (*Ropucha* III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

4 *Tapir* (Project 1171 (*Alligator*)) with at least 2 twin Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

2 Project 11711 (*Gren*) with 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 2 AK630M CIWS (capacity 1 Ka-29 *Helix* B hel; 13 MBT/36 AFV; 300 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 28

LCM 26: 9 *Akula* (Project 1176 (*Ondatra*)) (capacity 1 MBT); 5 *Dyugon* (Project 21820) (capacity 5 APC or 100 troops); 12 *Serna* (Project 11770) (capacity 2 APC or 100 troops)

LCAC 2 *Zubr* (Project 12322 (*Pomornik*)) with 2 22-cell 140mm MS-227 *Ogon'* MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC(T))

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 278

SSAN 8:

2 *Halibut* (Project 18511 (*Paltus*))

3 *Kashalot* (Project 1910 (*Uniform*))

1 *Nelma* (Project 1851 (*X-Ray*))

1 *Orenburg* (*Delta* III Stretch)

1 *Podmoskovye* (Project 09787)

(1 non-operational *Losharik* (Project 10831 (*Norsub*-5)) reportedly damaged by fire in 2019)

SSA 1 *Sarov* (Project 20120)

ABU 12: 8 *Kashtan*; 4 Project 419 (*Sura*)

AE 9: 6 *Muna*; 1 *Dubnyak*; 2 *Akademik Kovalev* (Project 20181) with 1 hel landing platform

AEM 2: 1 *Kalma*-3 (Project 1791R); 1 *Lama*

AFS 2 *Longvinik* (Project 23120)

AG 1 *Potok*

AGB 5: 1 *Dobrynya Mikitich*; 1 *Ilya Muromets*; 2 *Ivan Susanin*; 1 *Vladimir Kavraisky*

AGE 3: 2 *Seliger*; 1 *Tchusovoy*

AGHS 4 Project 23040G

AGI 14: 2 *Alpinist*; 2 *Dubridium* (Project 1826); 1 *Moma*; 7 *Vishnya*; 2 *Yuri Ivanov*

AGM 1 *Marshal Nedelin*

AGOR 7: 1 *Akademik Alexandrov* (Project 20183); 1

Akademik Krylov; 2 *Sibiriyakov*; 2 *Vinograd*; 1 *Yantar*

AGS 67: 8 *Biya*; 16+ *Finik*; 7 *Kamenka*; 5 *Moma*; 8+ *Onega*; 6 *Baklan* (Project 19920); 4 *Baklan* (Project 19920B); 4 *Vaygach*; 9+ *Yug*

AGSH 1 *Samara*

AH 3 *Obt*

AK 3: 2 *Irgiz*; 1 *Pevek*

AOL 8: 2+ *Dubna*; 3 *Uda*; 3+ *Altay* (mod)

AOR 4: 3 *Boris Chilikin*; 1 *Akademik Pashin* (Project 23130)

AORL 2: 1 *Kaliningradneft*; 1 *Olekma*

AOS 1 *Luza*

AOTL 1 *Platforma-Arktika* (Project 03182) with 1 hel landing platform

AR ε7 *Amur*

ARC 5: 4 *Emba*; 1 Improved *Klasma*

ARS 33: 1 *Kommuna*; 5 *Goryn*; 4 *Mikhail Rudnitsky*; 22 Project 23040; 1 *Zvezdochka* (Project 20180)

AS 3 Project 2020 (*Malina*)

ASR 2: 1 *Elbrus*; 1 *Igor Belousov*

ATF 53: 1 *Okhotsk*; 1 *Baklan*; ε3 *Katun*; 3 *Ingul*; 1 *Neftgaz*; 10 *Okhtensky*; 13 *Prometey*; 2 Project 23470 with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Prut*; 4 *Sliva*; 14 *Sorum*

ATS 6 Project 22870

AWT 1 *Manych*

AXL 9: 7 *Petrushka*; 2 *Smolny* with 2 RBU 2500 *Smerch* 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns

Naval Aviation ε31,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM *Foxhound*

1 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

1 regt with Su-33 *Flanker D*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR *Fulcrum*

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound*; Su-24M/M2/MR *Fencer*

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

2 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*; Su-30SM

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 regt with Il-38/Il-38N *May**; Il-18D; Il-20RT *Coot A*; Il-22 *Coot B*

2 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N *May**; Il-18D; Il-20RT *Coot A*; Il-22 *Coot B*

1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

2 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J**

1 unit with Ka-31R *Helix*

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-26 *Curl*; Be-12 *Mail**; Ka-27 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12PS *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-24RV *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*; An-140

2 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154, Il-38 *May*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

4 AD div HQ

1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 219 combat capable

FTR 67: 10 MiG-31B/BS *Foxhound*; 22 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; 17 Su-33 *Flanker D*; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

FGA 44: 19 MiG-29KR *Fulcrum*; 3 MiG-29KUBR *Fulcrum*; 22 Su-30SM

ATK 46: 41 Su-24M *Fencer*; 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot* (trg role)

ASW 44: 12 Tu-142MK/MZ *Bear F*; 10 Tu-142MR *Bear J* (comms); 15 Il-38 *May*; 7 Il-38N *May*

MP 7: 6 Be-12PS *Mail**; 1 Il-18D

ISR 12 Su-24MR *Fencer E**

SAR 4: 3 An-12PS *Cub*; 1 Be-200ES

ELINT 4: 2 Il-20RT *Coot A*; 2 Il-22 *Coot B*

TPT 49: **Medium** 2 An-12BK *Cub*; **Light** 45: 1 An-24RV *Coke*; 24 An-26 *Curl*; 6 An-72 *Coaler*; 4 An-140; 9 Tu-134; 1 Tu-134UBL; **PAX** 2 Tu-154M *Careless*

TRG 4 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 8 Mi-24P *Hind*

ASW 52: 30 Ka-27PL *Helix*; 22 Ka-27M *Helix*

EW 8 Mi-8 *Hip J*

AEW 2 Ka-31R *Helix*

SAR 16 Ka-27PS *Helix D*

TPT 41: **Medium** 35: 27 Ka-29 *Helix*; 4 Mi-8T *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MT *Hip*; **Light** 6 Ka-226T

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range 200: 56 S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 40 S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); 104 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 30 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D *Alamo*); R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-74M (RS-AA-11B *Archer*); **ARH** R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B *Adder*); **SARH** R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C *Alamo*); R-33 (RS-AA-9A *Amos*)

ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

ASM Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 *Kingbolt*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); Kh-29T (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*)

AshM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*)

Naval Infantry (Marines) €35,000**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

3 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

4 (OMRP) SF unit

11 (PDSS) cbt diver unit

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 recce bde

Mechanised

1 MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 SAM regt)

2 MR bde

1 MR regt

6 naval inf bde

1 naval inf regt

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26 *Stone*/RS-SSC-7 *Southpaw*)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

2 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt with 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); *Strela-1*/*Strela-10* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*/RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 330: 50 T-72B; 150 T-72B3; 30 T-72B3M; 50 T-80BV; 50 T-80BVM

IFV 1,260: 400 BMP-2; 80 BMP-3; 40 BMP-3F; 740 BTR-82A

APC 400

APC (T) 300 MT-LB

APC (W) 100 BTR-80

AUV *Vystrel*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 60+: 60 9P148 with 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9P157-2 with 9K123 *Khrisantema* (RS-AT-15 *Springer*)

MANPATS 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

GUNS 100mm T-12

ARTILLERY 405

SP 181: **122mm** 95 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 86: 50 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 36 2S19M1 *Msta-S*

TOWED 152mm 100: 50 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 50 2A65 *Msta-B*

GUN/MOR 66

SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S
TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 58: 122mm 36 BM-21 *Grad/Tornado-G*; **220mm** 18
 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 4+ 9A52 *Smerch*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHER

SRBM • Dual-capable 12 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26
Stone)

GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7
Southpaw)

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Short-range 12+ *Tor-M2DT*

Point-defence 70+: 20 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*);
 50 9K31 *Strela-1*/9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*/RS-
 SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS • SP 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4

Coastal Missile and Artillery Forces 2,000**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

5 ASHM bde

1 ASHM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**COASTAL DEFENCE**

ARTY • SP 130mm ε36 A-222 *Bereg*

AShM 96+: 40 3K60 *Bal* (RS-SSC-6 *Sennight*); 56 3K55
Bastion (RS-SSC-5 *Stooge*); some 4K44 *Redut* (RS-SSC-1
Sepal); some 4K51 *Rubezh* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*)

Aerospace Forces ε165,000 (incl conscripts)

A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM,
 BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB

FORCES BY ROLE**BOMBER**

3 regt with Tu-22M3 *Backfire C*

3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod *Bear*

1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod *Blackjack*

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* (Armenia)

2 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM/Su-27UB *Flanker B/J/C*; Su-
 30M2 *Flanker G*

2 regt with Su-30SM *Flanker H*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-27SM *Flanker J*;
 Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*; Su-35S *Flanker*
M

1 regt with Su-27SM *Flanker J*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

1 regt with Su-35S *Flanker M*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

1 regt with Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*

1 regt with Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*; Su-34 *Fullback*

1 regt with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

3 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with Su-25SM *Frogfoot* (Kyrgyzstan)

3 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*

ISR

3 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer*

1 flt with An-30 *Clank*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with A-50/A-50U *Mainstay*

TANKER

1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M *Midas*

TRANSPORT

6 regt/sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-148-100E; An-26 *Curl*;
 Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154 *Careless*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with An-124 *Condor*; Il-76MD *Candid*

1 regt with An-124 *Condor*; Il-76MD *Candid*; Il-76MD-
 90A *Candid*

1 regt with An-12BK *Cub*; Il-76MD *Candid*

1 sqn with An-22 *Cock*

3 regt with Il-76MD *Candid*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 bde with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*;
 Mi-8 *Hip*

2 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8MTPR-1
Hip; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-35 *Hind*;
 Mi-8 *Hip*

2 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

2 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

9 AD div HQ

4 regt with 9K37M1-2 *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*);
 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); S-300V (RS-SA-12
Gladiator/Giant)

1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

2 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

6 regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

12 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1*
 (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 1,172 combat capable**

BBR 137: 60 Tu-22M3 *Backfire C*; 1 Tu-22MR *Backfire+* (1 in
 overhaul); 42 Tu-95MS *Bear*; 18 Tu-95MS mod *Bear*; 7 Tu-
 160 *Blackjack*; 7 Tu-160 mod *Blackjack*; 2 Tu-160M *Blackjack*
 (in test)

FTR 185: 70 MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; 85 MiG-31BM
Foxhound C; 12 Su-27 *Flanker B*; 18 Su-27UB *Flanker C*

FGA 427+: 15 MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UBT
Fulcrum; 6 MiG-35S/UB *Fulcrum* (in test); 47 Su-27SM
Flanker J; 24 Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; 19 Su-30M2 *Flanker G*;
 91 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 124 Su-34 *Fullback*; 1+ Su-34 mod
Fullback; 97 Su-35S *Flanker M*; 1 Su-57 *Felon* (in test)

ATK 264: 70 Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*; 40 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 139 Su-
 25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*; 15 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*

ISR 58: 4 An-30 *Clank*; up to 50 Su-24MR *Fencer**; 2 Tu-
 214ON; 2 Tu-214R

EW 3 Il-22PP *Mute*

ELINT 31: 14 Il-20M *Coot A*; 5 Il-22 *Coot B*; 12 Il-22M *Coot B*
AEW&C 9: 3 A-50 *Mainstay*; 6 A-50U *Mainstay*
C2 8: 2 Il-80 *Maxdome*; 1 Il-82; 4 Tu-214SR; 1 Tu-214PU-SBUS

TKR 15: 5 Il-78 *Midas*; 10 Il-78M *Midas*

TPT 448: **Heavy** 126: 11 An-124 *Condor*; 4 An-22 *Cock*; 99 Il-76MD *Candid*; 3 Il-76MD-M *Candid*; 9 Il-76MD-90A *Candid*; **Medium** 65 An-12BK *Cub*; **Light** 225: 114 An-26 *Curl*; 25 An-72 *Coaler*; 5 An-140; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 32: 15 An-148-100E; 17 Tu-154 *Careless*

TRG 262: 35 DA42T; 118 L-39 *Albatros*; 109 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 399+: 133 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 100 Mi-24D/V/P *Hind*; 90+ Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 13 Mi-28UB *Havoc*; 63+ Mi-35 *Hind*
EW £20 Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT 333: **Heavy** 33 Mi-26/Mi-26T *Halo*; **Medium** 300: 100 Mi-8/Mi-8MT *Hip*; 60 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 5 Mi-8AMTSh-VA *Hip*; 135 Mi-8MTV-5-1 *Hip*

TRG 69: 19 Ka-226U; 50 *Ansat-U*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** some *Inokhodets*

ISR • **Medium** *Forpost (Searcher II)*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 714:

Long-range 584: 160 S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); 150 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 20 S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 6 S-350 *Vityaz* (RS-SA-28); 248 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Medium-range 80 9K37M1-2 *Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*/RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)

Short-range 50 96K6 *Pantsir-S1/S2* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D *Alamo*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-74M (RS-AA-11B *Archer*); R-60T (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); **SARH** R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C *Alamo*); R-33 (RS-AA-9A *Amos*); **ARH** R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B *Adder*); R-37M (RS-AA-13A *Axehead*); **PRH** R-27P/EP (RS-AA-10E/F *Alamo*)

ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-25M (RS-AS-12B *Kegler*); Kh-31P/PM (RS-AS-17A/C *Krypton*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

ASM Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-38; Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 *Kingbolt*) Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); *Kinzhal* (RS-AS-24 *Killjoy*); 9M114 *Kokon* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9M120 *Ataka* (RS-AT-9 *Spiral 2*); 9M120-1 *Vikhr* (RS-AT-16 *Scallion*)

AShM Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 *Kitchen*); Kh-31A/AM (RS-AS-17B/D *Krypton*); Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A *mod*); Kh-35U (RS-AS-20 *Kayak*)

LACM

Nuclear Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*); Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B *Kodiak*)

Conventional Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A *Kodiak*); Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 *Kluge*)

BOMBS

Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L

TV-guided KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD; UPAB 1500

INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S

Airborne Forces £45,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (AB *Recce*) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

2 AB div (1 tk bn, 3 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 indep AB bde

2 air aslt bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 160: 150 T-72B3; 10 T-72B3M

IFV 130 BTR-82AM

APC 822+

APC (T) 822: 700 BTR-D; 122 BTR-MDM

PPV *Typhoon*-VDV

ABCV 1,351: 1,000 BMD-2; 351 BMD-4M

AUV *GAZ Tigr*; *UAMZ Toros*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV *BREM-D*; *BREhM-D*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 100 BTR-RD

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (RS-AT-13); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS • **SP** 125mm 36+ 2S25 *Sprut*-SD

ARTILLERY 600+

TOWED 122mm 150 D-30

GUN/MOR • **SP** 120mm 250: 220 2S9 *NONA-S*; 30 2S9 *NONA-SM*; (500 2S9 *NONA-S* in store)

MOR • **TOWED** 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23 *NONA-M1*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** 30+: 30 *Strela*-10MN (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba* (RS-SA-29 *Gizmo*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*); 9K34 *Strela*-3 (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*)

GUNS • **SP** 23mm 150 BTR-ZD

Special Operations Forces £1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF unit

Railway Forces £29,000

4 regional commands

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

10 (railway) tpt bde

Russian Military Districts

Western Military District

HQ at St Petersburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

3 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bde

Armoured

1 tk div

1 tk bde

3 MR div

Mechanised

1 MR div

3 MR bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

3 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M*

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 (hy) arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 engr bde

3 engr regt

1 ptn br bde

1 EW bde

1 NBC bde

2 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

4 AD bde

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 MR bde

Northern Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 27

STRATEGIC 8 SSBN (of which 2 in refit) (1 additional in reserve)

TACTICAL 19: 5 SSGN; 9 SSN; 5 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV (in refit); 1 CGHMN; 1 CGHM; 5 DDGHM (1 more in reserve); 2 FFGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16: 6

FSM; 2 PCGM; 8 PB

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8: 1 MHO; 1 MSO; 6 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 8: 6 LST; 2 LCM

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-33 *Flanker D*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-24M/M2/*MR Fencer*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 regt with Il-38/Il-38N *May*; Il-20RT *Coot A*; Tu-134

1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*

AIR DEFENCE

5 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 38: 20 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; 18 Su-33 *Flanker D*

FGA 25: 19 MiG-29KR *Fulcrum*; 4 MiG-29KUBR *Fulcrum*; 2 Su-30SM *Flanker H*

ATK 18: 13 Su-24M *Fencer*; 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot* (trg role)

ASW 17: 5 Il-38 *May*; 1 Il-38N *May*; 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer*

ELINT 3: 2 Il-20RT *Coot A*; 1 Il-22 *Coot B*

TPT 9: 8 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix A* TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 MR bde

1 naval inf bde

COMMAND

1 engr regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 ASHM bde

Baltic Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 1

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 1 DDGHM; 5 FFGHM (1 more non-operational, in long-term refit)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 34: 3 FSGM; 2 FSG; 6 FSM; 4 PCGM; 7 PCFG; 11 PBF; 1 PB
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11: 1 MCC; 4 MSC; 6 MHI
AMPHIBIOUS 13: 4 LST; 7 LCM; 2 LCAC

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-27 *Flanker B*

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

2 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker B/C*

FGA 8 Su-30SM *Flanker H*

ATK 10 Su-24M *Fencer*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer*

TPT 8: 6 An-26 *Curl*; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*

HELICOPTERS

ATK Mi-24P *Hind*

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • **Medium** Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR div

1 MR regt

1 naval inf bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M*

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 ASHM regt

Military Air Force

6th Air Force & Air Defence Army

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-30SM *Flanker H*

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

1 regt with Su-27SM *Flanker J*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*

ISR

1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*; An-30 *Clank*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-24P/Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-8PPA *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

3 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 30 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*

FGA 98: 12 Su-27SM *Flanker J*; 24 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 24 Su-34 *Fullback*; 38 Su-35S *Flanker M*

ISR 19: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 15 Su-24MR *Fencer E**

TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ATK 76+: 24 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 16 Mi-24P *Hind*; 24 Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 12+ Mi-35 *Hind*

EW 8 Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT • **Medium** 50 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Long-range S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (AB Recce) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

3 AB div

Central Military District

HQ at Yekaterinburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk div

3 MR bde

Mechanised

3 (lt/mtn) MR bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE2 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M***COMBAT SUPPORT**

2 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 engr bde

3 engr regt

1 EW bde

2 NBC bde

2 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD bde

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

3 MR bde

Military Air Force**14th Air Force & Air Defence Army****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**2 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C***GROUND ATTACK**1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*1 sqn with Su-25SM *Frogfoot* (Kyrgyzstan)**ISR**1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E***TRANSPORT**1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*;Tu-154; Mi-8 *Hip***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 bde with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*1 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*1 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip* (Tajikistan)**AIR DEFENCE**1 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)1 regt with S-300PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)4 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**FTR 40 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*FGA 25: 24 Su-34 *Fullback*; 1+ Su-34 mod *Fullback*ATK 13 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*ISR 9 Su-24MR *Fencer E*TPT 36 An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154 *Careless***HELICOPTERS**ATK 24 Mi-24 *Hind*TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 *Halo*; 40 Mi-8 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE****SAM**Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)**Airborne Troops****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Air Manoeuvre**

1 AB bde

Southern Military District

HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

3 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

3 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 recce bde

Armoured

3 MR div

1 MR bde

1 MR bde (Armenia)

1 MR bde (South Ossetia)

Mechanised

1 MR div

1 MR bde

1 MR bde (Abkhazia)

1 (lt/mtn) MR bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE3 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M***COMBAT SUPPORT**

3 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 engr bde

1 EW bde

1 NBC bde

2 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD bde

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in Crimea, at Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaia Bay

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 6 SSK**

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 1 CGHM; 3 FFGHM; 2 FFGM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 36: 8 FSGM; 6 FSM; 3 PSOH; 5 PCFG; 6 PB; 8 PBF

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10: 3 MCC; 1 MHO; 5 MSO; 1 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 10: 7 LST; 3 LCM

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 regt with Ka-27 *Helix*; An-26 *Curl*; Be-12PS *Mail*; Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FGA 12 Su-30SM *Flanker H*

ATK 13 Su-24M *Fencer D*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

MP 3 Be-12PS *Mail*

TPT 6 An-26

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • **Medium** Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 naval inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

1 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

2 AShM bde

Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15: 3 FSGM; 1 PCFG; 3 PCM; 3 PB; 1 PBF; 4 PBR

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3: 2 MSC; 1 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS 9 LCM

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 naval inf regt

Military Air Force

4th Air Force & Air Defence Army

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-30SM *Flanker H*

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-30SM *Flanker H* (Armenia)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM *Flanker B/J*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*

1 regt with Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

2 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*

1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer D/E*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12 *Cub*/Mi-8 *Hip*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 bde with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

1 regt with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

2 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*;

Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*

1 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip* (Armenia)

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt with 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

3 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 26: 12 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 14 Su-27 *Flanker B*

FGA 95: 12 Su-27SM *Flanker J*; 24 Su-27SM3

Flanker; 14 Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; 21 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 24 Su-34 *Fullback*

ATK 109: 24 Su-24M *Fencer D*; 85 Su-25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*

ISR 12 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TPT 12 An-12 *Cub*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 117: 25 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 44 Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 8 Mi-24P *Hind*; 40 Mi-35 *Hind*

EW 3+ Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT 72: **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 62 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Medium-range 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvr

1 AB div

Eastern Military District

HQ located at Khabarovsk

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 tk bde
1 MR div
6 MR bde

Mechanised

2 MR bde
1 MGA div

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

4 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M*

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 arty bde
1 MRL bde
1 engr bde
1 EW bde
1 NBC bde
4 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

5 AD bde

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Mechanised
8 MR bde

Pacific Fleet**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES** 15

STRATEGIC 3 SSBN

TACTICAL 12: 3 SSGN (2 more non-operational in long-term refit); 1 SSN (3 more non-operational in long-term refit); 8 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CGHM;

5 DDGHM; 4 FFGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28: 8

FSM; 4 PCGM; 10 PCFG; 6 PB

MINE WARFARE 10: 1 MCC; 2 MSO; 7 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 9: 4 LST; 5 LCM

Naval Aviation**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with MiG-31BS/BM *Foxhound A/C*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*
2 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N *May*; Il-18D; Il-22 *Coot B*
1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 12 MiG-31B/BS/BM *Foxhound A/C*
ASW 23: 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*; 8 Il-38 *May*; 4 Il-38N *May*

MP 1 Il-18D

EW • ELINT 1 Il-22 *Coot B*

TPT 6: 2 An-12BK *Cub*; 3 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Long-range S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Naval Infantry**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Mechanised
2 naval inf bde

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

2 ASHM bde

Military Air Force**11th Air Force & Air Defence Army****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-27SM *Flanker J*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

1 regt with Su-35S *Flanker M*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

1 regt with Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer D/D mod*; Su-34 *Fullback*

1 regt with Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

ISR

1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*/
Tu-154 *Careless*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

1 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

1 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

1 regt with 9K37M *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*);

1 regt with S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*);
S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

4 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-400
(RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22
Greyhound)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 20 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*

FGA 120: 23 Su-27SM *Flanker J*; 6 Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; 31 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 26 Su-34 *Fullback*; 34
Su-35S *Flanker M*

ATK 102: 20 Su-24M *Fencer D*; 10 Su-24M2 *Fencer*;

72 Su-25/Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

ISR 12 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TPT 24: 22 An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*; 1 Tu-154 *Careless*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 36: 24 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 12 Mi-24P *Hind*

EW 2+ Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT 60: **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 56 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Medium-range 9K317 *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range 9K6K *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

2 air aslt bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 554,000

Border Guard Service €160,000

Subordinate to Federal Security Service

FORCES BY ROLE

10 regional directorates

MANOEUVRE

Other

7 frontier gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR/

AUV BPM-97

ARTILLERY 90

SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 2S9 *NONA-S*

MOR 120mm 2S12 *Sani*

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 201

PSOHM 2 *Nerey (Krivak III)* with 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad PTA-53-1135 533mm TT Inchr, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix A* ASW hel)

PSO 6: 4 *Komandor*; 2 *Okean* (Project 22100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCO 27: 8 *Alpinist* (Project 503); 1 *Sprut*; 12 *Okhotnik* (Project 22460) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 hel landing platform; 6 *Purga* with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 33: 4 *Molnya II (Pauk II)*; 6 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410); 13 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 8 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410) with 2 AK630M CIWS; 1 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410) with 1 AK630M CIWS; 1 *Yakhont*

PCR 1 *Slepen (Yaz)* with 1 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns

PBF 87: 57 *Mangust*; 3 *Mirazh* (Project 14310); 4 *Mustang-2* (Project 18623); 21 *Sobol*; 2 *Sokzhoi*

PBR 27: 4 *Ogonek*; 8 *Piyavka* with 1 AK630 CIWS; 15 *Moskit (Vosh)* with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun

PB 18: 6 *Gyuyys* (Project 03050); 2 *Morzh* (Project 1496M; 10 *Lamantin* (Project 1496M1)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34

AE 1 *Muna*

AGB 2 *Ivan Susanin* (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

AK 8 *Pevek*

AKSL 5 *Kanin*

AO 3: 1 *Ishim* (Project 15010); 2 *Envoron*

ATF 15: 14 *Sorum* (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK230M CIWS; 1 *Sorum* (primarily used as patrol ship)

AIRCRAFT • TPT €86: 70 An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/An-72 *Coaler*/Il-76 *Candid*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Yak-40 *Codling*; 16 SM-92

HELICOPTERS: €200 Ka-27PS *Helix*/Mi-24 *Hind*/Mi-26 *Halo*/Mi-8 *Hip*

Federal Guard Service €40,000–50,000

Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech inf regt

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB regt

Other

1 (Presidential) gd regt

Federal Security Service Special Purpose Centre €4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF unit (Alfa and Vypmel units)

National Guard €340,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

10 paramilitary div (2–5 paramilitary regt)

17 paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)

36 indep paramilitary rgt

90 paramilitary bn (incl special motorised units)

Aviation

8 sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE some BRDM-2A

IFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/BTR-82A/BTR-82AM

PPV *Ural-VV*

AUV *Patrol-A*; *Tigr*

ARTILLERY 35

TOWED 122mm 20 D-30

MOR 120mm 15 M-1938 (PM-38)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

PBF 3 BK-16 (Project 02510)

PB 2+ *Grachonok*

AIRCRAFT

TPT 29: **Heavy** 9 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*;

Light 18: 12 An-26 *Curl*; 6 An-72 *Coaler*

HELICOPTERS

TPT 71: **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 60+: 60 Mi-8 *Hip*; some Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; **Light** 1 Ka-226T

DEPLOYMENT

ARMENIA: 3,500: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 4 Su-30SM *Flanker* H; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MT *Hip*; 2 AD bty with S-300V; 1 AD bty with *Buk*-M1-2)

AZERBAIJAN: 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping)

BELARUS: 1 radar station at Baranovichi (*Volga* system; leased); 1 naval comms site

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 8

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 4

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 10

GEORGIA: 7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72B3; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; 16 S-300PS); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72BA; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

KAZAKHSTAN: 1 radar station at Balkash (*Dnepr* system; leased)

KYRGYZSTAN: €500; 13 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip*

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: 2 SSK; 1 FFGHM; 1 FFGM; 1 AGI

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4

MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: €1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 7 Mi-24 *Hind*; some Mi-8 *Hip*

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

SYRIA: 4,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; €10 T-72B3; €20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; *Typhoon*-K; *Tigr*; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 *Smerch*; 10 Su-24M *Fencer* D; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S *Flanker* M; 1 A-50U *Mainstay*; 1 Il-20M; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35M *Hind*; 4 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 1 ASHM bty with 3K55 *Bastion*; 1 SAM bty with S-400; 1 SAM bty with *Pantsir*-S1/S2; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus

TAJIKISTAN: 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 17 BMP-2M; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; *Tigr*; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140 *Uragan*); 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8MTV *Hip*; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-1 *Hip*; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS


UKRAINE: Crimea: 30,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC regt; 40 T-72B3; 80 BMP-2; 200 BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80; 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 18 2A65; 12 BM-21; 8 9P140 *Uragan*; 1 ASHM bde with 3K60 *Bal*; 3K55 *Bastion*; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 2 AD regt with S-400; *Pantsir*-S1; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system); Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 10

Tajikistan TJK

Tajikistani Somoni TJS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TJS	82.5bn	92.1bn	
	USD	8.00bn	8.10bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	844	839	
Growth	%	4.5	5.0	
Inflation	%	8.6	8.0	
Def bdgt [a]	TJS	€917m	€1.06bn	
	USD	€88.8m	€93.5m	
USD1=TJS		10.32	11.37	

[a] Excludes budget for law enforcement



Population 8,990,874

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.7%	4.7%	4.5%	4.3%	18.9%	1.6%
Female	15.1%	4.5%	4.4%	4.2%	19.7%	2.2%

Capabilities

The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than token forces and most equipment is of Soviet-era origin. Regional security and terrorism remain key security concerns, given the border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan has been building its capability by hosting CSTO counter-terrorism exercises and by taking part in exercises, organised by US CENTCOM, focused on scenarios including counter-terrorism. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO and the SCO, and the armed forces also conduct exercises with Russian troops based at Russia's 201st military base. In 2021, bilateral military exercises and CSTO joint drills concerned scenarios focused on the border with Afghanistan. Reports in early 2019 indicated that there may be a Chinese military facility in eastern Tajikistan, though this remains unconfirmed by either Beijing or Dushanbe. In 2021, reports indicated that China was to fund an outpost for Tajikistan's police special forces near to the border with Afghanistan. Though the pre-existing base is still officially denied by Beijing and Dushanbe, there were reports that full control of the facility would be transferred to Beijing and future rent will be waived in exchange for military aid from China. In 2018, India and Tajikistan agreed to strengthen defence cooperation, in particular on counter-terrorism, and there were reports in 2021 of agreements on security cooperation with Iran. Border deployments have been stepped up in response to concerns about regional and border security and terrorism. In late 2016, a Military Cooperation Plan was signed with Russia. Moscow has indicated that Tajikistan is to receive military equipment, including aircraft. Some personal equipment has been donated by the US. Barring maintenance facilities, Tajikistan only has minimal defence-industrial capacity.

ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500

Conscript liability 24 months

RESERVE 20,000 (Army 20,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 7,300

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

3 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 40: 30 T-72 Ural/T-72A/T-72AV/T-72B; 3 T-72B1; 7

T-62/T-62AV/T-62AM

RECCE 31: 9 BRDM-2; 22 BRDM-2M

IFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2

APC 36

APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

PPV 13 VP11

AUV 24 CS/VN3B mod; *Tigr*

ARTILLERY 41

SP 122mm 3 2S1 *Gvozhdika*

TOWED 122mm 13 D-30

MRL 122mm 15 BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 10+: SP 82mm CS/SS4; 120mm 10

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Medium-range 3 S-125 *Pechora*-2M (RS-SA-26)

Short-range 5 S-125M1 *Neva*-M1 (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS

SP 23mm 8 BTR-ZD

TOWED 23mm ZU-23M1

Air Force/Air Defence 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Tu-134A *Crusty*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17TM *Hip* H

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A *Crusty*

TRG 4+: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; some Yak-52

HELICOPTERS

ATK 4 Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-17TM *Hip* H

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500

Internal Troops 3,800

National Guard 1,200

Emergencies Ministry 2,500

Border Guards

FOREIGN FORCES

China €300 (trg)

Russia 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 17 BMP-2M; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; *Tigr*; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140 *Uragan*); 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8MTV *Hip*; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-1 *Hip*; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS

Turkmenistan TKM

Turkmen New Manat TMT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TMT	160bn	186bn	
	USD	45.6bn	53.1bn	
per capita	USD	7,674	8,844	
Growth	%	-3.4	4.5	
Inflation	%	7.6	12.5	
Def bdgt	TMT	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=TMT		3.50	3.50	

Population 5,579,889

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.6%	3.9%	4.1%	4.7%	21.6%	2.6%
Female	12.3%	3.8%	4.1%	4.7%	22.3%	3.3%

Capabilities

Turkmenistan has concerns over potential spillover from security challenges in Afghanistan, but its armed forces lack significant capabilities and equipment. Ashgabat has maintained a policy of neutrality since 1995 and confirmed this commitment in its 2016 military doctrine. This aimed to increase the armed forces' defensive capability in order to safeguard national interests and territorial integrity. Turkmenistan is not a member of the CSTO or the SCO. Progress remains slow in changing from a Soviet-era divisional structure to a brigade structure. The armed forces are largely conscript-based and reliant on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine, and the government has stated a requirement to improve conditions of service. Turkmenistan has participated in multinational exercises and is reported to have restarted joint exercises with Russia and Uzbekistan, but has limited capacity to deploy externally. In October 2019, in Saint Petersburg, Turkmenistan and four other Caspian littoral states signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, among other discussions including on maritime security. There are plans to strengthen the border guard's equipment and facilities. Plans to bolster naval capabilities have resulted in some procurements, leading to a modest improvement in the naval presence in the Caspian Sea. UAVs have been acquired, including from China. In 2021, Turkmenistan confirmed the procurement of the *Bayraktar* TB2 UAV from Turkey in its Independence Day parade. The parade also featured new military equipment including the A-29 *Super Tucano*, C-27J *Spartan* and M-346 jet trainer. Apart from maintenance facilities, Turkmenistan has little domestic defence industry, but is building a number of patrol vessels of Turkish design under licence.

ACTIVE 36,500 (Army 33,000 Navy 500 Air 3,000)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

Conscript liability 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 33,000

5 Mil Districts

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops regt

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Mechanised

1 (3rd) MR div (1 tk regt; 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (22nd) MR div (1 tk regt; 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

4 MR bde

1 naval inf bde

Other

1 MR trg div

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM bde with 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud* B)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 (mixed) arty/AT regt

1 MRL bde

1 AT regt

1 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

2 SAM bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 654: 4 T-90S; 650 T-72/T-72UMG

RECCE 260+: 200 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1; Nimr *Ajban*

IFV 1,050: 600 BMP-1/BMP-1M; 4 BMP-1UM; 430 BMP-2;

4 BMP-2D; 4 BMP-3; 4 BTR-80A; 4 BTR-80 *Grom*

APC 907+

APC (W) 870+: 120 BTR-60 (all variants); 300 BTR-70; 450 BTR-80

PPV 37+: 28+ *Kirpi*; 9+ *Titan*-DS; some *Typhoon*-K

AUV 12+: 8 Nimr *Ajban* 440A; 4+ *Cobra*

ABCV 8 BMD-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 58+: 8 9P122 *Malyutka*-M (RS-AT-3 *Sagger* on BRDM-2); 8 9P133 *Malyutka*-P (RS-AT-3 *Sagger* on BRDM-2);

2 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel* on BRDM-2); 36

9P149 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral* on MT-LB); 4+ *Baryer* (on *Karakal*)

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12

ARTILLERY 769

SP 122mm 40 2S1

TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 101: 17 D-1; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 *Giatsint*-B; 6 2A65 *Msta*-B

GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S

MRL 158: 122mm 92: 18 9P138; 70 BM-21 *Grad*; 4 BM-21A; RM-70; 220mm 60 9P140 *Uragan*; 300mm 6 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • **Conventional** 16 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud* B)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range: FM-90 (CH-SA-4); 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence 53+: 40 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 13 9K35 *Strela*-10 mod (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K32M *Strela*-2M (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K34 *Strela*-3 (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); *Mistral* (reported); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

GUNS 70

SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4

TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM CM-502KG; AR-1

Navy 500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

CORVETTES • FSGM 1 *Deñiz Han* with 4 twin Inchr with *Otomat* ASHM, 1 16-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 *Gokdeniz* CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCFG 2 *Edermen* (RUS *Molnya*) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran*-E (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCGM 2 *Arkadag* (TUR *Tuzla*) with 2 twin Inchr with *Otomat* ASHM, 2 twin *Simbad*-RC Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGHS 1 (Dearsan 41m)

Air Force 3,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with MiG-29A/S/UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with Su-25MK *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with M346FA*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind*

TRAINING

1 unit with EMB-314 *Super Tucano**

1 unit with L-39 *Albatros*

AIR DEFENCE

1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9)

1 bty with KS-1C (CH-SA-12)

3 bty with S-125 *Neva*-M1 (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

1 bty with S-125 *Pechora*-2M (RS-SA-26)

2 bty with S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable

FTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

ATK 31: 19 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 12 Su-25MK *Frogfoot*

TPT 5: **Medium** 2 C-27J *Spartan* **Light** 3: 1 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-74TK *Coaler*

TRG 13: 5 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 6 M346FA*; 2 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERSATK 10 Mi-24P *Hind F*

MRH 2+ AW139

TPT 11+: **Medium** 8: 6 Mi-8 *Hip*; 2 Mi-17V-V *Hip*; **Light** 3+ AW109**UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES**CISR 3+: **Heavy** CH-3A; WJ-600; **Medium** 3+ *Bayraktar TB2*ISR 3+: **Medium** 3+ *Falco Light Orbiter-2***LOITERING MUNITIONS** *Skystriker***AIR DEFENCE • SAM****Long-range** 18: 2 2K11 *Krug* (RS-SA-4 *Ganef*); 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9); 12 S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*);**Medium-range** 8: 4 S-125 *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26); 4 KS-1A (CH-SA-12)**Short-range** 12: 12 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); some S-125-2BM *Pechora***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*)**BOMBS**

Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000**Internal Troops** €15,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**IFV 2+ *Lazar-3*APC • PPV 9: 4+ *Survivor II*; 5 *Titan-DS*AUV 4+ *Plasan Stormrider***Federal Border Guard Service** €5,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • PPV 8: 4+ *Kirpi*; 4+ *Survivor II*AUV 6+ *Cobra***ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 4 BM-21A****AIR DEFENCE**

GUNS • TOWED • 23mm ZU-23-2


PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33PCGM 8 *Arkadag* (TUR *Tuzla*) with 2 twin Inchr with *Otomat* ASHM, 2 twin *Simbad*-RC Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 1 *Roketsan* ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S morPBFG 6 *Nazya* (Dearsan 33) with 2 single Inchr with *Marte* Mk2/N ASHMPBF 18: 10 *Bars*-12; 5 *Grif*-T; 3 *Sobol*PB 1 *Point***AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 1 Dearsan LCM-1****HELICOPTERS**

MRH 2 AW139

TPT 3+: **Medium** some Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 3 AW109**Ukraine UKR**

Ukrainian Hryvnia UAH		2020	2021	2022
GDP	UAH	4.19tr	4.98tr	
	USD	155bn	181bn	
per capita	USD	3,741	4,384	
Growth	%	-4.0	3.5	
Inflation	%	2.7	9.5	
Def bdgt [a]	UAH	118bn	118bn	131bn
	USD	4.35bn	4.27bn	
FMA (US)	USD	20m	115m	115m
USD1=UAH		26.99	27.52	

[a] Including military pensions



Population 43,745,640

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.3%	2.4%	2.3%	3.0%	24.4%	5.9%
Female	7.8%	2.3%	2.2%	2.9%	26.9%	11.5%

Capabilities

Ukraine's overriding security concern is Russia's support for separatists in the east of the country and occupation of Crimea. During 2021 exchanges of fire continued along the line of contact, with a marked increase in the second quarter of the year. Defence policy is based on maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity. The country continues to aspire to membership of NATO, with an ongoing reform programme intended to align its armed forces with Alliance standards. In line with these aims it replaced its Military Doctrine in 2021 with a new Military Security Strategy which built on the 2020 National Security Strategy. Part of the reform programme included separating the position of chief of the general staff from that of commander in chief of the armed forces, and establishing several new commands, including a Joint Forces Command. The armed forces participate in bilateral and multinational exercises. The equipment inventory still consists predominantly of Soviet-era weaponry. Sustaining and in some cases upgrading these systems is a near-term concern, and equipment replacements will be required over the coming decade in order to forestall potential problems with obsolescence. Alongside an aspiration to re-equip the air force with Western combat aircraft by the mid-2030s, there is now a near-term focus on improving its limited naval capability. This includes the acquisition of ex-UK minehunters in 2022 as well as two new-build corvettes on order from Turkey, the first of which is due for delivery by the end of 2023. The country has a broad defence industrial base, operating in all sectors, though its capability remains shaped, and limited, by its Soviet heritage. Ukraine was a key provider of guided-weapons technologies in the Soviet Union. It retains the capability to build Soviet-era land systems and can maintain and modestly upgrade Soviet-era tactical combat aircraft.

ACTIVE 196,600 (Army 125,600 Navy 15,000 Air Force 35,000 Airborne 20,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 102,000

Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. Minimum age for conscription raised from 18 to 20 in 2015

RESERVE 900,000 (Joint 900,000)

Military service within 5 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army** €125,600

4 regional HQ

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Reconnaissance**

5 recce bn

Armoured

4 tk bde

Mechanised

9 mech bde

2 mtn bde

Light

4 mot inf bde

1 lt inf bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

1 SSM bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty bde

1 MRL bde

2 MRL regt

1 engr regt

1 EW regt

1 EW bn

2 EW coy

1 CBRN regt

4 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 maint regt

1 maint coy

HELICOPTERS

4 avn bde

AIR DEFENCE

4 AD regt

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

2 tk bde

Mechanised

2 mech bde

Other

23 (territorial def) sy bde(-)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 858: 385 T-64BV; 235 T-64BV mod 2017; 100

T-64BM *Bulat*; 82 T-72AV/B1; 4 T-72AV mod 2021; 47T-72AMT; 5 T-84 *Oplot*; (34 T-80; 500 T-72; 578 T-64; 20 T-55 all in store)

RECCE 547: 327 BRDM-2; 80 BRDM-2L1; 25 BRDM-2T; 115 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 1,212: 213 BMP-1/BMP-1AK; 890 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; 54+ BTR-3DA; 6+ BTR-3E1; 45 BTR-4E

APC 622

APC (T) 60: 15 BTR-D; 45 MT-LB

APC (W) 322: 5 BTR-60; 215 BTR-70; 102 BTR-80

PPV 240: 40 *Kozak-2* /-2M; 200 Varta

ABCV 30: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2

AUV 40 *Novator***ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**

AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB

ARV 34+: 10 BREM-1; 2 BREM-M; BREM-2; BREM-64; 22+ BTS-4

VLB MTU-20

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**SP 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*)MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113*Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); FGM-148 *Javelin*;*Stugna-P*; *Corsar*

GUNS 100mm €500 MT-12/T-12

ARTILLERY 1,818SP 607+: 122mm 292 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 302: 249 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 18 2S5 *Giatsint-S*; 35 2S19 *Msta-S*; 203mm 13+ 2S7 *Pion* (up to 83 2S7 *Pion* in store)TOWED 515+: 122mm 75 D-30; 152mm 440: 180 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 130 2A65 *Msta-B*; 130+ D-20

GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 354: 122mm 203: 18 9P138; 185 BM-21 *Grad*;220mm 70 9P140 *Uragan*; 300mm 81+: *Adler*; 81 9A52 *Smerch*MOR 120mm 340: 190 2S12 *Sani*; 30 M-1938 (PM-38); 120 M120-15**SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS**SRBM • Conventional 90 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*)**HELICOPTERS**ATK €35 Mi-24 *Hind*MRH 1 *Lev-1*TPT • Medium €23 Mi-8 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 81+

Long-range Some S-300V (RS-SA-12A *Gladiator*)Short-range 6 9K330 *Tor-M* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)Point-defence 75+: 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K33 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 75 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grisson*)**GUNS**SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM *Barrier-V***Navy** €15,000 (incl Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry)

After Russia's annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa. Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in Crimea

2 Regional HQ

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES** 1FFHM 1 *Hetman Sagaidachny* (RUS *Krivak* III) with 1 twin Inchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad

533mm ASTT with SET-65 HWT/53-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

CORVETTES • FS 1 *Albatros* (Project 1124P (*Grisha* II)) with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 57mm guns

PCC 2 *Slavyansk* (ex-US *Island*)

PHG 1 *Vekhr* (FSU *Matka*) with 2 single Inchr with P-15M/R *Termit*-M/R (RS-SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) AShM, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PBG 7 *Gyurza*-M (Project 51855) with 2 *Katran*-M RWS with *Barrier* SSM

PB 1 *Grif*-M (FSU *Zhuk*)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1

MHI 1 *Korund* (Project 1258 (*Yevgenya*))

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Project 773I (*Polnochny* C) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 *Akula* (*Ondatra*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8

ABU 1 Project 419 (*Sura*)

AG 1 *Bereza*

AGI 1 *Muna*

AKL 1

AWT 1 *Sudak*

AXL 3 *Petrushka*

Naval Aviation €1,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

ASW (2 Be-12 *Mail* non-operational)

TPT • Light (2 An-26 *Curl* in store)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 7+: 4+ Ka-27 *Helix* A; 1 Mi-14PS *Haze* A; 2 Mi-14PL *Haze* C

TPT • Medium 1 Ka-29 *Helix*-B

TRG 1 Ka-226

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Medium 1+ *Bayraktar* TB2

Naval Infantry €6,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 rece bn

Light

2 nav inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 69: 41 T-64BV; 28 T-80BV mod

IFV BMP-1

APC

APC (T) MT-LB

APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-80

PPV *Varta*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

GUNS 100mm MT-12

ARTILLERY

SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*

TOWED 152mm 2A36 *Giatsint*-B

AIR DEFENCE

GUNS • SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

Coastal Defence €1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 arty bde

1 MRL regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY

TOWED 152mm some D-20

MRL 220mm some 9P140 *Uragan*

COASTAL DEFENCE

AShM 1 RK-360MC *Neptun*

Air Forces 45,000

3 Regional HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

4 bde with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27 *Flanker* B; L-39

Albatros

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 bde with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR

2 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer* E*

TRANSPORT

3 bde with An-24 *Curl*; An-26 *Coke*; An-30 *Clank*; Il-76

Candid; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-9 *Hip*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AIR DEFENCE

6 bde with 9K37M *Buk*-M1 (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

4 regt with 9K37M *Buk*-M1 (RS-SA-11); S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT €124 combat capable

FTR 70: €36 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; €34 Su-27 *Flanker* B

FGA €14 Su-24M *Fencer* D

ATK €31 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 12: 3 An-30 *Clank*; €9 Su-24MR *Fencer* E*

TPT 29: **Heavy** 5 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 1 An-70; **Light**

€23: 3 An-24 *Coke*; €19 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG €31 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

C2 €14 Mi-9 *Hip*

TPT 32: **Medium** €30 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 2 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Medium 6 *Bayraktar* TB2

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 322+:

Long-range 250 S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

Medium-range 72 9K37M *Buk*-M1 (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range some S-125 *Pechora* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

GUNS • TOWED 23mm some ZU-23-2

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A

Archer) SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10A *Alamo*)

ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*);
MAM-L
ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11
Kilter); Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 *Kyle*) (likely WFU)

Airborne Assault Troops €20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bde
5 air aslt bde
1 air mob bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 SP arty bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 60 T-80BV mod
IFV some BTR-3E1; some BTR-4 *Bucephalus*
APC 187+

APC (T) 25 BTR-D

APC (W) 162+: 1 BTR-60; 2 BTR-70; 122 BTR-80; 10
Dozor-B; 27+ *Oncilla*

ABCV 75: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2

AUV 30+: some KrAZ *Spartan*; €30 *Novator*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*);
9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

ARTILLERY 142

SP 18+: 122mm 2S1 *Gvozhdika*; 152mm 18 2S3 *Akatsiya*
TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30
MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 *Grad*
GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 NONA-S
MOR 120mm 24 2S12 *Sani*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K35M *Strela-10M*
GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted)

Special Operations Forces €1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF regt

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 102,000

National Guard €60,000

Ministry of Internal Affairs; 5 territorial comd

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

Some tk bn

Mechanised

Some mech bn

Light

Some lt inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-64; T-64BV; T-64BM; T-72
IFV 93: BTR-3; 32+ BTR-3E1; €50 BTR-4 *Bucephalus*;
10+ BTR-4E; 1 BMP-2

APC 22+

APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80

PPV 22+: Streit *Cougar*; Streit *Spartan*; 22 *Kozak-2*;
Varta

AUV Novator

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 73mm some SPG-9

ARTILLERY

TOWED 122mm some D-30

MOR 120mm some

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 24: 20 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-72 *Coaler*; 2 Tu-
134 *Crusty*

HELICOPTERS • TPT 14: Medium 11: 4 H225M; 7

Mi-8 *Hip*; Light 3: 2 H125; 1 Mi-2MSB

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted)

Border Guard €42,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

some mot inf gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • PPV 17 *Kozak-2*

Maritime Border Guard

The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border Guards and is not part of the navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21

PCT 1 *Molnya* (*Pauk I*) with 4 single 406mm TT, 2

RBV 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 1 76mm gun

PCC 4 *Tarantul* (*Stenka*)

PB 12: 11 *Zhuk*; 1 *Orlan*

PBR 4 *Shmel* with 1 76mm gun

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1

AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 *Camp*; Light An-24

Coke; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*

HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 *Helix A*

DEPLOYMENT

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •

MONUSCO 260; 1 atk hel sqn

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 12

MOLDOVA: 10 (Joint Peacekeeping Force)

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40; UN • UNMIK 2

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 6

FOREIGN FORCES

Canada Operation *Unifier* 200

Lithuania JMTG-U 30

Poland JMTG-U 40

United Kingdom *Operation Orbital* 53

United States JMTG-U 150

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

In late February 2014, Russian forces occupied Crimea. The region then requested to join the Russian Federation after a referendum in March, regarded as unconstitutional by the government in Kyiv. Following the annexation, fighting broke out in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with separatist forces receiving support from Russia. The conflict has continued since 2014, with a July 2020 ceasefire being broken repeatedly during 2021. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition.

EASTERN UKRAINE SEPARATIST FORCES

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Donetsk People's Republic €20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bn

Armoured

1 tk bn

Light

6 mot inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 engr coy

1 EW coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

Luhansk People's Republic €14,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bn

Armoured

1 tk bn

Light

4 mot inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 engr coy

1 EW coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-64BV; T-64B; T-64BM+; T-72B1; T-72BA

RECCE BDRM-2

IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-4

APC

APC (T) BTR-D; MT-LB; GT-MU

APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80

ABCV BMD-1, BMD-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS 100mm MT-12

ARTILLERY

SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 2S19 *Msta-S*; 203mm 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A65 *Msta-B*

GUN/MOR

SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S

TOWED 120mm 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 122mm BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 82mm 2B14; 120mm 2B11 *Sani*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 9K331M *Tor-M2* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-defence 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grisson*);

9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-7B *Grail*); 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8

Gecko); 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K38 *Igla*

(RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); GROM

GUNS

SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MT-LB)

TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; 57mm S-60

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia Crimea: 30,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC bde; 40 T-72B3; 80 BMP-2; 200 BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80; 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 18 2A65; 12 BM-21; 8 9P140; 1 ASHM bde with 3K60 *Bal*; 3K55 *Bastion*; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system) • Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported)

Uzbekistan UZB

Uzbekistani Som UZS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	UZS	603tr	703tr	
	USD	59.9bn	65.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,767	1,901	
Growth	%	1.7	6.1	
Inflation	%	12.9	11.0	
Def exp	UZS	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
US\$1=UZS		10054.59	10736.33	

Population 30,842,796

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	11.7%	4.0%	4.3%	4.9%	22.2%	2.7%
Female	11.2%	3.7%	4.1%	4.9%	22.9%	3.5%

Capabilities

Uzbekistan introduced a new military doctrine in early 2018, which highlighted increased concern over terrorism and the potential impact of conflicts including in Afghanistan. It noted a requirement for military modernisation. The doctrine also focuses on border security and hybrid-warfare concerns. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, but suspended its CSTO membership in 2012. Uzbekistan maintains bilateral defence ties with Russia and in late 2018 a defence-cooperation agreement was reported with India. Military cooperation is developing with Turkey, and exercises were held in 2021. The armed forces are army-dominated and conscript-based. Uzbekistan has a limited capacity to deploy its forces externally. A sizeable air fleet was inherited from the Soviet Union, but minimal recapitalisation in the intervening period has substantially reduced the active inventory. Logistical and maintenance shortcomings hinder aircraft availability. Uzbekistan is reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced military equipment; military helicopters and armoured personnel carriers were procured from Russia in 2019. Meetings took place with India in 2020 to advance defence cooperation (three defence-related MOUs were signed in 2019) and in 2021 the leaders of Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on defence cooperation. A State Committee for the Defence Industry was established in late 2017 to organise domestic industry and defence orders. The 2018 doctrine calls for improvements to the domestic defence industry. In recent years, Uzbekistan's defence industry has showcased domestically produced light armoured vehicles.

ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 24,500

4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Mechanised

11 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bde

1 AB bde

Mountain

1 lt mtn inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde 1 MRL bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64B/MV; 170 T-62

RECCE 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM-1

IFV 370: 270 BMP-2; ε100 BTR-82A

APC 388

APC (T) 50 BTR-D

APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80

PPV 79: 50 *Maxxpro*+; 24 *Ejder Yalcin*; 5 *Typhoon-K* 4x4

ABCV 129: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2

AUV 11+: 7 *Cougar*; 4+ M-ATV; some *Tigr-M*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 20 *Maxxpro* ARV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*);

9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*)

GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12

ARTILLERY 487+

SP 83+: **122mm** 18 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 17+: 17 2S3

Akatsiya; 2S5 *Giatsint-S* (reported); **203mm** 48 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 200: **122mm** 60 D-30; **152mm** 140 2A36 *Giatsint-B*

GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 *NONA-S*

MRL 108: **122mm** 60: 36 BM-21 *Grad*; 24 9P138; **220mm** 48 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11 *Sani*; 19 2S12 *Sani*; 18 M-120

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Point-defence QW-18 (CH-SA-11)

Air Force 7,500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* A/B

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with Il-76 *Candid*; An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; C295W;

Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-35M *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9)

1 bty with S-125-2M *Pechora*-2M (RS-SA-26)

2 bty with S-125M1 *Neva*-M1 (RA-SA-3 *Goa*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable

FTR 12 MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* A/B; (18 more in store); (26 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker* B/C in store)

ATK 12: 12 Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*; (15 Su-24 *Fencer* in store)

TPT 11: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*;

Light 7: 2 An-26 *Curl*; 4 C295W; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 6 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 41: 29 Mi-24 *Hind*; 12 Mi-35M *Hind*

TPT 69: **Heavy** 9: 8 H225M *Caracal*; 1 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium**

52 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 8 AS350 *Ecureuil*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 18

Long-range 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9)

Medium-range 4 S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26)

Short-range 10 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)

ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*)

ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 *Kyle*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 20,000

Internal Security Troops up to 19,000

Ministry of Interior


National Guard 1,000

Ministry of Defence

Asia


- Regional defence spending maintained momentum in 2021 with real growth reaching 2.8%. This indicates the resilience of defence spending against wider economic pressures. Total regional spending came to USD488 billion in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn. China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021 with a defence budget of USD207bn. Using a PPP rate brings China's 2021 defence budget closer to USD332bn.
- The revelation by analysts, using open-source satellite imagery, that several large apparent ICBM silo fields were under construction in northwestern China, focused attention on the scale and pace of Beijing's nuclear force expansion and modernisation. The Pentagon's allegation that China has tested hypersonic boost-glide systems in 2021 further highlighted not just the scale of Beijing's military efforts, but also the technical sophistication it appears to have achieved in some areas.
- While there remains much attention on Chinese military activity near Taiwan, Southeast Asian countries are also feeling Chinese military pressure. From late 2019, Indonesia's government and armed forces have become increasingly concerned about Chinese activities inside its EEZ near the Natuna Islands. Meanwhile, in June Malaysia's government issued a tender for a new long-range air-surveillance radar, intended to improve coverage of east Malaysia, a month after the air force intercepted a formation of PLA transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak state.
- The AUKUS partnership, signed in September, is not only related to the development of a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia, but also concerns broader collaboration with the UK and US on cyber, AI, quantum and 'additional undersea' capabilities. Australia has also announced plans to establish a 'sovereign guided weapons enterprise'.
- The Quad remains an informal arrangement, introducing an additional layer to buttress the bilateral (US-centred) and multilateral (ASEAN-centred) regional security architecture. While there is much focus on the annual *Malabar* naval exercises, arguably of greater significance are the various bilateral agreements on logistics, visiting forces and information-sharing between its members which could smooth interoperability and coordinated military activities.

Asia defence spending, 2021 – top 5




Active military personnel – top 10


(25,000 per unit)



The Quad: selected 'cross-bracing' arrangements



Conventionally-powered attack submarines, by country, 2014–21



Asia

Many governments in Asia continued to use their armed forces in support of efforts to control the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. In September 2020, Indonesia's government increased the armed forces' role alongside that of the police, in attempts to enforce compliance with health protocols in badly afflicted provinces. In February 2021, Malaysia's armed forces – which had been helping to enforce the country's Movement Control Order (MCO) restricting domestic travel – were granted police powers so that they could arrest MCO offenders. During August, the Vietnam People's Army was deployed to deliver food supplies in heavily infected areas of Ho Chi Minh City, where a strict lockdown was in force. In May, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) established two large-scale vaccination centres to support efforts to vaccinate the general population against COVID-19. In late June, Bangladesh's government again deployed troops, this time to back up police enforcement of a lockdown intended to control the spread of the highly infectious Delta variant. The Australian government took similar measures in July, with up to 300 unarmed troops patrolling the streets of Sydney as part of the Australian Defence Force's *Operation COVID-19 Assist*. Armed forces also participated in some regional states' efforts to assist others: for example, in July, two Singapore air force C-130 aircraft transported medical supplies including ventilators and personal protective equipment to Indonesia. On a larger scale, during 2021, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) organised deliveries to friendly countries to bolster their pandemic responses. Notably, at the start of the year, the PLA provided its military counterparts in Cambodia and Pakistan with early access to vaccines.

Strategic tensions: China, Japan, Taiwan

Although military resources continued to be employed to respond to the pandemic, it was evident that this would not seriously affect the region's overall security landscape. While the need for governments to prioritise COVID-19 responses continued to affect defence budgets in some Asian countries (for example, Thailand, where defence spending for the 2022 financial year starting in October 2021 was

reduced by 5% in real terms compared with the previous year), in most cases it had no more than a marginal impact. Meanwhile, strategic tensions continued to confront governments across the region, leading to increased spending on their armed forces and focused efforts to improve military capabilities. China's continued drive to improve its capabilities, combined with Beijing's assertive foreign policy, provided grounds for other Asian governments' defence establishments to maintain or step-up efforts to improve their military capabilities. Taiwan emerged more strongly than ever as a potential flashpoint. In March, the outgoing Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that China might attempt to take control of Taiwan 'in the next six years' using force. In the meantime, the PLA Air Force continued to probe Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone with mixed formations of fast-jet, bomber and special-mission aircraft. During August, the PLA staged live-fire exercises south of Taiwan involving warships, fast jets and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, supposedly in response to 'external interference and provocations by Taiwan independence forces'. Reflecting a shared perception of the growing military challenge, the US and Taiwan moved towards closer defence coordination. Delivering an IISS Fullerton Lecture in Singapore in July, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that his country would 'stay focused on helping Taiwan to defend itself'. In early August, the Biden administration approved its first defence-equipment sale to Taiwan. The package, reportedly valued at USD750 million, included 40 M109A6 self-propelled howitzers and nearly 1,700 kits for converting artillery shells into GPS-guided projectiles. Other major procurements from the US included M142 HIMARS launchers with ATACMs and RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II coastal-defence systems. In late August, Taiwan's Executive Yuan proposed a slightly higher defence budget for 2022, including the 'special budget' to support the acquisition of 66 F-16V combat aircraft for delivery from 2023–28. Meanwhile, in November 2020, Taiwan's CSBC Corporation began building the first of eight indigenously designed

Studies in capability generation

Japan's Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade

In the post-war period, Japan's Self Defense Force (JSDF) eschewed the development of amphibious capabilities. The association with past power-projection efforts of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy meant that this type of capability was seen to transgress Japan's 'exclusively defence-oriented' policy and was deemed unacceptable domestically and internationally. Moreover, the fact that national defence posture was predicated on denying a Soviet land invasion of the Japanese mainland, rather than retaking territory, also meant an amphibious capability was deemed unnecessary in practice.

The Japanese defence establishment expressed a renewed interest in amphibious capabilities as the regional security environment and US–Japan alliance cooperation started to transform. The 1996 Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security and the revision of the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation in 1997 initiated the first serious efforts for bilateral contingency planning and military-to-military cooperation, thus raising questions about how the JSDF could engage with the US Marine Corps (USMC), with which it had limited interaction during the Cold War, and how it might consider acquiring its own amphibious capability to complement those operated by US forces. In the late 1990s, the JSDF chief of staff subsequently authorised the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) staff office to begin dialogue with the USMC. For their part, the US side welcomed deeper cooperation with the Japanese and was prepared to share its expertise.

Serious impetus was given to Japanese thinking by the increasingly evident rise of China and its expansion of maritime activities in the early 2000s, especially around Japan's remote southwestern islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China. In 2002, the GSDF established (under the Western Army) the 640-strong Western Army Infantry Regiment at Camp Ainoura in the city of Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture. This unit was to specialise in amphibious operations and to become the core of the eventual Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB).

The GSDF then ventured to undertake joint bilateral amphibious training with the USMC in *Exercise Iron Fist*, first held off the coast of California in 2006 with the aim of practising amphibious assault operations. Japan's recognition of the potential value of amphibious capabilities was further reinforced by the events of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. The USMC's role in assisting domestic Japanese disaster-relief activities, and the JSDF's own amphibious limitations by comparison, not only pointed to the need for Japan to fill this operational gap, but also enhanced the legitimacy of procuring these capabilities in the name of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

Japan further advanced its plans for amphibious capabilities by participating, from 2013, in the USMC's *Dawn Blitz* exercise series, this time involving not just the GSDF and USMC, but also the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), as part of a plan to develop true inter-service joint amphibious capability. The JSDF acquired further accumulated expertise and confidence in joint amphibious operations first through the domestic HADR mission in 2013 to relieve storm damage on Izu-Oshima, in essence a remote island, and then through the HADR mission in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, which required cooperation with the USMC and Philippines armed forces.

These activities prepared the way for Japan's 2013 National Defense Programme Guidelines to mandate the establishment of the ARDB in March 2018. The unit is planned to eventually reach a total strength of 3,000 personnel, with an order of battle of two amphibious regiments, one amphibious assault battalion, one field artillery battalion, one reconnaissance company, a signal company, an engineer company and a logistics support battalion. The ARDB has procured from the US a total of 52 Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV-7); for air transport it deploys the fixed-rotor CH-47JA and has started to procure 17 MV-22B *Osprey* tilt-rotor aircraft from the US. The MSDF's *Osumi*-class LHDs can function as ship-to-shore connectors with amphibious landing capabilities and LCACs, and *Hyuga*-class and *Izumo*-class helicopter carriers can serve as command-and-control platforms for amphibious operations and for helicopter and tilt-rotor air-support operations. The *Izumo*-class, once converted to operate Air Self-Defense F-35Bs, will be able to offer fixed-wing air-strike support.

Exercises have also taken place with other countries, including France and Australia, but the ARDB is still in its early stages and has a number of shortcomings to overcome. The GSDF has improved its own joint operation capabilities with the formation in March 2018 of the Ground Component Command which is able to direct the ARDB and regional forces. However, the JSDF's three services have limited experience of joint amphibious operations and, according to analysts, the GSDF does not yet share data link capabilities with the MSDF and Air Self-Defense Force. The MSDF's current ships may require further modifications to better operate AAVs and the MSDF is likely to need more purpose-built ships for amphibious assault operations incorporating internal docks. The GSDF will also likely be examining what modifications it still needs to make to its helicopter force to improve operational capability from MSDF ships, including better weather-proofing its helicopters for maritime use. Finally, as the GSDF has indicated, the ARDB is designed purely for retaking Japanese islands and tasks such as HADR; it is not a fully-fledged marine force and as such cannot fulfil the same types of multi-role operations as the USMC.

attack submarines, with a prototype vessel scheduled for delivery by 2025.

Tokyo's Defense of Japan 2021 white paper, released in July, emphasised concerns over China's growing military capabilities, the expanded remit of the China Coast Guard (CCG) under new legislation that took effect in February and intensive CCG operations near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (administered by Japan, but claimed by China). However, the white paper assigned unprecedented importance to 'stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan'. A joint statement by Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide and US President Joe Biden in April had underscored their countries' common interest in maintaining 'peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait'. However, Suga later stressed that in the event of a Taiwan conflict, Japan would provide only logistical support to US forces and would not deploy its own combat units. In May, Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo said that Japan should increase its military strength at a 'radically different pace' in response to China's

growing military spending and capabilities. Kishi stressed that Japan had a vital stake in Taiwan's security and asserted that his government would 'allocate the funding we need to protect our nation'. While it seemed likely that Tokyo's defence posture would only change incrementally, it was clear that Japan was strengthening its military capabilities. There was continuing emphasis on measures to enhance the security of the remote Senkakus and other southern islands. These measures include acquiring new transport vessels, establishing a new electronic warfare (EW) unit for the region and a decision announced in July to base the Japan Air Self-Defense Force's (JASDF's) F-35B combat aircraft at the country's southernmost air base. Japan's defence establishment also prioritised the development of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and EW capabilities, exemplified by the planned procurement of new EW aircraft for stand-off jamming and interest in contributing to the US National Defense Space Architecture's 'tracking layer' of satellites

Studies in capability generation

Vietnam's procurement of *Kilo*-class submarines

With an inventory of six *Hanoi*-class (Project 636.1 (*Improved Kilo*)) submarines, Vietnam currently ranks joint sixth in the region, alongside Australia, in terms of numbers of conventionally-powered attack submarines. The introduction into service of these submarines, and their associated weapons systems, has provided a significant boost to Vietnam's maritime capabilities.

Before acquiring the *Kilos*, Vietnam already operated two ageing *Yugo*-class midget submarines, acquired from North Korea (reportedly in a barter deal) in the 1990s. Indeed, Vietnam's subsurface ambitions predate even this. In 1973, some personnel were sent by the then-North Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence (MND) to the Soviet Union for training as submarine officers. Analysts have highlighted further Vietnamese interest in acquiring Soviet submarines in the late 1970s, as well as in the mid-to-late 1980s (when some crew were reportedly sent for training in the Soviet Union), but there was little concrete progress until 2006. That year saw the MND begin a strategic-planning process for the modernisation of the navy and air force, with the procurement of submarines once more in focus as Vietnam was coming to terms with an increasingly complex security situation in the South China Sea, within the context of growing Chinese assertiveness and Beijing's evident intent to improve its own military capabilities.

The plan to procure submarines from Russia was

approved by Vietnam's Central Military Commission (CMC) in September 2006. Russia had long been a key source of Vietnam's weapons, and the two countries' longstanding defence relationship included the Russian presence from the 1970s to the early 1990s at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base. The CMC (headed by the Communist Party of Vietnam's General Secretary) is the body that approves the MND's defence procurement plans. The CMC's Executive Board includes the party's general secretary, the prime minister, state president and defence minister, with the defence minister as its deputy head. The National Assembly approved the budget, which comprised a loan from Russia.

In 2007, the MND's weapons import firm, Vaxuco, started negotiations with Russia's Rosoboronexport over the acquisition of six submarines. Moscow offered six Project 636.1 (*Improved Kilo*)-class submarines and, after reports of delays in negotiations associated with the price tag (which analysts report at USD4.3bn), an agreement was reached in summer 2009 after a special envoy of Vietnam's prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, deputy public security minister Bui Van Nam, flew to Moscow to meet Russia's prime minister Vladimir Putin to discuss the price of the submarines and other issues.

A contract was subsequently signed in Moscow on 15 December 2009 by Rosoboronexport's CEO Anatoly Isaykin and Vietnam's navy chief, Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien, witnessed by the prime ministers of both countries. Reports indicated that the final agreed price was around

intended to detect and track missile threats. Offensive systems also increasingly featured in Japan's defence ambitions: modifications that will eventually allow the helicopter carriers *Izumo* and *Kaga* to operate F-35Bs began during the 2020 financial year, and US Marine Corps F-35Bs conducted trial landings on the *Izumo* in October; deliveries of an extended-range version of the air-launched ASM-3 anti-ship missile will begin in the middle of the decade; in December 2020, the Japan Ministry of Defense ordered a third batch of Kongsberg long-range, precision-guided joint strike missiles (JSM) for the JASDF's F-35As; and in October 2020, the first of the new *Taigei*-class attack submarines was launched, equipped with lithium-ion batteries allowing extended operations.

Southeast Asia: challenges and responses

Southeast Asian countries also felt Chinese military pressure. On 31 May, Malaysia's air force intercepted a formation of 16 PLA IL-76 and Y-20 transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak state in

an incident that it said posed 'a serious threat to national security and flight safety'. Although Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein's claim on 1 June that the Chinese aircraft had breached 'Malaysian airspace and sovereignty' (rather than airspace over Malaysia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) was inaccurate, and China dismissed the incident as 'a routine training operation' that 'strictly abided by international law', the Malaysian government and armed forces nonetheless viewed it as disconcerting and unfriendly, particularly because of the number of aircraft involved. It gave almost immediate impetus to the defence ministry's plans to improve Malaysia's air defences, which had been delayed by budgetary constraints. In early June, it issued a tender for a single new long-range air-surveillance radar for the air force, intended to improve the coverage of east Malaysia, including Sarawak. Later in the month, it was reported that Japan's Mitsubishi Electric Corporation was likely to bid for the tender with its J/FPS-3 system, which in August 2020 had been chosen to fulfil a

USD2bn. Russia provided Vietnam with a defence loan for the purchase of these six submarines, including equipment, weapons, maintenance and logistics support, personnel training, base construction and basic rescue facilities.

Admiralty Shipyards, based in St Petersburg, was contracted to build the submarines. At the same time, the two countries embarked on the other supporting developments, such as crew training, needed to bring the systems into service. Construction of the first boat began in 2010, and after submarine selection and basic language training in Vietnam, the first batch of 53 officers and sailors travelled to Russia at the end of August 2011 to train in St Petersburg, with this training reported as lasting one and a half years. Vietnamese personnel have also been trained at the Indian Navy's submarine training centre (reportedly on tactical aspects of underwater warfare), but advanced technical training generally still takes place in Russia.

In June 2011, the MND established the navy's 189th Submarine Brigade to operate the *Improved Kilo*-class boats. This unit has been focused not only on training, maintenance and weapons-integration, but has looked to develop the necessary supporting infrastructure in Vietnam and, alongside naval command and the MND, will also have been engaged on strategy and doctrinal matters designed to help Vietnam integrate this improved submarine capability into its military plans.

A base for the six submarines was built at the Cam Ranh naval base, under the supervision of Russian military engineers, though there is an alternative base at Da Nang.

The first submarine arrived at Cam Ranh on 1 January 2014 and was commissioned two weeks later on 15 January 2014. The last two boats were commissioned in Vietnam on 28 February 2017. According to the navy, when a new boat arrived, the crew was seeded by posting in experienced personnel from earlier boats, and training was also directed by the 189th Brigade's submarine training centre. There is a support and maintenance agreement between the navy and Russia's defence industry, but Vietnam has looked to improve domestic maintenance capabilities, providing for complex maintenance at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base and other shipyards. At the same time, Vietnam has begun to develop a submarine-rescue capability, with a domestically built submarine-rescue vessel handed over to the navy in July 2021. A submarine-rescue agreement had earlier been signed with Singapore's navy in September 2013.

A series of exercises have been employed as part of this integration process, developing from navigation and day-to-day submarine operations and weapons drills, such as torpedo and missile launches (the first missile launch by the first *Kilo* was reportedly conducted without Russian assistance in mid-2017), to exercises more closely focused on improving overall capability, including anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and joint drills with other services. The live-fire drills in 2017 were reported in the media with images of the weapons associated with the platforms, which now include not only torpedoes but also 3M14E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-30B) land-attack cruise missiles and, most recently, 3M54E1/E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27A/B) long-range anti-ship missiles.

similar requirement in the Philippines (making it the most important Japanese defence export since Tokyo ended its ban on international military sales in 2014). While the Malaysian tender announced in June is likely to only partially fulfil a requirement, stated in 2019, for three such systems, the US government's prospective donation – announced in June 2020 – of up to three long-range radars (possibly AN/TPS-77 systems) to Indonesia and Malaysia could potentially fill the gap.

From late 2019, Indonesia's government and armed forces became increasingly concerned about Chinese activities inside its EEZ near the Natuna islands; Jakarta strengthened its military presence in the area and in November 2020 naval Chief of Staff Admiral Yudo Margono revealed that the first fleet command's operational headquarters would move permanently from Jakarta to the Natunas. In May, Indonesia's presidential office revealed the draft of a new long-term military modernisation plan costed at USD125 billion. Covering the period to 2044, the draft plan was subdivided into five-year segments, the first covering 2020–24 and coinciding with the final phase of the current Minimum Essential Force programme. The main emphasis of the new plan is on developing external defence capabilities, particularly those of the air force and navy. Expanding the existing small submarine force will be central to enhancing naval capability, but Indonesia's plans to possess a force of eight submarines by 2024 suffered a major setback in April when one of the Indonesian Navy's two 40-year-old Type-209/1300 *Cakra*-class boats, KRI *Nanggala*, was lost with all hands 100 kilometres north of Bali during an exercise. The submarine's age was widely presumed to have played a part in the accident, and Indonesian parliamentarians subsequently called for the immediate retirement of its equally old sister vessel. That would leave in service just three Type 209/1400 *Nagapasa*-class submarines, supplied by the South Korean company DSME, the third of which was finished locally and commissioned only two weeks before *Nanggala* was lost. In 2019, Indonesia had signed a contract with DSME for a second batch of three Type 209/1400 boats. However, after Prabowo Subianto replaced Ryamizard Ryacudu as defence minister in October 2019, Indonesia's defence ministry began reassessing whether the requirement for additional boats would be fulfilled best by DSME or an alternative supplier; this inevitably slowed down the procurement process. The loss of *Nanggala*, however, provided

new impetus for the government to enhance the submarine force. In August, President Joko Widodo approved a USD89m funding boost for the state-owned naval shipbuilder, PT PAL Indonesia, with the specific aim of providing the infrastructure necessary for the domestic construction of submarines. Then, in September, British firm Babcock signed a contract with PT PAL, under which the Indonesian firm will build two *Arrowhead* 140 frigates, with local design modifications.

Other Southeast Asian states maintained efforts to improve their capabilities to the extent they could afford to do so. Vietnam is facing pressure from China's activities in the South China Sea and, while Hanoi is constrained from making major equipment purchases by the available budget, it continued to incrementally enhance its maritime forces. In March, a shipyard in Da Nang launched a fourth Dutch-designed roll-on/roll-off cargo ship for the navy. In April, the Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company launched the first of the second batch of 12 high-speed patrol vessels ordered for the Vietnam Coast Guard; deliveries of the first Indian-built tranche (vessels 1–5) are reported to have started. In July, the coast guard brought into service a second ex-US Coast Guard *Hamilton*-class cutter for use in maritime resource protection. Meanwhile, acquiring new training aircraft promised to help Vietnam's air force develop more sophisticated capabilities. In February, the Czech defence exporter Omnipol announced the sale of 12 L-39NG advanced trainers to Vietnam, for delivery in 2023–24. In February, the US Air Force issued a request for information relating to a new contract to provide three (and possibly more) training aircraft to Vietnam as part of a wider package also including logistical and technical support. In June, the US Pacific Air Forces command indicated that these would be T-6 basic trainers. This will be Hanoi's most important military procurement from the US since 2016, when the latter lifted its embargo on arms sales to Vietnam. But Vietnam is also planning to procure more of its military equipment from domestic suppliers. In July, it was reported that the defence ministry's General Department of Defence Industry was developing a plan for the next decade, envisaging the expansion of national defence-industrial capacity, with particular emphasis on developing uninhabited systems and artificial intelligence (AI) for military purposes.

Myanmar's armed forces, the Tatmadaw, were a focus of international attention following their seizure

of state power and installation of their commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, as head of state on 1 February, and their subsequent violent suppression of widespread popular demonstrations in support of the deposed elected government led by state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the following months, the new military government also faced an upsurge in attacks by ethnic-minority insurgent groups, notably the Kachin Independence

Army and the Karen National Liberation Army. In April, seven armed groups that had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015 announced that they would join the self-styled National Unity Government in opposition to the military seizure of power. The following month, this umbrella opposition movement announced the establishment of its armed wing, the People's Defence Force (PDF), as a first step towards a 'federal union army'. PDF

Afghanistan – the Taliban's military victory

The collapse of the government of Afghanistan led by President Ashraf Ghani in August 2021, and the subsequent assumption of power by the Taliban, was a significant shock – particularly for countries in the West and elsewhere that had since 2001 supported attempts to develop governance and security and defence capabilities in Afghanistan. During the war, the Taliban's offering to the Afghan people in the districts that its forces controlled was twofold: providing security and facilitating dispute resolution in its Sharia courts. It did not pledge to improve agriculture, health, education or infrastructure in the way that international stabilisation efforts did.

Since the 2014 withdrawal of US and NATO forces from combat roles, the Taliban had steadily isolated provincial capitals by capturing surrounding rural districts. Up to 2018, this was constrained by the presence of small numbers of US troops, acting as advisers, and by US air support. But concurrently Afghan government forces were weakened by corruption, 'ghost soldiers' on payrolls and political disunity in the Kabul government. The 2018 Doha Agreement between the US government and the Taliban was widely interpreted by Afghans as a withdrawal agreement that did not protect the interests of the Kabul government. And new US president Joe Biden's early 2021 announcement that the US would withdraw by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was a blow to the morale of government forces.

In early 2021, the US had urged Ghani to withdraw Afghan troops and police from isolated checkpoints dispersed across rural areas surrounding provincial capitals. They also recommended that Afghan forces concentrate on the defence of key towns, cities and Kabul. This way they hoped that the government could fight the Taliban to a stalemate. However, it is likely that Taliban forces were pre-positioned across the country ready to begin offensive operations in spring 2021. Their opening move was to seize border crossing points in western Afghanistan; attacks then shifted to eastern Afghanistan, rapidly followed by attacks in the north. These offensives pre-empted any attempts by the warlords of the

former Northern Alliance to mobilise their militias. The subsequent fall of Kandahar, Afghanistan's second city, decisively weakened the government's position; Kabul fell on 15 August.

Lessons for the future

Factors contributing to the outcome of the war included weaknesses in intelligence and understanding of the country as well as in reconstruction efforts, political strategies, military strategy, operational concepts, tactics and equipment. Combined with failures across government and armed forces to adapt quickly enough to unforeseen circumstances, these provided opportunities that were exploited by insurgents and militias. And the US decision to attack Iraq drew off resources and government energy that could have been applied in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the collapse the US stressed that it remained concerned about the threat from terrorist activity emanating from Afghanistan, though President Biden said 'we just don't need to fight a ground war to do it. We have what's called over-the-horizon capabilities, which means we can strike terrorists and targets without American boots on the ground – or very few, if needed.' However, effectively implementing such a strategy has its challenges, not least around basing and targeting. The collapse of government forces led to fears about the fate of the military equipment that had in recent years been transferred to the former-government's security and defence forces, but many of the modern aircraft left the country (with their pilots) while others were disabled. More broadly, keeping modern Western-origin equipment in service will depend on maintenance capability, including the provision of spare parts, neither of which will be straightforward. Perhaps apart from small arms, this means that the Taliban's ability to effectively operate this equipment may diminish in short order, but the picture may be different for older Soviet-era equipment, while the Taliban will likely persist with capabilities that served them well during the war – the pickups, motorbikes and such like effectively suitable for a 'light infantry' force.

units, many of them highly autonomous, were soon employing attacks using improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations aimed at the Tatmadaw and its supporters in major cities as well as in the countryside. In one major clash in the eastern Kayah State in late May, the Tatmadaw called in substantial close air support from armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft after sustaining substantial casualties. Meanwhile, the ramifications of the military takeover – a substantial economic contraction (owing to the pandemic as well as the coup) and a renewed focus on internal security and counter-insurgency – called into question the future of the Tatmadaw's efforts to enhance conventional military capabilities, particularly in the naval sphere. At the time of the coup, Myanmar's navy had been amidst a major expansion programme aimed at enhancing its surface and subsurface combat capabilities: satellite imagery

in December 2020 had revealed domestic construction of a new frigate-sized vessel probably possessing a vertical launch system for air-defence missiles, as well as the second of a new class of offshore patrol vessels. The navy's capability improvement efforts were evident when the service commissioned its first submarine (a refurbished former Indian Navy *Sindhughosh*-class (*Kilo*) boat) in December 2020, and again in February 2021 when a task force comprising the LPD *Moattama*, a frigate and an auxiliary vessel repatriated 1,000 illegal immigrants from Malaysia back to Myanmar.

India's expanding defence horizons

Clashes on India's disputed Himalayan border with China in 2019–20 accentuated perceptions in New Delhi of a growing threat from China. Despite the two sides announcing in February 2021 their agreement to a simultaneous but limited military disengagement in

The Quad

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or 'Quad', is a forum for promoting intergovernmental security cooperation between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. It is not an alliance or dedicated defence grouping and has no formal agenda or meeting schedule. The Quad has recently begun moving into wider policy areas than defence, including pandemic mitigation, cyber and climate change. Originally established in 2007, it was abruptly discontinued in 2008 under diplomatic pressure from China, which branded it as 'containment'. The decision to revive the Quad, in 2017, and to elevate its meetings to summit-level in 2021 (virtually in March and in-person in September), signifies a closer alignment of its members' threat perceptions towards China and a shared, though not necessarily equal, desire to cross-brace defence and security ties among key US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. While it remains an informal arrangement, the Quad can optimally be conceived of as introducing an additional layer to buttress the bilateral (US-centred) and multilateral (ASEAN-centred) security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, in recognition that the regional balance of power has shifted in China's favour and requires an adjustment. Its future development is contingent in large part on China's external behaviour: if Beijing pushes more aggressively, the Quad's drawstrings are likely to tighten further. At a minimum, the Quad provides a channel for information-sharing, coordination and deconfliction among its members. More ambitiously, it has the potential to serve as the foundation of a countervailing coalition, including in the military domain.

The Quad is symbolically associated with the annual *Malabar* naval exercises, which were reconstituted in quadripartite format in 2020 following a long hiatus triggered by Australia's decision to withdraw from the drills in 2008 because of concerns about retaliation by China. Arguably of greater significance are the various bilateral agreements on logistics, visiting forces and information-sharing between its members. These could do much to smooth inter-operability and coordinated military activities under crisis or wartime conditions, as well as during military exercises in peacetime. A wide range of bilateral and trilateral defence cooperative arrangements and exercises were already in place before the Quad was revived, especially between the US and its treaty allies Australia and Japan. Canberra and Tokyo concluded an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2013, which was upgraded in 2017, but have yet to finalise a bilateral visiting forces agreement which has been long under negotiation. India's willingness to strengthen its Quad military connections is more open to question given its history of non-alignment. None of India's Quad partners has a visiting forces agreement with it, but all have ACSAs or other logistics-support arrangements, which have been concluded at a conspicuously quickening pace. A Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation was signed between New Delhi and Washington in late 2020, marking the last of four key bilateral defence agreements now in place. Japan and India concluded an ACSA in 2020, the same year that Australia and India negotiated a Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement.

one of the four areas where their forces continued to confront each other, India continued to plan stronger defences along its northern border. India also continued a major effort to strengthen its maritime forces. Having commissioned the third from a batch of six locally built *Kalvari*-class (*Scorpène*) diesel-electric attack submarines in March, in July India's Defence Acquisition Council authorised a request for proposals for the local construction of a further six submarines, potentially of a different design. These would support the Indian Navy's long-term plan to operate 18 conventionally powered as well as six nuclear-powered boats. During August, India's first locally built aircraft carrier – the future *INS Vikrant* – began sea trials. It is scheduled to enter service in 2022, six years later than originally expected. In May, the US government approved the sale of an additional six P-8I maritime patrol aircraft to India, opening the way for a likely order from New Delhi. Such defence equipment transfers formed an important element of India's burgeoning bilateral security relations, in light of New Delhi's drive to improve its military capabilities and Washington's intent to enhance the interoperability of Indian and US forces. That said, India has largely been unable to realise the technology transfers and joint ventures promised in the 2012 India-US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, which cast a cloud over the future of US military sales to the country. Another potential obstacle was the prospect of the US imposing sanctions on India if New Delhi proceeded with a planned purchase of S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*) air-defence systems from Russia, an issue raised by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin when he met Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in New Delhi in March.

Australia steps up

Following the publication of the Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan in July 2020, efforts to upgrade the Australian Defence Force's capabilities continued apace, largely in response to Canberra's perception of a rising threat from China. Important developments included the announcement in May of the Australian defence department's intent to inaugurate in early 2022 a dedicated tri-service Space Division, led by the air force and tasked with the management, acquisition and operation of relevant capabilities. In March, the government announced plans for Australia to establish a 'sovereign guided weapons enterprise' that would allow the country to manufacture its own missiles, and subsequently set

AUKUS: the Indo-Pacific's new regional security grouping

Announced on 15 September in a joint statement by the leaders of Australia, the UK and the US (which are already connected as allies through the UKUSA or 'Five Eyes' intelligence-sharing treaty, as well as through NATO in the case of the UK and US, and by ANZUS in the case of Australia and the US), AUKUS is a major new regional security development. Although it is not a treaty alliance, its establishment potentially has significant ramifications for the Indo-Pacific distribution of power. The new arrangement between the three longstanding partners is intended to provide a trilateral intergovernmental context for wider activities, summarised in the three leaders' statement as a 'diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region' including 'deeper information and technology sharing' and 'deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains', with particular cooperation 'on a range of security and defense capabilities'. In the first instance, AUKUS will support Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. However, it is possible that the new arrangement may also facilitate the expanded use of Australian facilities by UK and US forces.

up the Australian Missile Corporation to facilitate cooperation between industrial partners and other potential stakeholders. In a related development, in August Australia formalised its cooperation with the US Precision Strike Missile programme, potentially to fulfil the requirement for an Australian Army long-range precision strike capability. In July, the revelation that Australia would explore options for developing a ground-based EW capability intended to prevent attempts to interfere with or attack its use of space underlined Canberra's acute interest in the domain. Australia also continued to enhance its amphibious warfare capabilities. These efforts broadly paralleled Japan's, in Australia's case building towards the capacity to deploy up to a 1,500-strong Amphibious Ready Group. In June, Exercise *Sea Explorer* saw troops practise amphibious landings in northern Queensland from the LHD *Canberra* and LSD *Choules*, with air support from embarked army CH-47F, NH90 and *Tiger* helicopters.

Australia's single most important defence procurement programme faced major challenges, but Canberra resolved these decisively. In March,

Canberra set a September deadline for France's Naval Group to submit acceptable revised costings for the next part of the design phase of the Future Submarine Program, which involved building 12 *Attack*-class boats. However, by mid-2021 the Australian Navy was examining other possible solutions amid questions about the viability of the *Attack*-class (not due to start entering service until the mid-2030s) and about the risks associated with the proposed life-extension programme that would see the navy's current six *Collins*-class submarines rebuilt from 2026 onwards to provide an interim improved capability. In mid-September, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US issued a joint statement announcing they were establishing 'an enhanced trilateral partnership' called AUKUS, the first initiative of which would be 'to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines' using UK and US expertise. Simultaneously, Australia cancelled its submarine agreement with France. Nuclear-powered attack submarines, perhaps equipped with land-attack missiles, promised a significant capability boost, though for the time being it was unclear whether Australia's new boats would be based on the UK *Astute*-class, the US *Virginia*-class

or on a future design. However, the three AUKUS governments immediately started 'a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway' to Australia's new submarine capability. Within days, Australia also announced orders for US-made *Tomahawk* land-attack cruise missiles to equip its *Hobart*-class destroyers and AGM-158B JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles for its air force, further highlighting Canberra's emphasis on developing offensive capabilities in the face of what was perceived to be a deteriorating regional security environment.

Korean Peninsula developments

Against the backdrop of deadlocked denuclearisation talks with the US, North Korea continued programmes to develop missiles and nuclear weapons. In October 2020, a military parade displayed what Pyongyang claimed to be a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – possibly with the designation *Hwasong-17* – which was notably larger than earlier long-range missiles and may be capable of carrying multiple warheads. The *Pukguksong-4*, which could be a new and possibly longer-range version of the *Pukguksong-3* submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), was displayed in the same parade. In January 2021, a

North Korea: ballistic missile test launches, 2021

North Korea conducted six ballistic missile test-launches in 2021, all at relatively short ranges of up to 800 km. The tests all highlighted apparent efforts to develop systems that would be potentially less vulnerable than existing systems to 'left-of-launch' attack, or to missile defences. Measures included greater mobility and/or presenting a more challenging intercept environment by employing quasi-ballistic trajectories (in the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) series). Pyongyang also claimed an initial test of a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

In addition to a rail-mobile KN-23 SRBM, North Korea also launched an apparently modified KN-23 from a submarine – a contrast to the *Pukguksong* series of larger medium-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) also under development. Beyond ballistic missiles, in September 2021 North Korea also conducted tests of what Pyongyang claimed was a land-attack cruise missile with a range of 1,500km, demonstrating further diversification of its potential delivery systems.

Table 9 North Korea: ballistic missile test launches, 2021

Date (local)	Type	Classification	Alt	Distance	Assessed Outcome	Comments
19 Oct	KN-23 (mod 2)	SLBM / SRBM	60 km	590 km*	Successful	Apparent KN-23 modified for submarine-launch
28 Sep	<i>Hwasong-8</i> with HGV	Unconfirmed	60 km	200 km	Unconfirmed	Claimed HGV with sealed liquid-fuel booster
15 Sep	KN-23	SRBM	60 km	800 km*	Successful	Rail-mobile KN-23
	KN-23	SRBM	60 km	800 km*	Successful	
21 Mar	KN-23 (mod 1)	SRBM	50 km	600 km*	Successful	Modified KN-23 with claimed 2.5t warhead
	KN-23 (mod 1)	SRBM			Successful	


*Reportedly flew a quasi-ballistic trajectory with 'pull-up' manoeuvre

new missile, the *Pukguksong-5*, was displayed at a parade and in late March, after reportedly testing two cruise missiles, North Korea resumed ballistic missile tests following a year-long hiatus, launching two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), each of which travelled approximately 600 km. In April, South Korea's joint chiefs of staff said they were closely monitoring activity at the North's Sinpo shipyard, amid speculation that Pyongyang might shortly launch a new submarine, test a new SLBM, or both. In August, an International Atomic Energy Agency report revealed 'deeply troubling' signs that Pyongyang had restarted a reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex during the previous month. Amid these ominous signs, South Korea's Moon administration maintained its emphasis on the desirability of dialogue with Pyongyang, but simultaneously continued to strengthen its military deterrence. In May, following a summit between President Moon Jae-in and Biden, the US agreed to end 'missile guidelines' that, among other things, had prevented Seoul from acquiring or developing ballistic missiles with ranges longer than 800 km. Launching its 2022–26 Mid-Term Defense Plan in September, Seoul's defence ministry said that it would develop new surface-to-surface missiles with 'significantly enhanced destructive power'. This suggested that a reported missile able to deliver a three-ton conventional warhead to North Korean targets, such as underground missile facilities, might be fully-tested and operational by 2026. The defence ministry also said that it would reinforce surveillance capabilities with extra radars and 'sharply increase' its deployment of interceptor missiles to protect South Korea against a North Korean missile attack; it would also expand its space-related activities. Enhanced naval capabilities would include additional *Chang Bogo* III submarines. These will be larger than the *Chang Bogo* III Batch I boats that were commissioned in 2021, and like the Batch I vessels could carry SLBMs. In September it was reported that Seoul had test-launched, from a *Chang Bogo* III submarine, an SLBM based on the *Hyunmoo-2B* ballistic missile.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics

Economic expansion was a key factor permitting increased military spending in Asia in recent decades, and the global economic slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic has posed perhaps the biggest



Note: analysis excludes North Korea and Laos due to insufficient data.


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▲ Figure 13 Asia: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021

obstacle to further defence budget growth since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Regional real GDP contracted by 1.5% in 2020 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was a strong performance when compared to the global drop of 3.1%, but masks a divergence in economic performance across the region. Buoyed by a 2.3% rise in real GDP growth in China, the region's emerging economies only contracted by 0.9% in 2020 compared to the 2.9% and 8.9% reduction in the region's advanced economies (e.g., Australia, Japan, South Korea) and Pacific Island states respectively.

Similarly, there have been variable economic recoveries, with emerging regional economies rebounding by 8.5% in 2021, faster than in any other region in the world. While the growth rate for the region's advanced economies is lower – 3.8% in 2021 – it is sufficient to ensure that the region's economy ends 2021 larger than it was before the pandemic began. Nevertheless, sporadic outbreaks of the virus and the emergence of new, more infectious variants have highlighted the fragility of the recovery and the speed at which conditions can shift. New lockdowns were imposed in Australia in August 2021 while regional air travel – a useful proxy for wider economic restrictions – declined steadily between April and September 2021.

Furthermore, aggregates do not tell the full story, and economic and fiscal conditions have varied significantly from country to country. According to




▲ Map 4 Asia: regional defence spending¹

IMF figures, GDP in certain regional economies such as Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand is expected to be lower at the end of 2021 than it was before the pandemic and, while growth continued in other countries such as India, Indonesia and Korea, it slowed over the past 24 months. Only Bangladesh, China, Taiwan and Vietnam have seen robust economic activity continue throughout the crisis, with real GDP growth of between 4% and 8%.

The knock-on fiscal effects of the crisis have had an equally profound impact on the region, as governments across Asia have been forced to reassess their spending priorities. In the face of burgeoning budget deficits, austerity has so far been eschewed by most governments, and resources have been

redirected towards alternative policy areas. Spending on healthcare and economic stimulus have become priorities as regional states have sought to minimise both the human and the economic consequences of the pandemic.

The trend was perhaps most pronounced in South Asia where India announced a 137% increase in expenditure on ‘health and wellbeing’ in February – long before the pandemic reached its peak in the country – as the government looked to rapidly expand access to healthcare. In Pakistan, spending on ‘health affairs and services’ rose from PKR12.0 billion (USD87.2 million) under the pre-pandemic 2019–20 budget to PKR28.4bn (USD179m) for fiscal year 2021–22.



▲ **Figure 14 Asia: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)**


Defence spending


Despite this constrained fiscal backdrop, Asian defence budgets have proved resilient, with little evidence to suggest the pandemic has derailed planned investments in the defence sector. Regional defence spending growth slowed from 5.3% in 2019 to 3.4% in 2020, but crucially only a handful of countries implemented cuts, with others choosing to rein in spending plans instead. Indeed, defence budget increases were maintained in 2021, with real growth reaching 2.8%. This is still far below the average 4.9% rate of growth seen between 2008 and 2018 but is an indication of the resilience of defence spending to wider economic pressures. Total regional spending came to USD488bn in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn.

With a defence budget of USD207bn (including local militia funding), China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021. As such, Chinese movements dominate regional trends, but growth in other important markets also influences the overall market. China's 2021 defence budget is more than double the 2011 budget in nominal terms. Cheaper production in China makes it useful to consider the value of the budget using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates. Using this rate rather than the market exchange rate brings China's 2021 defence budget closer to USD332bn. Australia has continued to increase spending in line with the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update. The 2021 budget of AUD45.5bn (USD34.3bn) means that Australian defence spending has increased by 26.3% since 2015. The most recent budget also met the equally ambitious target of increasing investment spending from 29% of the budget to 35% by 2021/22, ensuring that the boost to equipment spending announced five years ago materialises as planned.

Japan approved a 0.5% nominal increase in its 2021 defence budget, broadly in line with trends over the last decade. More significantly, the new budget increased spending on equipment acquisition by 7.5% to USD8.6bn, representing a new record high with the share of the budget dedicated to procurement reaching its highest level since 2007. Given the challenging economic and fiscal environment in Japan, the rebalancing of existing resources has been important for the modernisation and expansion of the Japan Self Defense Force's capabilities. To this end, the Ministry of Defense has also continued attempts to streamline

▼ **Figure 15 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 2008–21, USDbn, constant 2015**





▲ **Figure 16** Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth, 2020–21 (USDbn, constant 2015)

procurement and contracting processes and to foster competition among local suppliers to create a more efficient environment for equipment acquisition.

In Taiwan, where the pandemic's impact has been muted compared to that in many Asian countries, defence spending increased at its fastest rate for a decade in 2021 as funding for the country's new F-16 purchase ramped up significantly. In 2020, Taipei approved a special TWD247bn (USD7.99bn) budget for the purchase of 66 F-16V combat aircraft, with 2021's allocation rising from TWD5bn (USD17.9m) to TWD29bn (USD1.03bn). As a result, total defence spending increased by 7.7% to TWD391bn (USD14.0bn). With the Ministry of National Defence's (MND's) core budget remaining largely static, an important development in Taiwan has been the return of special budgets to finance major defence procurement projects. In the 1990s and early 2000s this extra-budgetary financing represented a crucial element of Taiwan's defence spending. However, fiscal constraints and the reluctance of foreign suppliers to approve transfers of military equipment to Taiwan saw such funding largely discontinued. Budget plans for 2022 show the special budget increasing further to TWD40.1bn (USD1.49bn) which will further expand the MND budget.

In India, where the pandemic exacerbated existing fiscal constraints, the government has sought to protect modernisation spending. While the defence budget as a whole for 2021–22 saw a marginal cut compared to the previous year, its capital component increased by 18.8% compared to the initial 2020–21 budget – the highest rate of growth for a decade and well above the average 6.8% increase seen over the last ten years. Given the Indian government's tendency to reduce the capital budget at times of fiscal stress, the

move may mark a recognition that modernisation has been delayed too long – particularly in light of border skirmishes with China in 2020. New Delhi's approval of a long-delayed USD2.54bn purchase of 56 Airbus C295MW medium transport aircraft in September, some six years after the aircraft was selected, further supports this potential shift in stance.

While Indonesia moved to cut its 2021 defence budget from IDR137 trillion (USD9.58bn) to IDR120tr (USD8.39bn) during the course of the fiscal year – a reduction of some 12% – draft legislation proposed by the presidential office in May simultaneously outlined planned investments of almost USD125bn on military modernisation over the next 25 years, including USD79bn on the acquisition of new equipment, to be financed largely through foreign loans. If approved and fully implemented, the plan would ostensibly see an average of USD3.2bn spent on procurement each year over the course of the programme, compared to around USD1.8bn over the last decade.

Defence industry

While security concerns undoubtedly influence some of the region's military modernisation drives, trends over the past year also suggest that military spending is being protected as states look to utilise their defence budgets as a means of investing in national economic development. Regional states are seeking to increase national self-sufficiency in defence production and focus more defence investment spending on domestic firms. There is nothing inherently new in this, but an increased focus on providing economic stimuli in the wake of the pandemic has seen governments look to increase their efforts in this area.

In August, South Korea announced measures designed to incentivise the use of local suppliers,

with the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy announcing that foreign-manufactured equipment will become up to 1.5 times more expensive than similar locally produced products. Furthermore, under the new proposals, in instances where foreign imports are deemed necessary, overseas suppliers will be required to partner with local firms. Ultimately, Seoul's objective is to ensure that by 2026, 80% of the country's military modernisation budget – some USD14.4bn in 2021 – is spent within the domestic defence sector compared to around 65% at present.

Industrial policy measures like these have become so central to wider defence strategy in Asia that measures to develop the local defence sector are now routinely included in wider defence and security policy papers. A cornerstone of Taiwan's 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review is technological self-reliance, both in terms of providing direct financial support through increased investment in research and development (R&D), and through using offset requirements linked to defence procurement deals to enhance the capabilities of local suppliers. Similarly, Japan's 2021 defence white paper emphasised the need to increase local capacity in relation to the development of advanced military technologies. To this end, in fiscal year 2021, a Future Capabilities Development Centre and a Technology Collaboration Support Division were set up within the Ministry of Defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency in order to prioritise and coordinate efforts in this area.

Similar measures are also being pursued in countries with less developed defence sectors. The economic and budgetary challenges posed by the pandemic prompted Malaysia's Technology Depository Agency to initiate a series of measures linked to procurement in strategic sectors (including defence) in order to support the economy. The new initiatives will reinforce existing policies designed to ensure that foreign military suppliers work closely with domestic companies in order to enhance the capabilities of the local defence sector and to engage with the country's wider Economic Enhancement Programme. Similar measures to expand existing industrial collaboration policies are also under review in Indonesia, with the aim of increasing domestic content in major defence projects.

In Vietnam, where local defence-industrial capabilities remain relatively limited, the General Department of Defence Industry within the MND announced plans to reform the country's primarily

state-owned defence sector. The new plan, covering 2021–30, aims to leverage dual-use technologies in key sectors like telecommunications to drive development of the local defence sector. Ultimately, the government hopes that the new strategy will enhance self-sufficiency, increase employment, enable increased defence exports and support wider economic development in the high-tech sector.

From the perspective of defence exporters, the key challenge created by the coronavirus pandemic therefore is not that there is a lack of funding for defence investment in the short term, but rather that it has sharpened focus on the role of local suppliers and local industrial development. The requirement for such measures will inevitably increase the complexity of operating in what is likely to remain a high-growth market for defence exports, but holds the promise of ultimately increasing regional self-sufficiency and lowering dependence upon foreign suppliers. However, much depends on the ability of regional defence R&D organisations to keep pace with defence equipment requirements both regionally and perhaps also globally. Nonetheless, in the longer term, the industrial policy measures that are being implemented across the region are likely to accelerate Asia's shift from being predominantly an importer of defence equipment to being a net exporter.

CHINA

China's Communist Party marked its centenary in July 2021 with a lavish celebration in Beijing and a fly-past of military helicopters and the air force's latest combat aircraft. The Chinese government had previously set out its intent for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve basic mechanisation and make progress towards informatisation by 2020 and by 2035, to 'basically achieve' defence and armed forces modernisation. The communiqué issued at the Chinese Communist Party's Fifth Plenum, in October 2020, continued calls to 'accelerate mechanisation, informationisation and intelligent integration'. Mechanisation is generally held to refer to ambitions to replace legacy equipment; informationisation to efforts at improving technical sophistication (likened by the Pentagon to 'net-centric' capability); while intelligent integration likely refers to the premise that military systems will be improved by the integration of automation, big data and artificial intelligence.

Statements have indicated that the 2020 goal has not yet been fully realised, but Beijing is nonetheless

pushing ahead with the 2035 target. This was reinforced by the release in early 2021 of the 14th Five Year Plan (FYP), which laid out the broad 2035 goal of creating a ‘peaceful and secure China’, but also indicated that defence modernisation would be accelerated. It again mentioned the plan to build a modernised army by 2027 (the centenary of the founding of the PLA’s antecedent) but provided little detail as to how these goals were to be achieved over the next 15 years, or of any shorter-term goals. However, the 2027 objective effectively adds a midway point for military modernisation in the run-up to the 2035 goal and does not replace the timeline set out by President Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress in 2017.

Introducing new laws and amending others

This year began with the passing of two new defence-related laws. On 22 January, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the China Coast Guard Law. Though the law is new, the China Coast Guard (CCG) was earlier brought into the Central Military Commission’s chain of command. Importantly, Article 83 stipulates that the CCG will ‘carry out defense operations and other missions in accordance with the National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of China ... and other relevant laws, military regulations and orders from the Central Military Commission’. Article 20 authorises the CCG to order or force the suspension or demolition of illegal activities by foreign organisations and individuals, including installing facilities, buildings or fixed or floating devices in the sea areas, islands and reefs under Chinese jurisdiction. Article 17 allows the CCG to expel any ship it encounters within its territorial seas and ‘internal maritime area’ (a term that is probably intentionally vague) through detention, forced removal or forced towing. Meanwhile, Article 25 provides it with the authority to create temporary exclusion zones as needed to stop vessels or personnel from entering. Articles 22, 47 and 48 provide the CCG with the specific authority to use force. The former stipulates that ‘when national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are being illegally infringed by foreign organizations and individuals at sea or are facing an imminent danger of illegal infringement, the CCG has the right to take measures including: use all necessary measures including weapons to stop the infringement and eliminate danger’. Articles 47 and 48 specify the circumstances under which the CCG

can use personal weapons, or weapons mounted on ships or carried by an aircraft. Under this law, the CCG is allowed to use weapons mounted on ships in circumstances where CCG forces perform maritime anti-terrorism missions, deal with serious incidents of violence at sea, or face attack by weapons or other ‘dangerous methods’ – though the latter is not defined.

Earlier, amendments to China’s National Defense Law were rubber-stamped by the National People’s Congress in late December 2020; these were the first amendments since the last revision in 2009, which predated Xi’s rise to power. In explanatory notes submitted to the 22nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on 13 October 2020, the amendments were justified due to the fact that the existing defence law at that time did not ‘fully adapt to the new tasks and requirements of building national defence and the army’ in light of developments and changes in global security as well as in China, the Party and the military. The most significant change is to the National Defense Law’s Article 50. In the latest version, the Central Military Commission is listed as being in charge of war powers and defence mobilisation, whereas previously the State Council and Central Military Commission jointly led mobilisation preparation and implementation. While Premier Li Keqiang remains the chairman of the State National Defense Mobilisation Commission, the State Council is in fact an implementation rather than a defence-related decision-making agency. Xi, as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, now fully holds the reins over the PLA. Another change to the National Defense Law is evident in [Chapter 3](#), Article 2, wherein greater emphasis is now placed on the use of force to protect China’s core interests, including for the purposes of ‘separatism’ and ‘development interests’, which were absent from earlier versions.

Training and exercises

The scale and nature of the PLA’s training and exercises have been closely studied in recent years for signs that they are being used to more directly improve military capability, such as through increased realism and interoperability. At the same time, they can be used for other purposes, such as political signalling. Like other armed forces, the pandemic had an effect in restricting some drills in 2020, but the PLA returned to active training and exercise activity into 2021. From January to November 2021, the PLA conducted 230

▼ Figure 17 People's Liberation Army (PLA) incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone

Between January and November 2021, the PLA increased the scale and number of air incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), conducting 230 incursions involving 886 aircraft of various types. Just under half involved just one type of aircraft, either flying solo or accompanied by other aircraft of the same type. The remainder involved multiple flights by special-mission aircraft, H-6 bombers and combat aircraft, including Su-30s, J-16s, J-11s, J-10s and JH-7s. Most of the aircraft have been fixed-wing types belonging to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy Aviation (PLANAF), but in August and November 2021 three separate incursions included WZ-10 attack helicopters (accompanied by a Mi-17 multi-role helicopter) and Z-8 heavy transport helicopters from the PLA Army.


Most flights in 2021 were conducted during the day, but there were also night-flights. The flight paths have tended to follow a similar pattern, entering from the west and routing

eastwards between Pratas Island and the southernmost point of Taiwan, though some sorties have followed a longer route, around the southern tip of the island and northward along Taiwan's southeastern coast.

The PLA likely uses these flights to train in areas of current weakness, such as anti-submarine warfare, and also to learn about Taiwan's responses. Frequent scrambles in response to PLA incursions have placed a heavy financial and maintenance burden on Taiwan's armed forces. Most sorties have avoided the politically sensitive Taiwan Strait Median Line but the incursions have also peaked around politically sensitive dates, signalling political messages to Taiwan and the US, as well as Chinese audiences. The largest incursion to date occurred on 4 October 2021, between the national days marked by Beijing and Taipei, when the PLA flew 56 aircraft on a single day in two sorties.



PLA incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ: January–November 2021



incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone, carried out by 886 PLA aircraft of various types. Although these flights included fighters and bombers, most also included special mission aircraft, particularly KQ-200 ASW aircraft and, in September 2021, ASW helicopters. In official 'reflections', it appears that the PLA recognises that ASW remains a significant area of weakness. Moreover, it is likely that these exercises – which Beijing now calls 'routine' – are not only intended to develop PLA capability, but also to signal displeasure politically to Taiwan and countries friendly to it. Responding to these sorties has come at high financial and equipment cost to Taiwan's armed forces, while it has also had the effect of normalising flights (sometimes at high tempo) by PLA aircraft around Taiwan.

In addition to incursions around Taiwan, the PLA has continued both single-service and multi-service drills across theatre commands, with a focus on joint operations. In 2021, particular attention was paid to exercises that practised skills related to naval warfare and amphibious assault, such as a month-long series of exercises in the South China Sea in March. However, there seems to be closer attention to information-security relating to the public discussion of exercises and military matters more broadly. For instance, while large-scale annual exercises, such as *Stride*, are still held, they feature less prominently in Chinese media coverage than in previous years. Moreover, there is less frequent reporting of the outcomes and analysis of such exercises by PLA leaders. In addition to a shift in official media reporting, a number of Chinese 'PLA-watcher' social media accounts have been censored.

PLA Rocket Force

In mid-2021, open-source satellite imagery showed several large ICBM silo fields under construction in northwestern China, focusing attention on the scale and pace of Beijing's nuclear force expansion and modernisation. When complete, these fields could (if fully filled) accommodate hundreds of ICBMs and bring the number of China's operationally deployed land-based strategic nuclear launchers much closer to parity with those of Russia and the US.

Although the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) was previously understood to be modernising the small number of silos it currently maintains for its liquid-fuelled DF-5 (CH-SS-4) ICBM systems and testing a silo-launched version of its solid-fuelled DF-41 (CH-SS-20) ICBM design, the

scale of this new construction effort surprised many international observers. (The DF-41 itself entered operational service with the PLARF in 2020, although the configuration paraded in 2019 suggests that this is more likely to have been a road-mobile, rather than silo-based, version.)

This potential large-scale expansion in ICBM-launcher numbers comes at a time when concern is rising about the potential for China to exploit its civil nuclear sector as a source of fissile material to support an expanding nuclear arsenal. The two fast neutron reactors currently under construction, as well as a new reprocessing plant, could potentially allow the PLA to recover large amounts of weapons-grade plutonium should it wish. The Pentagon's 2021 'China military power' report estimated that this expansion could enable the PLA to have at least 1,000 new nuclear warheads by 2030.

It is possible, as some analysts have suggested, that the PLA does not intend to fill all of the silos it has under construction, and instead may only occupy a small percentage of the sites (a strategy colloquially known as a 'shell game'). This approach could still leverage uncertainty over the precise number and location of deployed missiles within the fields to significantly increase targeting complications for adversaries, but with a much smaller outlay of force. Beijing itself has not yet publicly offered an official explanation of the silo-field imagery and maintains that its nuclear-power programme is solely for civilian use. Nonetheless, the combination of the two developments has renewed concerns in some quarters about China's nuclear ambitions, and there have been questions raised over whether they may indicate a change in China's previously avowed policies of nuclear no first use and a minimum credible deterrent.

In addition to force structure and fissile material, the technical capabilities of Chinese strategic nuclear delivery systems have begun to receive greater public scrutiny. The US alleged that hypersonic boost glide vehicle tests during 2021 had included placing a glide vehicle into a low Earth orbit and then de-orbiting the vehicle into the upper atmosphere where it flew to the target area. Such a development, should it be introduced into service, would complicate the task for defensive forces in that identifying the intended target and the trajectory of the threat system would be more challenging than for a ballistic missile, given the flight characteristics of a glide vehicle. Media reporting suggested that one such delivery system,

utilising a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), had been tested in July 2021. Beijing, however, maintained that this was a misidentification of an earlier reusable 'space vehicle' mission.

As well as the DF-41, the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile/HGV combination (CH-SS-22) is also believed to have begun operational fielding now with the PLARF's 61 Base opposite Taiwan. Some reports suggest that the reported test of a 'new type missile' by the Shangrao-based 613 Brigade in summer 2021 was DF-17 related. The 613 Brigade retains the historical honorific of China's first conventional missile brigade; this honorific was associated with the DF-17 at the 2019 parade. By contrast, however, the precise service status of the other new conventional system displayed at that parade, the CJ-100 cruise missile (CH-SSC-X-13), remains unclear.

PLA Army

In early 2021, after a year's delay as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, the PLA switched its induction of conscript personnel from a single annual intake in August to two smaller intakes in March and September. The PLA generally, and the PLA Army (PLAA) specifically, remain dependent on conscript personnel – estimates suggest that conscripts, each serving a two-year term of enlistment, currently comprise approximately one-third of all active-duty PLA personnel. Under the previous recruitment system, conscript-heavy units and departments across the force effectively experienced a cyclical growth and reduction in unit strength and readiness every year, peaking in late summer before dropping off as conscripts completing their second year of service were demobilised. The revised process is intended to mitigate this somewhat by splitting mobilisation and demobilisation across two windows. This will allow the PLA to retain units at high levels of training and readiness across larger parts of the year, resulting in greater operational flexibility.

The army began re-equipping multiple combined arms regiments in the Xinjiang military region in late 2020/early 2021 with modern light and medium armoured vehicles, including the ZBL-08 IFV family and ZTQ-15 light tanks. At the same time, the region's artillery regiments began receiving new PCL-181 155-millimetre truck-mounted artillery. Xinjiang has long been a relative backwater in terms of army equipment modernisation, and this focused effort probably reflects both the increasing tensions between Beijing and New Delhi, as well as

the relative success of the re-equipment programme elsewhere in the army. Given the long distances they are expected to cover, and the tough and inhospitable local terrain, the emphasis on medium- or light-weight equipment for these formations is logical. However, the decision also suggests growing confidence amongst army leaders in their strategy of reinforcing crisis points from a distance – illustrated by the appearance of ZTZ-99A main battle tanks, most likely drawn from the 76th Group Army, in southern Ladakh.

Although India has clearly risen up the army's list of priorities in recent years, Taiwan remains its key capability driver. During the summer and autumn of 2021, multiple PLA Army and Marine Corps manoeuvre brigades took part in amphibious exercises using civilian 'ro-ro' transport vessels. Despite the considerable number of landing craft and ships held by both the PLA Army and Navy, the PLA would probably still depend on a considerable number of requisitioned civilian vessels for a major Taiwan amphibious operation, given the scale of the forces involved. While most of these requisitioned vessels would be expected to transport follow-on waves of forces and supplies to an established lodgement ashore, some appear to have been modified to launch and recover amphibious assault vehicles, suggesting that the PLA may also expect them to take part in any initial landing operations.

In addition to recapitalising its traditional combat platforms, such as armoured vehicles and artillery, the army continues to invest in new capabilities. While it has already made considerable use of unarmed small- and medium-sized UAVs for reconnaissance and target acquisition, Army Aviation Brigades have now also reportedly begun using larger CH-4 combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs – a capability previously restricted to the navy and air force. It is possible that the PLAA is experimenting with pairing the CH-4 with its WZ-10 attack helicopters, in a manner similar to the MQ-1C UAVs and AH-64 attack helicopter pairing seen in US Army attack reconnaissance battalions. The army also continues to experiment with uninhabited ground vehicle (UGV) systems, including in EOD, engineering, patrol and reconnaissance roles.

PLA Navy

During 2021, speculation mounted regarding the likely imminent launch (either by the end of the year or in 2022) of China's third aircraft carrier, the second

▼ Figure 18 China Coast Guard (CCG): patrol ships, 2021


The introduction in 2021 of a new China Coast Guard (CCG) Law appears to further reinforce the development of the coast guard as a major arm of Chinese maritime law enforcement and also of power projection to assert maritime influence in China's near seas and in pursuit of its maritime claims. In this it serves as one component in a three-layered maritime capability alongside the PLA Navy (PLAN) and China's maritime militia.

In 2013, Beijing began consolidating several civilian maritime law-enforcement agencies into a single CCG under the State Ocean Administration (SOA). In 2018, there was a further transformation when the SOA was dissolved and the CCG was transferred to the People's Armed Police under the country's Central Military Commission.


The CCG's capabilities have also transformed, not least in its ability to deploy increased numbers of oceangoing assets at greater range and for longer periods than before. The introduction of two 12,000+-tonne full-load displacement *Zhaotou*-class

cutters was particularly noteworthy; these are the largest such coast guard vessels in the world. The CCG has also introduced cutters armed with weapons including 76mm guns and other smaller deck-mounted weapons, high-powered water cannons and embarked rotary-wing aircraft. These include former PLAN frigates with reduced armament, or vessels based on PLAN frigate designs. The US Coast Guard, in particular, also employs frigate-sized cutters, and deploys on forward-presence missions in the Indo-Pacific, including transits of the Taiwan Strait. However, the CCG is by far the largest coast guard in the world, with 524 patrol and coastal craft overall, compared to 343 and 383 respectively in the US and Japan, 136 for India, 84 for South Korea and 73 for Vietnam. Beijing's employment of the CCG in conjunction with the other arms of its maritime power in an incremental, sub-threshold approach to pursuing its maritime ambitions has been presenting an increasing challenge to China's neighbours and competitors.

Selected Asian nations, Russia and US: coastguard and other maritime gendarmerie patrol ships*



China Coast Guard: patrol ships*



* Vessels with a full-load displacement of over 1,500 tonnes; ** Fitted with a naval gun with a calibre of 57mm or more, or a close-in weapons system

US designation:	<i>Zhaotou</i>	<i>Shuoshi II</i>	<i>Zhaolai</i>	<i>Zhaoduan</i>	<i>Zhaojun</i>	<i>Jiangwei I</i>
Length (meters):	175	129	99	138	101	112
Built:	2014–15	2014–15	2013–14	2016–ongoing	Late 2010s–ongoing	1990–92
Weaponry:	1 76mm gun	-		1 76mm gun	1 76mm gun	
Capacity:	Hangar for 2 hel	Landing platform for 1 hel	Landing platform for 1 hel	Hangar for 1 hel	Landing platform for 1 hel	Hangar for 1 hel
Notes:				Based on navy Type-054A (<i>Jiangkai II</i>) frigate design		Ex-Navy, delivered to CCG 2016

to be built domestically. The primary focus of attention has been the greater size and potential capability of the vessel, designated Type-003, compared to its predecessors.

Its full-load displacement is estimated at around 80,000-tonnes, with capacity for more than 40 fixed-wing aircraft plus helicopters. More significantly, it appears to be equipped with three (apparently electromagnetic) catapult launch systems plus arrestor gear, as opposed to the ski-jump ramps which equip the first two ships. This will enable the operation of a greater range of aircraft, including a fixed-wing airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability, greater endurance and payload for the combat aircraft, and a higher tempo for air operations.

Nevertheless, the challenge of integrating these systems and capabilities, as well as generating a full carrier group based on such a vessel with enhanced features, suggests that the Type-003 is still several years away from being fully operational. Generating an air group for the new ship will present challenges. However, a new batch of the carrier-capable J-15 aircraft appears to be in production; a new fifth-generation naval fighter based on the FC-31 has begun flight tests; and flight development is said to be continuing on the KJ-600 carrier-borne AEW&C aircraft.

The Type-003 represents an overall capability closer to, but still somewhat behind, that of the latest US carriers. Even so, its progress, the expectation that the fourth Chinese carrier (which may already be under construction) will also feature nuclear power, and the indication that further such vessels are still planned, all suggest that China's carrier power continues to develop and mature and that more ambitious longer-range deployments by existing People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels, which have long been anticipated, may happen sooner rather than later.

Likewise, the commissioning in April 2021 of the first Type-075 (*Yushen*) large-deck amphibious assault ship with floodable well deck (LHD) suggests that a step-change in China's amphibious capacity is also under way. With the construction in rapid succession of two more of these LHDs, all three could be in service by the end of 2022 or early 2023.

The building of follow-on vessels remains uncertain, but two more Type-071 (*Yuzhao*) landing platform docks (LPDs) apparently joined the fleet in 2021, to make a total of eight. Despite the

power-projection potential of these new platforms, generating and integrating the necessary level of aviation and other specialist requirements will again be a major challenge.

The second and third Type-055 (*Renhai*) cruisers were commissioned in 2021. The lead ship of the class, *Nanchang*, also took part in several notable deployments, including for the first time joining a carrier strike group deployment (based around the prototype Chinese carrier *Liaoning*), providing the centrepiece for a deployment off Alaska, and in October joining a high-profile exercise with the Russian Navy. These deployments underscored the probable centrality of these potent vessels to future PLAN blue-water task group deployments.

Among other new arrivals during 2021 – adding to the considerable list of modern-design surface combatants – were two Type-052D mod (*Luyang III* mod) destroyers, making six of this variant now in commission. The number of Type-056A corvettes has now reached 50, with the prospect of more to follow. Among other significant specialist vessels, the PLAN added a fourth *Dongjian* surveillance vessel. Meanwhile, the retirement of legacy platforms continued, with the only Type-053H1 (*Jianghu I*) frigate remaining in service likely to soon decommission as well.

Even the US Department of Defense, perhaps for its own reasons, now regularly refers to China's navy as the largest in the world. That depends on a particular approach and perspective to counting hull numbers. By most other yardsticks, the US Navy remains superior in scale and capability, if significantly overstretched relative to its global commitments.

Nevertheless, the Chinese navy's transformation in recent years has, by any measure, been remarkable and rapid, and it continues. It may also be at an important stage in its development of a full range of capabilities. This may be true in Beijing's eyes as well, a point perhaps highlighted by the unusual high-profile triple commissioning, on 23 April 2021 at Yulin naval base on Hainan Island – and in the presence of Xi – of the first LHD, the third Type-055 cruiser, and a Type-094 (*Jin*) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, of which six are believed to be in service.

PLA Air Force

The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) continued to take delivery of a range of modern multi-role combat aircraft during 2021, with Chengdu J-10C

Firebird, J-20A, and possibly J-20B and Shenyang J-16 *Flanker* aircraft all handed over. PLAAF activity in Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone also increased.

The PLAAF is also returning to the nuclear role it lost around 1995, with the Xian H-6N designed to carry the CH-AS-X-13 air-launched ballistic missile fitted with a conventional or nuclear warhead. Work is also continuing on a successor to the H-6, the Xian H-20, and a low-observable flying wing design is in development. In addition, Xian appears to be working on a smaller tactical strike aircraft.

A two-seat variant of the J-20 entered flight testing in the fourth quarter of 2021. While the aircraft could be the conversion trainer equivalent of the J-10S, it is also possible that it is intended for a combat role, with the second seat designed for a weapons system operator. It appears that one brigade is re-equipping with the J-20 approximately every 12 months, suggesting a production rate of at least 24 aircraft per year. A number of J-20s apparently fitted with the domestically-produced WS-10C turbofan have been seen, and this aircraft may be known as the J-20B. Along with the aircraft's current air-to-air armament of the PL-10 (CH-AA-09) short-range imaging infrared guided missile, and the PL-15 (CH-AA-10) active radar-guided medium- to long-range missile, development work is believed to be continuing on the PL-16. This is in a similar performance class to the PL-15, but six rather than only four can be carried in the J-20's main internal weapons bay.

The PL-15 uses a boost-sustain solid motor configuration, combined with what may well be a high fly-out speed, for medium- to long-range performance and, since introduction into service in 2018, has been a key threat driver for the air arms of the US and its regional allies. Beijing has yet to show the PL-16 design, but it is unlikely to be one of the rocket-ramjet missile configurations that it has also been developing. Given the carriage constraints of a weapons bay and the design requirement to provide air inlets for a rocket-ramjet missile, packaging any more than four of this type of weapon with a performance similar to the PL-15 into the J-20 would appear to be challenging.

A dedicated electronic warfare variant of the J-16, the J-16D, was shown in PLAAF colours at the Air Show China 2021 in late September/early October, suggesting that this variant is entering service. The J-16D displayed had wingtip electronic sensing pods and four jamming pods on wing stations.

While Chengdu and Shenyang have been delivering batches of combat aircraft to the PLAAF during 2021, it is harder to discern whether and when these types are being used to replace ageing types, to form new units, or to increase airframe numbers in existing formations (the latter would raise questions over whether the PLAAF may be moving to a larger brigade-size for some of its tactical combat aircraft types).

The PLAAF's airlift capacity continues to benefit from the delivery of the four-engined Xian Y-20, with at least 31 of the A-model of the heavy transport aircraft now in service with two brigades. A tanker variant, possibly designated Y-20U, is now in active service and may in time replace the H-6U. The Y-20A is fitted with the Saturn D-30KP-2 turbofan engine, while a re-engined variant, likely the Y-20B, is fitted with the domestically-produced WS-20 turbofan. Flight testing of the Y-20B began in 2020, with a small number of the re-engined variant visible at the Xian Yanliang manufacturing site by the fourth quarter of 2021.

In addition to its aviation branch, the PLAAF has also focused considerable resources on modernising its surface-to-air missile (SAM) forces in recent years. The absorption of the former air defence artillery branch after 2012 has enabled the PLAAF to increase the size of its existing SAM brigades as well as forming new ones. The last of the old HQ-2 systems appear to have been phased out and the bulk of the PLAAF's long-range SAM inventory is now comprised of a mix of Russian S-300 and S-400 systems, and comparable domestic designs such as HQ-9/-9B and HQ-22.

Defence economics

An ambitious new chapter in China's defence and national security development planning cycle began in 2021. The goal appears to be to ramp up the construction of a broad and capable defence economic and innovation base amid escalating political, military and economic rivalry with the United States and its allies. In the 2021–25 14th FYP, launched in March 2021, this takes the form not only of focus on the defence and strategic spheres, but also on the rest of the domestic economy and society. The importance of comprehensive securitisation is highlighted in other official plans and policies that have come out in the past several years, such as the 2020 'dual circulation' initiative.

This approach is anchored in a steadily worsening assessment of the country's external threat environ-

ment. The 14th FYP points to ‘profound and complex changes’ that China is facing in the international environment.

While the plan does not explicitly identify the chief cause for China’s predicament, speeches given by President Xi Jinping as the 14th FYP was being drafted make clear that the US is the main adversary. In internal remarks to Communist Party officials to explain the geostrategic reasoning behind the 14th FYP, Xi said that ‘the biggest source of chaos in the world today is the United States’ and ‘the United States is the biggest threat to China’s development and security’.

The 14th FYP also pointed to other major trends that would profoundly impact China’s development and security in the near to medium term. The most noteworthy is a science and technology revolution happening alongside an industrial transformation and a far-reaching adjustment in the balance of international forces. This has made the existing international order increasingly complex, unstable and uncertain, and brought in an era of ‘turbulent change, unilateralism, protectionism, and hegemonism that poses threats to world peace and development’.

Security imperatives of the 14th FYP

Several major security-related themes are apparent in the 14th FYP. Economic securitisation at both the macro- and micro-levels received prominent attention. Macro-level economic securitisation is set out in the ‘dual circulation’ concept in which ‘China will form a formidably large domestic market and create a new development framework’. Using a combination of supply- and demand-side policies, the intention is to reconfigure and unblock domestic supply chains so they are protected from international disruptions.

The plan also stresses the urgent need to achieve technological self-reliance. The rapid tightening of US-led export controls has forced the Chinese authorities into concerted action to prevent what they describe as technological ‘strangulation’. The developmental response has been to place science, technology and innovation at the ‘commanding heights’ of the 14th FYP’s policy agenda. The plan points to the critical importance of ‘adhering to the core position of innovation in China’s modernisation drive’ and taking ‘science and technology independence and self-reliance as the strategic support for national development’.

This is being carried out in several areas:

- **Resource allocations:** the plan calls for a significant boost in basic research spending from around 6% at the end of the 13th FYP to 8% by 2025. This is still around half of what advanced economies such as the US and Japan spend on basic research (17% and 13% respectively in 2017), but in absolute terms means doubling the size of Chinese basic research outlays by the mid-2020s. Moreover, the plan calls for increasing annual R&D expenditures by 7%. No mention is made of defence R&D allocations, but the defence R&D system will likely enjoy growth rates of a similar if not higher level.
- **Structural reforms:** a long-awaited establishment of large-scale national laboratories is finally taking place, with the plan calling for these to be set up in the areas of quantum information, photonics and micro-nanoelectronics, network communications, AI, biomedicine, and modern energy systems.
- **Prioritisation of select technology domains:** seven areas are expressly identified in the plan: AI; quantum information; integrated circuits; genetics and biotechnology; neuroscience; advanced clinical medicine; and deep space, deep sea and polar exploration.

Military civil fusion

While military civil fusion (MCF) as a term appears to be less prominent in official discourse, the pursuit of the convergence between the civilian and defence economies remains a pressing priority. The general objective outlined in the 14th FYP is to build an overarching integrated strategic system in which the civilian, defence and national security sectors are closely aligned and coordinated. An extensive list of goals has been put forward:

- Expand efforts to share resources, which means allowing the defence-industrial sector to increase access to the financial markets through fundraising initiatives such as asset securitisation and government guidance funds.
- Encourage the coordinated civil-military development of key regions. A top priority of the 14th FYP is regional and infrastructure development, especially the construction of

high-speed transportation networks and the building of major urban clusters around the country. Military requirements will feature prominently in these projects.

- Deepen civil–military research collaboration. The civilian research and development system will be increasingly leveraged for defence requirements.
- Strengthen civil-military joint development in maritime, space, cyber, biotechnology, new energy, AI and quantum technology.
- Improve the development of the national defence mobilisation system to ensure that the national economy can be rapidly and effectively repurposed for defence and national security in crisis and wartime conditions. The coronavirus pandemic in 2020 is an example of activating the defence mobilisation system to deal with a health crisis.

MCF will become even more important under the new economic securitisation concept, with the emphasis on domestic economic and technological self-sufficiency and safeguarding against external economic threats.

2035 vision and the long-term science and technology plan

A 15-year vision that declares that China will ‘basically realize socialist modernization’ by 2035 is briefly outlined in the 14th FYP. This means that the country’s national strength, of which economic, scientific and technological capabilities are central components, is intended to ‘rise sharply’. Major breakthroughs are planned in key core technologies and China will become a global innovator. A modern economic system will be built that will allow China to reach the per capita income levels of a moderately developed country. China will also reach a higher level of security and stability, of which a key contributing factor is the ‘basic realization’ of defence modernisation.

A new 15-year Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (MLP) should have started alongside the 14th FYP, following the conclusion of the 2006–20 MLP. In sharp contrast to its predecessor – which was made public – the Chinese authorities have been tight-lipped about whether to openly disclose the details of the new plan because of foreign, especially US, scrutiny of China’s technological advancements.

Defence industry

China’s defence industry entered 2021 with robust growth momentum, and it looks well placed to capitalise on the pivot to securitisation over the next few years. The impact of the coronavirus pandemic proved to be short lived and appears to have only affected the defence industry in the first half of 2020. Prime contractors in the defence sector posted strong double-digit growth in profits and revenues from the second half of 2020 and into the first half of 2021. Total revenue of the Chinese defence industry for the first six months of 2021 increased by 22.4% over the same period for 2020, while net profits grew by 19.8%.

The Chinese government launched a three-year action plan at the end of 2020, intended to overhaul the entire state-owned enterprise system, of which the defence-industrial sector is an important part. A key reform measure is the promotion of mixed private-public ownership and defence research institutes, which is the focus of the initial restructuring phase, due for completion in 2023.

Defence-industrial enterprises have been given permission to implement an important reform that would enable the establishment of equity incentive mechanisms to allow high-achieving personnel to be rewarded at levels comparable to private-sector counterparts. This will improve the ability of defence enterprises to retain and better incentivise employees; they have to date been hampered from effectively doing this because of restrictions arising from their state-owned status.

Another effort is being made to overhaul the pricing system for military products, but deeply entrenched and competing interests between the defence industry and the PLA have meant this issue has proven highly resistant to reform. The existing pricing system dates back to the central planning era of the 1950s and 1960s that was based on a formula of cost plus 5% profit. A chronic lack of market competition for defence products has meant that military procurement officials have found it difficult to obtain accurate pricing information.

The consolidation and remaking of the country’s primes (which has been proceeding at a glacial pace) finally reached the defence-electronics sector in 2021. In June, the State Council approved the merger of China Electronics Technology Corp. (CETC) and China Potevio Corp., with the latter becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of CETC. China Potevio Corp. is a central government-owned enterprise specialising in information and communications

technology. This merger significantly increased the size of CETC, which now has a workforce of more than 200,000 employees.

A move towards more closely integrating the defence-electronics industry and the space and missile sector took place in August 2021 with an announcement by China Electronics Corp. (CEC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC) of a strategic cooperation agreement on the joint development of projects in the industrial internet and network security sectors, as well as personnel exchanges. In 2020, CASIC had also entered into a strategic cooperation arrangement with China Aerospace Science Corp. (CASC). This leaves the ordnance sector as the last remaining holdout to corporate consolidation and integration.

Defence spending and investment

The growing importance of defence and national security priorities in leadership pronouncements and policies – such as in the 14th FYP – is not yet reflected in the official core defence budget, which came to CNY1.355 trillion (USD202 billion) in 2021, a 6.8% nominal increase over 2020 levels. While this growth rate is marginally higher than the 6.6% increase seen in 2020, both fall considerably below the 7.6% growth seen during the first four years of the 2016–20 13th FYP.

The coronavirus pandemic appears to be principally responsible for this reduced pace of

growth. How long lasting this modest but not inconsequential fall in defence expenditure growth rates will be depends on how quickly China's economy emerges from the pandemic: increasingly this looks to be sooner rather than later.

Total Chinese defence expenditure is estimated to be much higher if foreign-weapons purchases, military R&D funding and the People's Armed Police central budget are included. Including local militia funding, the 2021 budget is estimated to have reached CNY1.388tr (USD207bn), while total expenditure is likely closer to CNY1.810tr (USD270bn). The official Chinese defence budget is therefore a relatively poor guide for measuring trends and inputs into military research, development and acquisition activities, as it does not contain much of the funding for defence R&D, which is located in other parts of the state budget, extra-budgetary funding allocations, and investment funds raised from the capital markets.

A useful proxy indicator of Chinese defence R&D investment is the securitisation of the corporate assets of the country's principal state-owned defence contractors through stock market listings. These defence primes have raised a combined total of CNY2.55tr (USD370bn) between 2012 and 2020, including CNY143bn (USD20.7bn) in 2020 alone. The reform effort to increase the ratio of private ownership in the defence industry over the next few years could see the rate of asset securitisation of the defence primes increase yet further.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Asia

Significant events in 2021



FEBRUARY

CHINA CUTS DEFENCE-INDUSTRY RED TAPE


China's defence procurement agency relaxed administrative regulations for dual-use equipment to encourage companies into the defence industry, in line with the government's 'military-civil fusion (MCF)' strategy. Under the new measure, which is still in a trial period, a contractor will undergo a simpler evaluation and licensing process, reducing registration time from months to weeks. In October 2017, the number of licences and certificates that defence contractors required before submitting a defence tender was reduced from four to three. Launched in 2015, the MCF strategy aims to 'reinvigorate' the country's defence-technology industrial base by 2049.



SEPTEMBER

HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES & CONSTRUCTION SOLD


Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC) became majority privately-owned. Initially, 83.45% of shares were put up for sale, though this was later reduced to a 66.85% stake in April 2021, when the Korea Development Bank (KDB) and 11 other major Korean and Filipino shareholders signed a share purchase agreement with a consortium led by the Dongbu Corporation, a Korean civil-engineering and construction group. HHIC has been responsible for several key naval shipbuilding programmes (including the *Dokdo/Marado* amphibious assault ships) with defence-related revenue accounting for 23.66% of its total revenue in 2020 (down from 29.08% in 2019 and 30.75% in 2018).



SEPTEMBER

INDONESIA DEFENCE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATIONS

Indonesia announced that before the end of 2021 it will have brought together five state-owned defence companies under a new parent company called industri pertahanan (Defence Industry). The new firm will consist of Dirgantara Indonesia (aerospace), Pindad (armoured vehicles), Dahana (munitions) and Penataran Angkatan Laut (PAL) Indonesia (maritime), with the industry cluster led by Len Industri (electronics). The new company will aim to better support Indonesia's increasingly ambitious procurement plans. In 2019, the aforementioned five companies had an estimated revenue of IDR5.6tr (USD396.16m) in the defence sector out of a combined estimated revenue of IDR14.47tr (USD1.02bn) and comprised around 8,000 employees.



SEPTEMBER

AUKUS PARTNERSHIP

Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced a trilateral security partnership, called AUKUS. Its first objective is, over a period of 18 months, to devise the best way to equip Australia with at least eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). The Australian government has said it intends to build the submarines in Adelaide. As a consequence, Australia cancelled the 2016 contract with France's Naval Group for 12 conventionally powered submarines based on the *Barracuda* SSN design. This programme had attracted criticism over cost increases. The initial production cost estimate of more than AUD50bn (USD37.19bn) had almost doubled by 2019 to AUD80bn (USD55.63bn), according to testimony given to a parliamentary committee in November 2019. The move damaged relations between the AUKUS nations and France, and also further delays the replacement of Australia's six *Collins*-class submarines, which were built in the late 1990s and early 2000s.



OCTOBER

INDIA'S ORDNANCE FACTORY BOARD IS DISSOLVED

The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), India's oldest state-owned defence manufacturer, was dissolved, three months after a corporatisation plan was authorised by the government. OFB's 41 factories across 24 states have been restructured into seven limited companies with around 70,000 staff distributed across these new firms: Munitions India (ammunition and explosives); Armoured Vehicles Nigam (vehicles); Advanced Weapons and Equipment India (weapons and equipment); Troop Comforts (clothing and general stores); Yantra India (ancillary products, such as cartridge cases); India Optel (opto-electronics); and Gliders India (parachutes). The reforms are intended to redress underperformance and inefficiencies but also to promote the exports of OFB companies, which recently accounted for under 4% of India's defence exports. Although the Indian government has said it has no plans to privatise the new companies, media reports indicate that this may be an option.

Figure 19  **Vietnam: indigenous naval shipbuilding capability**





Figure 20  Republic of Korea: K2 Black Panther main battle tank

In the early 1990s, the K2 *Black Panther* programme was launched to develop a 3.5 generation main battle tank (MBT), intended to replace South Korea's ageing M-series MBTs (the M47 and the M48 *Pattton*). The Agency of Defense Development (ADD), the government's defence research centre, and Rotem (now Hyundai Rotem) have led the *Black Panther* programme, based on technology acquired from the 1970s M48A5 upgrade programme and the successful development of the K1. This was South Korea's first indigenous MBT with a 1,200-horsepower engine, and was developed through the Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) programme, based on Chrysler's M1 *Abrams* design in 1987. It was projected that KRW4.22tr (USD5.47bn) would be spent on a research and development phase that lasted 14 years with a ten-year production contract with the plan to introduce the first K2 into service from 2011. However, production has suffered delays due to a series of contract modifications related to the powerpack (engine and transmission system). After 1992, the plan was that the first batch, of 100 vehicles, would be fitted with foreign-supplied powerpacks due to the inability of local industry to produce a suitable engine with 1,500-horsepower and a transmission system. This was changed in June 2003. Local industry was tasked with developing an indigenous powerpack (expected to be completed after five years of R&D). However, significant development delays led to this decision being reversed in 2012, with plans for the local system being pushed to batch 2, which was contracted in December 2014. However, further delays led to another change on the powerpack question in 2018. This time a German transmission was to be imported; the plan remains that local industry develops the powerpack.




Afghanistan AFG

Afghan Afghani AFN		2020	2021	2022
GDP [a]	AFN	1.55tr	n.k	
	USD	20.1bn	n.k	
per capita	USD	611	n.k	
Growth	%	-2.4	n.k	
Inflation	%	5.6	n/a	
Def bdgt [b]	AFN	155bn	€172bn	
	USD	2.01bn	€1.88bn	
USD1=AFN		76.84	€91.43	

[a] IMF economic data unavailable for Afghanistan in 2021

[b] Security expenditure. Includes expenditure on Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council and the General Directorate of National Security. Also includes donor funding.



Population 37,466,414

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	20.4%	5.2%	5.4%	4.5%	13.8%	1.3%
Female	19.8%	5.1%	5.2%	4.3%	13.5%	1.5%

Capabilities

In August 2021, all government forces and the government itself collapsed under the pressure of the Taliban offensive. The Taliban administration has publicly committed to the undertaking they made to the US in the 2020 Doha Agreement to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorist attacks against the US and its interests. Nonetheless, terrorist groups remain active in the country. ISIS has continued to mount attacks on Taliban fighters and Afghan civilians, while ties between the Taliban and al-Qaeda may result in the Taliban tolerating the latter's presence in the country. The United States has indicated that an 'over the horizon' counter-terrorism capability is being developed, but this faces a host of challenges including basing and target selection. Taliban fighters are widely deployed across Afghanistan, particularly in key towns and cities. The Taliban have acquired many foreign-supplied vehicles, weapons and small arms. Some captured aircraft have been flown, though many were taken out of the country or disabled. Although the Taliban has appealed for specialist personnel from the previous government's forces to join them so that the group can operate such systems, evidence of Taliban revenge killings of former members of the security forces will limit take-up. Moreover, many complex platforms were previously maintained by (now departed) foreign contractors, while spare-parts availability will also limit the ability to operate Western-origin systems. The Taliban's ability to employ and support the large amount of captured material is unlikely to be high. Moreover, the freezing of the former Afghan government's funds held overseas has precipitated a fiscal crisis. Although the G20 have agreed to fund humanitarian relief, the rapid release of frozen funds appears very unlikely. These factors are expected to limit the Taliban's military capability. Its defence priorities are likely to remain internal security, border control and countering ISIS.

ACTIVE 165,000 (Taliban 165,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Taliban 165,000

The Taliban's military strength is believed to consist of approximately 75,000 full time fighters and 90,000 local militia

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY

TOWED 122mm D-30

MOR 82mm 2B14

AIRCRAFT • TPT 1 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*

HELICOPTERS


ATK 1 Mi-35 *Hind*

MRH 2 Mi-17 *Hip H*

Australia AUS

Australian Dollar AUD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AUD	1.97tr	2.13tr	
	USD	1.36tr	1.61tr	
per capita	USD	52,905	62,619	
Growth	%	-2.4	3.5	
Inflation	%	0.9	2.5	
Def bdgt [a]	AUD	45.5bn	45.5bn	47.8bn
	USD	31.4bn	34.3bn	
USD1=AUD		1.45	1.33	

[a] Includes pensions



Population 25,809,973

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.6%	3.1%	3.6%	3.8%	22.1%	7.5%
Female	9.0%	2.9%	3.2%	3.6%	22.8%	8.7%

Capabilities

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is capable, well trained and well equipped. It also has considerable recent operational experience. In March 2016, the government published Australia's third defence white paper in seven years. This identified China's growing regional role, regional military modernisation and inter-state rivalry as among the influences shaping defence policy. A 'Strategic Update' to the white paper, published in July 2020, outlined plans to adjust Australia's defence posture in order to develop a more powerful and self-reliant military deterrent. The document pointed to an increased prospect of war in Australia's region, claimed that a ten-year 'strategic warning time' could no longer be assumed, and highlighted potential threats from 'grey-zone activities'. The country's primary ally is the US, but it is also forging closer defence ties with India, Japan, South Korea and the UK, while remaining committed to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and to its close defence relations with New Zealand. The AUKUS partnership, signed in September 2021, will see the UK and US assist Australia in developing a nuclear-powered submarine capability and other defence and security technologies. It led to the cancellation of the existing contract with France for conventionally-powered boats.

The plan is to build the nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide. Australia is also building frigates and patrol ships, based on European designs. Strategic air- and sea-lift platforms give the ADF considerable capability to move and sustain deployments overseas. Combat-air, maritime-patrol and armoured-vehicle capabilities are also being boosted, and more closely integrating Australia's armed forces – and their modern platforms – is a priority. Australia imports most of its significant defence equipment but possesses an increasingly capable defence industry. Its largest naval ship-builders are ASC and Austal, whose US subsidiary, Austal USA, builds vessels for the US Navy.

ACTIVE 59,600 (Army 29,400 Navy 15,300 Air 14,900)

RESERVE 29,750 (Army 20,100 Navy 3,950 Air 5,700)

Integrated units are formed from a mix of reserve and regular personnel. All ADF operations are now controlled by Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 *Optus* C1 (dual use for civil/mil comms)

Army 29,400

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (1st) div HQ (1 sigs regt)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

3 mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 lt mech inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 CSS bn)

Amphibious

1 (2nd RAR) amph bn

Aviation

1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt hel sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn))

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 2 UAV bty, 1 CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt (2 construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn)

Special Operations Command

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (SAS) SF regt
1 (SF Engr) SF regt
2 cdo regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 sigs sqn (incl 1 reserve sqn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 CSS sqn

Reserve Organisations 20,100 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (2nd) div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated)

Light

1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn)

1 (5th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 2 spt bn)

1 (9th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn)

1 (11th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn)

1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

1 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 trg bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 59 M1A1 *Abrams*

RECCE 25 *Boxer* CRV (incl variant)

IFV 253 ASLAV-25 (all variants)

APC • APC (T) 431 M113A4

AUV 1,120: 1,020 *Bushmaster* IMV; 100 *Hawkei*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 51: 15 ASLAV-F; 17 ASLAV-R; 19 M88A2

VLB 5 *Biber*

MW 20: 12 *Husky*; 8 MV-10

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL • 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 239

TOWED 155mm 54 M777A2

MOR 81mm 185

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70

AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200 troops)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 22 *Tiger*

MRH 2 AW139 (leased)

TPT 87: **Heavy** 12 CH-47F *Chinook*; **Medium** 75: 41 NH90

TTH (MRH90); 34 S-70A *Black Hawk*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 15 RQ-7B *Shadow* 200

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114M *Hellfire*

Navy 15,300

Fleet Comd HQ located at Sydney. Naval Strategic Comd HQ located at Canberra

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 6

SSK 6 *Collins* with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/Mk 48 ADCAP mod 7 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 *Hobart* with *Aegis* Baseline

8.1 C2, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM,

6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIB SAM/RIM-162A

ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with

MU90 LWT/Mk 54 LWT, 1 MK 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS,

1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R *Seahawk*)

FRIGATES • FFGHM 8 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R *Seahawk* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14

PCO 14: 12 *Armida* (Bay mod); 2 *Cape* (leased)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MHC 4 *Huon*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3

LHD 2 *Canberra* (capacity 18 hel; 4 LCM-1E; 110 veh; 12 M1 Abrams MBT; 1,000 troops)

LSD 1 *Choules* (ex-UK *Bay*) (capacity 1 med hel; 24 MBT; 350 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM-1E

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13

AGHS 2 *Leeuwin* with 1 hel landing platform

AGS 4 *Paluma*

AORH 2 *Supply* (ESP *Cantabria*) (capacity 1 MH-60R *Seahawk*)

AX 1 *Sycamore* (capacity 1 med hel) (operated by private company, Teekay Shipping; multi-role aviation training vessel)

AXS 1 *Young Endeavour*

The following vessels are operated by a private company, DMS Maritime:

ASR 2: 1 *Besant*; 1 *Stoker*

AXL 1 *Seahorse Mercator*

Naval Aviation 1,450

FORCES BY ROLE

ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with NH90 TTH (MRH90)

1 sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*

1 sqn with H135

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ASW 24 MH-60R *Seahawk*

TPT 21: **Medium** 6 NH90 TTH (MRH90) (operated on rotational basis); **Light** 15 H135

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114M *Hellfire*

Clearance Diving Branch

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 diving unit

Air Force 14,900

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F/A-18F *Super Hornet*

2 sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II

1 sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II (forming)

ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with P-8A *Poseidon*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with EA-18G *Growler*

ISR

1 (FAC) sqn with PC-21

1 sqn with AP-3C *Orion*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with B-737-700 *Wedgetail* (E-7A)

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with A330 MRTT (KC-30A)

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; *Falcon* 7X

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster* III

1 sqn with C-27J *Spartan*

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 OCU with F-35A *Lightning* II

1 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air*

2 sqn with PC-21

2 (LIFT) sqn with *Hawk* MK127*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 124 combat capable

FGA 68: 24 F/A-18F *Super Hornet*; 44 F-35A *Lightning* II

ASW 12 P-8A *Poseidon*

EW 13: 2 AP-3C *Orion* mod; 11 EA-18G *Growler**

AEW&C 6 B-737-700 *Wedgetail* (E-7A)

TKR/TPT 7 A330 MRTT (KC-30A)

TPT 47: **Heavy** 8 C-17A *Globemaster* III; **Medium** 22: 10

C-27J *Spartan*; 12 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 12 Beech 350

King Air; **PAX** 5: 2 B-737BBJ (VIP); 3 *Falcon* 7X (VIP)

TRG 82: 33 *Hawk* Mk127*; 49 PC-21

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; ASRAAM; ARH AIM-120B/C-5/C-7 AMRAAM

ARM AGM-88B HARM; AGM-88E AARGM

AShM AGM-84A *Harpoon*

LACM **Conventional** AGM-158A JASSM

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Paveway* II/IV; Laser JDAM

INS/GPS-guided AGM-154C JSOW; JDAM; JDAM-ER

DEPLOYMENT

EGYPT: MFO (*Operation Mazurka*) 27

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* (*Okra*) 110; 1 SF gp;

NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1

MALAYSIA: 120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 P-8A *Poseidon* (on rotation)

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (*Operation Paladin*) 13

PHILIPPINES: *Operation Augury* 100 (trg team)

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (*Operation Aslan*) 13

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: *Operation Accordion* 400: 1 tpt det with 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules*

FOREIGN FORCES

Singapore 230: 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 *Super Puma*; AS532 *Cougar*


United States US Pacific Command: 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap • US Strategic Command: 1 detection and tracking

radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt

Bangladesh BGD

Bangladeshi Taka BDT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BDT	27.4tr	30.2tr	
	USD	323bn	356bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,962	2,139	
Growth	%	3.5	4.6	
Inflation	%	5.6	5.6	
Def bdgt	BDT	321bn	344bn	373bn
	USD	3.79bn	4.06bn	
FMA (US)	USD	1.5m	0.0m	0.0m
USD1=BDT		84.79	84.81	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 164,098,818

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.2%	4.5%	4.6%	4.2%	19.2%	3.3%
Female	12.8%	4.4%	4.6%	4.4%	20.9%	3.8%

Capabilities

Bangladesh has limited military capability, which is optimised for border and domestic security, including domestic disaster relief. A defence-modernisation plan is under way, called Forces 2030, although acquisitions have been limited. Bangladesh has relied on Chinese and Russian aid and credit to overcome its limited procurement funding. It has increased defence collaboration with India. The country has a long record of UN peacekeeping deployments. A major naval-recapitalisation and -expansion programme, including local manufacture of patrol boats, is under way to better protect the country's large EEZ. Airlift capability has improved with the addition of ex-UK C-130Js. Substantial efforts have also been made to strengthen the shipbuilding industry and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility. The armed forces reportedly retain extensive commercial interests, including in real estate, banks and other businesses.

ACTIVE 163,050 (Army 132,150 Navy 16,900 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 132,150

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

10 inf div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 cdo bde (2 cdo bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde

3 indep armd regt

Light

25 inf bde

2 (composite) bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

10 arty bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bde

AVIATION

1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn)

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 276: 174 Type-59/-59G(BD); 58 Type-69/-69G; 44 Type-90-II (MBT-2000)

LT TK 8 Type-62

RECCE 8+ BOV M11

APC 545

APC (T) 134 MT-LB

APC (W) 330 BTR-80

PPV 81+ *Maxxpro*

AUV 17 *Cobra*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ARV 3+: T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654

VLB MTU

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 *Metis* M1 (RS-AT-13)

RCL 106mm 238 M40A1

ARTILLERY 895+

SP 155mm 18 NORA B-52

TOWED 363+: 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer;

122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83; 54

Type-96 (D-30); 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46)

MRL 42: 122mm 36+ WS-22; 302mm 6 T-300

MOR 472: 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type-87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3: 1 LCT; 2 LCVP

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA-31T *Cheyenne*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2 AS365N3 *Dauphin*

TPT 6: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 3 Bell 206L-4

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range FM-90 (CH-SA-4)

Point-defence FN-16 (CH-SA-14); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

GUNS • TOWED 174: 35mm 8 GDF-009 (with

Skyguard-3); 37mm 132 Type-65/74; 57mm 34 Type-59 (S-60)

Navy 16,900

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 2

SSK 2 *Nabajatra* (ex-PRC Type-035G (*Ming*)) with 8 single 533mm TT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6

FFGHM 3:

1 *Bangabandhu* (ROK modified *Ulsan*) with 2 twin

Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHM, 1 octuple FM-90N

(CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm

TT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1

AW109E hel)

2 *Umar Farooq* (ex-PRC Type-053H3 (*Jiangwei II*)) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple GMLS with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 hel)

FFG 3:

2 *Abu Bakr* (ex-PRC Type-053H2 (*Jianghu III*)) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

1 *Osman* (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (*Jianghu I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 46

CORVETTES 6

FSGM 4 *Shadhinota* (PRC C13B) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with FL-3000N (HHQ-10) (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FSG 2 *Bijoy* (ex-UK *Castle*) (of which 1 damaged in 2020 Beirut port explosion) with 2 twin Inchr with C-704 ASHM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PSOH 2 *Somudra Joy* (ex-US *Hero*) with 1 76mm gun, hel landing platform

PCFG 4 *Durdarsha* (ex-PRC *Huangfeng*) with 4 single Inchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 *Safflower*) ASHM

PCG 2 *Durjoy* with 2 twin Inchr with C-704 ASHM, 1 76MM gun

PCO 8: 1 *Madhumati* (*Sea Dragon*) with 1 57mm gun; 5 *Kapatakhaya* (ex-UK *Island*); 2 *Durjoy* with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun

PCC 8: 2 *Meghna* with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection); 1 *Nirbhoy* (ex-PRC *Hainan*) with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor; 2 twin 57mm gun; 5 *Padma*

PBFG 5 *Durbar* (PRC *Hegu*) with 2 single Inchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1 *Scrubbrush*) ASHM

PBF 4 *Titas* (ROK *Sea Dolphin*)

PB 7: 1 *Barkat* (ex-PRC *Shanghai III*); 2 *Karnaphuli*; 1 *Salam* (ex-PRC *Huangfen*); 3 *Shaheed Daulat* (PRC *Shanghai II*)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5

MSO 5: 1 *Sagar*; 4 *Shapla* (ex-UK *River*)

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1

LANDING CRAFT 14

LCU 4 (of which 2+)

LCT 2

LCM 5 *Darshak* (*Yuchin*)

LCVP 3+

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11

AG 1

AGHS 2: 1 *Agradoot*; 1 *Anushandhan*

AGS 2 *Darshak*

AOR 2 (coastal)

AOT 1 *Khan Jahangir Ali*

AR 1+

ATF 1+

AX 1 *Shaheed Ruhul Amin*

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228NG (MP)

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AW109E *Power*

Special Warfare and Diving Command 300

Air Force 14,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B *Airguard*

1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG *Airguard*

1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI *Airguard*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Yak-130 *Mitten**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-32 *Cline*

1 sqn with C-130B/J *Hercules*

1 sqn with L-410UVP

TRAINING

1 sqn with K-8W *Karakorum**; L-39ZA *Albatros**

1 sqn with PT-6

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; Mi-171Sh

1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; Mi-171Sh

1 sqn with Bell 212

1 trg sqn with Bell 206L *Long Ranger*; AW119 *Koala*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable

FTR 53: 9 F-7MB *Airguard*; 11 F-7BG *Airguard*; 12 F-7BGI *Airguard*; 5 FT-7B *Airguard*; 4 FT-7BG *Airguard*; 4 FT-7BGI *Airguard*; 6 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

TPT 14: Medium 7: 4 C-130B *Hercules*; 3 C-130J *Hercules*;

Light 7: 3 An-32 *Clinet*; 3 L-410UVP; 1 C295W

TRG 65: 15 K-8W *Karakorum**; 7 L-39ZA *Albatros**; 30+ PT-6; 13 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 16: 2 AW139 (SAR); 12 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 2 Mi-17-1V *Hip H* (VIP)

TPT 19: Medium 11 Mi-171Sh; **Light 8:** 2 Bell 206L *Long Ranger*; 4 Bell 212; 2 AW119 *Koala*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); PL-5; PL-7; **SARH R-27R** (RS-AA-10A *Alamo*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900

Ansars 20,000+

Security Guards

Rapid Action Battalions 5,000

Ministry of Home Affairs

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

14 paramilitary bn

Border Guard Bangladesh 38,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 rvn coy


Other

54 paramilitary bn

Coast Guard 900**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23**PSO 4 *Syed Nazrul* (ex-ITA *Minerva*) with 1 hel landing platformPCC 5 *Sobuj Bangla* (*Padma* mod)PB 9: 1 *Ruposhi Bangla*; 4 *Shaheed Daulat*; 2 *Shetgang*; 2 *Sonadia*PBR 5 *Pabna***DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 1,301; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy; 1 hel coy**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 1,632; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn sqn; 1 hel coy**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 229; 1 FSGM**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 1,118; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr coy; 2 sigs coy; 1 tpt coy**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 1,623; 1 inf bn; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 3**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 27; 1 fd hospital**Brunei BRN**

Brunei Dollar BND		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BND	16.6bn	21.0bn	
	USD	12.0bn	15.7bn	
per capita	USD	26,061	33,979	
Growth	%	1.1	2.0	
Inflation	%	1.9	2.5	
Def bdgt	BND	606m	610m	
	USD	439m	457m	
USD1=BND		1.38	1.34	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 471,103

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.4%	3.7%	4.2%	4.5%	22.0%	3.1%
Female	10.7%	3.6%	4.3%	4.8%	24.4%	3.2%

Capabilities

The Royal Brunei Armed Forces are professional and well trained. In March 2021, the government's budget statement set out an acquisition plan including uninhabited aerial and undersea vehicles and tracked armoured reconnaissance platforms. In May 2021, the government published Brunei's fourth defence white paper in 17 years. C4ISR capabilities are being improved to offset the forces'

relatively small size, and the white paper advocates procurements to strengthen airspace control and harden C4 systems. There are also plans to develop a fully mechanised battalion. Under a long-standing bilateral arrangement, which currently extends to 2025, Brunei continues to host a British military presence including a Gurkha infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron and a jungle-warfare school. Brunei has a close defence relationship with Singapore and hosts a permanent Singapore Armed Forces training facility. There are regular bilateral exercises with Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. The armed forces also take part in multinational exercises organised by the ADMM-Plus. Brunei has limited capacity to deploy forces abroad without assistance, but has nevertheless maintained a small deployment to the IMT in southern Philippines since 2004 and to UNIFIL in Lebanon since 2008. Brunei has no domestic defence industry and imports all its military equipment. In 2010, the Centre of Science and Technology Research and Development was established to conduct defence-technology research, and provide engineering and support services to the armed forces.

ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,400 Navy 1,200 Air 1,100 Special Forces 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400-500

RESERVE 700 (Army 700)**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 4,400****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

3 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn)

Reserves 700**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

1 inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**LT TK 20 FV101 *Scorpion* (incl FV105 *Sultan* CP)

APC • APC (W) 45 VAB

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLESARV 2 *Samson***ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 24****Navy 1,200****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9**CORVETTES • FSG 4 *Darussalam* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platformPCC 4 *Ijtihad*PBF 1 *Mustaed*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4: 2 *Teraban*; 2 *Cheverton Loadmaster*

Air Force 1,100

FORCES BY ROLE

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with CN235M

TRAINING

1 sqn with Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 214 (SAR)

1 sqn with Bo-105

1 sqn with S-70i *Black Hawk*

AIR DEFENCE

1 sqn with *Rapier*

1 sqn with *Mistral*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

MP 1 CN235M

HELICOPTERS

TPT 21: **Medium** 13: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 12 S-70i *Black Hawk*; **Light** 8: 2 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*; 6 Bo-105 (armed, 81mm rockets)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Rapier*; *Mistral*

Special Forces Regiment €500

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400–500

Gurkha Reserve Unit 400–500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf bn(-)

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 31

PHILIPPINES: IMT 8

FOREIGN FORCES

Singapore 1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg school; 1 hel det with AS332 *Super Puma*


United Kingdom 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212

Cambodia CAM

Cambodian Riel KHR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KHR	104tr	108tr	
	USD	25.2bn	26.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,607	1,647	
Growth	%	-3.1	1.9	
Inflation	%	2.9	2.5	
Def bdgt [a]	KHR	4.24tr	4.25tr	
	USD	1.03bn	1.02bn	
USD1=KHR		4108.91	4154.20	

[a] Defence and security budget

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 17,304,363

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.0%	4.5%	4.1%	4.5%	18.9%	1.7%
Female	14.7%	4.5%	4.2%	4.7%	20.3%	3.0%

Capabilities

Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia's formal status as a constitutional monarchy, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are essentially the modern manifestation of the armed forces of the former People's Republic of Kampuchea, and were established in 1979 following Vietnam's invasion. Cambodia faces no direct external military threats, besides border clashes with Thailand which last occurred in 2011. Internally, security concerns include civil unrest and transnational threats that can generate instability, such as drug trafficking. Cambodia's most important international defence links are with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, while relations with Russia also remain strong. Training ties have developed with China in recent years and exercises have grown in scale. Skirmishes on the border with Thailand since 2008 have provided little indication of capacity for high-intensity combat. However, Cambodia has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, including UNMISS in South Sudan. Cambodia lacks significant resources for personnel training, which is partly financed by Chinese military assistance. The RCAF has a large number of senior officers, while many formations and units appear to be of only nominal status. Funds for equipment purchases are limited, and most recent procurement has been from China. There is no domestic defence industry, with Cambodia possessing no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment for its armed forces.

ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500 Provincial Forces 45,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000

Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not implemented since 1993

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €75,000

6 Military Regions (incl 1 special zone for capital)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (Spec Ops Comd) AB/SF Bde

MANOEUVRE**Light**

2 (2nd & 3rd Intervention) inf div (3 inf bde)

5 (Intervention) indep inf bde

8 indep inf bde

Other

1 (70th) sy bde (4 sy bn)

17 (border) sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bn

4 fd engr regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (construction) engr regt

2 tpt bde

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 200+: 50 Type-59; 150+ T-54/T-55

LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63

RECCE 20+ BRDM-2

IFV 70 BMP-1

APC 230+

APC (T) M113

APC (W) 230: 200 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64

APC 15 *Tiger* 4x4**ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**

ARV T-54/T-55

MW *Bozena*; RA-140 DS**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**

RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11

ARTILLERY 468+TOWED 400+: 76mm ZIS-3 (M-1942)/122mm D-30/
122mm M-30 (M-1938)/130mm Type-59-I

MRL 68+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 48: 8 BM-21; ε20

PHL-81; 20 RM-70; 132mm BM-13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20

BM-14-16 (BM-14)

MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10); FN-16 (CH-SA-14) (reported)

GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Navy €2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13**PBF 4 Project 205P (*Stenka*)

PB 7: 4 (PRC 46m); 3 (PRC 20m)

PBR 2 *Kaoh Chhlam***AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1**LCU 1 Type-067 (*Yunnan*)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1****Naval Infantry 1,500****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

1 (31st) nav inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

Air Force 1,500**FORCES BY ROLE****ISR/TRAINING**1 sqn with P-92 *Echo***TRANSPORT**1 VIP sqn (reporting to Council of Ministers) with An-24RV *Coke*; AS350 *Ecureuil*; AS355F2 *Ecureuil* II1 sqn with BN-2 *Islander*; Y-12 (II)**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip* H; Mi-8 *Hip*; Z-9**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**TPT • Light 9: 2 MA60; 5 P-92 *Echo* (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II) (2 An-24RV *Coke*; 1 BN-2 *Islander* in store)TRG (5 L-39C *Albatros** in store)**HELICOPTERS**MRH 14: 3 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 11 Z-9TPT 4: Heavy (2 Mi-26 *Halo* in store); Light 4: 2 AS350 *Ecureuil*; 2 AS355F2 *Ecureuil* II**Provincial Forces 45,000+**


Reports of at least 1 inf regt per province, with varying numbers of inf bn (with lt wpn)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000**Police 67,000** (including gendarmerie)**DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 210; 1 engr coy**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 179; 1 EOD coy**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 289; 2 engr coy(-); 1 EOD coy**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 86; 1 MP coy**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 1

China, People's Republic of PRC

Chinese Yuan Renminbi CNY		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CNY	103tr	113tr	
	USD	14.9tr	16.9tr	
per capita	USD	10,511	11,891	
Growth	%	2.3	8.0	
Inflation	%	2.4	1.1	
Def exp	CNY	£1.72tr	£1.81tr	
	USD	£256bn	£270bn	
Def bdtg [a]	CNY	1.30tr	1.39tr	
	USD	189bn	207bn	
USD1=CNY		6.90	6.70	

[a] Central Expenditure budget including local militia funding



Population 1,405,791,350

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.2%	2.9%	3.1%	3.7%	26.3%	6.1%
Female	8.0%	2.4%	2.7%	3.3%	25.5%	6.8%

Capabilities

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the world's largest armed force, with an increasingly advanced equipment inventory. Its operational effectiveness, however, remains hampered by training and doctrine issues. China's 2019 defence white paper did not significantly alter the strategic direction laid out in the 2015 edition and was focused more on updating the progress of PLA modernisation efforts. In 2021, amendments to the National Defence Law were passed, which handed decision-making powers fully to the Central Military Commission and removed the role of the State Council. A major restructuring process is now mostly complete and the Strategic Support Force continues to develop China's cyber, space and information-dominance capabilities. China does not maintain any formal alliances, but it does have a number of key defence relationships with regional states and through its membership of the SCO. In 2021, Xi emphasised that the SCO should play a special role in Afghanistan following the United States' withdrawal, though a military role for the PLA remains unlikely. China has also worked to develop defence ties with several African and Middle Eastern states. In 2021, the PLA's conscription pattern changed from once to twice a year, with a particular focus of recruiting university graduates and those skilled in science and engineering. Improving readiness for combat operations is a key objective of the current reforms; the PLA currently lacks any significant recent combat experience and its training has traditionally suffered from over-scripted and unrealistic exercises. Though these weaknesses are acknowledged and possibly being addressed, it is unclear how effective the newly established structures will be at generating and controlling high-intensity combined-arms capabilities. In the short term, changes to roles and requirements for officers may have had a detrimental effect on morale within the PLA, as well as on its overall level of readiness. The requirement for out-of-area operations is relatively new for the PLA; the navy is the only service to have experience in extended deployments, assisted by its

support base in Djibouti. Major platform inventories in all the services comprise a mix of modern, older and obsolescent designs. The reduction in overall force size as part of the restructuring process has seen some older equipment designs withdrawn from service. China has an extensive defence-industrial base, capable of producing advanced equipment across all domains, although questions persist over quality and reliability.

ACTIVE 2,035,000 (Ground Forces 965,000 Navy 260,000 Air Force 395,000 Strategic Missile Forces 120,000 Strategic Support Force 145,000 Other 150,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000

Conscript liability Selective conscription; all services 24 months

RESERVE £510,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Missile Forces 120,000+

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (formerly the Second Artillery Force) organises and commands its own troops to launch nuclear counter-attacks with strategic missiles and to conduct operations with conventional missiles. Organised as launch bdes subordinate to 6 army-level msl bases. Org varies by msl type

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 ICBM bde with DF-4
- 3 ICBM bde with DF-5A/B
- 1 ICBM bde with DF-31
- 1 ICBM bde with DF-31A
- 3 ICBM bde with DF-31A(G)
- 2 ICBM bde with DF-41 (forming)
- 6 IRBM bde with DF-26
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-16
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-17 with HGV (forming)
- 6 MRBM bde with DF-21A/E
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-21C/D
- 3 SRBM bde with DF-11A/DF-15B
- 2 GLCM bde with CJ-10/CJ-10A/CJ-100
- 5 SSM bde (forming)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

- ICBM • Nuclear** 116: £10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3); £20 DF-5A/B (CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3); £8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1); £24 DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2); £30 DF-31A(G) (CH-SS-10 Mod 3); £24 DF-41 (CH-SS-20)
- IRBM • Dual-capable** 110+ DF-26 (CH-SS-18)
- MRBM 194: Nuclear** £80 DF-21A/E (CH-SS-5 Mod 2/6); **Conventional** 114: £36 DF-16 (CH-SS-11 Mod 1/2); £24 DF-17 with HGV (CH-SS-22); £24 DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4); £30 DF-21D (CH-SS-5 Mod 5 – ASBM)
- SRBM • Conventional** 189: £108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7 Mod 2); £81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3)
- GLCM • Conventional** 108: £54 CJ-10/CJ-10A (CH-SS-9 mod 1/2); £54 CJ-100 (CH-SS-X-13 *Splinter*) (entering service)

Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 6

SSBN 6 Type-094 (*Jin*) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT

Defensive

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RADAR • STRATEGIC: 4+ large phased array radars; some detection and tracking radars

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 161

COMMUNICATIONS 9: 2 *Shen Tong*-1; 3 *Shen Tong*-2; 2 *Feng Huo*-1; 2 *Feng Huo*-2

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 45: 3 *Beidou*-2(M); 5 *Beidou*-2(G); 7 *Beidou*-2(IGSO); 24 *Beidou*-3(M); 3 *Beidou*-3(G); 3 *Beidou*-3(IGSO)

METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 8: 2 *Yunhai*-1; 6 *Yunhai*-2

ISR 32: 2 *Jianbing*-5; 4 *Jianbing*-6; 3 *Jianbing*-7; 5 *Jianbing*-9; 4 *Jianbing*-10; 3 *Jianbing*-11/-12; 4 LKW; 2 *Tianhui*-2; 2 *Yaogan*-29; 1 *Yaogan*-34; 2 ZY-1

ELINT/SIGINT 67: 30 *Chuangxin*-5 (*Yaogan*-30); 18 *Jianbing*-8; 8 *Shijian*-6 (4 pairs – reported ELINT/SIGINT role); 7 *Shijian*-11 (reported ELINT/SIGINT role); 4 *Yaogan*-32

COUNTERSPACE • MSL SC-19 (reported)

Army €965,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

13 (Group) army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

15 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

34 (cbd arms) armd bde

Mechanised

3 (high alt) mech inf div (3 (cbd arms) mech regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

16 (cbd arms) mech inf bde

2 indep mech inf regt

Light

1 (high alt) inf div (3 (cbd arms) inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

25 (cbd arms) inf bde

Air Manoeuvr

2 air aslt bde

Amphibious

6 amph aslt bde

Other

1 (OPFOR) armd bde

1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 sy gd div (4 sy regt)

16 (border) sy bde

15 (border) sy regt

1 (border) sy gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

15 arty bde

9 engr/NBC bde

5 engr bde

5 NBC bde

1 engr regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

13 spt bde

COASTAL DEFENCE

19 coastal arty/AShM bde

AVIATION

1 mixed avn bde

HELICOPTER

12 hel bde

TRAINING

4 hel trg bde

AIR DEFENCE

15 AD bde

Reserves

The People's Liberation Army Reserve Force is being restructured, and the army component reduced. As a result some of the units below may have been re-rolled or disbanded

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd regt

Light

18 inf div

4 inf bde

3 indep inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty div

7 arty bde

15 engr regt

1 ptn br bde

3 ptn br regt

10 chem regt

10 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

9 log bde

1 log regt

AIR DEFENCE

17 AD div

8 AD bde

8 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 5,400: 600 ZTZ-59/-59-II; 600 ZTZ-59D; 200 ZTZ-79; 300 ZTZ-88A/B; 1,000 ZTZ-96; 1,500 ZTZ-96A; 600 ZTZ-99; 600 ZTZ-99A

LT TK 750: 250 ZTD-05; 400 ZTQ-15; 100 ZTS-63A

ASLT 1,000 ZTL-11

IFV 7,200: 400 ZBD-04; 1,900 ZBD-04A; 2,500 ZBL-08; 600 ZBD-86; 650 ZBD-86A; 550 ZSL-92; 600 ZSL-92B

APC 4,350

APC (T) 2,700: 750 ZSD-63; 200 ZSD-63C; 1,750 ZSD-89

APC (W) 1,650: 700 ZSL-92A; 900 ZSL-10; 50 ZSL-93

AAV 900 ZBD-05

AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; *Tiger 4*×4

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654

VLB MTU; TMM; GQL-110A (Type-84A); GQL-111 (HZQL75); GQL-321 (HZQL22); GQL-410; High Altitude VLB; HZQL-18; ZGQ-84

MW Type-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 1,100: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted); 200 HJ-10; 450 ZSL-02B

MANPATS HJ-73D; HJ-8A/C/E; HJ-11; HJ-12

RCL 3,966: 75mm PF-56; 82mm PF-65 (B-10); PF-78;

105mm PF-75; 120mm PF-98

GUNS 1,788

SP 480: 100mm 250 PTL-02; 120mm 230 PTZ-89

TOWED • 100mm 1,308 PT-73 (T-12)/PT-86

ARTILLERY 9,834+

SP 2,910: 122mm 2,140: 500 PLZ-89; 550 PLZ-07A; 150 PLZ-07B; 300 PCL-09; 550 PLL-09; 30 PCL-161; 60+ PCL-171; 152mm 150 PLZ-83A/B; 155mm 620: 320 PLZ-05; 300 PCL-181; (400 in store: 122mm 200 PLZ-89; 152mm 200 PLZ-83A)

TOWED 1,234: 122mm 500 PL-96 (D-30); 130mm 234 PL-59 (M-46)/PL-59-I; 152mm 500 PL-66 (D-20); (4,400 in store: 122mm 2,800 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/PL-60 (D-74)/PL-96 (D-30); 152mm 1,600 PL-54 (D-1)/PL-66 (D-20))

GUN/MOR 120mm 1,250: 450 PLL-05; 800 PPZ-10

MRL 1,640+ 107mm PH-63; 122mm 1,415: 550 PHL-81/PHL-90; 350 PHL-11; 375 PHZ-89; 100 PHZ-11; 30 PHL-20; 10+ PHL-21; 300mm 175 PHL-03; 370mm 50+ PHL-19; (700 in store: 122mm 700 PHL-81)

MOR 2,800: 82mm PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87; SP 82mm PCP-001; 100mm PP-89

COASTAL DEFENCE

AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 *Silkworm*); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 *Seersucker*); HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 *Sadsack*); YJ-62

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25

PB 25: 9 *Huzong*; 16 *Shenyang*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 255: 3+ *Yugong*; 50+ *Yunnan II*; 100+ *Yupen*; 2+ *Yutu*; approx. 100 *Yurwei*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22

AK 6+ *Leizhuang*

AKR 1 *Yunsong* (capacity 1 MBT; 1 med hel)

ARC 1

AOT 11: 1 *Fuzhong*; 8 *Fubing*; 2 *Fulei* ATF 2 *Huntao*

AX 1 *Haixun III*

AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: Medium 4: 2 Y-8; 2 Y-9; Light 2 Y-7

HELICOPTERS

ATK 300+: 180 WZ-10; 120+ WZ-19

MRH 208: 22 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 3 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; 38 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*; 25 Mi-17V-7 *Hip H*; £120 Z-9WZ

TPT 398: Heavy 111: 9 Z-8A; 96 Z-8B; 6 Z-8L; Medium 219: 140 Mi-171; 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) *Black Hawk*; £60 Z-20;

Light 68: 15 H120 *Colibri*; 53 Z-11

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 5+ CH-4B

ISR • Heavy BZK-005; BZK-009 (reported); Medium BZK-006 (incl variants); BZK-007; BZK-008

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harpy*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 614+

Medium-range 200 HQ-16A/B (CH-SA-16)

Short-range 414: 24 9K331 *Tor-M1* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*); 30 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6); 200 HQ-7A/B (CH-SA-4); 140 HQ-17 (CH-SA-15); 20+ HQ-17A (CH-SA-15)

Point-defence HN-5A/B (CH-SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-1 (CH-SA-7); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

GUNS 7,396+

SP 396: 25mm 270 PGZ-04A; 30mm some PGL-19; 35mm 120 PGZ-07; 37mm 6 PGZ-88

TOWED 7,000+: 25mm PG-87; 35mm PG-99 (GDF-002); 37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74; 57mm PG-59 (S-60); 100mm PG-59 (KS-19)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR TY-90

ASM AKD-8; AKD-9; AKD-10

Navy £260,000

The PLA Navy is organised into five service arms: submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and marine corps, as well as other specialised units. There are three fleets, one each in the Eastern, Southern and Northern theatre commands

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 59

STRATEGIC • SSBN 6 Type-094 (*Jin*) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT

TACTICAL 53

SSN 6:

2 Type-093 (*Shang I*) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

4 Type-093A (*Shang II*) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

(3 Type-091 (*Han*) in reserve with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM/Yu-3 HWT)

SSK 46:

2 Project 877 (*Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT

2 Project 636 (Improved *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT

8 Project 636M (Improved *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM

4 Type-035B (*Ming*) with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT

12 Type-039(G) (*Song*) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

4 Type-039A (*Yuan*) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

14 Type-039B (*Yuan*) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

(10 Type-035(G) (*Ming*) in reserve with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT)

SSB 1 Type-032 (*Qing*) (SLBM trials)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 86

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 2:

- 1 Type-001 (*Kuznetsov*) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 18–24 J-15 ac; 17 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel)
- 1 Type-002 (*Kuznetsov* mod) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 32 J-15 ac; 12 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel)

CRUISERS • CGHM 3 Type-055 (*Renhai*) with 14 8-cell VLS (8 fore, 6 aft) with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)

DESTROYERS 36

DDGHM 34:

- 1 *Hangzhou* (Project 956E (*Sovremenny* I)) (in refit) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80E *Moskit-E* (RS-SS-N-22A *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-956 ASTT with SET-65KE HWT/53-65KE HWT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 2 *Hangzhou* (Project 956EM (*Sovremenny* II)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80MVE *Moskit-E* (RS-SS-N-22B *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-956 ASTT with SET-65KE HWT/53-65KE HWT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 2 *Kashtan* (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 1 *Hangzhou* (Project 956E (*Sovremenny* III)) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-12A ASHM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 1 Type-051B (*Luhai*) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-12A ASHM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 2 Type-052 (*Luhu*) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel)
- 2 Type-052B (*Luyang*) (of which 1 in refit) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil*-1 (SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 6 Type-052C (*Luyang* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-62 ASHM, 8 8-cell VLS with HHQ-9 (CH-SA-N-9) SAM (CH-SA-N-9), 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7

LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

10 Type-052D (*Luyang* III) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

3 Type-052D (*Luyang* III) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

6 Type-052D mod (*Luyang* III mod) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9/Z-20 hel)

DDGM 2 Type-051C (*Luzhou*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM; 6 6-cell B-204 VLS with S-300FM *Rif-M* (SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FRIGATES 45

FFGHM 40:

- 4 Type-053H3 (*Jiangwei* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
- 4 Type-053H3 (*Jiangwei* II Upgrade) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
- 1 Type-054 (*Jiangkai*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)
- 1 Type-054 (*Jiangkai*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)
- 16 Type-054A (*Jiangkai* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)
- 14 Type-054A (*Jiangkai* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)

FFG 5:

- 1 Type-053H1 (*Jianghu* I) with 2 twin Inchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 *Safflower*) ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
- 4 Type-053H1G (*Jianghu* I Upgrade) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS €196**CORVETTES • FSGM 72:**

22 Type-056 (*Jiangdao*) with 2 twin Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

50 Type-056A (*Jiangdao*) with 2 twin Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCFG €60 Type-022 (*Houbei*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS

PCG 24: 6 Type-037-II (*Houjian*) with 2 triple Inchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) ASHM; 18 Type-037-IG (*Houxin*) with 2 twin Inchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) ASHM

PCC 8+:

some Type-037 (*Hainan*) with €4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun

some Type-037-I (*Haijiu*) with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun

€8 Type-037-IS (*Haiqing*) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor

PB €32 Type-062-1 (*Shanghai III*)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 57:

MCO 20: 4 Type-081 (*Wochi*); 9+ Type-081A (*Wochi* mod); 7+ Type-082II (*Wozang*)

MSC 16: 4 Type-082 (*Wosao I*); 12 Type-082-II (*Wosao II*)

MSD 21 Type-529 (*Wonang*) (operated by *Wozang* MCO)

AMPHIBIOUS**PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 9:**

LHD 1 Type-075 (*Yushen*) with 2 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 3 *Yuyi* LCAC; 800 troops; at least 60 AFVs; 28 hel)

LPD 8 Type-071 (*Yuzhao*) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 4 *Yuyi* LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60 armoured vehs; 4 hel)

LANDING SHIPS 49**LST 28:**

4 Type-072-IIG (*Yukan*) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200 troops)

9 Type-072-II/III (*Yuting I*) (capacity 10 tk; 250 troops; 2 hel)

9 Type-072A (*Yuting II*) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops)

6 Type-072B (*Yuting II*) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops)

LSM 21:

1 Type-073-II (*Yudeng*) with 1 twin 57mm gun (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops)

10 Type-073A (*Yunshu*) (capacity 6 tk)

7 Type-074 (*Yuhai*) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops)

3 Type-074 (mod)

LANDING CRAFT 60

LCU 11 Type-074A (*Yubei*) (capacity 10 tanks or 150 troops)

LCM €30 Type-067A (*Yunnan*)

LCAC 19: 15+ Type-726 (*Yuyi*); 4 *Zubr*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 157

ABU 1 Type-744A

AFS 2: 1 Type-904 (*Dayun*); 1 Type-904A (*Danyao I*)

AFSH 2 Type-904B (*Danyao II*)

AG 7: 6 *Kanhai*; 1 *Kanwu*

AGB 2 Type-272 (*Yanrao*) with 1 hel landing platform

AGE 7: 2 Type-909 (*Dahua*) with 1 hel landing platform (weapons test platform); 1 *Kantan*; 3 Type-636 (*Shupang*); 1 *Yuting I* (naval rail gun test ship)

AGI 19: 1 *Dadie*; 1 Type-815 (*Dongdiao*) with 1 hel landing platform; 9 Type-815A (*Dongdiao*) with 1 hel landing platform; 8 FT-14

AGM 4 Type-718 (*Yuan Wang*) (space and missile tracking)

AGOR 2 *Dahua*

AGOS 4 *Dongjian*

AGS 8 Type-636A (*Shupang*) with 1 hel landing platform

AH 8: 5 *Ankang*; 1 Type-920 (*Anwei*); 2 *Anshen*

AOEH 2 Type-901 (*Fuyu*) with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS

AORH 10: 2 Type-903 (*Fuchi*); 7 Type-903A (*Fuchi* mod); 1 *Fusu*

AOT 22: 4 *Fubai*; 16 Type-632 (*Fujian*); 2 *Fuxiao*

AP 4: 2 *Daguan*; 2 *Darong*

ARC 2 *Youlan*

ARS 18: 1 *Dadao*; 1 *Dadong*; 1 Type-922III (*Dalang II*); 3 Type-922IIIA (*Dalang III*); 3 *Dasan*; 4 *Datuo*; 2 *Dazhou*; 3 *Hai Jiu* 101 with 1 hel landing platform

ASR 6: 3 Type-926 (*Dalao*); 3 Type-925 (*Dajiang*) (capacity 2 Z-8)

ATF 14: €11 *Hujiu*; 3 *Tuqiang*

AWT 8: 4 *Fujian*; 3 *Fushi*; 1 *Jinyou*

AX 4:

1 Type-0891A (*Dashi*) with 2 hel landing platforms

1 *Daxin* with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

1 Type-927 (*Qi Ji Guang*) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

1 *Yudao*

ESD 1 *Donghaidao*

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 72 YJ-12/YJ-62 (3 regt)**Naval Aviation 26,000****FORCES BY ROLE**

Naval aviation fighter/ground-attack units adopted brigade structure in 2017

BOMBER

2 regt with H-6DU/G/J

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 bde with J-10A/S *Firebird*; Su-30MK2 *Flanker G*

1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*

1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*; JH-7A *Flounder*

1 bde with J-8F *Finback*; JH-7A *Flounder*

2 regt with J-15 *Flanker*

GROUND ATTACK

1 bde with JH-7 *Flounder*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

2 regt with KQ-200

ELINT/ISR/ASW

1 regt with Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; KQ-200

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

3 regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500

TRANSPORT

1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700

TRAINING

1 regt with CJ-6A
 1 regt with HY-7
 2 regt with JL-8
 1 regt with JL-9G
 1 regt with JL-9
 1 regt with JL-10
 1 regt with Z-9C

HELICOPTER

1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31
 1 regt with AS365N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH
 1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D

AIR DEFENCE

2 SAM bde with HQ-9; HQ-9B; HQ-6A

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 446 combat capable

BBR 45: 27 H-6G/G mod; 18 H-6J
FTR 24 J-8F *Finback*
FGA 169: 16 J-10A *Firebird*; 7 J-10S *Firebird*; 72 J-11B/
BS Flanker L; ε50 J-15 *Flanker*; 24 Su-30MK2 *Flanker G*
ATK 120: 48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A *Flounder*
ASW 20+ KQ-200
ELINT 13: 4 Y-8JB *High New 2*; 3 Y-8X; 6 Y-9JZ
AEW&C 24: 6 KJ-200 *Moth*; 14+ KJ-500; 4 Y-8J *Mask*
TKR 5 H-6DU
TPT 38: **Medium** 6 Y-8C; **Light** 28: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7G; 6
 Y-7H; **PAX** 4: 2 CRJ-200; 2 CRJ-700
TRG 118: 38 CJ-6; 12 HY-7; 16 JL-8*; 28 JL-9*; 12 JL-9G*;
 12 JL-10*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 32: 14 Ka-28 *Helix A*; 14 Z-9C; 4 Z-18F
AEW 10+: 9 Ka-31; 1+ Z-18 AEW
MRH 18: 7 AS365N; 11 Z-9D
SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS; 4 Z-8JH; 2 Z-8S; 2 Z-9S
TPT 38: **Heavy** 30: 8 SA321 *Super Frelon*; 9 Z-8; 13 Z-8J;
Medium 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR Heavy BZK-005; **Medium** BZK-007

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range 32: 16 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 16 HQ-9B (CH-
 SA-21)
Short-range HQ-6A (CH-SA-6)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR PL-5; PL-8; PL-9; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*);
IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** PL-11; **ARH**
 R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*); PL-12 (CH-AA-7)
ASM KD-88
AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*); YJ-12; YJ-61; YJ-
 8K; YJ-83K; YJ-9
ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*); YJ-91

BOMBS

Laser-guided: LS-500J
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR

Marines €35,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised
 3 mne bde

Amphibious

3 mne bde

HELICOPTER

1 bde (forming) with Z-8C

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

LT TK 80+: ε80 ZTD-05; some ZTQ-15
ASLT ε50 ZTL-11
IFV ε150 ZBL-08
AAV ε240 ZBD-05

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8
RCL 120mm Type-98

ARTILLERY 40+

SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89
MRL 107mm PH-63
MOR 82mmε

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Heavy 5 Z-8C

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5 (CH-
 SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

Air Force 395,000**FORCES BY ROLE****BOMBER**

1 regt with H-6M
 2 regt with H-6H
 4 regt with H-6K
 1 bde with H-6N (forming)

FIGHTER

2 bde with J-7 *Fishcan*
 5 bde with J-7E *Fishcan*
 5 bde with J-7G *Fishcan*
 2 bde with J-8F/H *Finback*
 2 bde with J-11A/Su-27UBK *Flanker*
 4 bde with J-11A/J-11B/Su-27UBK *Flanker*
 2 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

6 bde with J-10A/S *Firebird*
 1 bde with J-10A/C/S *Firebird*
 2 bde with J-10B/S *Firebird*
 5 bde with J-10C/S *Firebird*
 1 bde with Su-35 *Flanker M*; Su-30MKK *Flanker G*
 5 bde with J-16 *Flanker*
 2 bde with Su-30MKK *Flanker G*
 1 bde with J-20A
 1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*; J-20A

GROUND ATTACK

6 bde with JH-7A *Flounder*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

4 regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ

ISR

1 regt with JZ-8F *Finback**
 1 bde with JZ-8F *Finback**

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 regt with KJ-500
 1 regt with KJ-200 *Moth*; KJ-2000; Y-8T

SEARCH & RESCUE

4 bde with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8
 1 regt with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8

TANKER

1 bde with H-6U

TRANSPORT

1 (VIP) regt with A319; B-737; CRJ-200/700

1 (VIP) regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D

1 regt with Il-76MD/TD *Candid*

1 regt with Il-76MD *Candid*; Il-78 *Midas*

1 regt with Y-7

2 regt with Y-9

2 regt with Y-20/Y-20U

TRAINING

5 bde with CJ-6/6A/6B; Y-5

6 bde with J-7; JJ-7A

13 bde with JL-8; JL-9; JL-10

1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8C

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 (VIP) regt with AS332 *Super Puma*; H225

ISR UAV

2 bde with GJ-1; GJ-2

1 regt with WZ-7

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM div (3 SAM regt)

24 SAM bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 2,475 combat capable

BBR 176: ε12 H-6A (trg role); ε60 H-6H/M; ε100 H-6K; 4+ H-6N

FTR 517: 100 J-7 *Fishcan*; 120 J-7E *Fishcan*; 120 J-7G *Fishcan*; 50 J-8F/H *Finback*; 95 J-11; 32 Su-27UBK *Flanker*

FGA 972+: 220 J-10A *Firebird*; 55 J-10B *Firebird*; 180+ J-10C *Firebird*; 70 J-10S *Firebird*; 130 J-11B/BS *Flanker* L; 170+ J-16 *Flanker*; ε50 J-20A; 73 Su-30MKK *Flanker* G; 24 Su-35 *Flanker* M

ATK 140 JH-7A *Flounder*

EW 21: 2+ J-16D *Flanker**; 4 Y-8CB *High New* 1; 2 Y-8DZ; 6 Y-8G *High New* 3; 2 Y-8XZ *High New* 7; 3 Y-9G; 2 Y-9XZ

ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D *Careless*

ISR 48: 24 JZ-8 *Finback**; 24 JZ-8F *Finback**

AEW&C 19: 4 KJ-200 *Moth*; 11 KJ-500; 4 KJ-2000

C2 5: 2 B-737; 3 Y-8T *High New* 4

TKR 13: 10 H-6U; 3 Il-78 *Midas*

TKR/TPT 3 Y-20U

TPT 247+ **Heavy** 51+: 20 Il-76MD/TD *Candid*; 31+ Y-20;

Medium 55+: 30 Y-8C; 25+ Y-9; **Light** 111: 70 Y-5; 41 Y-7/ Y-7H; **PAX** 30: 3 A319; 9 B-737 (VIP); 5 CRJ-200; 5 CRJ-

700; 8 Tu-154M *Careless*

TRG 1,012+: 400 CJ-6/-6A/-6B; 12+ HY-7; 50 JJ-7*; 150 JJ-7A*; 350 JL-8*; 30 JL-9*; 40+ JL-10*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 *Hip* H

TPT 31+: **Heavy** 18+ Z-8; **Medium** 13+: 6+ AS332 *Super Puma* (VIP); 3 H225 (VIP); 4+ Mi-171

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 12+ GJ-1; GJ-2; GJ-11 (in test)

ISR • **Heavy** 14+: 12+ WZ-7; 2+ WZ-8

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 832+

Long-range 608+: 180 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 80 HQ-9B (CH-SA-21); 100+ HQ-22; 32 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*); 64 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 120 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21B *Growler*)

Medium-range 150 HQ-12 (CH-SA-12)

Short-range 74+: 50+ HQ-6A (CH-SA-6); 24 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6)

GUNS • **TOWED** • 57mm PG-59 (S-60)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IIR**

PL-10; **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** PL-11;

ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7); PL-15 (CH-AA-10); R-77 (RS-

AA-12A *Adder*); R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (RS-AA-12B *Adder*)

ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*);

Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*)

AShM YJ-12

ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*); YJ-91 (Domestically produced Kh-31P variant)

ALCM • **Conventional** CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63

BOMBS

Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2

TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR

Airborne Corps**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

6 AB bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bde

TRANSPORT

1 bde with Y-5; Y-7; Y-8; Y-12

HELICOPTER

1 regt with WZ-10K; Z-8KA; Z-9WZ

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

ABCV 180 ZBD-03

APC • **APC (T)** 4 ZZZ-03 (CP)

AUV CS/VN3 mod

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

SP some HJ-9

ARTILLERY 162+

TOWED 122mm ε54 PL-96 (D-30)

MRL 107mm ε54 PH-63

MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** 40: **Medium** 6 Y-8; **Light** 34: 20 Y-5;

2 Y-7; 12 Y-12D

HELICOPTERS

ATK 8 WZ-10K

CSAR 8 Z-8KA

MRH 12 Z-9WZ

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** QW-1 (CH-SA-7)

GUNS • **TOWED** 25mm 54 PG-87

Strategic Support Force ε175,000

At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was established by drawing upon capabilities previously exercised by the PLA's 3rd and 4th departments and other central functions. It reports to the Central Military Commission and is responsible for the PLA's space and cyber capabilities

Theatre Commands

In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were consolidated into five new theatre commands

Eastern Theatre Command

Eastern Theatre Ground Forces

71st Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

72nd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

73rd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Eastern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (approx. 35°10'N to 23°30'N), and to seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian, Zhoushan, Ningbo

18 SSK; 13 DDGHM; 17 FFGHM; 2 FFG; 30 FSGM; ε30 PCFG/PCG; ε22 MCMV; 3 LPD; ε22 LST/M

Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation

1st Naval Aviation Division

(1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500; 1 ASW regt with KQ-200)

Other Forces

(1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA bde with JH-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MK2; J-10A; 1 hel regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31)

Eastern Theatre Air Force

10th Bomber Division

(1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6M)

26th Special Mission Division

(1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ-200/KJ-2000/Y-8T)

Fuzhou Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 SAM bde)

Shanghai Base

(1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 2 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Other Forces

(1 ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 SAR bde; 1 Flight Instructor Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10)

Other Forces

Marines

(2 mne bde)

Southern Theatre Command

Southern Theatre Ground Forces

74th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

75th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 3 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)

Other Forces

(1 (composite) inf bde (Hong Kong); 1 hel sqn (Hong Kong), 1 AD bn (Hong Kong))

Southern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx. 23°30'N) to VNM border, and to seaward (including Paracel and Spratly islands); HQ at Zhanjiang; support bases at Yulin, Guangzhou

6 SSBN; 2 SSN; 13 SSK; 1 CV; 1 CGHM; 11 DDGHM; 12 FFGHM; 1 FFG; 27 FSGM; ε38 PCFG/PCG; ε16 MCMV; 1 LHD; 5 LPD; ε21 LST/M

Southern Theatre Navy Aviation

3rd Naval Aviation Division

(1 ASW regt with KQ-200; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500)

Other Forces

(1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; JH-7A; 1 tpt/hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D; 1 SAM bde)

Southern Theatre Air Force

8th Bomber Division

(2 bbr regt with H-6K)

20th Special Mission Division

(3 EW regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ)

Kunming Base

(1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde)

Nanning Base

(1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-35; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde)

Other Forces

(1 tkr bde with H-6U; 1 SAR bde; 1 UAV bde)

Other Forces

Marines

(1 spec ops bde; 2 mne bde)

Western Theatre Command

Western Theatre Ground Forces

76th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

77th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde; 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Xinjiang Military District

(1 spec ops bde, 3 (high alt) mech div, 1 (high alt) inf div, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 hel bde)

Xizang Military District

(1 spec ops bde; 1 mech inf bde; 2 inf bde; 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 hel bde)

Western Theatre Air Force**4th Transport Division**

(2 tpt regt with Y-9; 1 tpt regt with Y-20A)

Lanzhou Base

(1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 SAM bde)

Urumqi Base

(1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Lhasa Base

(1 SAM bde)

Xi'an Flying Academy

(1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 trg bde with JL-9A; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8)

Other Forces

(1 SAR regt)

Northern Theatre Command**Northern Theatre Ground Forces****78th Group Army**

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

79th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

80th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 1 mech inf bde, 4 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Northern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10'N), and to seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Qingdao.

4 SSN; 16 SSK; 1 CV; 2 CGHM; 10 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 11 FFGHM; 2 FFG; 15 FSGM; 18 PCFG/PCG; 18 MCMV; 7 LST/M

Northern Theatre Navy Aviation**2nd Naval Air Division**

(1 EW/ISR/ASW regt with KQ-200; Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; 1 AEW&C regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500)

Other Forces

(1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with JH-7A; J-8F; ; 1 hel regt with AS365N; Z-8J/JH; Z-9C/D1 tpt regt with Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with CJ-6A; 2 trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1 trg regt with JL-9G; 1 trg regt with JL-9; 1 trg regt with JL-10)

Northern Theatre Air Force**16th Special Mission Division**

(1 EW regt with Y-8CB/G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F; 1 UAV regt with WZ-7)

Dalian Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7; 2 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A/C; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-11B/J-20A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde)

Jinan Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7G; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Harbin Flying Academy

(1 trg bde with CJ-6; Y-5; 1 trg bde with H-6; HY-7; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-9)

Other Forces

(1 SAR bde)

Other Forces**Marines**

(2 mne bde; 1 hel bde)

Central Theatre Command**Central Theatre Ground Forces****81st Group Army**

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 (OPFOR) armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde)

82nd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

83rd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 4 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)

Other Forces

(2 (Beijing) gd div)

Central Theatre Air Force**13th Transport Division**

(1 tpt regt with Y-20A; 1 tpt regt with IL-76MD/TD; 1 tpt regt with IL-76MD; IL-78)

34th VIP Transport Division

(1 tpt regt with A319; B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel regt with AS332; H225)

36th Bomber Division

(1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H)

Datong Base

(3 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 SAM div; 4 SAM bde)

Wuhan Base

(2 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 3 SAM bde)

Shijiazhuang Flying Academy

(3 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-8; JL-10)

Airborne Corps

(6 AB bde; 1 tpt bde; 1 hel regt)

Other Forces

(1 bbr bde with H-6N; 1 SAR bde)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000+ active**People's Armed Police 500,000**

In 2018 the People's Armed Police (PAP) divested its border-defence, firefighting, gold, forest, hydropower

and security-guard units. In addition to the forces listed below, PAP also has 32 regional commands, each with one or more mobile units

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (1st Mobile) paramilitary corps (3 SF regt; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)
1 (2nd Mobile) paramilitary corps (2 SF unit; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)

China Coast Guard (CCG)

In 2018 the CCG was moved from the authority of the State Oceanic Administration to that of the People's Armed Police. The CCG is currently reorganising its pennant-number system, making it problematic to assess the number of vessels that entered service since 2019.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 524

PSOH 42:

2 *Zhaotou* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)
7 Type-054 mod (*Zhaoduan*) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
3 Type-053H2G (*Jiangwei I*) (capacity 1 med hel) (ex-PLAN)
4 *Shuoshi II* (capacity 1 med hel)
2 *Shucha I* (capacity 1 med hel)
10 *Shucha II* (capacity 1 med hel)
12 *Zhaoyu* (capacity 1 med hel)
1 *Zhaochang* (capacity 1 med hel)
1 *Zhongyang* (capacity 1 med hel)

PSO 49:

9 Type-718B (*Zhaojun*) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
1 Type-922 (*Dalang I*) (ex-PLAN)
1 Type-625C (*Hai Yang*) (ex-PLAN)
1 Type-053H (*Jianghu I*) (ex-PLAN)
1 Type-636A (*Kanjie*) with 1 hel landing platform (ex-PLAN)
6 *Shusheng* with 1 hel landing platform
3 *Shuwu*
3 *Tuzhong* (ex-PLAN)
4 Type-056 mod (*Zhaogao*) with 1 hel landing platform
1 Type-918 (*Wolei*) (ex-PLAN)
1 *Xiang Yang Hong 9* (ex-PLAN)
4 *Zhaolai* with 1 hel landing platform
14 *Zhaotim*

PCO 29: 1 *Shuke I*; 4 *Shuke II*; 14 *Shuke III*; 3 *Shuyou*; 4 *Zhaodai*; 3 *Zhaoming*

PCC 104: 25+ Type-618B-II; 45 *Hailin I/II*; 1 *Shuzao II*; 14 *Shuzao III*; 10 *Zhongeng*; 2 *Zhongmel*; 7 *Zhongsui PB/PBF 300+*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 2

LST 2 Type-072-II (*Yuting I*) (ex-PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27

AG 6: 5+ *Kaobo*; 1 *Shutu*

AGB 1 Type-210 (*Yanbing*) (ex-PLAN)

AGOR 9: 4 *Haijian*; 3 *Shuguang 04* (ex-PLAN); 2 *Xiang Yang Hong 9*

ATF 11

AIRCRAFT

MP 1+ MA60H

TPT • **Light** Y-12 (MP role)

HELICOPTERS

TPT • **Light** Z-9

Maritime Militia

Composed of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing boats and oil tankers.

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •

MONUSCO 232; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD

GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 419; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 426; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 86; 1 hel flt


TAJIKISTAN: €300 (trg)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11

Fiji FJI

Fijian Dollar FJD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	FJD	9.75bn	9.46bn	
	USD	4.49bn	4.64bn	
per capita	USD	4,995	5,127	
Growth	%	-15.7	-4.0	
Inflation	%	-2.6	1.1	
Def bdgt	FJD	112m	94.9m	94.2m
	USD	51.8m	46.5m	
USD1=FJD		2.17	2.04	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 939,535

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.4%	4.0%	3.8%	3.9%	22.0%	3.6%
Female	12.8%	3.9%	3.6%	3.8%	20.9%	4.2%

Capabilities

The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantry-dominated defence force with a small naval element. The RFMF has intervened heavily in Fiji's domestic politics and after a third coup in 2006, democracy was effectively suspended until 2014. Guidelines issued in 2018 emphasised the need to confront non-traditional threats such as climate change, terrorism and transnational crime. The RFMF is developing a deployable-force headquarters, funded by Australia, which will also administer and train personnel for peacekeeping and HADR roles. Engagement in international peacekeeping operations is an important source of revenue for the government. Fiji's principal defence relationships are with Australia and New Zealand, with which the RFMF regularly conducts training and maritime patrols. Defence relations with China, South Korea and the US are growing, with all three countries providing training or donating equipment. The RFMF is attempting to improve the quality of senior NCOs and to raise standards across the rest of the force. Fiji has no significant defence industry and is only able to carry out basic equipment maintenance domestically. Significant upgrade and maintenance work is usually conducted in Australia.

ACTIVE 4,040 (Army 3,700 Navy 340)

RESERVE £6,000

(to age 45)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 3,700 (incl 300 recalled reserves)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops coy

MANOEUVRE

Light

3 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bty

1 engr bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 log bn

Reserves 6,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

5 inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

AUV 10 *Bushmaster* IMV

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12

Navy 340

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4:

PCO 1 *Guardian* (AUS *Bay* mod)

PB 3: 1 *Kula* (AUS *Pacific*); 2 *Levuka*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

AGHS 2: 1 *Kacau*; 1 *Volasiga*

DEPLOYMENT

EGYPT: MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn

IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 168; 2 sy unit

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4


SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 151; 1 inf coy

India IND

Indian Rupee INR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	INR	197tr	225tr	
	USD	2.66tr	2.95tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,930	2,116	
Growth	%	-7.3	9.5	
Inflation	%	6.2	5.6	
Def bdgt [a]	INR	4.71tr	4.96tr	
	USD	63.5bn	65.1bn	
USD1=INR		74.23	76.24	

[a] Includes defence civil estimates, which include military pensions

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 1,339,330,514

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.6%	4.6%	4.6%	4.4%	21.4%	3.3%
Female	12.1%	4.1%	4.0%	3.9%	20.3%	3.7%

Capabilities

India continues to modernise its armed forces, though progress in some areas remains slow. The armed forces are orientated against both Pakistan and China, and violence on the western frontier with China in 2020 raised tensions. India is looking to improve military infrastructure on its northern border. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. New Delhi considers the Taliban victory in Afghanistan as increasing the threat from violent extremists. There is growing focus on Indian Ocean security. Large numbers of paramilitary forces remain employed in the internal-security role. Army doctrine issued in late 2018 identified requirements including for 'integrated battle groups' and improved cyber, information-warfare and electronic-warfare capabilities. A Joint Armed Forces Doctrine was issued in 2017, much of which was consistent with similar US and NATO doctrines. It set out doctrine for Indian nuclear command and control, and envisaged an 'emerging triad' of space, cyber and special-operations capabilities complementing conventional land, sea and air capabilities. India continues to develop its nuclear capabilities. In 2020 the first Chief of Defence Staff was appointed, which may improve

high-level coordination of military planning. India continues to operate significant quantities of equipment of Soviet as well as Russian origin, though recent imports of foreign equipment have primarily been from the US and France. Nonetheless, India is also interested in acquiring new Russian equipment, such as air-defence systems, and continues to develop the *Brahmos* supersonic cruise missile as a joint venture with a Russian missile design bureau. Indian personnel participate in numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, and the country is one of the main troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. However, the overall capability of India's large conventional forces is limited by inadequate logistics, maintenance and shortages of ammunition, spare parts and maintenance personnel. Though modernisation continues, many equipment projects have seen delays and cost overruns, particularly indigenous systems. The government's 'Make in India' policy aims to strengthen the defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 1,460,350 (Army 1,237,000 Navy 70,900
Air 139,850 Coast Guard 12,600) Gendarmerie &
Paramilitary 1,608,150

RESERVE 1,155,000 (Army 960,000 Navy 55,000 Air
140,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 941,000

Army first-line reserves (300,000) within 5 years of full-time service, further 500,000 have commitment to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces Command

Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is a tri-service command established in 2003. The commander-in-chief of SFC, a senior three-star military officer, manages and administers all strategic forces through army, navy and air-force chains of command

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 SRBM bde with *Agni* I
- 1 IRBM bde with *Agni* II/III
- 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 *Prithvi* II

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 54

- ICBM • Nuclear *Agni* V (in test)
- IRBM • Nuclear ε4 *Agni* III; *Agni* IV (in test)
- MRBM • Nuclear ε8 *Agni* II
- SRBM • Nuclear 54: ε12 *Agni* I; ε42 SS-250 *Prithvi* II; some SS-350 *Dhanush* (naval testbed)

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 *Arihant* with 4
1-cell VLS with K-15 *Sagarika* SLBM, 6 533mm TT

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ALCM • Nuclear *Nirbhay*
(likely nuclear capable; in development)

Some Indian Air Force assets (such as *Mirage* 2000H or Su-30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 21

NAVIGATION, POSITIONING, TIMING: 7 IRNSS

COMMUNICATIONS: 2 GSAT-7/-7A

ISR 11: 8 *Cartosat*; 3 RISAT

ELINT/SIGINT 1 EMISAT

Army 1,237,000

6 Regional Comd HQ (Northern, Western, Central, Southern, Eastern, Southwestern), 1 Training Comd (ARTRAC)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 4 (strike) corps HQ
- 10 (holding) corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 8 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 2 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde (2 arty regt))
- 1 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 SP arty bde (2 SP arty regt))
- 8 indep armd bde

Mechanised

- 6 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 arty bde)
- 2 indep mech bde

Light

- 15 inf div (2–5 inf bde, 1 arty bde)
- 1 inf div (forming)
- 7 indep inf bde
- 12 mtn div (3–4 mtn inf bde, 1 arty bde)
- 2 indep mtn bde

Air Manoeuvre

- 1 para bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 SRBM bde with *Agni* I
- 1 IRBM bde with *Agni* II/III
- 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 *Prithvi* II
- 3 GLCM regt with PJ-10 *Brahmos*

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 3 arty div (2 arty bde, 1 MRL bde)
- 2 indep arty bde
- 4 engr bde

HELICOPTER

- 25 hel sqn

AIR DEFENCE

- 8 AD bde

Reserve Organisations

Reserves 300,000 reservists (first-line reserve within 5 years full-time service); 500,000 reservists (commitment until age 50) (total 800,000)

Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000 regular establishment)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

- 42 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 6 (Railway) engr regt
- 2 engr regt
- 1 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 6 ecological bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 3,690: 122 *Arjun*; 2,418 T-72M1; €1,150 T-90S (€1,100 various models in store)

RECCE *Ferret* (used for internal-security duties along with some indigenously built armd cars)

IFV 3,100: 700 BMP-1; 2,400 BMP-2 *Sarath* (incl some BMP-2K CP)

APC 336+

APC (W) 157+ OT-64

PPV 179: 165 *Casspir*; 14+ *Yukthirath* MPV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV BMP-2; FV180

ARV 730+: T-54/T-55; 156 VT-72B; 222 WZT-2; 352 WZT-3

VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; *Kartik*; MTU-20; MT-55; *Sarvatra*

MW 24 910 MCV-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 110 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

MANPATS 9K113 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); *Milan* 2 **RCL** 3,000+: **84mm** *Carl Gustaf*; **106mm** 3,000+ M40A1 (10 per inf bn)

ARTILLERY 9,859+

SP 155mm 100 K9 *Vajra-T*

TOWED 3,011+: **105mm** 1,350+: 600+ IFG Mk1/Mk2/Mk3; up to 700 LFG; 50 M-56; **122mm** 520 D-30; **130mm** €600 M-46 (500 in store) **155mm** 541: €300 FH-77B; €200 M-46 (mod); 41 M777A2

MRL 228: **122mm** €150 BM-21/LRAR **214mm** 36 *Pinaka*; **300mm** 42 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 6,520+: **81mm** 5,000+ E1; **120mm** €1,500 AM-50/E1; **SP** 120mm E1; **160mm** 20 M-58 *Tampella*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

IRBM • **Nuclear** some *Agni-III* (entering service)

MRBM • **Nuclear** €12 *Agni-II*

SRBM • **Nuclear** 42: €12 *Agni-I*; €30 250 *Prithvi II*

GLCM • **Conventional** 15 PJ-10 *Brahmos*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 343: 79 *Dhruv*; 12 *Lancer*; 74 *Rudra*; 118 SA315B *Lama* (*Cheetah*); 60 SA316B *Alouette III* (*Chetak*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 25: 13 *Nishant*; 12 *Searcher* Mk I/II

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 748+

Medium-range €48 *Akash*

Short-range 180 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence 520+: 20-80 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grisson*); 50+ 9K33AKM *Osa*-AKM (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 200 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*); 250 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS 2,315+

SP 23mm 75 ZSU-23-4; ZU-23-2 (truck-mounted);

TOWED 2,240+: **20mm** Oerlikon (reported); **23mm** 320 ZU-23-2; **40mm** 1,920 L40/70

Navy 70,900 (incl 7,000 Naval Avn and 1,200 Marines)

Fleet HQ New Delhi. Commands located at Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 17

STRATEGIC • **SSBN** 1 *Arihant* with 4 1-cell VLS with K-15 *Sagarika* SLBM, 6 533mm TT

TACTICAL 16**SSK** 16:

4 *Shishumar* (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT mod 1 HWT

1 *Sindhughosh* (FSU *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT

7 *Sindhughosh* (FSU *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M54E1/E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27A/B) (*Klub-S* AShM variant unclear) AShM/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT

4 *Kalvari* (FRA *Scorpène*) with 6 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* Block 2 AShM

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • **CV** 1 *Vikramaditya* (ex-FSU *Kiev* mod) with 3 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 4 AK630M CIWS (capacity: 12 MiG-29K/KUB *Fulcrum* FGA ac; 6 Ka-28 *Helix A* ASW hel/Ka-31 *Helix B* AEW hel)

DESTROYERS 10**DDG** 7:

2 *Delhi* (Project 15) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2 *Dhruv* hel/*Sea King* Mk42A ASW hel)

1 *Delhi* (Project 15) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2 *Dhruv* hel/*Sea King* Mk42A ASW hel)

3 *Kolkata* (Project 15A) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-8* SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 *Dhruv*/*Sea King* Mk42B hel)

1 *Vishakhapatnam* (Project 15B) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-8* SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with *Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 *Dhruv*/*Sea King* Mk42B hel)

DDGM 3:

1 *Rajput* (FSU *Kashin*) with 2 twin Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) AShM, 2 twin ZIF-101 Inchr with 4K91 M-1 *Volnya* (RS-SA-N-1 *Goa*)

SAM, 5 single 533mm PTA-51-61ME ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varanustra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix A* hel)

- 2 *Rajput* (FSU *Kashin*) with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* ASHM, 2 twin Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 1 twin ZIF-101 Inchr with 4K91 M-1 *Volnya* (RS-SA-N-1 *Goa*) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varanustra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix A* hel)

FRIGATES 17

FFGHM 13:

- 3 *Brahmaputra* (Project 16A) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 3 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*)/*Sea King* Mk42 ASW hel) (of which 1 non-operational)
- 1 *Godavari* (Project 16) with 4 single Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 1 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*)/*Sea King* Mk42 ASW hel)
- 3 *Shivalik* (Project 17) with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE *Klub-N* (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/*Brahmos* ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 1 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil-1* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Sea King* Mk42B ASW hel)
- 3 *Talwar I* with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE *Klub-N* (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM, 1 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil-1* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunashtra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 *Kashtan* (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*/Ka-28 *Helix A* ASW hel)
- 3 *Talwar II* with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* ASHM, 1 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil-1* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunashtra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*/Ka-28 *Helix A* ASW hel)

FFH 4 *Kamorta* (Project 28) with 2 twin 533mm ITTL ASTT with *Varunashtra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*/Ka-28 *Helix A* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 169

CORVETTES • FSGM 8:

- 4 *Khukri* (Project 25) with 2 twin Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 twin Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for *Dhruv*/SA316 *Alouette* III (*Chetak*))

4 *Kora* (Project 25A) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for *Dhruv*/SA316 *Alouette* III (*Chetak*))

PSOH 10: 4 *Saryu* with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*); 6 *Sukanya* with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor (capacity 1 SA316 *Alouette* III (*Chetak*))

PCFGM 8:

- 6 *Veer* (FSU *Tarantul*) with 4 single Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 2 *Prabal* (mod *Veer*) each with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCMT 3 *Abhay* (FSU *Pauk* II) with 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53 ASTT with SET-65E, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCC 15: 4 *Bangaram*; 10 *Car Nicobar*; 1 *Trinkat* (SDB Mk5)

PCF 4 *Tarmugli* (*Car Nicobar* mod)

PBF 121: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78); 13 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 *Plascoa* 1300 (SPB); 5 *Super Dvora*; 79 *Solas* Marine Interceptor

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1

Jalashwa (ex-US *Austin*) with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVF; 930 troops)

LANDING SHIPS 8

LSM 3 *Kumbhir* (FSU *Polnochny* C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5 APC; 160 troops)

LST 5: 2 *Magar* (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops); 3 *Magar* mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 12

LCT 8 LCU Mk-IV (capacity 1 *Arjun* MBT/2 T-90 MBT/4 IFV/160 troops)

LCM 4 LCM 8 (for use in *Jalashwa*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43

AFD 2: 1 FDN-1; 1 FDN-2

AGOR 1 *Sagardhwani* with 1 hel landing platform

AGHS 8: 1 *Makar*; 7 *Sandhayak*

AGM 1 *Dhruv*

AO 4 GSL 1,000T Fuel Barge

AOL 10: 1 *Ambika*; 2 *Poshak*; 7 *Purak*

AOR 1 *Jyoti* with 1 hel landing platform

AORH 3: 1 *Aditya* (based on *Deepak* (1967) Bremer Vulkan design); 2 *Deepak* with 4 AK630 CIWS

AP 3 *Nicobar* with 1 hel landing platform

ASR 1

ATF 1

AWT 3 *Ambuda*

AX 1 *Tir*

AXS 4: 2 *Mhadei*; 2 *Tarangini*

Naval Aviation 7,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB *Fulcrum*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-28 *Helix A*

1 sqn with *Sea King* Mk42B

MARITIME PATROL

4 sqn with BN-2 *Islander*; Do-228-101

1 sqn with Do-228

1 sqn with Il-38SD *May*

1 sqn with P-8I *Neptune*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with Ka-31 *Helix B*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*; *Sea King* Mk42C

1 sqn with *Dhruv*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with HS-748M (HAL-748M)

TRAINING

1 sqn with Do-228

1 sqn with HJT-16 *Kiran* MkI/II, *Hawk* Mk132*

1 hel sqn with *Sea King* Mk42B

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with UH-3H *Sea King*

ISR UAV

3 sqn with *Heron*; *Searcher* MkII

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 76 combat capable

FTR 43 MiG-29K/KUB *Fulcrum*

ASW 16: 5 Il-38SD *May*; 11 P-8I *Neptune*

MP 13+ Do-228-101

TPT 37:

Light 27: 17 BN-2 *Islander*; 10 Do-228

PAX 10 HS-748M (HAL-748M)

TRG 29: 6 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkI; 6 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkII; 17 *Hawk* Mk132*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 32: 12 Ka-28 *Helix A*; 2 MH-60R *Seahawk*; 18 *Sea King* Mk42B

MRH 57: 10 *Dhruv*; 24 SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*; 23 SA319 *Alouette III*

AEW 11 Ka-31 *Helix B*

TPT • Medium 11: 5 *Sea King* Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H *Sea King*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR 10: **Heavy** 4 *Heron*; **Medium** 6 *Searcher* Mk II

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-550 *Magic/Magic 2*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **ARH**: R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)

AShM AGM-84 *Harpoon* (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (RS-AS-20 *Kayak*; on *May* ac); *Sea Eagle* (possibly WFU)

Marines €1,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB duties)

After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime infrastructure

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (marine) cdo force

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 amph bde

Air Force 139,850

5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern (Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance (Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore)

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

3 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with *Jaguar* IB/IS

6 sqn with MiG-21 *Bison*

3 sqn with *Mirage* 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH – secondary ECM role)

2 sqn with *Rafale* DH/EH

11 sqn with Su-30MKI *Flanker*

2 sqn with *Tejas*

ANTI SURFACE WARFARE

1 sqn with *Jaguar* IM

ISR

1 unit with Gulfstream IV SRA-4

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with Il-76TD *Phalcon*

TANKER

1 sqn with Il-78 *Midas*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster III*

5 sqn with An-32/An-32RE *Cline*

1 (comms) sqn with B-737; B-737BBJ; EMB-135BJ

4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748

1 sqn with Il-76MD *Candid*

1 flt with HS-748

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with Su-30MKI *Flanker*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-25 *Hind*; Mi-35 *Hind*

1 sqn with Mi-25 *Hind*; Mi-35 *Hind*; AH-64E *Apache Guardian*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

5 sqn with *Dhruv*

7 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-1V *Hip H*

12 sqn with Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

2 sqn with SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*

1 flt with Mi-26 *Halo*

2 flt with SA315B *Lama (Cheetah)*

2 flt with SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*

ISR UAV

5 sqn with *Heron*; *Searcher* MkII

AIR DEFENCE

25 sqn with S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3B *Goa*)

6 sqn with 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*)

2 sqn with *Akash*

10 flt with 9K38 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 777 combat capable

FTR 61: 54 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (incl 12+ MiG-29UPG); 7 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*
FGA 500: 109 MiG-21 *Bison*; 38 MiG-21U/UM *Mongol*; 38 *Mirage* 2000E/I (2000H); 10 *Mirage* 2000ED/IT (2000TH); 8 *Rafale* DH; 18 *Rafale* EH; 263 Su-30MKI *Flanker H*; 16 *Tejas* ATK 115: 28 *Jaguar* IB; 79 *Jaguar* IS; 8 *Jaguar* IM
ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4
AEW&C 5: 2 EMB-145AEW *Netra* (1 more in test); 3 IL-76TD *Phalcon*
TKR 6 IL-78 *Midas*
TPT 243: **Heavy** 28: 11 C-17A *Globemaster* III; 17 IL-76MD *Candid*; **Medium** 10 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 141: 47 An-32; 55 An-32RE *Cline*; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; **PAX** 64: 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748
TRG 308: 101 *Hawk* Mk132*; 90 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkI/IA; 42 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkII; 75 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer* MkII

HELICOPTERS

ATK 39: 22 AH-64E *Apache Guardian*; 17 Mi-25/Mi-35 *Hind*
MRH 402: 60 *Dhruv*; 35 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 45 Mi-17-1V *Hip* H; 148 Mi-17V-5 *Hip* H; 59 SA315B *Lama* (*Cheetah*); 39 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*); 16 *Rudra*
TPT • **Heavy** 16: 15 CH-47F *Chinook*; 1+ Mi-26 *Halo*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Heavy** 9 *Heron*; **Medium** some *Searcher* MkII

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harop***AIR DEFENCE** • **SAM**

Medium-range 68: ε64 *Akash*; 4 MRSAM
Short-range S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3B *Goa*); *Spyder-SR*
Point-defence 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*) R-550 *Magic*; **IIR** *Mica IR*; **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** Super 530D **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*); *Mica RF*
AShM AGM-84 *Harpoon*; AM39 *Exocet*; Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*); *Sea Eagle*†
ASM AGM-114L/R *Hellfire*; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 *Kingbolt*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); AS-30; *Popeye* II (*Crystal Maze*)
ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)
ALCM • **Nuclear** *Nirbhay* (likely nuclear capable; in development)

BOMBS

INS/SAT guided *Spice*
Laser-guided *Paveway* II

Coast Guard 12,600**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 136

PSOH 25: 2 *Sankalp* (capacity 1 *Chetak*/*Dhruv* hel); 4 *Samar* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Chetak*/*Dhruv* hel); 9 *Samarth*; 7 *Vikram* (capacity 1 *Dhruv* hel); 3 *Vishwast* (capacity 1 *Dhruv* hel)
PSO 3 *Samudra Prahari* with 1 hel landing platform
PCC 44: 20 *Aadesh*; 8 *Rajshree* (Flight I); 4 *Rajshree* (Flight II) 5 *Rani Abbakka*; 7 *Sarojini Naidu*

PBF 63: 6 C-154; 2 C-141; 11 C-143; 44 C-401

PB 1 *Priyadarshini*

AMPHIBIOUS • **UCAC** 18: 6 H-181 (*Griffon* 8000TD); 12 H-187 (*Griffon* 8000TD)

AIRCRAFT • **MP** 23 Do-228-101

HELICOPTERS • **MRH** 21: 4 *Dhruv*; 17 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,608,150**Rashtriya Rifles** 65,000

Ministry of Defence. 15 sector HQ

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

65 paramilitary bn

Assam Rifles 65,150

Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within northeastern states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF

FORCES BY ROLE

Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn

COMMAND

7 HQ

MANOEUVRE**Other**

46 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • **MOR** 81mm 252

Border Security Force 263,900

Ministry of Home Affairs

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

192 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Small arms, lt arty, some anti-tank weapons

ARTILLERY • **MOR** 81mm 942+

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** some (air spt)

HELICOPTERS • **MRH** 2 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*

Central Industrial Security Force 144,400 (lightly armed security guards)

Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations

Central Reserve Police Force 324,800

Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal-security duties, only lightly armed, deployable throughout the country

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

215 paramilitary bn

15 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn

10 (CoBRA) paramilitary bn

6 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female)

2 sy gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 sigs bn

Defence Security Corps 31,000

Provides security at Defence Ministry sites

Indo-Tibetan Border Police 89,450

Ministry of Home Affairs. Tibetan border security SF/ guerrilla-warfare and high-altitude-warfare specialists

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

56 paramilitary bn

National Security Guards 12,000

Anti-terrorism contingency deployment force, comprising elements of the armed forces, CRPF and Border Security Force

Railway Protection Forces 70,000**Sashastra Seema Bal 79,450**

Guards the borders with Nepal and Bhutan

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

73 paramilitary bn

Special Frontier Force 10,000

Mainly ethnic Tibetans

Special Protection Group 3,000

Protection of ministers and senior officials

State Armed Police 450,000

For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army-standard infantry weapons and equipment

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn

Reserve Organisations**Civil Defence 500,000 reservists**

Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units for NBC defence

Home Guard 441,000 reservists (547,000 authorised str)

In all states except Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala; men on reserve lists, no trg. Not armed in peacetime. Used for civil defence, rescue and firefighting provision in wartime; 6 bn (created to protect tea plantations in Assam)

DEPLOYMENT

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,858; 2 inf bn; 1 med coy

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 867; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,372; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pl, 1 MP pl, 1 log coy(-)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

FOREIGN FORCES

Total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan

Argentina 2

Croatia 8

Italy 1

Korea, Republic of 7

Mexico 1

Philippines 6

Romania 1

Sweden 4

Switzerland 3


Thailand 5

Uruguay 3

Indonesia IDN

Indonesian Rupiah IDR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	IDR	15434tr	16456tr	
	USD	1.06tr	1.15tr	
per capita	USD	3,922	4,225	
Growth	%	-2.1	3.2	
Inflation	%	2.0	1.6	
Def bdgt	IDR	118tr	120tr	134tr
	USD	8.10bn	8.40bn	
FMA (US)	USD	14m	0m	14m
USD1=IDR		14565.47	14306.19	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 275,122,131

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.8%	4.3%	4.1%	3.9%	21.6%	3.3%
Female	12.3%	4.1%	3.9%	3.7%	22.1%	3.8%

Capabilities

The Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces – TNI) are the largest armed forces in Southeast Asia. They have traditionally been concerned primarily with internal security and counter-insurgency. The army remains the dominant service and is deployed operationally for counter-insurgency in West Papua and in a counter-terrorist role in central Sulawesi. A modernisation plan adopted in 2010 called for establishing a 'Minimum Essential Force' including strengthened naval and air forces by 2024. The

2015 defence white paper outlined Indonesia's 'Global Maritime Fulcrum' policy and advocated building up maritime, satellite and UAV capabilities. Some of these objectives were reflected in the 2020 State Defence Policy document. In 2018, Indonesia expanded its forces in the country's east and established a third naval fleet command and a third air-force regional command in that region. A new army reserve division and a third marine corps group were also established in the east. Indonesia has no formal defence alliances but there are a number of defence-cooperation agreements with regional and extra-regional partners. China has supplied some military equipment, including armed UAVs. The armed forces have contributed to UN and other international peacekeeping operations and exercise regularly with Australian and US armed forces and those of other Southeast Asian states. The TNI's inventory comprises equipment from diverse international sources, and the country uses technology-transfer agreements to develop its national defence industry which has significant capabilities in specific areas, including naval construction and the manufacture of transport aircraft and helicopters.

ACTIVE 395,500 (Army 300,400 Navy 65,000 Air 30,100) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000

Conscription liability 24 months selective conscription authorised (not required by law)

RESERVE 400,000

Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45 for officers

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €300,400

Mil Area Commands (KODAM)

15 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, Jaya & Iskandar Muda)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

- 3 armd cav bn
- 8 cav bn
- 1 mech inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 mech inf bn)
- 1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn)
- 3 indep mech inf bn

Light

- 1 inf bde (3 cdo bn)
- 1 inf bde (2 cdo bn, 1 inf bn)
- 1 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn)
- 2 inf bde (3 inf bn)
- 3 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 1 inf bn)
- 3 inf bde (2 inf bn)
- 24 indep inf bn
- 20 indep cdo bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 11 fd arty bn
- 11 cbt engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 4 construction bn

AVIATION

- 1 composite avn sqn

HELICOPTER

- 1 hel sqn with Bo-105; Bell 205A; Bell 412; Bell 412EPI
- Twin Huey*; AH-64E *Apache Guardian*
- 1 hel sqn Mi-35P *Hind*; Mi-17V-5 *Hip* H

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit)
- 8 ADA bn
- 3 SAM unit

Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 3 SF gp (total: 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit)

Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 3 div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 2 tk bn

Mechanised

- 1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn)

Light

- 2 inf bde (3 cdo bn)
- 1 inf bde (2 inf bn)

Air Manoeuvre

- 3 AB bde (3 AB bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 2 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 fd arty bn)
- 1 fd arty bn
- 2 cbt engr bn

AIR DEFENCE

- 3 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 103: 42 *Leopard* 2A4; 61 *Leopard* 2RI

LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76; 60 FV101 *Scorpion*-90

RECCE 142: 55 *Ferret* (13 upgraded); 69 *Saladin* (16 upgraded); 18 VBL

IFV 64: 22 *Black Fox*; 42 *Marder* 1A3

APC 834+

APC (T) 267: 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333 *Stormer*; 143 M113A1-B

APC (W) 567+: 350 *Anoa*; some *Barracuda*; 40 BTR-40; 45 FV603 *Saracen* (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150 *Commando*; 32 VAB-VTT

PPV some *Casspir*

AUV 39: 14 APR-1; 3 *Bushmaster*; 22 *Commando Ranger*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 4: 3 PiPz-2RI *Dachs*; 1 M113A1-B-GN

ARV 15+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 BPz-3 *Buffel*; *Stormer*; T-54/T-55

VLB 19: 10 AMX-13; 3 BPR *Biber*-1; 4 M3; 2 *Stormer*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; SS.11; *Milan*; 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)

RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1

RL 89mm LRAC

ARTILLERY 1,238+

SP 87: 105mm 20 AMX Mk61; 155mm 67: 49 CAESAR; 18 M109A4

TOWED 133+: 105mm 110+: some KH-178; 60 M101; 50 M-56; 155mm 23: 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179

MRL 127mm 63 ASTROS II Mk6

MOR 955: 81mm 800; 120mm 155: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 ADRI LI with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 8 MBT; 500 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCU 17: 1 ADRI XXXII; 4 ADRI XXXIII; 1 ADRI XXXIX; 1 ADRI XL; 3 ADRI XLI; 2 ADRI XLIV; 2 ADRI XLVI; 2 ADRI XLVIII; 1 ADRI L

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 9: 1 BN-2A *Islander*; 6 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212); 2 *Turbo Commander* 680

HELICOPTERS

ATK 14: 8 AH-64E *Apache Guardian*; 6 Mi-35P *Hind*

MRH 51: 12 H125M *Fennec*; 17 Bell 412 *Twin Huey* (NB-412); 6 Bell 412EPI *Twin Huey*; 16 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT • Light 29: 7 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2 H120 *Colibri*

TRG up to 19 Hughes 300C

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 95+: 2 *Kobra* (with 125 GROM-2 msl); *Starstreak*; TD-2000B (*Giant Bow II*); 51 *Rapier*; 42 RBS-70; QW-3

GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 121 Rh 202; 23mm *Giant Bow*; 40mm 90 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*

Navy €65,000 (including Marines and Aviation)

Three fleets: East (Sorong), Central (Surabaya) and West (Jakarta). Two Forward Operating Bases at Kupang (West Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • SSK 4:

1 *Cakra* (Type-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT

3 *Nagapasa* (Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with *Black Shark* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7

FRIGATES 7:

FFGHM 5:

1 *Ahmad Yani* (ex-NLD *Van Speijk*) with 2 twin-cell VLS with 3M55E *Yakhont* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM; 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr (manual) with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)

2 *Ahmad Yani* (ex-NLD *Van Speijk*) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr (manual) with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)

2 *R.E. Martadinata* (SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 6-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 *Millennium* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FFHM 2 *Ahmad Yani* (ex-NLD *Van Speijk*) with 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr (manual) with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 136

CORVETTES 24

FSGM 7:

3 *Bung Tomo* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 18-cell VLS with *Sea Wolf* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 Bo-105 hel)

4 *Diponegoro* (SIGMA 9113) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 quad *Tetral* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FSGH 1 *Nala* with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 twin Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun (capacity 1 lt hel)

FS 16:

2 *Fatahillah* with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun

14 *Kapitan Pattimura* (GDR *Parchim I*) with 4 single 400mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun

PCFG 3 *Mandau* with 4 single Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 57mm gun

PCG 4:

2 *Sampari* (KCR-60M) with 2 twin Inchr for C-705 ASHM
2 *Todak* with 2 single Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 57mm gun

PCT 2 *Andau* with 2 single 533mm TT with SUT, 1 57mm gun

PCC 13: 4 *Kakap* with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Pandrong*; 3 *Pari*; 2 *Sampari* (KCR-60M) with 1 NG-18 CIWS; 2 *Todak* with 1 57mm gun

PBG 8: 2 *Clurit* with 2 single Inchr with C-705 ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 6 *Clurit* with 2 single Inchr with C-705 ASHM

PBF 4 *Combat Boat AL D-18*

PB 78: 2 *Badau* (ex-BRN *Waspada*); 9 *Boa*; 1 *Cucut* (ex-SGP *Jupiter*); 4 *Kobra*; 1 *Krait*; 8 *Sibarau*; 32 *Sinabang* (KAL 28); 4 *Tarihu*; 13 *Tatihu* (PC-40); 4 *Viper*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8

MCO 2 *Pulau Rengat*

MSC 6 *Pulau Rote* (ex-GDR *Wolgast*)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 6:

1 *Dr Soeharso* (ex-Tanjung *Dalpele*) (capacity 2 LCU/LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L *Super Puma*) (used in AH role)

4 *Makassar* (capacity 2 LCU or 4 LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L *Super Puma*)

1 *Semarang* (IDN *Makassar* mod) (capacity 2 LCM; 3 hel; 28 vehs; 650 troops) (used in AH role)

LANDING SHIPS • LST 23

1 *Teluk Amboina* (capacity 16 tanks; 800 troops)

2 *Teluk Bintuni* (capacity 10 MBT)

2 *Teluk Cirebon* (ex-GDR *Frosch II*)

9 *Teluk Gilimanuk* (ex-GDR *Frosch*)

5 *Teluk Lada* with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 4 LCVP; 470 troops; 15 APC; 10 MBT)

4 *Teluk Semangka* (capacity 17 tanks; 200 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 54

LCM 20

LCU 4

LCVP 30

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18AGF 1 *Multatuli* with 1 hel landing platformAGOR 2 *Rigel* (OSV 190)AGOS 1 *Leuser*AGHS 1 *Dewa Kembar* (ex-UK *Hecla*)AGS 1 *Pulau Rote* (ex-GDR *Wolgast*)

AKSL 1

AORLH (1 *Arun* (ex-UK *Rover*) damaged at sea 2018, non-operational and in repair)AOR 2: 1 *Bontang* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Tarakan* with 1 hel landing platformAOT 1 *Sorong*AP 2: 1 *Tanjung Kambani* (troop transport) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Karang Pilang* (troop transport)ATF 1 *Soputan*AX 2 *Kadet*AXS 3: 1 *Arung Samudera*; 1 *Bima Suci*; 1 *Dewaruci***Naval Aviation €1,000****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**MP 28: 3 C-212-200; 5 CN-235-220 (MPA); 14 N-22B *Searchmaster B*; 6 N-22SL *Searchmaster L*TPT • **Light** 33: 1 Beech 350i *King Air* (VIP transport); 8 Beech C-36 *Bonanza*; 2 Beech C-38 *Baron*; 17 C-212-200 *Aviocar*; 3 TB-9 *Tampico*; 2 TB-10**HELICOPTERS**ASW 11 AS-565MBe *Panther*MRH 4 Bell 412 (NB-412) *Twin Huey*CSAR 4 H-225M *Caracal*TPT 15: **Medium** 3 AS-332L *Super Puma* (NAS332L);**Light** 12: 3 H-120 *Colibri*; 9 Bo-105 (NB-105)**Marines €20,000****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

2 mne gp (1 cav regt, 3 mne bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt spt regt, 1 CSS regt)

1 mne gp (forming)

1 mne bde (3 mne bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

LT TK 65: 10 AMX-10 PAC 90; 55 PT-76+

RECCE 21 BRDM-2

IFV 114: 24 AMX-10P; 22 BMP-2; 54 BMP-3F; 2 BTR-4; 12 BTR-80A

APC 103: APC (T) 100 BTR-50P; APC (W) 3 BTR-4M

AAV 15: 10 LVTP-7A1; 5 M113 *Arisgator***ARTILLERY 71+**

TOWED 50: 105mm 22 LG1 MK II; 122mm 28 M-38

MRL 122mm 21: 4 PHL-90B; 9 RM-70; 8 RM-70 *Vampir*

MOR 81mm some

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; 57mm S-60

Air Force 30,100

3 operational comd (East, Central and West) plus trg comd

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**1 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D *Fighting Falcon***FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*1 sqn with Su-27SK *Flanker*; Su-30MK *Flanker*1 sqn with Su-27SKM *Flanker*; Su-30MK2 *Flanker*2 sqn with *Hawk* Mk109*/Mk209*1 sqn with T-50i *Golden Eagle****GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with EMB-314 (A-29) *Super Tucano****MARITIME PATROL**

1 sqn with B-737-200

1 sqn with CN-235M-220 MPA; CN-235M-110

TANKER/TRANSPORT1 sqn with C-130B/KC-130B *Hercules***TRANSPORT**1 VIP sqn with B-737-200; C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; L-100-30; F-27-400M *Troopship*; F-28-1000/30001 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; L-100-301 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*1 sqn with C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212/NC-212i)

1 sqn with C-295M

TRAINING

1 sqn with Grob 120TP

1 sqn with KT-1B

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER2 sqn with H-225M; AS-332L *Super Puma* (NAS332L);NAS332 C1+ *Super Puma*; SA330J/L *Puma* (NAS330J/L)1 VIP sqn with AS-332L *Super Puma* (NAS332L);SA330SM *Puma* (NAS330SM)1 sqn with H-120 *Colibri***ISR UAV**1 sqn with *Aerostar***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

Only 45% of ac op

AIRCRAFT 108 combat capableFTR 9: 7 F-16A *Fighting Falcon*; 2 F-16B *Fighting Falcon* (8 F-5E *Tiger II*; 4 F-5F *Tiger II* non-operational)FGA 40: 19 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 5 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*;2 Su-27SK *Flanker*; 3 Su-27SKM *Flanker*; 2 Su-30MK *Flanker F*; 9 Su-30MK2 *Flanker G*

MP 8: 3 B-737-200; 2 CN-235M-220 MPA

ISR 1 C-295M

TKR/TPT 1 KC-130B *Hercules*TPT 53: **Medium** 19: 4 C-130B *Hercules*; 7 C-130H *Hercules*; 6 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 2 L-100-30; **Light** 25: 9C-295; 9 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212); 2 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212i); 5 CN-235M-110; **PAX** 9: 1 B-737-200; 3 B-737-400; 1

B-737-500; 1 B-737-800BBJ; 1 F-28-1000; 2 F-28-3000

TRG 103: 15 EMB-314 (A-29) *Super Tucano**; 30 Grob 120TP; 7 *Hawk* Mk109*; 22 *Hawk* Mk209*; 14 KT-1B; 15T-50i *Golden Eagle****HELICOPTERS**TPT 37: **Heavy** 6 H-225M (CSAR); **Medium** 19: 9 AS-332 *Super Puma* (NAS332L) (VIP/CSAR); 1 NAS332 C1+ *Super Puma*;1 SA330SM *Puma* (NAS330SM) (VIP); 4 SA330J *Puma* (NAS330J); 4 SA330L *Puma* (NAS330L); **Light** 12H-120 *Colibri*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy CH-4B (in test)

ISR • Medium *Aerostar***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9P *Sidewinder*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*);IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)ASM AGM-65G *Maverick*; AR-2; Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); Kh-59T (RS-AS-14B *Kedge*)ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)**Special Forces (Paskhasau)****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

3 (PASKHASAU) SF wg (total: 6 spec ops sqn)

4 indep SF coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE**SAM • Point *Chiron*; QW-3GUNS • TOWED 35mm 6 Oerlikon *Skyshield***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000+**

Police €280,000 (including 14,000 police 'mobile bde' (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT unit (Gegana))

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC (W) 34 *Tactica*AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212); 1 C295; 1 *Turbo Commander* 680**HELICOPTERS**

MRH 1 Bell 412EP

TPT • Light 22: 3 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 19 Bo-105 (NBo-105)**KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence Command)**

Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency


EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37**PCO 7: 1 *Arda Dedali*; 3 *Chundamani*; 1 *Kalimasada*; 2 *Trisula*PB 30: 4 *Golok* (SAR); 5 *Kujang*; 6 *Rantos*; 15 (various)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 *Jadayat*****Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10**PSO 4: 3 *Pulau Nipah* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Tanjung Datu* with 1 hel landing platformPB 6 *Bintang Laut* (KCR-40 mod)**Reserve Organisations****Kamra People's Security €40,000**

Report for 3 weeks' basic training each year; part-time police auxiliary

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 230; 1 engr coy**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 1,035; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 1,229; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGHM**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 9**PHILIPPINES:** IMT 9**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 4**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 4**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 3**Japan JPN**

Japanese Yen JPY		2020	2021	2022
GDP	JPY	539tr	553tr	
	USD	5.05tr	5.10tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	40,089	40,704	
Growth	%	-4.6	2.4	
Inflation	%	-0.0	-0.2	
Def bdgt	JPY	5.31tr	5.34tr	5.45tr
	USD	49.8bn	49.3bn	
USD1=JPY		106.77	108.46	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 124,687,293

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	6.5%	2.4%	2.5%	2.6%	21.9%	12.7%
Female	6.1%	2.2%	2.3%	2.4%	22.3%	16.1%

Capabilities

Japan's concerns over its regional security environment have heightened, as evidenced in its 2021 Defense White Paper. These principally relate to security challenges posed by a more assertive China and continued concern over North Korea. As a result, there have been defence-budget increases and defence-policy and legislative reforms designed to enable Japan to play a more active international security role and strengthen the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Due to their defensive mandate, JSDF deployments are mostly for peacekeeping purposes. While the JSDF's offensive capacity remains weak, the navy has strengths in anti-submarine warfare and air defence. In 2018, a Ground Component Command was created. An Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade has also been established, tasked mainly with the defence of remote islands. The *Izumo* helicopter carrier has completed the first stage of modifications to embark and operate fixed-wing aircraft, and in October 2021, F-35B aircraft from the US Marine Corps successfully landed on and took off from its flight deck. Final conversion work will take place in FY 2025, while JS *Kaga* will be fully modified in FY 2022. Japan is developing capabilities in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to develop a 'multi-domain defence force', based on the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2019-23

Mid-Term Defense Program. In 2020, a Space Operations Squadron was set up, with the aim of enhancing space situational-awareness capabilities. The Cyber Defense Group is to expand. Enhancing ballistic-missile defence remains a key priority. In December 2020, the cabinet announced that two vessels equipped with *Aegis* ballistic-missile-defence systems would be developed as alternatives to the cancelled land-based *Aegis* Ashore. Japan's alliance with the US remains the cornerstone of its defence policy, reflected by continued US basing, the widespread use of US equipment across all three services and regular training with US forces. Meanwhile, meetings with Germany, India, Indonesia and the UK have indicated efforts to expand security relations. Following a joint statement in March 2021 by the 'Quad' (Australia, India, Japan and the US), in which they reaffirmed their 'commitment to quadrilateral cooperation', the first-ever Leaders' Summit was held in September 2021. In November 2020, Australia and Japan agreed in principle on a Reciprocal Access Agreement, while India and Japan inked an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in September 2020. In September 2021, negotiations for a Reciprocal Access Agreement began with the UK. Japan has an advanced defence-industrial base. Defence exports have mainly consisted of components, though there are ambitions to secure more significant export deals; a notable development was the August 2020 contract to supply air-surveillance radars to the Philippines Air Force. Japan's ongoing military-procurement drive is focused on power projection, mobility and ISR. Budget documents also note research on a hypersonic glide body, new anti-ship missiles and research on advanced radar technology.

ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300 Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,350

RESERVE 55,900 (General Reserve Army (GSDF) 46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,000 Navy 1,100 Air 800)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 11

COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 *Kirameki*-1; 1 *Kirameki*-2
ISR 9 IGS

Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

5 army HQ (regional cmd)

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops unit (bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 indep tk bn

Mechanised

1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce bn, 3 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1 hel sqn, 1 AT coy, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (6th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 mech inf regt; 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (5th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)

1 (11th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)

Light

2 (1st & 3rd) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Amphibious

1 amph bde (1 recce coy, 2 amph regt, 1 amph aslt bn, 1 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (1st) arty bde (1 SP arty regt (2 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 1 SP arty regt (1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 3 ASHM regt)

1 (Northwestern Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 ASHM regt)

1 (Western Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 MRL bn; 1 ASHM regt)

1 (Central Army) fd arty bn

4 engr bde

1 engr unit

1 EW bn

5 int bn

1 MP bde

1 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

5 log unit (bde)

5 trg bde

HELICOPTER

2 sqn with MV-22B *Osprey* (forming)

HELICOPTER

- 1 hel bde (5 tpt hel sqn; 1 VIP tpt hel bn)
- 5 hel gp (1 atk hel bn, 1 hel bn)

AIR DEFENCE

- 2 SAM bde (2 SAM gp)
- 2 SAM gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

- MBT 579: 99 Type-10; 145 Type-74; 335 Type-90
- ASLT 123 Type-16 MCV
- RECCE 111 Type-87
- IFV 68 Type-89
- APC 804
- APC (T) 226 Type-73
- APC (W) 578: 197 Type-82; 381 Type-96
- AAV 52 AAV-7
- AUV 8 *Bushmaster*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

- ARV 63: 5 Type-11; 28 Type-78; 30 Type-90
- VLB 22 Type-91

NBC VEHICLES 55: 34 Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; 21 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

- SP 37 Type-96 MPMS
- MANPATS Type-79 *Jyu-MAT*; Type-87 *Chu-MAT*; Type-01 LMAT
- RCL • 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 1,582

- SP 166: 155mm 135 Type-99; 203mm 31 M110A2
- TOWED 155mm 229 FH-70
- MRL 227mm 54 M270 MLRS
- MOR 1,133: 81mm 656 L16 120mm 453 RT-61; SP 120mm 24 Type-96

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 92: 30 Type-12; 62 Type-88

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 8 Beech 350 *King Air* (LR-2)

TILTROTOR • TPT 7+ MV-22B *Osprey*

HELICOPTERS

- ATK 99: 50 AH-1S *Cobra*; 12 AH-64D *Apache*; 37 OH-1
- TPT 249: Heavy 53: 18 CH-47D *Chinook* (CH-47J); 35 CH-47JA *Chinook*; Medium 43: 3 H225 *Super Puma* MkII+ (VIP); 40 UH-60L *Black Hawk* (UH-60JA); Light 153: 123 Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B)

AIR DEFENCE**SAM 311+**

- Medium-range 130: 48 Type-03 *Chu-SAM*; 4 Type-03 *Chu-SAM Kai*; 78 MIM-23B *I-Hawk*
- Short-range 44 Type-11 *Tan-SAM*
- Point-defence 137+: 46 Type-81 *Tan-SAM*; 91 Type-93 *Kin-SAM*; Type-91 *Kei-SAM*

GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87

Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300

Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with bases at Kure and Yokosuka

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES • SSK 22:**

- 11 *Oyashio* (of which 2 in trg role) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/Type-89 HWT
- 11 *Soryu* (of which 9 fitted with AIP and 2 fitted with lithium-ion fuel battery; 1 other AIP-fitted boat non-operational following 2021 collision) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/Type-89 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 49**AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 4:**

- 2 *Hyuga* with 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46/Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (normal ac capacity 3 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 7 SH-60 *Seahawk* or 7 MCH-101)
- 2 *Izumo* (being converted to CVS) with 2 11-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM Inchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (normal ac capacity 7 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 5 SH-60 *Seahawk*/MCH-101 hel)

CRUISERS • CGHM 4:

- 2 *Atago* with *Aegis* Baseline 9 C2, 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 2 *Maya* (*Atago* mod) with *Aegis* Baseline 9 C2, w quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)

DESTROYERS 35**DDGHM 29:**

- 8 *Asagiri* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 Inchr with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 Inchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 4 *Akizuki* with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 2 *Asahi* (*Akizuki* mod) with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-12 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 1 *Hatsuyuki* (trg role) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 Inchr with RIM-7F/M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112

- Inchr with ASROC A/S msl, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 9 *Murasame* with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 5 *Takanami* (improved *Murasame*) with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)

DDGM 6:

- 2 *Hatakaze* (trg role) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 1 Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 Inchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
- 4 *Kongou* with *Aegis* Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun

FRIGATES • FFG 6 *Abukuma* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 Inchr with ASROC A/S msl, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6

PBFG 6 *Hayabusa* with 4 SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 1 76mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 22**MCCS 2:**

- 1 *Uraga* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101 hel)
- 1 *Uraga* with 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101)

MSC 17: 3 *Hirashima*; 11 *Sugashima*; 3 *Enoshima*

MSO 3 *Awaji*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3 *Osumi* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity for 2 CH-47 hel) (capacity 10 Type-90 MBT; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; 330 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 8

LCM 2 LCU-2001

LCAC 6 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24

AGBH 1 *Shirase* (capacity 2 AW101 *Merlin* hel)

AGEH 1 *Asuka* (wpm trials) with 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* hel)

AGOS 3 *Hibiki* with 1 hel landing platform

AGS 3: 1 *Futami*; 1 *Nichinan*; 1 *Shonan*

AOE 5: 2 *Mashu* (capacity 1 med hel); 3 *Towada* with 1 hel landing platform

ARC 1 *Muroto*

ASR 2: 1 *Chihaya* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Chiyoda* with 1 hel landing platform

ATF 5 *Hiuchi*

AX 3:

- 1 *Kashima* with 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
- 1 *Kurobe* with 1 76mm gun (trg spt ship)
- 1 *Tenryu* (trg spt ship); with 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 med hel)

Naval Aviation €9,800

7 Air Groups

FORCES BY ROLE**ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE**

5 sqn with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K *Seahawk*

MARITIME PATROL

2 sqn with P-1

2 sqn with P-3C *Orion*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with EP-3 *Orion*

MINE COUNTERMEASURES

1 sqn with MCH-101

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with *Shin Meiwa* US-2

2 sqn with UH-60J *Black Hawk*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with AW101 *Merlin* (CH-101); Beech 90 *King Air* (LC-90); KC-130R *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Beech 90 *King Air* (TC-90)

1 sqn with P-3C *Orion*

1 sqn with T-5J

1 hel sqn with H135 (TH-135); SH-60K *Seahawk*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 73 combat capable

ASW 73: 29 P-1; 44 P-3C *Orion*

ELINT 5 EP-3C *Orion*

SAR 6 *Shin Meiwa* US-2

TPT 24: **Medium 6** C-130R *Hercules*; **Light 18:** 5 Beech 90 *King Air* (LC-90); 13 Beech 90 *King Air* (TC-90) (trg)

TRG 30 T-5J

HELICOPTERS

ASW 83: 14 SH-60B *Seahawk* (SH-60J); 69 SH-60K *Seahawk*

MCM 10 MCH-101

SAR 9 UH-60J *Black Hawk*

TPT 18: **Medium 3** AW101 *Merlin* (CH-101); **Light 15** H135 (TH-135) (trg)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AShM ASM-1C (Type-90)

Air Self-Defense Force 46,950

7 cbt wg

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

7 sqn with F-15J *Eagle*

3 sqn with Mitsubishi F-2

2 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11EA

ELINT

1 sqn with RC-2; YS-11EB

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL2 sqn with E-2C/D *Hawkeye*

1 sqn with E-767

SEARCH & RESCUE1 wg with U-125A *Peace Krypton*; UH-60J *Black Hawk***TANKER**1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus* (forming)

1 sqn with KC-767J

TRANSPORT

1 (VIP) sqn with B-777-300ER

1 sqn with C-1; Gulfstream IV (U-4)

1 sqn with C-2

1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; KC-130H *Hercules*

Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4*

TRAINING1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J *Eagle***TEST**1 wg with F-15J *Eagle*; T-4***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**4 flt with CH-47JA *Chinook***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 514 combat capable**FTR** 201: 156 F-15J *Eagle*; 45 F-15DJ *Eagle***FGA** 116: 64 F-2A; 27 F-2B; 25 F-35A *Lightning II***EW** 3: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA**SIGINT** 4: 1 RC-2; 3 YS-11EB**AEW&C** 18: 10 E-2C *Hawkeye*; 4 E-2D *Hawkeye*; 4 E-767**SAR** 26 U-125A *Peace Krypton***TKR/TPT** 7: 1 KC-46A *Pegasus*; 2 KC-130H *Hercules*; 4 KC-767J**TPT** 54: **Medium** 34: 14 C-130H *Hercules*; 8 C-1; 12 C-2; **PAX** 20: 2 B-777-300ER (VIP); 13 Beech T-400; 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4)**TRG** 246: 197 T-4*; 49 T-7**HELICOPTERS****SAR** 39 UH-60J *Black Hawk***TPT** • **Heavy** 15 CH-47JA *Chinook***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES****AAM** • **IR** AAM-3 (Type-90); AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; **IIR**AAM-5 (Type-04); **SARH** AIM-7 *Sparrow*; **ARH** AAM-4 (Type-99); AIM-120C5/C7 AMRAAM (limited numbers)**AShM** ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93)**BOMBS****INS/SAT** **guided** GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-54 Laser JDAM**Air Defence**

Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites

FORCES BY ROLE**AIR DEFENCE**6 SAM gp (total: 24 SAM bty with M902 *Patriot* PAC-3)1 AD gp with Type-81 *Tan-SAM*; M167 *Vulcan***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIR DEFENCE****SAM** 146+**Long-range** 120 M902 *Patriot* PAC-3**Short-range** £26 Air Base Defense SAM**Point-defence** Type-81 *Tan-SAM***GUNS** • **TOWED 20mm** M167 *Vulcan***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,350****Coast Guard 14,350**

Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism (no cbt role)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 383****PSOH** 18: 2 *Mizuho* (capacity 2 hel); 1 *Mizuho II* (capacity 2 hel); 4 *Shikishima* (capacity 2 hel); 1 *Shunko* (capacity 2 hel); 1 *Soya* (capacity 1 hel) (icebreaking capability); 9 *Tsugaru* (*Soya* mod) (capacity 1 hel)**PSO** 48: 9 *Hateruma* with 1 hel landing platform; 3 *Hida* with 1 hel landing platform; 6 *Iwami*; 1 *Izu* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Kojima* (trg) with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Kunigami* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Miura* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Miyako* with 1 hel landing platform; 6 *Ojika* with 1 hel landing platform; 18 *Taketomi* with 1 hel landing platform**PCO** 16: 3 *Aso*; 8 *Katori*; 5 *Teshio***PCC** 26: 4 *Amami*; 22 *Tokara***PBF** 50: 24 *Hayagumo*; 3 *Mihashi*; 15 *Raizan*; 2 *Takatsuki*; 6 *Tsuruugi***PB** 55: 4 *Asogiri*; 4 *Hamagumo*; 11 *Hayanami*; 15 *Katonami*; 1 *Matsunami*; 10 *Shimoji*; 10 *Yodo***PBI** 170: 2 *Hakubai*; 1 *Hayagiku*; 167 *Himegiku***LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18****ABU** 1 *Teshio***AGS** 14: 6 *Hamashio*; 1 *Jinbei*; 2 *Meiyo*; 2 *Peiyo*; 1 *Shoyo*; 1 *Takuyo*; 1 *Tenyo***AX** 3**AIRCRAFT****MP** 4 *Falcon* 2000MSA**SAR** 4 Saab 340B**TPT** 26: **Light** 24: 5 Cessna 172; 10 Beech 350 *King Air* (LR-2); 9 DHC *Dash-7* (Bombardier 300) (MP); **PAX** 2 Gulfstream V (MP)**HELICOPTERS****MRH** 4 Bell 412 *Twin Huey***SAR** 12 S-76D**TPT** 37: **Medium** 12: 2 AS332 *Super Puma*; 10 H225 *Super Puma*; **Light** 25: 18 AW139; 4 Bell 505 *Jet Ranger* X; 3 S-76C**DEPLOYMENT****ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN:** MSDF: 1 DDGHM;**Combined Maritime Forces** • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM**DJIBOUTI:** 180; 2 P-3C *Orion***SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 4**FOREIGN FORCES****United States**

US Pacific Command: 55,600

Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn with M903 *Patriot* PAC MSE**Navy** 20,000; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18E *Super Hornet*; 1 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18F *Super Hornet*; 2 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A *Poseidon*; 1 ELINT flt

with 2 EP-3E *Aries* II; 2 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G *Growler*; 1 AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D *Hawkeye*; 2 ASW hel sqn with 12 MH-60R *Seahawk*; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S *Knight Hawk*; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka

USAF: 13,000; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa-Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa-Kadena AB (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D *Eagle*; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R *Stratotanker*; 1 AEW sqn with 2 E-3B *Sentry*; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G *Pave Hawk*); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops gp at Okinawa-Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J *Commando II*; 1 sqn with 5 CV-22B *Osprey*); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 *Rivet Joint*; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A *Global Hawk*

USMC 20,000; 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18A++/C+ *Hornet*; 2 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F-35B *Lightning II*; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15 KC-130J *Hercules*; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B *Osprey*

US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of DPRK

North Korean Won KPW	2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD		
per capita	USD		
Def exp	KPW		
	USD		

USD1=KPW

*definitive economic data not available

Population 25,831,360

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	10.4%	3.5%	3.7%	4.0%	23.6%	3.4%
Female	10.0%	3.4%	3.7%	3.9%	24.0%	6.3%

Capabilities

Renewed diplomacy reduced overall tensions on the Korean Peninsula after 2018, though North Korea's observed actions remain inconsistent with de-nuclearisation. Aware of the qualitative inferiority of its conventional forces, North Korea continues to invest in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile delivery systems. A self-imposed 2018 moratorium covering nuclear- and long-range-missile tests technically remains unbroken, though the resumption of launch testing since 2019 has included several potentially dual-capable shorter-range missiles together with a medium-range SLBM. Pyongyang's ambitions to further diversify delivery systems were also indicated in September 2021 with flight tests of an apparent Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), its first known rail-based ballistic missile and what Pyongyang claimed was a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). Other new designs have been shown but as yet remain untested, including ICBM and additional SLBM designs. North Korea remains diplomatically isolated. While foreign defence cooperation is restricted by international pressure and sanctions,

Pyongyang has nonetheless often found ways to develop military ties. Official conscription for both men and women is often extended, sometimes indefinitely. Training is focused on fighting a short, intensive war on the peninsula, but the armed forces' overall effectiveness in a modern conflict against technologically superior opposition is unclear. Internal exercises are conducted regularly, but those publicised are staged and are not necessarily representative of wider operational capability. North Korea's conventional forces remain reliant on increasingly obsolete equipment, with older Soviet-era and Chinese-origin equipment supplemented by a growing number of indigenous designs and upgrades, though the precise capability of these remains unclear. Overall effectiveness and serviceability of some equipment remains in doubt but there is local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity. Local defence-industrial capacity includes the manufacture of light arms, armoured vehicles, artillery and missile systems. North Korea has exported weaponry in the past. It is unclear whether the country would have had the capability to indigenously develop some of the technical advances it has demonstrated, including in rocket propulsion.

ACTIVE 1,280,000 (Army 1,100,000 Navy 60,000 Air 110,000 Strategic Forces 10,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000

Conscript liability Army 5-12 years, Navy 5-10 years, Air Force 3-4 years, followed by compulsory part-time service to age 40. Thereafter service in the Worker/Peasant Red Guard to age 60

RESERVE €600,000 (Armed Forces €600,000), Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,700,000

Reservists are assigned to units (see also Paramilitary)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces €10,000

North Korea describes its ballistic missile force as nuclear capable, although there is no conclusive evidence to verify the successful integration of a warhead with any of these systems

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (€)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

ICBM 10+: 6+ *Hwasong-14* (in test)/*Hwasong-15* (in test); 4+ *Hwasong-17* (under development); (Earlier *Hwasong-13*/13 mod designs untested and presumed cancelled)

IRBM 10+ *Hwasong-10* (*Musudan*) (status uncertain)/*Hwasong-12* (in test)

MRBM 17+: €10 *Nodong* mod 1/mod 2 (€90+ msl); some *Scud-ER*; 7+ *Pukgusong-2* (in test)

SBRM 69+: 30+ *Hwasong-5*/6 (RS-SS-1C/D *Scud-B/C*) (€200+ msl); 1+ *Hwasong-8* with HGV (in test); 9+ *Hwasong-11* mod (in test); 6+ *Scud* (mod) (in test); 17+ KN-23 (road & rail mobile variants); 6+ KN-23 mod 1 (in test)

GLCM some M-2021 (in test)

Army €1,100,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

10 inf corps HQ

1 (Capital Defence) corps HQ

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 armd div

15 armd bde

Mechanised

6 mech div

Light

27 inf div

14 inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty div

21 arty bde

9 MRL bde

5–8 engr river crossing/amphibious regt

1 engr river crossing bde

Special Purpose Forces Command 88,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

17 recce bn

Light

9 lt inf bde

6 sniper bde

Air Manoeuvre

3 AB bde

1 AB bn

2 sniper bde

Amphibious

2 sniper bde

Reserves 600,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

40 inf div

18 inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (€)**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

The Korean People's Army displayed a number of new armoured-vehicle designs at a parade in 2020, but it is unclear if any of them have entered operational service

MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/*Chonma/**Pokpoong/Songun***LT TK** 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985**IFV** 32 BTR-80A**APC** 2,500+**APC (T)** BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323**APC (W)** 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/ M-2010 (6×6)/M-2010 (8×8)**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL****SP** 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); M-2010 ATGM**MANPATS** 2K15 *Shmel* (RS-AT-1 *Snapper*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)**RCL** 82mm 1,700 B-10**ARTILLERY** 21,600+**SP/TOWED** 8,600:**SP 122mm** M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991; **130mm** M-1975; M-1981; M-1991; **152mm** M-1974; M-1977; M-2018; **170mm** M-1978; M-1989**TOWED 122mm** D-30; D-74; M-1931/37; **130mm** M-46; **152mm** M-1937; M-1938; M-1943**GUN/MOR 120mm** (reported)**MRL** 5,500: **107mm** Type-63; VTT-323 107mm; **122mm** BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-323 122mm; **200mm** BMD-20; **240mm** BM-24; M-1985; M-1989; M-1991; **300mm** some M-2015 (KN-SS-X-09) (in test); **600mm** some M-2019 (in test)**MOR** 7,500: **82mm** M-37; **120mm** M-43; **160mm** M-43**SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS****SBRM** 24+: 24 FROG-3/5/7; some *Toksa* (RS-SS-21B *Scarab* mod)**AIR DEFENCE****SAM****Point-defence** 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†**GUNS** 11,000+**SP** **14.5mm** M-1984; **23mm** M-1992; **37mm** M-1992; **57mm** M-1985**TOWED** 11,000: **14.5mm** ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; **23mm** ZU-23; **37mm** M-1939; **57mm** S-60; **85mm** M-1939 KS-12; **100mm** KS-19**Navy €60,000****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES** 71**SSB** 1 8.24 *Yongung* (*Gorae* (*Sinpo-B*)) (SLBM trials) with 1 *Pukguk*song-1 SLBM (status unclear)/KN-23 Mod 2 SLBM (in test)**SSK** €20 Type-033 (*Romeo*) with 8 single 533mm TT with SAET-60 HWT**SSC** €40 (some *Sang-O* some with 2 single 533mm TT with 53–65E HWT; some *Sang-O* II with 4 single 533mm TT with 53–65E HWT)**SSW** €10† (some *Yugo* some with 2 single 406mm TT; some *Yeono* some with 2 single 533mm TT)**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS** 2**FRIGATES** • FFG 2:1 *Najin* with 2 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun1 *Najin* with 2 twin Inchr with *Kumsong*-3 (KN-SS-N-2 *Stormpetrel*) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun (operational status unclear)**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 372+**CORVETTES** • FS 5: 4 *Sariwon* with 2 twin 57mm gun; 1 *Tral* with 1 85mm gun (Two *Tuman*- and two *Amnok*-class corvettes constructed since early 2010s; operational status unknown)**PCG** 10 *Soju* (FSU Project 205 mod (*Osa*)) with 4 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) AShM**PCC** 18:6 Type-037 (*Hainan*) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun7 *Taechong* I with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 85mm gun, 1 twin 57mm gun

5 *Taechong* II with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 100mm gun, 1 twin 57mm gun

BPFG 31+:

4 *Huangfeng* (Type-021) with 4 single Inchr with P-15

Termit (RS-SS-N-2 *Styx*) ASHM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

6 *Komar* with 2 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) ASHM

8 Project 205 (*Osa* I) with 4 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) ASHM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

6 *Sohung* (*Komar* mod) with 2 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) ASHM

1+ *Nongo* with 2 single Inchr with P-15 *Termit* (RS-SS-N-2 *Styx*) ASHM (operational status unknown)

6+ *Nongo* with 2 twin Inchr with *Kumsong*-3 (KN-SS-N-2 *Stormpetrel*) ASHM (operational status unknown)

BBF 222: approx. 50 *Chong-Jin* with 1 85mm gun; 142 *Ku Song/Sin Hung/Sin Hung* (mod); approx. 30 *Sinpo*

PB 86: approx. 50 *Chaho*; 6 *Chong-Ju* with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 85mm gun; 12 Type-062 (*Shanghai* II); 18 SO-1 with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 20

MSC 20: 15 *Yukto* I; 5 *Yukto* II

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LSM 10 *Hanta*e (capacity 3 tanks; 350 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 255

LCM 25

LCPL approx. 95 *Nampo* (capacity 35 troops)

UCAC 135 *Kongbang* (capacity 50 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23:

AGI 14 (converted fishing vessels)

AS 8 (converted cargo ships)

ASR 1 *Kowan*

Coastal Defence

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

2 ASHM regt with HY-1/*Kumsong*-3 (6 sites, some mobile launchers)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE

ARTY 130mm M-1992; SM-4-1

ASHM HY-1; *Kumsong*-3

ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 152mm M-1937

Air Force 110,000

4 air divs. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divs (cbt) responsible for N, E and S air-defence sectors respectively; 8th Air Div (trg) responsible for NE sector. The AF controls the national airline

FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER

3 lt regt with H-5; Il-28 *Beagle*

FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-15 *Fagot*

6 regt with J-5; MiG-17 *Fresco*

4 regt with J-6; MiG-19 *Farmer*

5 regt with J-7; MiG-21F-13/PFM *Fishbed*

1 regt with MiG-21bis *Fishbed*

1 regt with MiG-23ML/P *Flogger*

1 regt with MiG-29A/S/UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

Some regt with An-2 *Colt*/Y-5 (to infiltrate 2 air-force sniper brigades deep into ROK rear areas); Il-62M *Classic*

TRAINING

Some regt with CJ-6; FT-2; MiG-21U/UM

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some regt with Hughes 500D/E; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip* H; Mil-26 *Halo*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; Mi-4 *Hound*; Z-5

AIR DEFENCE

19 bde with S-125M1 *Pechora*-M1 (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); S-75

Dvina (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5

Gammon); 9K36 *Strela*-3 (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 545 combat capable

BBR 80 Il-28 *Beagle*/H-5† (includes some Il-28 for ISR)

FTR 401+: MiG-15 *Fagot*†; 107 MiG-17 *Fresco*/J-5†; 100

MiG-19 *Farmer*/J-6; 120 MiG-21F-13 *Fishbed*/J-7; MiG-21PFM *Fishbed*; 46 MiG-23ML *Flogger*; 10 MiG-23P *Flogger*; 18+ MiG-29A/S/UB *Fulcrum*

FGA 30 MiG-21bis *Fishbed* (18 Su-7 *Fitter* in store)

ATK 34 Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot*

TPT 205: **Heavy** 3 Il-76 (operated by state airline); **Light** ε200 An-2 *Colt*/Y-5; **PAX** 2 Il-62M *Classic* (VIP)

TRG 215+: 180 CJ-6; 35 FT-2; some MiG-21U/UM

HELICOPTERS

MRH 80 Hughes 500D/E (some armed)

TPT 206: **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 63: 15 Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-17 *Hip* H; 48 Mi-4 *Hound*/Z-5; **Light** 139 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium some (unidentified indigenous type);

Light *Pchela*-1 (*Shmel*) (reported)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 209+

Long-range 10 S-200 *Angara*† (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)

Medium-range 179+: some *Pongae*-5 (KN-SA-X-01) (status unknown); 179+ S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)

Short-range ε20 S-125M1 *Pechora*-M1† (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K36 *Strela*-3 (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)†; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); PL-5; PL-7; **SARH** R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 *Apex*); R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10 A/C *Alamo*)

ASM Kh-23 (RS-AS-7 *Kerry*)†; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29L (RS-AS-14A *Kedge*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000 active

Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards, public-safety personnel)

Ministry of Public Security


Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000 reservists

Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns (but many units unarmed)

Korea, Republic of ROK

South Korean Won KRW		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KRW	1933tr	2069tr	
	USD	1.64tr	1.82tr	
per capita	USD	31,638	35,196	
Growth	%	-0.9	4.3	
Inflation	%	0.5	2.2	
Def bdtg	KRW	48.4tr	52.9tr	55.2tr
	USD	41.0bn	46.7bn	
USD1=KRW		1180.00	1134.35	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 51,715,162

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	6.2%	2.4%	3.2%	3.8%	27.2%	7.3%
Female	5.8%	2.2%	3.0%	3.3%	26.1%	9.5%

Capabilities

South Korea's forces are some of the best equipped and trained in the region. Defence policy remains focused on North Korea, and Seoul continues to prioritise developing new capabilities to respond to the nuclear and conventional threat from the DPRK. The Defense Reform 2.0 project announced in 2018 sets out ambitions to modernise, restructure and re-equip the armed forces, placing emphasis on new technologies. In early 2019, the three-axis defence strategy comprising 'Kill Chain', 'Korea Air and Missile Defense' and 'Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation' components was reportedly rebranded. The 2020 defence white paper, released in February 2021, detailed plans to tackle North Korea's missile threats through a 'four-Ds strategy' of detect, disrupt, destroy and defend. The long-established alliance with the US is a central element of defence strategy. The planned transfer of wartime operational control of forces to Seoul is now 'conditions based' with no firm date set. A large number of US military personnel and equipment remain stationed in South Korea, along with THAAD missile-defence systems. South Korea has demonstrated the capacity to support small international deployments, including contributions to UN missions and counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea. The equipment inventory increasingly comprises modern systems. South Korea has developed a substantial domestic defence industry which supplies a large proportion of equipment requirements, although some equipment – notably the F-35 combat aircraft – is still procured from the US. Local defence companies are finding growing export success.

ACTIVE 555,000 (Army 420,000 Navy 70,000 Air 65,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 13,500

Conscript liability Service period reducing from Oct 2018, by three months for the army and marines (now 18 months), and the navy (now 20 months); and by two months for the air force (now 22 months)

RESERVE 3,100,000

Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat Forces (Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat Forces (Home-land Defence Forces) to age 33

Reserve Paramilitary 3,000,000

Being reorganised

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 *Anasis*

Army 420,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

8 corps HQ

1 (Capital Defence) comd HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Special Warfare) SF comd (1 SF gp; 6 spec ops bde)

6 cdo regt

2 indep cdo bn

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

7 armd bde

1 (Capital) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 2 armd bde, 1 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)

1 (8th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 1 armd bde, 2 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)

1 (11th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 3 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)

2 tk bn

Light

15 inf div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn)

2 indep inf bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air mob div (2 cdo bde)

1 air aslt bde

Other

5 sy regt

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

3 SSM bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

6 arty bde

1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn)

6 engr bde

5 engr gp

1 CBRN defence bde

8 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 log spt comd

HELICOPTER

1 (army avn) comd

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA bde

5 ADA bn

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 army HQ

MANOEUVRE

Light

24 inf div

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 2,074: 1,000 K1/K1E1; 484 K1A1/K1A2; €150 K2; €400 M48A5; 40 T-80U

IFV 540: €500 K21; 40 BMP-3

APC 2,490

APC (T) 2,260: 1,700 KIFV; 420 M113; 140 M577 (CP)

APC (W) 220; 20 BTR-80; 200 K806/K808

PPV 10 *MaxxPro*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 207 M9

ARV 238+: 200 K1; K21 ARV; K288A1; M47; 38 M88A1

VLB 56 K1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP *Hyeongung*MANPATS 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); *Hyeongung*; TOW-2A

RCL 75mm; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A2

GUNS 58

SP 90mm 50 M36

TOWED 76mm 8 M18 *Hellcat* (AT gun)

ARTILLERY 12,128+

SP 2,330: 105mm €50 K105A1; 155mm 2,280: €1,240 K9/K9A1 *Thunder*; 1,040 M109A2 (K55/K55A1)

TOWED 3,500+: 105mm 1,700 M101/KH-178; 155mm 1,800+ KH-179/M114

MRL 298: 130mm €40 K136 *Kooryong*; 227mm 58: 48 M270MLRS; 10 M270A1 MLRS; 239mm €200 K239 *Cheonmu*

MOR 6,000: 81mm KM29 (M29); 107mm M30

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 30+: 30 *Hyonmu* IIA/IIB; MGM-140A/B ATACMS (launched from M270/M270A1 MLRS)GLCM • Conventional *Hyonmu* III

HELICOPTERS

ATK 96: 60 AH-1F/J *Cobra*; 36 AH-64E *Apache*

MRH 175: 130 Hughes 500D; 45 MD-500

TPT 236+: Heavy 37: 31 CH-47D *Chinook*; 6 MH-47E *Chinook*; Medium 187+: 100+ KUH-1 *Surion*; 87 UH-60P *Black Hawk*; Light 12 Bo-105

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence *Chiron*; *Chun Ma* (*Pegasus*); FIM-92 *Stinger*; *Javelin*; *Mistral*; 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS 477+

SP 317: 20mm €150 KIFV *Vulcan* SPAAG; 30mm 167 K30 *Biho*TOWED 160: 20mm 60 M167 *Vulcan*; 35mm 20 GDF-003; 40mm 80 L/60/L/70; M1

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114R1 *Hellfire*

Navy 70,000 (incl marines)

Three separate fleet elements: 1st Fleet Donghae (East Sea/Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow Sea); 3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); independent submarine command; three additional flotillas (incl SF,

mine-warfare, amphibious and spt elements) and 1 Naval Air Wing (3 gp plus spt gp)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 19

SSB 1 *Chang Bogo* III (Batch I (GER Type-214 mod; KSS-III)) (fitted with AIP) with 6 SLBM (likely based on *Hyeonmu*-IIB), 8 single 533mm TT with K731 *White Shark*

SSK 18:

6 *Chang Bogo* I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 *White Shark* HWT

3 *Chang Bogo* I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASH/SUT HWT/K731 *White Shark* HWT

9 *Chang Bogo* II (GER Type-214; KSS-2) (fitted with AIP) with 8 single 533mm TT with *Hae Sung* III LACM/*Hae Sung* I ASH/SUT HWT/K731 *White Shark* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26

CRUISERS • CGHM 3:

3 *Sejong* (KDD-III) with *Aegis* Baseline 7 C2, 6 8-cell K-VLS with *Hae Sung* II LACM/*Red Shark* A/S msl, 4 quad Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASH, 10 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (6 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 6 *Chungmugong Yi Sun-Sin* (KDD-II) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with *Hae Sung* II LACM/*Red Shark* A/S msl, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASH/*Hae Sung* I ASH, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

FRIGATES 17

FFGHM 13:

3 *Gwanggaeto Daewang* (KDD-I) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASH, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

6 *Incheon* with 2 quad Inchr with TSLM LACM/*Hae Sung* I ASH, 1 21-cell Mk 49 Inchr with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127 mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

4 *Daegu* (*Incheon* Batch II)+ (limited serviceability due to faulty propulsion system) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with *Hae Sung* II LACM/TSLM LACM/*Haegung* (K-SAAM) SAM/*Red Shark* A/S msl, 2 quad Inchr with TSLM LACM/*Hae Sung* I ASH, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

FFG 4 *Ulsan* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASH, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS €78**CORVETTES • FSG 10:**

5 *Po Hang* (Flight IV) with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84 Harpoon ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun

5 *Po Hang* (Flight V) with 2 twin Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASHM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 2 76mm gun

PCFG 22: 18 *Gumdoksuri* with 2 twin Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASHM, 1 76mm gun; 4 *Chamsuri* II with 1 12-cell 130mm MRL, 1 76mm gun

PBF €46 *Sea Dolphin*

MINE WARFARE 11**MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9**

MHO 6 *Kan Kyeong*

MSO 3 *Yang Yang*

MINELAYERS • ML 2:

1 *Won San* with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT/K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

1 *Nampo* (MLS-II) with 1 4-cell K-VLS VLS with *Haegung* (K-SAAM) SAM, 2 triple KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

AMPHIBIOUS**PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 6****LHD 2:**

1 *Dokdo* with 1 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700 troops; 10 UH-60 hel)

1 *Marado* (Dokdo mod) with 1 4-cell K-VLS with K-SAAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 6 MBT, 7 AAV-7A1, 720 troops; 7-12 hel)

LPD 4 *Cheonwangbong* (LST-II) (capacity 3 LCM; 2 MBT; 8 AFV; 300 troops; 2 med hel)

LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 *Go Jun Bong* with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 25

LCU 7+ *Mulgae* I

LCT 3 *Mulgae* II

LCM 10 LCM-8

LCAC 5: 3 *Tsaplya* (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF-II (capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11

AG 1 *Sunjin* (trials spt)

AOEH 1 *Soyangham* (AOE-II) with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 1 med hel)

AORH 3 *Chun Jee*

ARS 1 *Cheong Hae Jin*

ATS 2 *Tongyeong*

AX 3: 1 *Hansando* with 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with K-VLS) (capacity 2 med hel; 300 students); 2 MTB

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable

ASW 16: 8 P-3C *Orion*; 8 P-3CK *Orion*

TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 *Caravan* II

HELICOPTERS

ASW 31: 11 *Lynx* Mk99; 12 *Lynx* Mk99A; 8 AW159 *Wildcat*

TPT 15: Medium 8 UH-60P *Black Hawk* Light 7 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

Marines 29,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

2 mne div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mne bde, 1 amph bn, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn)

1 mne bde (1 recce coy, 4 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn)

1 mne bde (3 mne bn, 1 fd arty bn)

1 mne BG (1 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 100: 50 K1A1; 50 M48A3

AAV 166 AAV-7A1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP *Spike* NLOS

MANPATS *Hyeongung*

ARTILLERY 238

SP • 155mm 80: €40 K9 *Thunder*; €20 K9A1 *Thunder*; €20 M109A2 (K55/K55A1)

TOWED 140: 105mm €20 M101; 155mm €120 KH-179

MRL • 239mm 18 K239 *Cheonmu*

MOR 81mm KM29 (M29)

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM RGM-84A *Harpoon* (truck mounted)

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 5+ MUH-1 *Surion*

AIR DEFENCE

GUNS • Towed • 20mm M167 *Vulcan* (direct fire role)

Naval Special Warfare Flotilla**Air Force 65,000**

4 Comd (Ops, Southern Combat, Logs, Trg)

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with F-4E *Phantom* II

5 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger* II

3 sqn with F-15K *Eagle*

8 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16C/D)

2 sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II

3 sqn with FA-50 *Fighting Eagle*

ISR

1 wg with KO-1

1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16C/D)

SIGINT

1 sqn with Hawker 800RA/XP

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with B-737 AEW

SEARCH & RESCUE

2 sqn with AS332L *Super Puma*; Bell 412EP; HH-47D *Chinook*; HH-60P *Black Hawk*; Ka-32 *Helix* C

TANKER

1 sqn with A330 MRTT

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with B-737-300; B-747; CN235-220; S-92A *Superhawk*; VH-60P *Black Hawk* (VIP)
 3 sqn (incl 1 Spec Ops) with C-130H/H-30/J-30 *Hercules*
 2 sqn with CN235M-100/220

TRAINING

1 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*
 1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*
 4 sqn with KT-1
 1 sqn with KT-100
 3 sqn with T-50/TA-50 *Golden Eagle**

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with UH-60P *Black Hawk* (Spec Ops)

ISR UAV

1 sqn with RQ-4B *Global Hawk* (forming)

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF sqn

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD bde (total: 6 SAM bn with *Chunggung*; 2 SAM bn with M902 *Patriot PAC-3 CRI*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 601 combat capable

FTR 174: 142 F-5E *Tiger II*; 32 F-5F *Tiger II*
FGA 347: 30 F-4E *Phantom II*; 59 F-15K *Eagle*; 118 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16C); 44 F-16D *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16D); 36 F-35A *Lightning II*; 60 FA-50 *Fighting Eagle*
AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW
ISR 24: 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1
SIGINT 6: 4 Hawker 800SIG; 2 *Falcon* 2000 (COMINT/SIGINT)

TKR/TPT 4 A330 MRTT

TPT 38: **Medium** 16: 8 C-130H *Hercules*; 4 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 4 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 20: 12 CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-220 (incl 2 VIP); **PAX** 2: 1 B-737-300; 1 B-747-400

TRG 183: 83 KT-1; 49 T-50 *Golden Eagle**; 9 T-50B *Black Eagle** (aerobatics); 22 TA-50 *Golden Eagle**; ε20 KT-100

HELICOPTERS

SAR 16: 5 HH-47D *Chinook*; 11 HH-60P *Black Hawk*
MRH 3 Bell 412EP
TPT • Medium 30: 2 AS332L *Super Puma*; 8 Ka-32 *Helix* C; 3 S-92A *Super Hawk*; 7 UH-60P *Black Hawk*; 10 VH-60P *Black Hawk* (VIP)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 7+: **Heavy** 4 RQ-4B *Global Hawk*; **Medium** 3+: some *Night Intruder*; 3 *Searcher*

LOITERING MUNITIONS 100 *Harpy***AIR DEFENCE • SAM** 120

Long-range 48 M902 *Patriot PAC-3 CRI*
Medium-range 72 *Chunggung* (KM-SAM)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **SARH** AIM-7 *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120B/C-5/7
AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65A *Maverick*; AGM-130
AShM AGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II; AGM-142 *Popeye*
ARM AGM-88 HARM
ALCM AGM-84H SLAM-ER; KEPD-350 *Taurus*

BOMBS • Laser-guided *Paveway II***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary** 13,500 active**Civilian Defence Corps** 3,000,000 reservists (to age 50)**Coast Guard** 13,500

Part of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Five regional headquarters with 19 coastguard stations and one guard unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 111

PSOH 16: 1 *Lee Cheong-ho* with 1 76mm gun; 1 *Sambongho*; 14 *Tae Pung Yang* with 1 med hel

PSO 21: 3 *Han Kang* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 5 *Han Kang II* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 12 *Jaemin* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Sumjinkang*

PCO 23 *Tae Geuk*

PCC 21: 4 *Hae Uri*; 15 *Hae Uri II*; 2 *Hae Uri III*

PB 30: 26 *Haenuri*; ε4 (various)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8

UCAC 8: 1 BHT-150; 4 *Griffon* 470TD; 3 *Griffon* 8000TD

AIRCRAFT

MP 5: 1 C-212-400 MP; 4 CN235-110 MPA

TPT • PAX 1 CL-604

HELICOPTERS

MRH 7: 5 AS565MB *Panther*; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP

SAR 2 S-92

TPT • Medium 10: 8 Ka-32 *Helix* C; 2 KUH-1 *Surion*

DEPLOYMENT

ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 7

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 255; 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 274; 1 engr coy

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 170 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

FOREIGN FORCES

Sweden NNSC: 5

Switzerland NNSC: 5

United States **US Pacific Command:** 30,400

Army 21,500; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ at Pyeongtaek; 1 armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 *Abrams*; M2A3/M3A3 *Bradley*; M109A6; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with AH-64D/E *Apache*; CH-47F *Chinook*; UH-60L/M *Black Hawk*; 1 MRL bde with M270A1 MLRS; 1 AD bde with M902 *Patriot PAC-3/FIM-92A Avenger*; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set

Navy 350

USAF 8,350; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*); 1 ftr wg at Osan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D *Fighting*

Falcon, 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C *Thunderbolt II*); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S
USMC 200

Laos LAO

Lao Kip LAK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	LAK	170tr	183tr	
	USD	18.8bn	19.4bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,587	2,626	
Growth	%	-0.4	2.1	
Inflation	%	5.1	4.9	
Def exp	LAK	n.k.	n.k.	
	USD	n.k.	n.k.	
USD1=LAK		9058.06	9421.03	

Population 7,574,356

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.6%	5.1%	5.0%	4.5%	17.4%	2.0%
Female	15.3%	5.1%	5.1%	4.6%	17.9%	2.4%

Capabilities

The Lao People's Armed Forces (LPAF) are closely linked to the ruling Communist Party and their primary role is internal security. Their main operational experience dates from the Second Indo-China War and the 1988 border war with Thailand. Defence spending and military procurement have been constrained for the last two decades. Contacts continue with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, and there is defence cooperation with Russia. Training support has been provided by Russia and Vietnam. The LPAF have participated in exercises, including those organised by the ADMM-Plus, with other regional countries and international partners. However, they have made no international deployments and have little capacity for sustained operations. Laos still operates Soviet-era military equipment and relies on Russian supplies, as illustrated by ongoing deliveries of training aircraft, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and main battle tanks. The country lacks a traditional defence-industrial base and maintenance capacity is limited, reflected in a support contract with a Russian firm for helicopter maintenance in 2016.

ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000

Conscript liability 18 months minimum

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • **ISR** 1 LaoSat-1

Army 25,600

FORCES BY ROLE

4 mil regions

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bn

Light

5 inf div

7 indep inf regt

65 indep inf coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty bn

1 engr regt

2 (construction) engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

9 ADA bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 25: 15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-72B1

LT TK 10 PT-76

RECCE BRDM-2M

IFV 10+ BMP-1

APC • APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152

AUV Dongfeng Mengshi 4x4; ZYZ-8002 (CS/VN3)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55

VLB MTU

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 57mm

M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40; 107mm B-11

ARTILLERY 62+

TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30

M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114

MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M2A1; 120mm

M-43

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 6+: 6 S-125M *Pechora*-M+ (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); some *Yitian* (CH-SA-13)

Point-defence 9K32M *Strela*-2M (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K35 *Strela*-10 (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Army Marine Section €600

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR some

AMPHIBIOUS • LCM some

Air Force 3,500

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 regt with MA60; MA600; Mi-17 *Hip* H

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable

TPT • **Light** 5: 1 An-74TK *Coaler*; 2 MA60; 2 MA600

TRG 4 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 15: 6 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 5 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; 4 Z-9A

TPT 4: **Medium** 1 Ka-32T *Helix* C; **Light** 3 SA360 *Dauphin*


Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Militia Self-Defence Forces 100,000+

Village 'home guard' or local defence

Malaysia MYS

Malaysian Ringgit MYR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MYR	1.42tr	1.51tr	
	USD	337bn	371bn	
per capita	USD	10,231	11,125	
Growth	%	-5.6	3.5	
Inflation	%	-1.1	2.5	
Def bdgt	MYR	15.6bn	15.9bn	
	USD	3.71bn	3.90bn	
USD1=MYR		4.20	4.06	



Population 33,519,406

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.8%	4.1%	4.6%	4.7%	22.4%	3.7%
Female	11.1%	3.9%	4.4%	4.4%	21.1%	3.9%

Capabilities

Modernisation programmes over the past 30 years have provided the Malaysian armed forces with a limited capacity for external defence. However, the army has continued to be the dominant service, reflecting a longstanding but now outdated focus on counter-insurgency. In December 2019, the then-government tabled its first-ever defence white paper, which identified the 'three pillars' of Malaysia's defence strategy as 'concentric deterrence' (the armed forces' protection of national interests in 'core', 'extended' and 'forward' zones); 'comprehensive defence' (involving whole-of-government and whole-of-society support for the national-defence effort); and 'credible partnerships' (involving engagement in regional and wider international defence cooperation). While the paper identified new defence challenges, including tensions in the South China Sea and cyber threats, it provided no detailed insights into future resource allocation or capability development. However, it is likely that budgetary constraints will continue to limit defence resources. Malaysian forces regularly participate in ADMM-Plus, Five Power Defence Arrangements and other exercises with regional and international partners, including the US. Malaysia has invested in synthetic military-training aids. In 2017, Malaysia began trilateral joint maritime patrols and joint Sulu-Sulawesi seas air patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines. Much of Malaysia's military equipment is ageing and there are important capability gaps, particularly in air defence and maritime surveillance. New equipment brought into service since 2015 includes A400M transport aircraft, and there are plans to acquire new light combat aircraft. An air force squadron was established in 2021 to operate new UAVs. Malaysia's defence industry focuses mainly on providing maintenance, repair and overhaul services, and on naval shipbuilding.

ACTIVE 113,000 (Army 80,000 Navy 18,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 22,500

RESERVE 51,600 (Army 50,000, Navy 1,000 Air Force 600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 244,700

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 80,000

2 mil region

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

5 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (3 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk regt

Mechanised

4 armd regt

1 mech inf bde (4 mech bn, 1 cbt engr sqn)

Light

1 inf bde (6 inf bn, 1 arty regt)

4 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty regt)

2 inf bde (3 inf bn)

1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 arty regt)

1 inf bde (2 inf bn)

1 inf bde (forming)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (Rapid Deployment Force) AB bde (1 lt tk sqn, 4 AB bn, 1 lt arty regt, 1 engr sqn)

Other

2 (border) sy bde (5 bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

9 arty regt

1 STA regt

1 MRL regt

1 cbt engr sqn

3 fd engr regt (total: 7 cbt engr sqn, 3 engr spt sqn)

1 construction regt

1 int unit

4 MP regt

1 sigs regt

HELICOPTER

1 hel sqn

1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 *Nuri* (forming)

AIR DEFENCE

3 ADA regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 48 PT-91M *Twardy*

LT TK 21 *Scorpion*-90

RECCE 98: 74 SIBMAS (somet); 24 AV8 *Gempita*

IFV 12: 31 ACV300 *Adnan* (25mm *Bushmaster*); 13

ACV300 *Adnan* AGL; 46 AV8 *Gempita* IFV25; 122 AV8

Gempita IFV30 (incl 54 with *Ingwe* ATGM)

APC 629

APC (T) 265: 149 ACV300 *Adnan* (incl 69 variants);

13 FV4333 *Stormer* (upgraded); 63 K200A; 40 K200A1

APC (W) 335: 35 AV8 *Gempita* APC (incl 13 CP; 3 sigs; 9 amb); 300 *Condor* (incl variants)

PPV 29: 9 IAG *Guardian*; 20 *Lipanbara*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 3 MID-M

ARV 65+: *Condor*; 15 ACV300; 4 K288A1; 22 SIBMAS; 6 WZT-4; 18 AV8 *Gempita* ARV

VLB 5+: *Leguan*; 5 PMCz-90

NBC VEHICLES 4+: 4 AV8 *Gempita*; K216A1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 8 ACV300 *Baktar Shikan*

MANPATS 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-2 *Metis*-M1 (RS-AT-13); *Eryx*; *Baktar Shihan* (HJ-8); SS.11

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 438

TOWED 140: **105mm** 118: 18 LG1 MkIII; 100 Model 56 pack howitzer; **155mm** 22 G-5

MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30)

MOR 262: **81mm** 232; **SP** **81mm** 14: 4 K281A1; 10 ACV300-S; **SP** **120mm** 16: 8 ACV-S; 8 AV8 *Gempita*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT

LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops)

HELICOPTERS • TPT 12: **Medium** 2 S-61A-4 *Nuri*; **Light** 10 AW109

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 15+: 15 *Jernas* (*Rapier* 2000); *Anza-II*; HY-6 (FN-6) (CH-SA-10); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); *Starstreak*

GUNS 52+

SP **20mm** K263

TOWED 52: **35mm** 16 GDF-005; **40mm** 36 L40/70

Reserves

Territorial Army

Some paramilitary forces to be incorporated into a re-organised territorial organisation

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

4 armd sqn

Light

16 inf regt (3 inf bn)

Other

5 (highway) sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty bty

2 fd engr regt

1 int unit

3 sigs sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 med coy

5 tpt coy

Navy 18,000

3 Regional Commands: MAWILLA 1 (Kuantan), MAWILLA 2 (Sabah) and MAWILLA 3 (Langkawi). A fourth is being formed (Bintulu)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 2

SSK 2 *Tunku Abdul Rahman* (FRA *Scorpène*) with 6 single 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* ASHM/*Black Shark* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFGHM 2 *Lekiu* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 16-cell VLS with *Sea Wolf* SAM, 2 triple

324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 *Super Lynx* 300 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 63

CORVETTES 8

FSG 2 *Kasturi* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FSH 6 *Kedah* (GER MEKO 100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (fitted for but not with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM & RAM SAM)

PCFM 4 *Laksamana* with 1 *Albatros* quad Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 1 76mm gun

PCF 4 *Perdana* (FRA *Combattante* II) with 1 57mm gun

PCC 3 *Keris* (Littoral Mission Ship)

PB 4 *Handalan* (SWE *Spica*-M) with 1 57mm gun

PBF 23: 6 Gading Marine FIC; 17 *Tempur* (SWE CB90)

PB 17: 6 *Jerong* (Lurssen 45) with 1 57mm gun; 9 *Sipadan Steel*; 2 *Sri Perlis*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MCO 4 *Mahamiru* (ITA *Lerici*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14

AFS 2: 1 *Mahawangsa* with 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Sri Indera Sakti* with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

AG 3: 2 *Bunga Mas Lima* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Tun Azizan*

AGS 2: 1 *Dayang Sari*; 1 *Perantau*

AP 2 *Sri Gaya*

ASR 1 *Mega Bakti*

ATF 1

AX 2 *Gagah Samudera* with 1 hel landing platform

AXS 1 *Tunas Samudera*

Naval Aviation 160

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ASW 6 *Super Lynx* 300

MRH 6 AS555 *Fennec*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASHM *Sea Skua*

Special Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (mne cdo) SF unit

Air Force 15,000

1 air op HQ, 2 air div, 1 trg and log comd, 1 Intergrated Area Def Systems HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F/A-18D *Hornet*

1 sqn with Su-30MKM *Flanker*

2 sqn with *Hawk* Mk108*/Mk208*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with Beech 200T

TANKER/TRANSPORT

2 sqn with KC-130H *Hercules*; C-130H *Hercules*; C-130H-30 *Hercules*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with A400M *Atlas*

1 (VIP) sqn with A319CT; AW109; BD700 *Global Express*;
F-28 *Fellowship*; Falcon 900
1 sqn with CN235M-220

TRAINING

1 unit with PC-7

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

4 (tpt/SAR) sqn with H225M *Super Cougar*; S-61N; S-70A
Black Hawk

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE

1 sqn (forming)

AIR DEFENCE

1 sqn with *Starburst*

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Air Force Commando) unit (airfield defence/SAR)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 42 combat capable

FTR (8 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (MiG-29N); 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*
B (MiG-29NUB) in store)

FGA 26: 8 F/A-18D *Hornet* (some serviceability in doubt);
18 Su-30MKM (some serviceability in doubt)

ISR 3 Beech 200T

TKR/TPT 4 KC-130H *Hercules*

TPT 24: **Heavy** 4 A400M *Atlas*; **Medium** 10: 2 C-130H
Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 6 CN235M-220
(incl 1 VIP and 2 being reconfigured); **PAX** 4: 1 A319CT
(VIP); 1 BD700 *Global Express*; 1 F-28 *Fellowship*; 1 Falcon
900

TRG 70: 4 *Hawk* Mk108*; 12 *Hawk* Mk208*; 7 MB-339C; 30
PC-7; 17 PC-7 Mk II *Turbo Trainer*

HELICOPTERS

TPT 17: **Heavy** 12 H225M *Super Cougar*; **Medium** 4: 2
S-61N; 2 S-70A *Black Hawk*; **Light** 1 AW109

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Starstreak***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A
Archer); **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-
AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** AIM-7 *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120C
AMRAAM; R-77 (AA-12A *Adder*)

ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*; Kh-29T (RS-AS-14B *Kedge*); Kh-
29L (RS-AS-14A *Kedge*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*);
Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*)

ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*);

AShM AGM-84D *Harpoon*; Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*)

BOMBS

Electro-optical guided KAB-500KR; KAB-500OD

Laser-guided *Paveway* II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €22,500

Police–General Ops Force 18,000

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

5 bde HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bn

MANOEUVRE**Other**

19 paramilitary bn

2 (Aboriginal) paramilitary bn

4 indep paramilitary coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (W) AT105 *Saxon*

AUV €30 SB-301

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) €4,500

Controls 5 Maritime Regions (Northern Peninsula;
Southern Peninsula; Eastern Peninsula; Sarawak;
Sabah), subdivided into a further 18 Maritime Districts.
Supported by one provisional MMEA Air Unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 128

PSO 4: 1 *Arau* (ex-JPN *Nojima*) with 1 hel landing
platform; 2 *Langkawi* with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing
platform; 1 *Pekan* (ex-JPN *Ojika*) with 1 hel landing
platform

PCC 5 *Bagan Datuk*

PBF 56: 18 *Penggalang* 17 (TUR MRTP 16); 2 *Penggalang*
18; 6 *Penyelamat* 20; 16 *Penggalang* 16; 14 *Tugau*

PB 63: 15 *Gagah*; 4 *Malawali*; 2 *Nusa*; 3 *Nusa* 28; 1
Peninjau; 7 *Ramunia*; 2 *Rhu*; 4 *Semilang*; 8 *Icarus* 1650; 10
Pengawal; 4 *Penyelamat*; 2 *Perwira*; 1 *Sugut*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 *Marlin*

AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Bombardier 415MP

HELICOPTERS

SAR 3 AW139

MRH 3 AS365 *Dauphin*

Area Security Units 3,500 reservists

(Auxiliary General Ops Force)

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

89 paramilitary unit

Border Scouts 1,200 reservists

in Sabah, Sarawak

People's Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists
(some 17,500 armed)

RELA

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 6

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,045; 1 mech inf bn

PHILIPPINES: IMT 11

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 9


FOREIGN FORCES

Australia 130; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1
P-8A *Poseidon* (rotational)

Mongolia MNG

Mongolian Tugrik MNT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MNT	37.0tr	41.6tr	
	USD	13.1bn	14.3bn	
per capita	USD	3,916	4,186	
Growth	%	-5.3	5.2	
Inflation	%	3.7	5.4	
Def bdtg	MNT	295bn	284bn	
	USD	105m	97.4m	
FMA (US)	USD	3m	0m	3m
USD1=MNT		2813.32	2912.62	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 3,198,913

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	13.7%	3.6%	3.8%	4.0%	21.7%	2.0%
Female	13.1%	3.5%	3.7%	4.1%	23.8%	3.0%

Capabilities

Mongolia's latest defence-policy document, from 2015, stresses the importance of peacekeeping and anti-terrorist capabilities. The country has no formal military alliances, but pursues defence ties and bilateral training with regional states and others including India, Turkey and the US. Mongolia hosts the annual *Khaan Quest* multinational peacekeeping-training exercise. The country's main exercise partners are India and Russia, with each country running regular bilateral exercises. In 2021, Mongolia and Russia held the counter-terrorism-focused exercise *Selega*. In 2021, NATO completed a multi-year project that involved establishing a Cyber Security Centre and Cyber Incident Response Capability. Mongolia's most significant deployment is to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, followed by the MINUSMA mission in Mali. The inventory generally comprises Soviet-era equipment, supplemented by deliveries of second-hand Russian weapons. Barring maintenance facilities, there is no significant defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,900 Air 800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500

Conscript liability 12 months for males aged 18–25

RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 5,600; 3,300 conscript (total 8,900)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR bde

Light

1 (rapid deployment) lt inf bn (2nd bn to form)

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 420: 370 T-54/T-55; 50 T-72A

RECCE 120 BRDM-2

IFV 310 BMP-1

APC • APC (W) 210: 150 BTR-60; 40 BTR-70M; 20 BTR-80

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

GUNS • TOWED 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm M-1944/MT-12

ARTILLERY 570

TOWED ε300: 122mm D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm M-46; 152mm ML-20 (M-1937)

MRL 122mm 130 BM-21

MOR 140: 120mm; 160mm; 82mm

AIR DEFENCE

SAM Medium-range 2+ S-125-2M *Pechora*-2M (RS-SA-26)

GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Air Force 800

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn (forming) with MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* B

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-171

AIR DEFENCE

2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable

FTR 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* B

TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 *Coke*; 1 An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Medium 12: 10 Mi-8 *Hip*; 2 Mi-171

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 active

Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total 6,000)

Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript (total 1,200)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

4 gd unit

Construction Troops 300

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 871; 1 inf bn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3

Myanmar MMR

Myanmar Kyat MMK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MMK	115tr	99.1tr	
	USD	81.3bn	66.7bn	
per capita	USD	1,527	1,246	
Growth	%	3.2	-17.9	
Inflation	%	5.7	4.1	
Def bdgt	MMK	3.39tr	3.41tr	
	USD	2.39bn	2.30bn	
USD1=MMK		1416.56	1485.07	



Population 57,069,099

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.1%	4.3%	4.2%	4.1%	20.9%	2.7%
Female	12.5%	4.1%	4.2%	4.2%	22.1%	3.6%

Capabilities

Since the country's independence struggle in the 1940s, Myanmar's large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed forces) has been intimately involved in domestic politics as well as internal security. Even though the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the November 2015 election, the armed forces remained politically powerful. A defence white paper published in 2016 gave a 'state-building' role to the Tatmadaw, further legitimising intervention in politics. Despite the NLD winning an increased majority in the November 2020 election, the Tatmadaw declared the result illegitimate and seized power on 1 February 2021, declaring a year-long state of emergency. The 2016 white paper prioritised ending conflicts with domestic armed groups. However, widespread civil unrest and an escalation in clashes with ethnic-minority armed groups since the coup will have intensified the Tatmadaw's focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. Opposition forces in May announced the establishment of an armed wing, and there have since been a series of attacks targeting the Tatmadaw. These issues have also focused attention on force health, including morale and general cohesion; there have been reports of defections and desertion. The Tatmadaw extended the state of emergency to August 2023, with no elections to be held until then. The Tatmadaw has been accused of widespread human-rights abuses against non-combatants during counter-insurgency operations. These concerns intensified after the widely condemned actions aimed at the Rohingya ethnic minority in 2017. China and Russia are key partners in defence cooperation. Since the 1990s, the armed forces have attempted to develop limited conventional-warfare capabilities, though these efforts have been called into question by renewed focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. There is limited defence-industrial capacity. The Aircraft Production and Maintenance Base has assembled Chinese K-8 trainer aircraft and the Tatmadaw reportedly intends to negotiate licence-production of the Chinese JF-17 combat aircraft. Myanmar

also has growing naval shipbuilding capabilities, notably through the Naval Dockyard in Yangon, which was reported in December 2020 to be building a frigate-sized ship.

ACTIVE 356,000 (Army 325,000 Navy 16,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000

Conscript liability 24-36 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €325,000

14 military regions, 7 regional op comd. Following the 2021 coup, and reports of desertions, combat losses and recruitment problems, personnel figures should be treated with caution

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 20 div HQ (military op comd)
- 10 inf div HQ
- 34+ bde HQ (tactical op comd)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 10 armd bn

Light

- 100 inf bn (coy)
- 337 inf bn (coy) (regional comd)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 7 arty bn
- 37 indep arty coy
- 6 cbt engr bn
- 54 fd engr bn
- 40 int coy
- 45 sigs bn

AIR DEFENCE

- 7 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURD FIGHTING VEHICLES

- MBT 195+: 10 T-55; 50 T-72S; 25+ Type-59D; 100 Type-69-II; 10+ Type-90-II (MBT-2000)

- LT TK 105 Type-63 (€60 serviceable)

- ASLT 24 PTL-02 mod

- RECCE 95+: €50 AML-90; 33 BRDM-2MS (incl CP); 12+ EE-9 *Cascavel*; MAV-1

- IFV 36+: 10+ BTR-3U; 26+ MT-LBMSH

- APC 345+

- APC (T) 305: 250 ZSD-85; 55 ZSD-90

- APC (W) 30+ ZSL-92

- PPV 10+: BAAC-87; *Gaia Thunder*; 10 MPV

- AUV MAV-2; MAV-3

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

- ARV Type-72

- VLB MT-55A

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

- RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 106mm M40A1

- GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr

ARTILLERY 440+

- SP 155mm 42: 30 NORA B-52; 12 SH-1

- TOWED 282+: 105mm 150: 54 M-56; 96 M101; 122mm 100 D-30; 130mm 16 M-46; 140mm; 155mm 16 Soltam M-845P

MRL 36+: 107mm 30 Type-63; 122mm BM-21 *Grad* (reported); Type-81; 240mm 6+ M-1985 mod
MOR 80+: 82mm Type-53 (M-37); 120mm 80+: 80 Soltam; Type-53 (M-1943)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional some *Hwasong-6* (reported)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 4+

Medium-range 12+: 12+ KS-1A (CH-SA-12); S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26); 2K12 *Kvadrat-M* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence Some 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*); HN-5 (CH-SA-3) (reported); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS 46

SP 57mm 12 Type-80

TOWED 34: 37mm 24 Type-74; 40mm 10 M1

Navy €16,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 1

SSK 1 *Min Ye Thein Kha Thu* (ex-IND *Sindhughosh* (Project 877EKM (*Kilo*))) with 6 single 533mm TT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5

FFGHM 2 *Kyansitthar* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 sextuple Inchr with MANPAD SAM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 3 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FFG 3:

1 *Aung Zeya* with 2 quad Inchr with DPRK ASHM (possibly 3M24 derivative), 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

2 *Mahar Bandoola* (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (*Jianghu I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 80

CORVETTES 3

FSGHM 1 *Tabinshwethi* (*Anawrahta* mod) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 sextuple Inchr with unknown MANPADs, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FSG 2 *Anawrahta* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PSOH 1 *Inlay* with 1 twin 57mm gun

PCG 8: 6 Type-037-IG (*Houxin*) with 2 twin Inchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4) ASHM; 2 FAC(M) mod with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS

PCT 2 *Yan Nyein Aung* (Project PGG 063) with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm TLS with *Shyena* LWT

PCO 2 *Indaw*

PCC 7 Type-037 (*Hainan*) with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun

PBG 4 *Myanmar* with 2 single Inchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4) ASHM

PBF 7: 1 Type-201; 6 *Super Dvora* Mk III

PB 32: 3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 14 *Myanmar*; 3 *Swift*

PBR 14: 4 *Sagu*; 9 Y-301+; 1 Y-301 (Imp)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1:

1 *Moattama* (ROK *Makassar*) (capacity 2 LCVP; 2 hel; 13 tanks; 500 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 21: LCU 5; LCM 16

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13

ABU 1

AGHS 2: 1 *Innya*; 1 (near shore)

AGS 1

AH 2

AK 1

AKSL 5

AP 1 *Chindwin*

Naval Infantry 800

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf bn

Air Force €15,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

4 sqn with F-7 *Airguard*; FT-7; JF-17 *Thunder*; MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; MiG-29SE/SM *Fulcrum*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with A-5C *Fantan*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with F-27 *Friendship*; FH-227; PC-6AB *Turbo Porter*

TRAINING

2 sqn with G-4 *Super Galeb**; PC-7 *Turbo Trainer**; PC-9* 1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 *Citation II*; Cessna 180 *Skywagon*; K-8 *Karakorum**

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-35P *Hind*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; PZL W-3 *Sokol*; SA316 *Alouette III*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 159 combat capable

FTR 63: 21 F-7 *Airguard*; 10 FT-7; 11 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29SE *Fulcrum*; 10 MiG-29SM *Fulcrum*; 5 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FGA 6: 4 JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2); 2 JF-17B *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2)

ATK 22 A-5C *Fantan*

MP 2 ATR-42

TPT 26: **Medium** 5: 4 Y-8D; 1 Y-8F-200W **Light** 20: 1 ATR-42; 6 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 180 *Skywagon*; 1 Cessna 550 *Citation II*; 3 F-27 *Friendship*; 5 PC-6A/B *Turbo Porter*

PAX 1+ FH-227

TRG 88: 11 G-4 *Super Galeb**; 20 Grob G120; 24+ K-8 *Karakorum**; 12 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer**; 9 PC-9*; 12 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 Mi-35P *Hind*

MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 9 SA316 *Alouette III*

TPT 49: **Medium** 10 PZL W-3 *Sokol*; **Light** 39: 12 Bell 205; 6 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 4 H120 *Colibri*; 17 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); PL-5E-II; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7) ASHM C-802A

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000


People's Police Force 72,000

People's Militia 35,000

Nepal NPL

Nepalese Rupee NPR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NPR	3.91tr	4.13tr	
	USD	34.0bn	34.3bn	
per capita	USD	1,178	1,173	
Growth	%	-2.1	1.8	
Inflation	%	6.2	3.6	
Def bdgt	NPR	50.1bn	49.2bn	51.0bn
	USD	435m	408m	
FMA (US)	USD	1.7m	0m	0m
USD1=NPR		115.20	120.49	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 30,424,878

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	14.1%	5.1%	5.2%	4.9%	16.7%	2.9%
Female	13.3%	4.9%	5.2%	5.0%	19.8%	2.9%

Capabilities

The principal role of Nepal's armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, but they have also traditionally focused on internal security and humanitarian relief. Nepal has a history of deploying contingents to UN peacekeeping operations. Training support is provided by several countries, including China, India and the US. Following a 2006 peace accord with the Maoist People's Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent a process of demobilisation or integration into the armed forces. Gurkhas continue to be recruited by the British and Indian armed forces and the Singaporean police. The small air wing provides a limited transport and support capacity but mobility remains a challenge, in part because of topography. Nepal's logistic capability appears to be sufficient for internal-security operations; however, its contingents on UN peacekeeping operations appear to largely depend on contracted logistic support. Modernisation plans include a very limited increase in the size of its air force. Barring maintenance capacities there is no defence-industrial base, and Nepal is dependent on foreign suppliers for modern equipment.

ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 96,600****FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

2 inf div HQ
1 (valley) comd

SPECIAL FORCES

1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech inf bn)

MANOEUVRE**Light**

18 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde
4 arty regt
5 engr bn
1 sigs bde

AIR DEFENCE

2 AD regt
4 indep AD coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 40 *Ferret*

APC 253

APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551

PPV 240: 90 *Casspir*; 150 MPV

AUV Dongfeng *Mengshi*; CS/VN3C mod 2

ARTILLERY 92+

TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer (6 non-operational)

MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op)

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type-56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60

Air Wing 320**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE+**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 BN-2T *Islander*; 1 CN235M-220; 3 M-28 *Skytruck*; 2 PA-28 *Cherokee* (trg)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 14: 1 A139; 1 Bell 407GXP (VIP); 2 *Dhruv*; 2 *Lancer*; 3 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; 2 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; 1 SA315B *Lama* (*Cheetah*); 2 SA316B *Alouette III*

TPT 3: **Medium** 1 SA330J *Puma*; **Light** 2 AS350B2 *Ecureuil*

Paramilitary 15,000**Armed Police Force 15,000**

Ministry of Home Affairs

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 752; 1 inf bn; 1 MP pl

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 899; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy

IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 877; 1 mech inf bn

LIBYA: UN • UNISMI 234; 2 sy coy

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 202; 1 EOD coy

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,752; 2 inf bn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 8

SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 409; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-)


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

FOREIGN FORCES

United Kingdom 60 (Gurkha trg org)

New Zealand NZL

New Zealand Dollar NZD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NZD	322bn	350bn	
	USD	209bn	248bn	
per capita	USD	41,165	48,349	
Growth	%	-2.1	5.1	
Inflation	%	1.7	3.0	
Def bdgt	NZD	5.06bn	4.62bn	5.19bn
	USD	3.29bn	3.27bn	
USD1=NZD		1.54	1.41	



Population 4,991,442

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	10.0%	3.2%	3.4%	3.6%	22.4%	7.4%
Female	9.5%	3.0%	3.2%	3.5%	22.3%	8.4%

Capabilities

New Zealand has a strong military tradition. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is well trained and has operational experience. The June 2016 defence white paper forecast a range of challenges likely to affect the country's security in the period to 2040, including rising tension in the South and East China seas. The white paper indicated investments including in improved maritime air-surveillance capability and cyber-support capability for deployed operations, but said that until 2030 defence spending was expected to remain pegged at around 1% of GDP. New Zealand's closest defence partner is Australia but the country has revived defence relations with the US. The 2016 Defence Capability Plan outlined plans including deliveries of new frigates in the late 2020s. In 2018, it was announced that four P-8 *Poseidon* maritime-patrol aircraft would be procured, while at-sea replenishment capability was revived in 2020 with the commissioning of HMNZS *Aotearoa*. A new 2019 Defence Capability Plan detailed plans to expand the army to 6,000 personnel by 2035, as well as to acquire a sealift vessel in the late 2020s. Replacement of the ANZAC frigates, both of which are being upgraded, has now been postponed until the 2030s. New Zealand has a small defence industry consisting

of numerous private companies and subsidiaries of larger North American and European companies. These companies are able to provide some maintenance, repair and overhaul capability but significant work is contracted to foreign companies.

ACTIVE 9,750 (Army 4,850 Navy 2,350 Air 2,550)

RESERVE 2,700 (Army 1,850 Navy 550 Air Force 300)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 4,850

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bty), 1 engr regt(-), 1 MP coy, 1 sigs regt, 2 log bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 93 NZLAV-25

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 7 NZLAV

ARV 3 LAV-R

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 60

TOWED 105mm 24 L118 Light Gun

MOR 81mm 36

Reserves

Territorial Force 1,850 reservists

Responsible for providing trained individuals for augmenting deployed forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt

Navy 2,350

Fleet based in Auckland. Fleet HQ at Wellington

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFHM 2:

1 *Anzac* (GER MEKO 200) with 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm TT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel) (undergoing refit in Canada since 2018)

1 *Anzac* (GER MEKO 200) with 1 20-cell VLS with *Sea Ceptor* SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PSOH 2 *Otago* (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel) (ice-strengthened hull)

PCC 2 *Lake*


AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2LCM 2 (operated off HMNZS *Canterbury*)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • 3**AGHS 1 *Manawanui* with 1 hel landing platformAKRH 1 *Canterbury* (capacity 4 NH90 tpt hel; 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel; 2 LCM; 16 NZLAV; 20 trucks; 250 troops)AORH 1 *Aotearoa* (capacity 1 NH90/SH-2G(I) hel)**Air Force 2,550****FORCES BY ROLE****MARITIME PATROL**1 sqn with P-3K2 *Orion***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with B-757-200 (upgraded); C-130H *Hercules* (upgraded)**ANTI-SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE**1 (RNZAF/RNZN) sqn with SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite***TRAINING**1 sqn with T-6C *Texan II*1 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air* (leased)**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**

1 sqn with AW109LUH; NH90

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable**ASW 5 P-3K2 *Orion*TPT 11: **Medium** 5 C-130H *Hercules* (upgraded); **Light** 4 Beech 350 *King Air* (leased); **PAX** 2 B-757-200 (upgraded)TRG 11 T-6C *Texan II***HELICOPTERS**ASW 8 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite*TPT 13: **Medium** 8 NH90; **Light** 5 AW109LUH**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASHM AGM-119 *Penguin* Mk2 mod7****DEPLOYMENT****EGYPT:** MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit**IRAQ:** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 9**MIDDLE EAST:** UN • UNTSO 7**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 3**Pakistan PAK**

Pakistani Rupee PKR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PKR	41.6tr	47.7tr	
	USD	262bn	288bn	
per capita	USD	1,255	1,209	
Growth	%	-0.5	3.9	
Inflation	%	10.7	8.9	
Def bdgt [a]	PKR	1.48tr	1.65tr	1.73tr
	USD	9.33bn	10.4bn	
USD1=PKR		158.78	158.80	

[a] Includes defence allocations to the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), including funding to the Defence Division and the Defence Production Division

**Population** 238,181,034

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	18.2%	5.2%	4.7%	4.2%	16.6%	2.1%
Female	17.4%	5.0%	4.4%	4.0%	15.8%	2.4%

Capabilities

The armed forces have considerable domestic political influence and are the dominant voice on defence and security policy. Pakistan's nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008 counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have been the forces' main effort. Although an army-led counter-terrorism operation has improved domestic security, terrorist attacks continue. Pakistan's leaders called for engagement with the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan, with some analysts considering that they considered the Taliban victory a policy success. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. The armed forces have a major role in disaster relief. China is Pakistan's main defence partner, with all three services employing a large amount of Chinese equipment. Military cooperation with the US is limited by sanctions aiming to improve cooperation on counter-terrorism. Recruitment is good, retention is high and the forces are well trained. The army and air force have considerable operational experience from a decade of counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan's tribal areas. Funds have been directed towards improving security on the border with Afghanistan. Major investment in military nuclear programmes continues, including the testing of a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile. The navy plans to increase surface combatants, patrol vessels, submarines (in collaboration with China), maritime-patrol aircraft and UAVs. This is to improve both combat capability and the protection of sea-based nuclear weapons. The air force is modernising its inventory while improving its precision-strike and ISR capabilities. The indigenous defence industry exports platforms, weapons and ammunition and there is considerable defence-industrial collaboration with China.

ACTIVE 651,800 (Army 560,000 Navy 21,800 Air 70,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces

Operational control rests with the National Command Authority. The Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) manages and commands all of Pakistan's military nuclear capability. The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong military security force responsible for guarding military nuclear infrastructure

Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000–15,000

Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+
MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 *Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); Shaheen-III (in test)*
SRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 *Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some Nasr (Hatf-IX)*
GLCM • Nuclear *Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII); Ra'ad (Hatf-VIII – in test)*

Air Force

1–2 sqn of F-16A/B or *Mirage 5* may be assigned a nuclear-strike role

Army 560,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

9 corps HQ
 1 (Northern) comd

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd div
 7 indep armd bde

Mechanised

2 mech inf div
 1 indep mech bde

Light

18 inf div
 5 indep inf bde
 4 (Northern Command) inf bde

Other

2 sy div

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty div
 14 arty bde
 7 engr bde

AVIATION

1 VIP avn sqn
 4 avn sqn

HELICOPTER

3 atk hel sqn
 2 ISR hel sqn
 2 SAR hel sqn
 2 tpt hel sqn
 1 spec ops hel sqn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn))

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 2,487: 300 *Al-Khalid* (MBT 2000); ε100 *Al-Khalid I*; 315 T-80UD; ε500 *Al-Zarrar*; 400 Type-69; 268 Type-85-IIAP; 4+ VT-4; ε600 ZTZ-59

APC 3,545

APC (T) 3,200: 2,300 M113A1/A2/P; ε200 *Talha*; 600 VCC-1/VCC-2; ε100 ZSD-63

APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80

PPV 225 *Maxxpro*

AUV 10 *Dingo 2*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 262+: 175 Type-70/Type-84 (W653/W653A); *Al-Hadeed*; 52 M88A1; 35 *Maxxpro* ARV; T-54/T-55

VLB M47M; M48/60

MW *Aardvark* Mk II

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP M901 TOW; ε30 *Maaz* (HJ-8 on *Talha* chassis)

MANPATS HJ-8; TOW

RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1 **RL** 89mm M20

GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44)

ARTILLERY 4,565+

SP 498: 155mm 438: 200 M109A2; ε115 M109A5; 123 M109L; 203mm 60 M110/M110A2

TOWED 1,629: 105mm 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56; 122mm 570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938); 130mm 410 Type-59-I; 155mm 292: 144 M114; 148 M198; 203mm 28 M115

MRL 88+: 107mm Type-81; 122mm 52+: 52 *Azar* (Type-83); some KRL-122; 300mm 36 A100

MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 *Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); some Shaheen-III (in test)*

SRBM 135+: **Nuclear** 30+: ε30 *Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some Nasr (Hatf-IX); Conventional* 105 *Hatf-I*

GLCM • Nuclear some *Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII)*

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 13: 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 3 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 *Citation*; 1 Cessna 560 *Citation*; 2 *Turbo Commander* 690; 4 Y-12(II)

TRG 87 MFI-17B *Mushshak*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S *Cobra* with TOW; 4 Mi-35M *Hind*; (1 Mi-24 *Hind* in store)

MRH 115+: 10 H125M *Fennec*; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 38+ Mi-17 *Hip H*; 2 Mi-171E *Hip*; 12 SA315B *Lama*; 20 SA319 *Alouette III*

TPT 76: **Medium** 36: 31 SA330 *Puma*; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi-172; **Light** 40: 17 H125 *Ecureuil* (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*

TRG 10 Hughes 300C

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 5 CH-4

ISR • Light *Bravo*; *Jasoos*; *Vector*

AIR DEFENCE**SAM 27+****Medium-range** 27 LY-80 (CH-SA-16)**Short-range** FM-90 (CH-SA-4)**Point-defence** M113 with RBS-70; *Anza-II*; FN-6 (CH-SA-10); *Mistral*; QW-18 (CH-SA-11); RBS-70**GUNS • TOWED** 1,933: **14.5mm** 981; **35mm** 248 GDF-002/GDF-005 (with 134 *Skyguard* radar units); **37mm** 310 Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; **40mm** 50 L/60; **57mm** 144 Type-59 (S-60); **85mm** 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12**Navy** 21,800 (incl €3,200 Marines)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 8****SSK 5:**2 *Hashmat* (FRA *Agosta* 70) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/F-17P HWT3 *Khalid* (FRA *Agosta* 90B) (of which 2 fitted with AIP) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with SM39 *Exocet* ASHM/*SeaHake* mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT**SSW** 3 MG110 (SF delivery) each with 2 single 533mm TT with F-17P HWT**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8****FFGHM 5:**4 *Sword* (F-22P) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with FM-90N (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with ET-52C (A244/S) LWT, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 Type 730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C *Haitun* hel)1 *Tughril* (Type-054AP (*Jiangkai II*)) with 2 twin Inchr with CM-302 (YJ-12A) ASHM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with LY-80N (HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16)) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C *Haitun* ASW hel)**FFGH** 1 *Alamgir* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun**FFHM** 2 *Tariq* (ex-UK *Amazon*) with 1 sextuple Inchr with LY-60N SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 hel)**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19****CORVETTES • FSH** 2 *Yarmook* (Damen OPV 1900) (fitted for but not with 2 quad Inchr for ASHM) (capacity 1 hel)**PCG** 3: 2 *Azmat* (FAC(M)) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 1 *Azmat* (FAC(M)) with 2 triple Inchr with C-602 ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS**PBG** 4: 2 *Jalalat* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM; 2 *Jurrah* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM**PBF** 4: 2 *Kaan* 15; 2 *Zarrar* (33)**PB** 6: 1 *Larkana*; 1 *Rajshahit*; 4 M16 Fast Assault Boat**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3****MCC** 3 *Munsif* (FRA *Eridan*)**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8****LCM 2**LCAC 2 *Griffon* 8100TDUCAC 4 *Griffon* 2000**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9**AGS 2: 1 *Behr Masa*; 1 *Behr Paima***AOL** 2 *Madagar***AORH** 2: 1 *Fuqing* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 1 SA319 *Alouette III* hel); 1 *Moawin* (Fleet Tanker) with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 hel landing platform**AOT** 2 *Gwadar***AXS** 1**Marines** €3,200**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 cdo gp

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

3 mne bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 9 combat capable**ASW** 9: 7 P-3B/C *Orion*; 2 ATR-72-500**MP** 7: 6 F-27-200 MPA; 1 Lineage 1000**TPT** 3: **Light** 2 ATR-72-500; **PAX** 1 Hawker 850XP**HELICOPTERS****ASW** 11: 4 *Sea King* Mk45; 7 Z-9C *Haitun***MRH** 6 SA319B *Alouette III***SAR** 1 *Sea King* (ex-HAR3A)**TPT • Medium** 1 *Sea King* (ex-HC4)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASHM** AM39 *Exocet***Coastal Defence****FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL Defence**1 ASHM regt with *Zarb* (YJ-62)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM** *Zarb* (YJ-62)**Air Force 70,000**

3 regional comds: Northern (Peshawar), Central (Sargodha), Southern (Masroor). The Composite Air Tpt Wg, Combat Cadres School and PAF Academy are Direct Reporting Units

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG *Airguard*1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU *Fighting Falcon*1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF *Fighting Falcon*1 sqn with *Mirage* IIID/E (IIID/EP)**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 1)3 sqn with JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2)1 sqn with JF-17B *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2)1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 *Fighting Falcon*3 sqn with *Mirage* 5 (5PA)**ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE**1 sqn with *Mirage* 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 *Exocet* ASHM**ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ELINT**1 sqn with *Falcon* 20F**AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL**1 sqn with Saab 2000; Saab 2000 *Erieye*

1 sqn with ZDK-03

SEARCH & RESCUE

- 1 sqn with Mi-171Sh; AW139 (SAR/liaison)
- 5 sqn with SA316 *Alouette* III
- 2 sqn with AW139

TANKER

- 1 sqn with Il-78 *Midas*

TRANSPORT

- 1 sqn with C-130B/E *Hercules*; L-100-20
- 1 sqn with CN235M-220
- 1 VIP sqn with B-707; Cessna 560XL *Citation Excel*; CN235M-220; F-27-200 *Friendship*; *Falcon* 20E; Gulfstream IVSP
- 1 (comms) sqn with EMB-500 *Phenom* 100; Y-12 (II)

TRAINING

- 1 OCU sqn with F-7P/FT-7P *Skybolt*
- 1 OCU sqn with *Mirage* III/*Mirage* 5
- 1 OCU sqn with F-16A/B MLU *Fighting Falcon*
- 2 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum**
- 2 sqn with MFI-17
- 2 sqn with T-37C *Tweet*

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 bty with HQ-2 (SA-2 *Guideline*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (SA-16 *Gimlet*)
- 6 bty with *Crotale*
- 10 bty with SPADA 2000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 416 combat capable

FTR 151: 46 F-7PG *Airguard*; 20 F-7P *Skybolt*; 23 F-16A MLU *Fighting Falcon*; 21 F-16B MLU *Fighting Falcon*; 9 F-16A ADF *Fighting Falcon*; 4 F-16B ADF *Fighting Falcon*; 21 FT-7; 5 FT-7PG; 2 *Mirage* IIIB
FGA 217: 12 F-16C Block 52 *Fighting Falcon*; 6 F-16D Block 52 *Fighting Falcon*; 49 JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 1); 61 JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2); 15 JF-17B *Thunder*; 7 *Mirage* IIID (*Mirage* IIID); 30 *Mirage* IIIE (IIIEP); 25 *Mirage* 5 (5PA); 5PA2; 2 *Mirage* 5D (5DPA)/5DPA2; 10 *Mirage* 5PA3 (ASuW)
ISR 10 *Mirage* IIIR* (*Mirage* IIIRP)
ELINT 2 *Falcon* 20F
AEW&C 10: 6 Saab 2000 *Erieye*; 4 ZDK-03
TKR 4 Il-78 *Midas*
TPT 35: **Medium** 16: 5 C-130B *Hercules*; 10 C-130E *Hercules*; 1 L-100-20; **Light** 14: 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 560XL *Citation Excel*; 4 CN235M-220; 4 EMB-500 *Phenom* 100; 1 F-27-200 *Friendship*; 2 Y-12 (II); **PAX** 5: 1 B-707; 1 *Falcon* 20E; 2 Gulfstream IVSP; 1 Saab 2000
TRG 141: 38 K-8 *Karakorum**; 80 MFI-17B *Mushshak*; 23 T-37C *Tweet*

HELICOPTERS

- MRH** 29: 15 SA316 *Alouette* III; 14 AW139
- TPT** • **Medium** 4 Mi-171Sh

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

- CISR** • **Heavy** CH-3 (*Burraq*); CH-4 (reported)
- ISR** • **Medium** *Falco*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 190+

- Medium-range** 6 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1)
- Short-range** 184: 144 *Crotale*; ε40 SPADA 2000
- Point-defence** 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

- AAM** • **IR** AIM-9L/P *Sidewinder*; U-Darter; PL-5; PL-5E-II; SARH Super 530; **ARH** PL-12; AIM-120C AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*; *Raptor* II

AShM AM39 *Exocet*

ARM MAR-1

ALCM • **Nuclear** *Ra'ad*

BOMBS

- INS/SAT-guided** FT-6 (REK)
- Laser-guided** *Paveway* II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000 active**Airport Security Force** 9,000

Government Aviation Division

Pakistan Coast Guards

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 5:

- PBF** 4
- PB** 1

Frontier Corps 70,000

Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

- Reconnaissance**
- 1 armd recce sqn
- Other**

11 paramilitary regt (total: 40 paramilitary bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC (W) 45 UR-416

Maritime Security Agency ε2,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MARITIME PATROL**

1 sqn with BN-2T *Defender*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 19

- PSO** 1 *Kashmir*
- PCC** 10: 4 *Barkat*; 4 *Hingol*; 2 *Sabqat* (ex-US Island)
- PBF** 5
- PB** 3 *Guns*

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** • **Light** 3 BN-2T *Defender*

National Guard 185,000

Incl Janbaz Force; Mujahid Force; National Cadet Corps; Women Guards

Pakistan Rangers 25,000

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT**ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN:** Combined Maritime

Forces • CTF-151: 1 FFGHM

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,314; 1 inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 hel sqn

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 217; 1 hel sqn

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 285; 1 engr coy

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 13

FOREIGN FORCES

Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan

Argentina 2

Croatia 8

Italy 1

Korea, Republic of 7

Mexico 1

Philippines 6

Romania 1

Sweden 4

Switzerland 3


Thailand 5

Uruguay 3

Papua New Guinea PNG

Papua New Guinea Kina PGK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PGK	81.5bn	92.7bn	
	USD	23.3bn	26.5bn	
per capita	USD	2,651	2,952	
Growth	%	-3.9	1.2	
Inflation	%	4.9	3.6	
Def bdgt	PGK	329m	305m	
	USD	93.9m	87.2m	
USD1=PGK		3.50	3.50	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 7,399,757

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.8%	5.1%	4.8%	4.3%	18.4%	2.4%
Female	15.3%	4.9%	4.7%	4.2%	17.5%	2.6%

Capabilities

Since independence in 1975, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) has suffered from underfunding and lack of capacity to perform its core roles. After personnel reductions in the 2000s, the government made efforts in the next decade to revive defence capability. A 2013 defence white paper identified core roles including defending the state and civil-emergency assistance, but noted that 'defence capabilities have deteriorated to the extent that we have alarming gaps in our land, air and maritime borders'. The white paper called for strengthening defence capability on an ambitious scale, with long-term plans calling for a 'division-sized force' of 10,000 personnel by 2030. The PNGDF continues to receive substantial external military assistance from

Australia and also from China, which has donated equipment. In late 2018, plans to build a joint US–Australia–Papua New Guinea naval base at Lombrum were announced. The PNGDF is not able to deploy outside the country without outside assistance and there have only been small PNGDF deployments to UN peacekeeping missions. The PNGDF will receive four of the *Guardian*-class patrol boats that Australia is donating to small Pacific island nations. These will replace the four *Pacific*-class boats Australia donated in the 1980s. Papua New Guinea has no significant defence industry, though there is some local maintenance capacity.

ACTIVE 4,000 (Army 3,700 Maritime Element 200 Air 100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army £3,700

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops unit

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

1 EOD unit

1 sigs sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • MOR 3+: 81mm Some; 120mm 3

Maritime Element £200

HQ located at Port Moresby

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCO 3 *Guardian* (AUS Bay mod)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LCT 3 *Salamaua* (ex-AUS *Balikpapan*) (of which 1 in trg role)

Air Force £100

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with CN235M-100; IAI-201 *Arava*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)†

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 CN235M-100 (1 more in store); 2 IAI-201 *Arava*

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 412 (leased); 1 Bell 212 (leased) (2 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*) non-operational)

DEPLOYMENT

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2